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Conservative	  religious	  believers	  often	  make	  use	  of	  language	  that	  represents	  the	  perception	  that	  
there	  are	  clear,	  fixed	  differences	  between	  their	  view	  of	  the	  world	  and	  the	  worldview	  of	  others,	  and	  
that	  their	  view	  is	  unambiguously	  true	  and	  other	  views	  are	  not.	  	  This	  thesis	  explores	  the	  validity	  of	  
that	  notion	  through	  an	  analysis	  of	  conservative	  religious	  language	  from	  a	  cognitive	  linguistic	  
perspective.	  	  It	  first	  examines	  the	  research	  relating	  to	  what	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  process	  of	  categorising	  
the	  environment	  around	  us	  and	  applies	  it	  to	  how	  that	  process	  can	  lead	  to	  and	  even	  encourage	  the	  
perception	  of	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  that	  reality	  can	  be	  simplified	  into	  sets	  of	  fixed,	  binary	  
categories.	  	  It	  then	  investigates	  whether	  there	  are	  clear,	  fixed	  differences	  between	  a	  15,225	  word	  
collection	  of	  Evangelical	  Times	  Christian	  testimonials	  and	  a	  29,067	  word	  collection	  of	  
islamfortoday.com	  Muslim	  testimonials	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  use	  of	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  
to	  express	  their	  way	  of	  believing.	  	  	  This	  thesis	  concludes	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  language	  of	  three	  
pairs	  of	  conservative	  Muslims	  and	  Christians	  during	  a	  videoed	  discussion	  focusing	  on	  the	  differences	  
in	  their	  experience	  as	  believers.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  first	  study`s	  focus	  on	  collections	  of	  texts,	  this	  
analysis	  focuses	  on	  individual	  differences	  in	  their	  use	  of	  proximity	  and	  movement	  metaphors	  and	  
empathetic	  language.	  	  The	  results	  of	  these	  studies	  suggest	  that,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  believers	  
perceive	  their	  views	  of	  the	  world	  as	  clear	  and	  fixed,	  the	  expression	  of	  their	  perceived	  experience	  of	  
interacting	  with	  a	  divine	  agent	  can	  only	  be	  accurately	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  varying	  patterns	  of	  
emphasis.	  	  In	  addition,	  not	  only	  is	  it	  sometimes	  quite	  difficult	  to	  mark	  out	  clear	  differences	  between	  
different	  belief	  communities	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  type	  of	  language,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  for	  individuals	  within	  
the	  same	  communities	  to	  exhibit	  as	  much	  divergence	  as	  individuals	  from	  two	  different	  communities.	  	  
The	  thesis	  concludes	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  these	  results	  for	  the	  field	  of	  inter-­‐faith	  
dialogue,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  possibility	  of	  widening	  the	  investigation	  beyond	  these	  specific	  groups	  of	  
conservative	  religious	  believers,	  and	  even	  beyond	  the	  domain	  of	  religious	  belief.	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  Chapter	  One:	  Introduction	  
	  
This	  chapter	  will	  begin	  with	  a	  brief	  autobiographical	  note	  outlining	  my	  motivations	  for	  choosing	  to	  
focus	  on	  an	  exploration	  of	  conservative	  religious	  language.	  	  This	  will	  be	  followed	  by	  an	  example	  of	  
such	  language	  taken	  from	  a	  religious	  testimonial,	  along	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  the	  simplified	  view	  
of	  reality	  represented	  in	  the	  language	  contained	  in	  the	  extract	  can	  become	  a	  source	  of	  social	  tension.	  	  
I	  will	  then	  explain	  how	  this	  thesis	  will	  explore	  conservative	  religious	  language	  by	  investigating	  three	  
research	  questions	  relevant	  to	  this	  area.	  	  I	  will	  conclude	  by	  introducing	  key	  issues	  related	  to	  each	  of	  
these	  research	  questions,	  before	  moving	  on	  to	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  various	  chapters	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  	  
	  
1.1 An	  Autobiographical	  Note	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  begin	  this	  thesis	  by	  explaining	  my	  personal	  motivation	  to	  focus	  on	  an	  exploration	  of	  
conservative	  religious	  language.	  	  My	  parents	  and	  siblings	  were	  and	  still	  are	  strong,	  committed	  
independent	  Baptists	  who	  successfully	  instilled	  in	  me	  an	  initial	  firm	  belief	  in	  God.	  	  This	  reached	  its	  
peak	  in	  my	  early	  twenties	  when	  I	  underwent	  a	  dramatic	  conversion	  experience	  and	  became	  
convinced	  that	  I	  should	  devote	  my	  life	  to	  teaching	  others	  about	  Christ.	  	  I	  embarked	  on	  a	  degree	  in	  
Theology	  and	  it	  was	  during	  my	  studies	  that	  my	  faith	  came	  under	  pressure.	  	  My	  contact	  with	  other	  
Christian	  groups,	  Muslims,	  practising	  Jews,	  Buddhists,	  atheists	  and	  agnostics	  and	  my	  study	  of	  the	  
historical	  critical	  approach	  to	  analysing	  the	  Bible	  opened	  me	  up	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  multiple	  
interpretations	  of	  a	  reality	  which	  I	  had	  assumed	  up	  until	  then	  could	  only	  have	  a	  single	  interpretation.	  	  
Over	  the	  next	  few	  years	  I	  moved	  from	  conservative	  religious	  belief	  to	  a	  liberal	  Christian	  perspective	  
and	  then	  to	  agnosticism.	  	  During	  this	  transition	  period,	  my	  relationship	  with	  my	  family	  went	  through	  
a	  challenging	  period	  as	  I	  attempted	  to	  persuade	  my	  parents	  that	  my	  worldview	  change	  was	  valid	  and	  
they	  attempted	  to	  persuade	  me	  that	  I	  had	  made	  a	  serious	  mistake.	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These	  experiences	  (both	  in	  terms	  of	  my	  own	  inner	  struggles	  and	  worldview	  shifts	  and	  my	  experience	  
of	  interaction	  with	  members	  of	  my	  former	  belief	  community)	  provided	  my	  motivation	  to	  investigate	  
conservative	  religious	  language.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  highlight	  from	  the	  outset	  that	  I	  do	  have	  
a	  very	  specific	  personal	  context	  that	  motivates,	  informs	  and	  inevitably	  affects	  my	  academic	  
exploration	  of	  notions	  such	  as	  certainty,	  individual	  difference,	  change,	  and	  the	  maintenance	  of	  
simplified	  views	  of	  the	  world	  within	  the	  frame	  of	  conservative	  religious	  belief.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
1.2	  The	  Purpose	  of	  the	  Thesis	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  explore	  conservative	  religious	  language	  from	  a	  cognitive	  linguistic	  
perspective.	  	  This	  exploration	  will	  focus	  on	  how	  and	  why	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  develop,	  
maintain	  and	  express	  simplified	  views	  of	  the	  world.	  	  It	  will	  also	  investigate	  whether	  there	  are	  clear,	  
fixed	  differences	  between	  the	  use	  of	  particular	  metaphors	  in	  the	  language	  of	  conservative	  religious	  
believers	  from	  competing	  communities,	  or	  whether	  it	  would	  be	  more	  appropriate	  to	  talk	  about	  
different	  patterns	  of	  emphasis.	  	  This	  thesis	  will	  also	  explore	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  identify	  key	  
similarities	  between	  the	  language	  of	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  from	  different	  communities	  and	  
key	  differences	  between	  the	  language	  of	  believers	  from	  the	  same	  communities.	  	  I	  will	  also	  be	  
concerned	  throughout	  with	  the	  implications	  that	  my	  conclusions	  could	  have	  for	  the	  area	  of	  inter-­‐
faith	  dialogue.	  	  I	  will	  begin	  with	  a	  brief	  introduction	  to	  the	  characteristics	  of	  this	  type	  of	  language,	  
before	  moving	  on	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  my	  research	  questions.	  	  	  	  	  
The	  Evangelical	  Times,	  a	  well-­‐known	  UK	  Evangelical	  Christian	  newspaper,	  publishes	  a	  special	  
Christmas	  edition	  each	  year.	  	  This	  edition	  features	  a	  collection	  of	  biographical	  stories	  of	  people	  who	  
have	  been	  converted	  to	  Christianity.	  	  On	  the	  front	  page	  of	  the	  2010	  Christmas	  edition	  is	  an	  article	  
entitled	  “My	  Story	  of	  God’s	  Love”	  (Christian	  Text	  1	  in	  the	  collection	  of	  Christian	  testimonials	  I	  will	  
examine	  in	  chapter	  three	  of	  this	  thesis).	  	  It	  is	  an	  account	  of	  a	  female	  convert	  who	  was	  brought	  up	  in	  a	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religious	  family,	  but	  lacked	  a	  personal	  faith	  of	  her	  own,	  while	  also	  becoming	  involved	  in	  a	  
relationship	  with	  a	  non-­‐Christian.	  Below	  is	  an	  extract	  from	  the	  testimonial:	  
I	  began	  to	  ask	  questions	  like,	  “Is	  this	  really	  the	  life	  that	  God	  wants	  me	  to	  be	  living?”	  I	  also	  thought,	  “If	  I	  die	  
tomorrow,	  where	  would	  I	  go?”	  I	  was	  scared	  that	  I	  might	  be	  on	  my	  way	  to	  hell,	  not	  heaven	  …	  As	  I	  continued	  to	  pray	  
for	  guidance,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  this	  man	  wasn’t	  in	  God’s	  plan	  for	  me.	  	  	  A	  few	  days	  later,	  a	  Christian	  lady	  shared	  
with	  me	  how	  she	  had	  married	  the	  wrong	  man.	  	  She	  knew	  he	  wasn’t	  the	  one,	  even	  on	  her	  wedding	  day!	  	  It	  scared	  me	  
–	  what	  if	  I	  was	  to	  do	  the	  same?	  	  She	  then	  shared	  with	  me	  how	  God	  had	  changed	  her	  life.	  	  She	  told	  me	  the	  good	  
news:	  Jesus	  died	  on	  the	  cross	  for	  every	  wrong	  thing	  we’ve	  ever	  done	  and	  will	  do.	  	  He	  took	  the	  punishment	  that	  
should	  be	  ours.	  	  If	  we	  believe	  in	  him,	  then	  we	  are	  forgiven	  and	  saved	  from	  hell.	  	  In	  that	  moment	  the	  penny	  dropped	  
–	  Jesus	  died	  “for	  me”!	  All	  the	  times	  I’d	  gone	  my	  own	  way	  and	  messed	  up,	  he	  died	  for	  all	  of	  it.	  	  He	  died	  for	  the	  shame	  
I	  was	  feeling	  and	  the	  guilt	  over	  my	  sins.	  	  There	  was	  nothing	  I	  could	  do	  to	  make	  me	  right	  with	  God.	  	  I’m	  made	  right	  
because	  of	  what	  Jesus	  Christ	  did	  for	  me.	  	  I	  prayed,	  accepting	  that	  I	  was	  a	  sinner.	  	  I	  asked	  Jesus	  to	  come	  into	  my	  life	  
as	  Saviour	  and	  change	  it	  to	  how	  he	  wanted	  it	  to	  be.	  	  After	  this	  prayer	  I	  had	  deep	  peace.	  	  I	  knew	  I	  had	  just	  done	  
something	  life-­‐changing.	  	  Now	  God	  was	  “number	  one”	  in	  my	  life	  and	  everything	  else	  was	  clear	  …	  Years	  on,	  God	  has	  
blessed	  me	  so	  much.	  	  I	  am	  married	  to	  a	  Christian	  man	  and	  know	  he	  is	  the	  right	  man,	  because	  I	  asked	  God	  at	  the	  
start!	  	  My	  testimony	  is	  a	  story	  of	  love	  –	  God’s	  love.	  	  He	  is	  the	  only	  one	  who	  can	  save	  you,	  love	  you	  and	  lead	  you	  in	  
life.	  	  People	  let	  you	  down,	  but	  God	  never	  does.	  	  Becoming	  a	  Christian	  isn’t	  by	  walking	  through	  a	  church	  door	  on	  
Sundays	  or	  being	  “religious”,	  it’s	  by	  having	  a	  relationship	  with	  God.	  	  Come	  to	  God	  in	  prayer;	  ask	  for	  forgiveness;	  
acknowledge	  that	  Jesus	  died	  in	  your	  place;	  and	  wait	  in	  faith	  and	  excitement	  to	  see	  where	  he	  takes	  you!	  	  	  	  
Such	  biographical	  stories	  or	  conversion	  experiences	  are	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  testimonies	  or	  
testimonials,	  and	  usually	  talk	  about	  a	  transition	  from	  one	  way	  of	  viewing	  the	  world	  to	  another.	  	  The	  
initial	  worldview	  is	  invariably	  evaluated	  as	  obviously	  incorrect	  and	  inferior,	  while	  the	  second	  
worldview	  is	  invariably	  construed	  as	  clearly	  correct	  and	  superior.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  
type	  of	  religious	  discourse	  is	  usually	  not	  intended	  to	  actively	  promote	  conflict.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  
inevitable	  that	  belief	  communities	  that	  view	  each	  other	  as	  absolutely	  incorrect	  or,	  as	  in	  this	  example,	  
not	  “right	  with	  God”,	  will	  co-­‐exist	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  tension	  and	  actively	  promote	  separation	  
from	  each	  other.	  	  The	  argument	  that	  religious	  belief	  can	  in	  some	  circumstances	  encourage	  various	  
degrees	  of	  conflict	  or	  tension	  and	  even	  violence	  between	  individuals	  and	  communities	  is	  now	  
generally	  accepted	  (Holden	  2009;	  Little	  2007;	  Marini	  2007).	  This	  chance	  of	  conflict	  or	  tension	  may	  be	  
increased	  in	  the	  case	  of	  strong,	  conservative	  believers	  who	  tend	  to	  define	  themselves	  through	  their	  
sense	  of	  exclusivity	  (Holden	  2009:	  39-­‐42).	  	  For	  example,	  conservative	  Christian	  or	  Muslim	  believers	  
are	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  for	  them	  to	  be	  right	  requires	  all	  other	  worldviews	  to	  be	  absolutely	  wrong.	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To	  put	  it	  another	  way:	  if	  they	  are	  on	  their	  way	  to	  heaven,	  then	  it	  follows	  that	  all	  those	  who	  disagree	  
with	  their	  beliefs	  are,	  for	  example,	  on	  their	  way	  to	  “the	  conscious	  eternal	  torments	  of	  hell”	  (Driscoll	  
2007;	  cf.	  Mawdudi	  1999).	  	  In	  the	  language	  of	  conflict	  resolution	  research,	  this	  inevitably	  brings	  them	  
into	  a	  competitive	  process	  (cf.	  Deutsch	  1973,	  Pearson	  d'Estrée	  2003)	  with	  other	  worldviews.	  	  This	  
process	  is	  further	  strengthened	  and	  entrenched	  through	  committed	  believers’	  sense	  of	  a	  self-­‐
evidently	  correct	  and	  simplified	  view	  of	  reality,	  to	  the	  point	  where	  meaningful	  engagement	  with	  their	  
worldviews	  outside	  of	  evangelisation,	  persuasion	  and	  debate	  is	  often	  problematic.	  	  
Conversations	  between	  conservative	  believers	  and	  non-­‐believers	  often	  revolve	  around	  differences	  in	  
the	  things	  believed.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  aim	  of	  many	  forms	  of	  dialogue	  is	  precisely	  the	  creation	  of	  
“opportunities	  that	  allow	  people	  of	  faith	  to	  air	  their	  differences”	  (Holden	  2009:	  174).	  	  This	  focus	  on	  
differences	  between	  the	  reified	  concepts	  associated	  with	  different	  belief	  systems	  can	  often	  
foreground	  the	  competitive	  processes	  alluded	  to	  above.	  	  Conversations	  with	  committed,	  
conservative	  believers	  can	  often	  degenerate	  into	  entrenched	  stalemates	  where	  belief	  is	  simply	  re-­‐
affirmed	  in	  different	  ways,	  and	  where	  both	  sides	  can	  often	  revert	  to	  talking	  at	  each	  other	  rather	  than	  
engaging	  in	  a	  functional	  discussion.	  	  This	  entrenchment	  is	  seemingly	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  ability	  of	  
conservative	  religious	  believers	  on	  all	  sides	  to	  interpret	  any	  relevant	  situation	  or	  aspect	  of	  their	  
environment	  as	  clear	  support	  for	  their	  own	  worldview	  and	  clear	  evidence	  against	  competing	  
worldviews.	  	  	  
Having	  briefly	  introduced	  some	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  conservative	  religious	  language,	  I	  now	  wish	  
to	  outline	  in	  more	  detail	  how	  I	  aim	  to	  structure	  my	  analysis	  of	  this	  type	  of	  language.	  	  Before	  any	  type	  
of	  analysis	  is	  possible,	  it	  is	  first	  necessary	  to	  explore	  and	  discuss	  the	  underlying	  presuppositions	  that	  
will	  act	  as	  a	  frame	  for	  that	  analysis.	  	  I	  will	  therefore	  begin	  with	  an	  exploration	  of	  how	  and	  why	  
conservative	  believers	  form	  worldviews	  that	  they	  perceive	  as	  absolute	  and	  rigid.	  	  This	  exploration	  will	  
cover	  two	  distinct	  areas.	  	  First	  of	  all,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  research	  relating	  to	  humans	  in	  general	  in	  terms	  of	  
what	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  process	  of	  categorising	  the	  environment	  around	  us.	  	  I	  will	  then	  apply	  that	  
5	  
	  
research	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  that	  process	  can	  lead	  to	  and	  even	  encourage	  the	  perception	  of	  
conservative	  religious	  believers	  that	  reality	  can	  be	  simplified	  into	  a	  set	  of	  clear	  and	  fixed	  absolutes	  
that	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  beyond	  doubt.	  	  	  	  
My	  rationale	  for	  splitting	  this	  exploration	  into	  two	  distinct	  areas	  is	  that	  before	  I	  am	  able	  to	  explore	  
the	  process	  of	  categorisation	  used	  by	  conservative	  religious	  believers,	  it	  is	  first	  necessary	  to	  explore	  
what	  researchers	  have	  so	  far	  uncovered	  about	  the	  categorisation	  processes	  employed	  by	  people	  in	  
general.	  	  It	  will	  then	  be	  possible	  to	  apply	  these	  findings	  to	  conservative	  religious	  believers,	  allowing	  
me	  to	  examine	  in	  more	  detail	  their	  need	  to	  form	  simplified	  categories	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  interpret	  
data	  from	  their	  environments	  as	  support	  for	  their	  worldviews.	  	  In	  order	  to	  effectively	  examine	  these	  
issues,	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  a	  Cognitive	  Linguistic	  approach	  to	  exploring	  how	  people	  categorise	  the	  
information	  obtained	  from	  their	  environments.	  	  I	  will	  introduce	  this	  approach	  in	  section	  1.3	  below,	  
along	  with	  an	  overview	  of	  why	  this	  approach	  is	  particularly	  suitable	  for	  addressing	  these	  specific	  
issues.	  	  	  
The	  above	  exploration	  contains	  the	  premise	  that	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  are	  typified	  by	  their	  
need	  to	  perceive	  reality	  in	  simplified	  terms	  where	  one	  belief	  community	  is	  clearly	  right	  and	  all	  the	  
others	  are	  very	  different	  and	  clearly	  wrong.	  	  However,	  if	  the	  focus	  were	  on	  the	  language	  of	  
experience	  instead	  of	  the	  language	  of	  doctrinal	  creeds,	  would	  it	  be	  more	  difficult	  for	  those	  believers	  
to	  talk	  about	  clear,	  distinctive	  differences	  between	  members	  of	  different	  conservative	  religious	  belief	  
communities?	  	  This	  focus	  on	  perceived	  experience	  is	  based	  on	  the	  argument	  that	  in	  terms	  of	  
doctrinal	  creeds,	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  for	  believers	  in	  the	  same	  belief	  community	  to	  attempt	  to	  
foreground	  stark,	  rigid	  lines	  of	  static	  difference	  between	  “true”	  believers	  and	  non-­‐believers.	  	  
However,	  when	  the	  focus	  shifts	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  experience,	  it	  may	  become	  more	  difficult	  to	  talk	  in	  
terms	  of	  clear,	  fixed	  differences,	  and	  easier	  to	  talk	  in	  terms	  of	  variable,	  situated	  patterns	  of	  emphasis.	  
It	  would	  be	  impossible	  for	  me	  to	  analyse	  a	  data	  set	  large	  enough	  for	  me	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  claims	  for	  
all	  conservative	  religious	  language,	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  me	  to	  analyse	  examples	  of	  a	  specific	  type	  of	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language	  produced	  by	  two	  specific	  belief	  communities.	  	  I	  would	  then	  be	  able	  to	  investigate	  whether	  
it	  would	  be	  more	  appropriate	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  differences	  in	  that	  type	  of	  language	  between	  those	  
two	  communities	  in	  terms	  of	  situated	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  rather	  than	  clear,	  rigid	  differences.	  	  	  
The	  two	  belief	  communities	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  will	  be	  the	  UK	  Protestant	  Evangelical	  Christian	  community	  
represented	  by	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  and	  the	  US	  conservative	  Sunni	  Muslim	  community	  represented	  
by	  the	  website	  islamfortoday.com.	  	  The	  genre	  of	  language	  that	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  my	  analysis	  will	  be	  
the	  genre	  of	  the	  testimonial,	  and	  the	  type	  of	  language	  focused	  on	  will	  be	  movement	  and	  proximity	  
metaphors.	  	  My	  research	  question	  will	  be:	  	  	  	  	  	  
Are	  there	  clear,	  fixed	  differences	  between	  Evangelical	  Times	  Christian	  testimonial	  authors	  and	  
islamfortoday.com	  Muslim	  testimonial	  authors	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  use	  of	  movement	  and	  proximity	  
metaphors	  to	  express	  their	  way	  of	  believing?	  	  	  	  
The	  results	  of	  this	  analysis	  will	  also	  naturally	  lead	  to	  one	  further	  question.	  	  If	  it	  could	  be	  
demonstrated	  that	  there	  are	  no	  clear,	  fixed	  differences	  in	  this	  area,	  what	  could	  be	  the	  potential	  
implications	  for	  the	  area	  of	  inter-­‐faith	  dialogue?	  	  In	  order	  to	  effectively	  address	  the	  above	  research	  
question,	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  relating	  to	  a	  believer	  and	  
a	  particular	  divine	  entity	  in	  two	  collections	  of	  religious	  testimonials,	  one	  from	  a	  Muslim	  website	  
islamfortoday.com	  and	  one	  from	  a	  Christian	  magazine,	  the	  Evangelical	  Times.	  	  I	  will	  introduce	  these	  
sources	  of	  data	  in	  section	  1.4	  below,	  along	  with	  my	  reasons	  for	  focusing	  on	  this	  type	  of	  language	  and	  
a	  discussion	  of	  their	  relevance	  to	  the	  language	  of	  religious	  experience.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  previous	  research	  question	  revolves	  around	  the	  types	  of	  differences	  that	  can	  be	  detected	  
between	  two	  different	  belief	  communities.	  	  This	  will	  inevitably	  entail	  looking	  at	  the	  various	  members	  
of	  a	  belief	  community	  as	  a	  collective	  entity.	  	  In	  contrast,	  I	  also	  wish	  to	  focus	  on	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  
differences	  and	  similarities	  between	  individuals	  from	  the	  same	  belief	  community,	  and	  also	  
individuals	  from	  different	  belief	  communities.	  Is	  it	  possible	  that,	  in	  terms	  of	  perceived	  experience,	  
some	  individuals	  appear	  closer	  to	  members	  of	  opposing	  belief	  communities	  than	  they	  do	  to	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members	  of	  their	  own	  belief	  community?	  	  Again,	  a	  second	  related	  question	  will	  be	  whether	  the	  
conclusions	  of	  this	  exploration	  could	  have	  useful	  implications	  for	  the	  area	  of	  inter-­‐faith	  dialogue.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  focus	  in	  detail	  on	  specific	  individual	  differences,	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  three	  
videoed	  discussions	  between	  Muslims	  and	  Christians	  that	  were	  designed	  to	  focus	  the	  believers	  on	  
the	  language	  of	  experience.	  	  These	  discussions	  will	  be	  designed	  to	  focus	  on	  some	  of	  the	  metaphorical	  
language	  that	  was	  highlighted	  as	  particularly	  interesting	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  testimonials.	  	  My	  
decision	  to	  use	  a	  structured,	  interactive	  format	  will	  also	  allow	  me	  to	  explore	  whether	  conservative	  
religious	  believers	  show	  signs	  of	  convergence	  and	  empathy	  in	  their	  language.	  	  This	  second	  research	  
question	  will	  therefore	  be:	  
Is	  it	  possible	  to	  identify	  signs	  of	  convergence	  and	  empathy	  in	  the	  language	  of	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  
conservative	  believers	  when	  they	  are	  encouraged	  to	  discuss	  their	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  believer	  
during	  structured	  videoed	  discussions?	  	  Are	  there	  similarities	  in	  the	  use	  of	  proximity	  and	  movement	  
metaphors	  in	  the	  language	  of	  individual	  conservative	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  religious	  believers,	  and	  
differences	  in	  the	  use	  of	  this	  type	  of	  language	  among	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  from	  the	  same	  
belief	  community	  during	  the	  course	  of	  those	  videoed	  discussions?	  
I	  will	  introduce	  the	  structure	  of	  these	  discussions	  and	  my	  method	  of	  analysis	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  section	  
1.5	  below.	  	  	  	  
Having	  very	  briefly	  introduced	  the	  research	  questions	  that	  this	  thesis	  will	  address,	  I	  am	  now	  able	  to	  
discuss	  in	  more	  detail	  how	  I	  intend	  to	  address	  each	  of	  these	  questions.	  	  I	  will	  begin	  below	  with	  an	  






1.3	  Cognitive	  Linguistics	  and	  Cognitive	  Models	  and	  their	  Relevance	  to	  this	  Thesis	  	  	  	  
Cognitive	  Linguistics	  is	  an	  approach	  to	  analysing	  language	  that	  draws	  on	  research	  within	  the	  field	  of	  
Cognitive	  Psychology	  in	  order	  to	  investigate	  the	  conceptual	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  use	  of	  language.	  
This	  involves	  taking	  seriously	  the	  premise	  that	  there	  is	  an	  intimate	  connection	  between	  conceptual	  
frameworks	  that	  operate	  beneath	  the	  level	  of	  language	  and	  language	  itself	  (e.g.	  Evans	  and	  Green	  
2006:	  6-­‐9;	  Lakoff	  1987:	  70-­‐74;	  Taylor	  2002:	  62-­‐65).	  	  This	  thesis	  will	  include	  investigations	  into	  the	  
possible	  structure	  of	  these	  conceptual	  frameworks,	  which	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  ever-­‐changing	  cognitive	  
models	  formed	  through	  the	  way	  the	  human	  mind	  continuously	  categorises	  and	  construes	  various	  
aspects	  of	  reality	  (Evans	  2009;	  Lakoff	  1987).	  	  The	  underlying	  goal	  of	  Cognitive	  Linguistics	  is	  therefore	  
to	  connect	  research	  into	  the	  cognitive	  basis	  of	  language	  with	  more	  generic	  cognitive	  processes	  in	  the	  
brain,	  such	  as	  those	  related	  to	  how	  we	  conceptually	  organise	  and	  categorise	  incoming	  data	  
(Geeraerts	  and	  Cuyckens	  2007).	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  this	  approach	  invokes	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  way	  we	  
view	  or	  construe	  the	  world	  is	  determined,	  up	  to	  a	  point,	  by	  a	  constant	  interaction	  between	  the	  
particular	  language	  that	  we	  speak	  (Gumperz	  and	  Levinson	  1996;	  Littlemore	  2009),	  that	  the	  use	  of	  
language	  in	  a	  dynamically	  unfolding	  discourse	  (Larsen-­‐Freeman	  and	  Cameron	  2008:	  162),	  the	  
arrangement	  and	  structure	  of	  our	  cognitive	  frameworks	  (Evans	  2009;	  Lakoff	  1987)	  and	  the	  
conceptual	  ramifications	  of	  having	  a	  physical	  body	  and	  a	  sensorimotor	  system	  (Gibbs	  2005;	  Lakoff	  
and	  Johnson	  1999:	  77).	  	  An	  important	  implication	  of	  this	  is	  the	  argument	  that	  will	  act	  as	  the	  central	  
starting	  point	  of	  this	  thesis:	  there	  can	  be	  no	  pure,	  objective	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world	  disconnected	  
from	  situated	  discourse,	  and	  the	  underpinning	  organisation	  of	  our	  cognitive	  frameworks	  at	  a	  
particular	  time	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  fact	  of	  embodied	  existence	  (Al-­‐Zahrani	  2008:	  52;	  Lakoff	  and	  
Johnson	  1980:	  210-­‐222;	  1999:	  106-­‐107).	  	  	  
If	  there	  is	  indeed	  a	  relative	  aspect	  to	  all	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world,	  it	  may	  be	  expected	  that	  we	  live	  
our	  lives	  in	  states	  of	  perpetual	  uncertainty	  and	  ambiguity.	  	  However,	  this	  is	  often	  not	  the	  case.	  	  We	  
often	  feel	  very	  sure	  about	  our	  worldviews,	  and	  often	  feel	  that	  other	  worldviews	  are	  clearly	  and	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obviously	  incorrect	  (cf.	  Wisdom	  1983).	  	  The	  testimonial	  and	  discussion	  data	  I	  have	  collected	  also	  
suggests	  that	  certain	  belief	  systems	  are	  developed	  by	  belief	  communities	  who	  passionately	  disagree	  
with	  the	  view	  that	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world	  is,	  to	  some	  degree,	  relative.	  	  There	  is	  therefore	  a	  
disconnection	  between	  the	  proposed	  notion	  that	  all	  knowledge	  is	  to	  some	  extent	  relative,	  and	  our	  
everyday	  sense	  that	  our	  view	  of	  the	  world	  often	  appears	  to	  be	  clearly	  right	  and	  other	  opposing	  views	  
clearly	  wrong.	  	  This	  thesis	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  address	  this	  issue	  is	  to	  explore	  how	  and	  
why	  humans	  categorise	  the	  world	  around	  them.	  	  Human	  beings	  all	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  categorise	  the	  
things	  they	  encounter	  and	  in	  many	  respects	  our	  survival	  depends	  on	  how	  successfully	  that	  ability	  is	  
used	  (Taylor	  2003:	  xi),	  but	  the	  human	  process	  of	  categorisation	  is	  not	  a	  detached,	  objective	  process.	  	  
It	  would	  be	  more	  accurate	  to	  describe	  it	  as	  a	  functional	  process	  that	  is	  intimately	  related	  to	  the	  
fulfilment	  of	  specific	  and	  subjective	  goals	  (Goldberg	  2006:	  103).	  	  These	  processes	  have	  the	  potential	  
to	  lead,	  as	  I	  believe	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  will	  show,	  to	  the	  production	  of	  very	  fixed	  views	  of	  the	  
world	  and	  our	  purpose	  and	  goal	  in	  it	  (cf.	  Gibbs	  2005:	  92;	  Lakoff	  1999:	  60-­‐61).	  	  
Another	  key	  point	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  made	  here	  is	  that,	  despite	  the	  inherent	  subjectivity	  of	  abstract	  
worldviews,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  deny	  that	  such	  rigid	  worldviews	  can	  often	  have	  an	  important	  social	  
function	  for	  certain	  individuals.	  	  A	  sense	  of	  certainty	  may,	  for	  example,	  help	  them	  to	  make	  important	  
decisions	  under	  pressure,	  reduce	  anxiety	  relating	  to	  difficult	  aspects	  of	  life	  such	  as	  the	  prospect	  of	  
one’s	  own	  death	  or	  the	  death	  of	  loved	  ones,	  endure	  difficult	  conditions,	  and	  enhance	  their	  
performance	  by	  being	  able	  to	  cultivate	  an	  unshakable	  belief	  in	  a	  clear	  purpose	  for	  their	  actions.	  	  
However,	  this	  sense	  of	  certainty	  would	  not	  be	  as	  effective	  if	  the	  individual	  was	  aware	  that	  it	  was	  
based	  on	  a	  cognitive	  sleight	  of	  hand.	  	  In	  order	  to	  maximise	  the	  perceived	  effectiveness	  of	  worldviews	  
for	  some	  communities	  and	  individuals,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  clear	  perception	  that	  the	  categories	  they	  use	  
are	  objectively	  correct	  and	  others	  are	  obviously	  wrong.	  	  However,	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  reality	  is	  
overwhelmingly	  complex	  and	  confusing	  and	  perpetually	  in	  a	  state	  of	  dynamic	  flux	  (Larsen-­‐Freeman	  
and	  Cameron	  2008;	  Miller	  and	  Page	  2007;	  Mitchell	  2009).	  	  There	  must	  therefore	  be	  an	  inevitable	  
tension	  between	  the	  shifting	  ambiguity	  of	  reality	  and	  the	  functional	  need	  to	  develop	  worldviews	  that	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construe	  reality	  as	  static	  and	  unambiguous.	  The	  maintenance	  of	  these	  worldviews	  will	  therefore	  
need	  to	  draw	  on	  powerful	  cognitive	  strategies	  –	  strategies	  that	  must	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  
consolidate	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  our	  environment	  and	  our	  part	  in	  it	  is	  very	  clear	  and	  
simple,	  although	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  infinitely	  complex	  and	  confusing.	  	  	  
A	  large	  amount	  of	  research	  has	  been	  carried	  out	  by	  Cognitive	  Linguists	  that	  is	  directly	  relevant	  to	  
such	  cognitive	  strategies.	  	  Lakoff’s	  (1987:	  68)	  notion	  of	  Idealised	  Cognitive	  Models	  or	  ICMs	  proposes	  
that	  the	  human	  mind	  makes	  use	  of	  image	  schemas,	  propositions,	  metonymy	  and	  metaphor	  in	  order	  
to	  filter,	  categorise	  and	  construe	  the	  data	  we	  receive	  from	  our	  environments.	  
Image	  schemas	  represent	  deeply	  embedded,	  highly	  abstract	  frameworks	  that	  cause	  humans	  to	  view	  
reality	  in	  a	  particular	  way.	  	  One	  such	  proposed	  schema	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  of	  particular	  relevance	  to	  
religious	  discourse	  is	  the	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  schema.	  	  The	  premise	  underpinning	  the	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  
schema	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  we	  are	  constrained	  to	  view	  many	  entities	  and	  events	  as	  coming	  from,	  being,	  
and	  going	  somewhere	  (Gibbs	  2005:	  91-­‐93;	  Lakoff	  1987:	  275;	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  1999:	  32-­‐24;	  Semino	  
2008:	  7;	  Turner	  1996:	  18).	  	  This	  abstract	  structuring	  of	  our	  minds	  in	  terms	  of	  origins,	  paths	  and	  
destinations	  could	  well	  be	  viewed	  as	  one	  of	  the	  key	  explanatory	  factors	  involved	  in	  the	  need	  for	  
communities	  to	  cultivate	  absolute	  beliefs	  regarding	  creation	  narratives	  and	  eternal	  destinations	  such	  
as	  heaven	  and	  hell.	  
Propositions	  include	  the	  categorisation	  of	  reality	  according	  to	  specifications	  that	  can	  often	  be	  
represented	  as	  statements,	  such	  as	  defining	  a	  segment	  of	  time	  as	  a	  week	  consisting	  of	  seven	  days	  
(ibid.).	  	  This	  particular	  example	  of	  a	  seven-­‐day	  week	  is	  of	  course	  viewed	  by	  most	  as	  an	  essentially	  
arbitrary	  specification	  imposed	  upon	  reality.	  	  However,	  it	  can	  also	  often	  be	  viewed	  by	  some	  religious	  
individuals	  or	  communities,	  such	  as	  Evangelical	  Christians	  for	  example,	  as	  a	  divinely	  appointed	  
absolute	  that	  encodes	  crucial,	  objective	  knowledge	  about	  the	  Universe	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  “basic	  
principle	  of	  life”	  (Eveson	  2001:	  54-­‐56).	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Metonymy	  is	  another	  element	  of	  Lakoff’s	  notion	  of	  cognitive	  models	  that	  is	  crucial	  in	  any	  exploration	  
of	  how	  we	  categorise	  reality.	  	  It	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  expanding	  a	  particular	  part	  of	  something	  so	  that	  it	  
represents	  the	  whole	  of	  that	  thing	  –	  referred	  to	  as	  source-­‐in-­‐target	  metonymy	  or	  “domain	  expansion”	  
–	  or	  representing	  something	  by	  reducing	  it	  down	  to	  one	  of	  its	  parts	  –	  referred	  to	  as	  target-­‐in-­‐source	  
metonymy	  or	  “domain	  reduction”	  (Ruiz	  de	  Mendoza	  and	  Campo	  2002:	  58-­‐59;	  Ruiz	  de	  Mendoza	  and	  
Hernández	  2001:	  5;	  Ruiz	  de	  Mendoza	  	  and	  Sáenz	  2003:	  7;	  Ruiz	  de	  Mendoza	  and	  Velasco	  2002:	  7).	  	  
One	  example	  of	  such	  domain	  reduction	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  way	  Evangelical	  Christians	  talk	  about	  the	  
importance	  of	  saving	  souls.	  	  In	  this	  example	  they	  are	  using	  one	  perceived	  aspect	  of	  a	  human	  being,	  
this	  notion	  of	  a	  soul,	  to	  represent	  the	  human	  being	  as	  a	  whole.	  Conservative	  religious	  discourse	  is	  
filled	  with	  vocabulary	  that	  represents	  individuals	  and	  communities	  by	  one	  perceived	  aspect	  of	  their	  
behaviour	  or	  status,	  for	  example:	  sinners,	  adulterers,	  non-­‐believers,	  true	  believers,	  disciples	  of	  Satan,	  
followers	  of	  Christ,	  souls,	  the	  lost,	  etc.	  	  The	  inevitable	  result	  of	  such	  metonymic	  strategies	  is	  that	  
highly	  complex	  entities	  and	  situations	  can	  often	  be	  effortlessly	  reduced	  to	  and	  treated	  as	  very	  simple,	  
often	  binary,	  stereotyped	  constructs.	  	  	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  element	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  metaphor,	  which	  involves	  drawing	  on	  a	  
more	  basic,	  concrete	  domain	  to	  describe	  a	  more	  elusive	  and	  abstract	  domain	  (Charteris-­‐Black	  2004:	  
15,	  21;	  Deignan,	  Littlemore	  and	  Semino	  2013;	  Gibbs	  2005:	  90-­‐96;	  Pragglejaz	  Group	  2007:	  3;	  Steen	  
2007:	  88-­‐89).	  	  One	  very	  common	  example	  of	  this	  is	  “I	  see	  what	  you	  mean”	  in	  place	  of	  “I	  understand	  
what	  you	  mean”,	  where	  the	  domain	  of	  seeing	  is	  being	  used	  to	  say	  something	  related	  to	  the	  domain	  
of	  knowing.	  	  In	  such	  cases,	  the	  implicit	  target	  domain	  is	  often	  placed	  in	  capitals	  or	  inverted	  commas	  
by	  conceptual	  metaphor	  researchers,	  for	  example	  KNOWING	  IS	  SEEING	  or	  “Knowing	  is	  seeing”	  (Gibbs	  
2011a:	  531).	  	  This	  use	  of	  basic	  domains	  helps	  the	  human	  mind	  to	  construe	  the	  complex	  and	  abstract	  
as	  something	  more	  simple,	  obvious	  and	  self-­‐evident,	  so	  that	  “an	  abstract	  notion	  is	  conceived	  as	  if	  it	  
had	  a	  physical	  reality”	  (Charteris-­‐Black	  2004:	  15),	  or	  as	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  (1980:	  95)	  put	  it,	  the	  use	  
of	  metaphor	  “allows	  us	  to	  understand	  one	  aspect	  of	  the	  concept	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  more	  clearly	  
delineated	  concept”.	  	  Deignan	  (2005:	  23-­‐24;	  2010:	  46-­‐47)	  takes	  it	  further	  with	  the	  argument	  that	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metaphor	  does	  not	  just	  neutrally	  represent	  an	  abstract	  domain	  in	  simpler	  terms,	  but	  inherently	  
produces	  “over-­‐simplification”,	  “distortion”	  and	  the	  concealing	  of	  certain	  characteristics	  from	  that	  
domain.	  Cognitive	  Linguistic	  researchers	  and	  those	  researchers	  who	  work	  closely	  with	  them	  have	  
focused	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  attention	  on	  groups	  of	  metaphors	  that	  will	  be	  of	  particular	  importance	  to	  this	  
thesis.	  	  These	  include	  viewing	  life	  as	  a	  journey	  (e.g.	  Charteris-­‐Black	  2004:	  93-­‐95;	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  
1999:	  60-­‐63;	  Lakoff	  and	  Turner	  1989:	  9-­‐10;	  Ritchie	  2008;	  Semino	  2008:	  6-­‐7,75),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  spatial	  
representation	  of	  concepts	  (e.g.	  Lakoff	  1987:	  283;	  Zlatev	  2007:	  318-­‐343;	  Evans	  and	  Green	  2006:	  68-­‐
79).	  	  	  
I	  have	  so	  far	  focused	  on	  introducing	  those	  aspects	  of	  cognitive	  models	  that	  explain	  how	  conservative	  
religious	  believers	  develop	  and	  maintain	  their	  sense	  of	  certainty	  in	  a	  simplified	  view	  of	  reality.	  	  
However,	  there	  are	  other	  aspects	  of	  cognitive	  models	  that	  inevitably	  exist	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  
development	  and	  maintenance	  of	  this	  static,	  clear-­‐cut	  perception	  of	  the	  world.	  	  I	  will	  therefore	  
primarily	  focus	  on	  these	  aspects	  when	  I	  come	  to	  consider	  how	  the	  field	  of	  inter-­‐faith	  dialogue	  could	  
benefit	  from	  a	  consideration	  of	  cognitive	  models.	  	  The	  first	  of	  these	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  episodic	  memory.	  
This	  way	  of	  encoding	  memories	  is	  based	  on	  research	  in	  Cognitive	  Psychology	  that	  posits	  that	  humans	  
encode	  and	  store	  information	  as	  both	  things	  and	  situations	  (Evans	  2009;	  Ryan,	  Hoscheidt	  and	  Nadel	  
2008;	  Tulving	  1985).	  The	  significance	  of	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  doctrines	  are	  often	  
construed	  and	  expressed	  as	  static	  things	  or	  entities,	  such	  as	  the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  God	  in	  Islam	  
and	  the	  competing	  doctrine	  of	  the	  Trinity	  in	  most	  forms	  of	  Christianity,	  feeding	  the	  conservative	  
religious	  perception	  that	  reality	  can	  be	  carved	  up	  into	  simplified	  binary	  categories.	  	  I	  am	  not	  arguing	  
here	  that	  doctrines	  are	  in	  reality	  static	  entities.	  	  They	  can	  easily	  be	  viewed	  as	  very	  complex,	  fluid	  and	  
highly	  abstract	  ideas	  that	  develop	  and	  adapt	  over	  time	  and	  varying	  contexts.	  	  However,	  the	  point	  I	  
am	  making	  here	  is	  that	  doctrines	  are	  often	  perceievd	  by	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  to	  be	  
objective,	  static,	  simplistic	  entities	  that	  a	  true	  believer	  holds	  to	  and	  a	  perceived	  non-­‐believer	  does	  
not.	  	  They	  are	  often	  used	  as	  a	  very	  strong	  either-­‐or	  membership	  marker,	  and	  often	  become	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construed	  as	  concerete	  entities	  or	  things	  that	  a	  believer	  must	  hold	  to,	  hold	  fast	  to,	  grasp	  or	  not	  turn	  
away	  from	  or	  reject	  (see	  for	  example	  2	  Timothy,	  chapter	  1,	  verse	  13,	  King	  James	  Version).	  	  	  	  
In	  contrast	  to	  this	  peception	  of	  doctrines	  as	  static	  things,	  episodic	  situations	  are	  memories	  that	  are	  
encoded	  or	  remembered	  as	  a	  connected	  series	  of	  images	  with	  mutiple	  elements	  viewed	  from	  an	  
often	  shifting	  perspective.	  	  To	  put	  it	  simply,	  this	  requires	  episodic	  memories	  to	  be	  encoded	  with	  
“when,	  where	  and	  how	  those	  events	  were	  encountered”	  (Katz	  and	  Taylor	  2008:	  151).	  This	  inherent	  
dynamic	  complexity	  makes	  them	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  view	  in	  static,	  simplified	  terms,	  as	  well	  as	  
being	  far	  harder	  for	  a	  belief	  community	  to	  monitor	  and	  control.	  	  My	  intention	  to	  focus	  on	  language	  
related	  to	  the	  expression	  of	  experience	  is	  therefore	  essentially	  another	  way	  of	  saying	  that	  my	  
intention	  is	  to	  focus	  on	  episodic	  language	  relating	  to	  an	  individual’s	  dynamic	  interaction	  with	  his	  or	  
her	  way	  of	  believing.	  	  Another	  phrase	  that	  I	  will	  use	  to	  encompass	  the	  area	  of	  the	  language	  of	  
experience	  that	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  is	  action	  and	  relationship	  language.	  	  	  This	  phrase	  refers	  to	  any	  
language	  that	  relates	  to	  the	  believer	  acting	  on	  something	  or	  being	  acted	  upon,	  as	  well	  as	  language	  
that	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  perceived	  relationship	  between	  the	  believer	  and	  the	  object	  of	  his	  or	  her	  
belief.	  	  	  
This	  desire	  to	  focus	  primarily	  on	  the	  language	  of	  experience	  is	  also	  influenced	  by	  the	  growing	  
importance	  of	  applying	  the	  findings	  of	  Complex	  Systems	  Theory	  to	  the	  study	  of	  language	  (cf.	  Larsen-­‐
Freeman	  and	  Cameron	  2008).	  	  The	  notion	  behind	  this	  theory	  is	  that	  processes	  related	  to	  discourse	  
and	  the	  way	  we	  think	  and	  feel	  should	  not	  be	  viewed	  in	  static	  or	  linear	  terms.	  	  They	  should	  instead	  be	  
viewed	  as	  constantly	  evolving,	  dynamic,	  self-­‐organising	  processes	  that	  influence	  and	  are	  influenced	  
by	  an	  innumerable	  array	  of	  contextual	  variables	  (Cameron	  2010c).	  	  Such	  processes	  may	  achieve	  
various	  patterns	  of	  temporary	  stability	  in	  the	  form	  of	  patterned	  of	  movement	  between	  two	  states	  or	  
restricted	  local	  movement	  within	  a	  particular	  state	  (Larsen-­‐Freeman	  and	  Cameron	  2008).	  	  However,	  
the	  landscape	  through	  which	  this	  movement	  takes	  place	  is	  always	  in	  a	  state	  of	  flux,	  and	  therefore	  
some	  form	  of	  change	  is	  inevitable	  and	  unavoidable.	  	  If	  my	  intention	  is	  to	  map	  such	  patterns	  and	  track	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these	  shifts,	  I	  need	  to	  avoid	  the	  language	  of	  theoretical	  doctrine	  that	  appears	  to	  minimise	  and	  in	  
some	  sense	  cover	  up	  the	  fact	  of	  dynamic	  flux.	  	  Instead,	  I	  need	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  language	  of	  personal	  
experience	  because	  such	  language	  must	  always	  be	  seeking	  to	  dynamically	  connect	  ever-­‐changing	  
situations	  and	  entities	  from	  a	  perspective	  that	  is	  always	  in	  the	  process	  of	  some	  form	  of	  development.	  
Having	  briefly	  introduced	  some	  of	  the	  key	  ideas	  relating	  to	  the	  Cognitive	  Linguistic	  approach,	  I	  am	  
now	  able	  to	  proceed	  to	  an	  introduction	  of	  the	  texts	  that	  will	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  my	  exploration	  of	  
the	  second	  research	  question.	  	  My	  analysis	  of	  these	  texts	  will	  focus	  on	  their	  use	  of	  particular	  
metaphors,	  which	  will	  involve	  a	  further	  expansion	  in	  the	  sections	  to	  come	  of	  the	  brief	  discussion	  
above	  of	  the	  relevance	  of	  metaphor	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  religious	  discourse.	  	  I	  will	  therefore	  first	  begin	  
by	  introducing	  the	  texts	  in	  which	  the	  metaphors	  are	  located	  –	  a	  collection	  of	  testimonials	  from	  
islamfortoday.com	  and	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  -­‐	  as	  well	  as	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  term	  conservative	  
religious	  believer.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
1.4	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Issues	  Related	  to	  Movement	  and	  Proximity	  Metaphors	  in	  Religious	  
Testimonials	  	  
This	  section	  relates	  to	  the	  second	  research	  question:	  Are	  there	  clear,	  fixed	  differences	  between	  
Evangelical	  Times	  Christian	  testimonial	  authors	  and	  islamfortoday.com	  Muslim	  testimonial	  authors	  in	  
terms	  of	  their	  use	  of	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  to	  express	  their	  way	  of	  believing?	  	  	  	  
One	  of	  the	  key	  methods	  available	  to	  researchers	  for	  analysing	  the	  nature	  of	  an	  individual’s	  
experience	  is	  of	  course	  to	  focus	  on	  what	  that	  individual	  says	  about	  their	  experience.	  This	  requires	  
selecting	  authentic	  texts	  that	  are	  characterised	  by	  expressions	  of	  experience	  rather	  than	  more	  
theoretical	  language	  about	  their	  beliefs.	  	  One	  such	  type	  of	  text	  that	  fits	  this	  criterion	  is	  the	  religious	  
testimonial,	  which	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  distinctive	  sub-­‐genre	  in	  that	  it	  generally	  exhibits	  a	  predictable	  
framework.	  	  Such	  testimonials	  usually	  involve	  three	  principal	  parts:	  a	  selective	  account	  of	  the	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author’s	  life	  story	  before	  their	  transition	  to	  a	  new	  belief	  system,	  an	  account	  of	  the	  transition	  itself,	  
and	  a	  selective	  account	  of	  the	  author’s	  life	  story	  after	  the	  transition.	  	  There	  may	  be	  extensive	  overlap	  
between	  the	  first	  and	  the	  second	  parts,	  as	  well	  as	  between	  the	  second	  and	  third	  parts,	  but	  invariably	  
the	  first	  part	  involves	  a	  negative	  construal	  of	  the	  author’s	  life,	  while	  the	  third	  part	  involves	  an	  
idealised,	  positive	  construal.	  	  The	  element	  of	  religious	  testimonials	  that	  makes	  them	  especially	  
suitable	  for	  any	  analysis	  of	  the	  language	  of	  experience,	  and	  therefore	  the	  expression	  of	  episodic	  
memories,	  is	  of	  course	  the	  central	  importance	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  personal	  story.	  	  	  
This	  thesis	  therefore	  focuses	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  collections	  of	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  testimonials,	  and	  
more	  specifically	  a	  collection	  of	  testimonials	  from	  the	  Muslim	  website	  islamfortoday.com	  and	  the	  
Protestant	  Evangelical	  magazine,	  the	  Evangelical	  Times.	  	  Both	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  website	  and	  the	  
Evangelical	  Times	  magazine	  represent	  specific	  groups	  within	  Islam	  and	  Christianity.	  	  The	  
islamfortoday.com	  website	  is	  an	  English	  language,	  US-­‐based	  resource	  for	  conservative	  Sunni	  Muslims	  
that	  is	  keen	  to	  promote	  an	  inclusive	  approach	  to	  Islam	  that	  construes	  Shia	  Muslims	  as	  having	  only	  
minor	  disagreements	  with	  Sunni	  Muslims.	  	  It	  also	  explicitly	  attempts	  to	  separate	  itself	  from	  views	  
that	  could	  be	  related	  to	  religious	  extremism.	  	  The	  Evangelical	  Times	  is	  a	  conservative,	  UK-­‐based	  
magazine	  for	  Protestant	  Evangelical	  Christians	  that	  is	  principally	  aimed	  at	  those	  independent	  
churches	  that	  have	  separated	  themselves	  from	  more	  liberal,	  ecumenical	  groups.	  	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  I	  define	  a	  Sunni	  Muslim	  as	  an	  individual	  who	  operates	  with	  an	  
absolute	  belief	  that	  the	  Qur’an	  is	  the	  word	  of	  God,	  and	  also	  demonstrates	  a	  mainstream	  approach	  
and	  commitment	  to	  the	  five	  pillars	  of	  Islam:	  the	  profession	  of	  faith,	  praying	  at	  specified	  times,	  the	  
giving	  of	  alms,	  pilgrimage	  and	  fasting.	  I	  define	  a	  Protestant	  Evangelical	  Christian	  as	  an	  individual	  who	  
operates	  with	  an	  absolute	  belief	  that	  the	  Bible	  is	  the	  word	  of	  God,	  and	  also	  believes	  that	  their	  
salvation	  is	  not	  achieved	  through	  works,	  but	  through	  faith	  in	  the	  death	  of	  Christ	  on	  the	  cross	  (Flinn	  
1999).	  These	  definitions	  are	  not	  controversial,	  although	  my	  use	  of	  the	  term	  conservative	  may	  
provoke	  some	  disagreement.	  	  Some	  Muslim	  believers	  may	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  no	  cohesive	  group	  of	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Muslims	  that	  do	  not	  have	  an	  absolute	  belief	  that	  the	  Qur’an	  is	  the	  word	  of	  God,	  so	  in	  a	  sense	  all	  
Muslim	  belief	  communities	  must	  be	  by	  definition	  conservative,	  rendering	  the	  term	  redundant.	  My	  
answer	  to	  this	  is	  that	  there	  are	  many	  Muslims	  who	  interpret	  the	  Qur’an	  in	  a	  way	  that	  more	  
conservative	  Muslims	  would	  strongly	  disagree	  with.	  	  For	  example,	  many	  Turkish	  Muslims	  will	  drink	  
alcohol	  and	  many	  Turkish	  women	  do	  not	  feel	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  them	  to	  cover	  their	  head	  in	  
public.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  many	  Muslims	  put	  forward	  the	  argument	  that	  some	  of	  the	  prescriptions	  in	  
the	  Qur’an	  may	  have	  been	  appropriate	  for	  the	  time	  they	  were	  written	  in,	  but	  should	  not	  be	  rigidly	  
applied	  today.	  	  It	  is	  correct	  that	  the	  Muslims	  who	  hold	  to	  this	  more	  progressive	  approach	  to	  the	  
Qur’an	  have	  not	  formed	  themselves	  into	  cohesive	  organisations	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  liberal	  
Christians	  have	  done,	  but	  they	  still	  exist	  in	  sizeable	  numbers	  in	  various	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  	  When	  I	  
therefore	  use	  the	  term	  conservative	  to	  refer	  to	  either	  Muslims	  or	  Christians,	  I	  am	  referring	  to	  an	  
individual	  or	  a	  group	  that	  is	  committed	  to	  the	  belief	  that	  their	  sacred	  text	  is	  not	  only	  the	  word	  of	  God	  
in	  an	  unqualified	  sense,	  but	  is	  also	  absolutely	  applicable	  to	  all	  places	  and	  all	  times.	  	  	  	  
Another	  point	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  highlighted	  is	  that	  my	  above	  identification	  of	  specific	  groups	  within	  
Islam	  and	  Christianity	  is	  intended	  to	  reinforce	  the	  view	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  disentangle	  the	  
expression	  of	  a	  process	  of	  belief	  from	  a	  very	  specific	  time,	  setting	  and	  cultural	  context,	  and	  the	  
influence	  of	  a	  specific	  function,	  text	  format,	  size	  and	  genre	  (cf.	  Deignan,	  Littlemore	  and	  Semino	  2013;	  
Steen	  2007:	  352-­‐353).	  	  It	  must	  therefore	  always	  be	  borne	  in	  mind	  that	  there	  are	  other	  discourse	  
communities	  within	  these	  religions,	  and	  that	  the	  members	  of	  these	  various	  communities	  would	  
produce	  language	  with	  very	  different	  patterns	  of	  emphasis.	  For	  example,	  I	  would	  fully	  expect	  
mainstream	  Sunni	  Muslims	  to	  express	  their	  perceived	  experience	  of	  interacting	  with	  God	  in	  a	  very	  
different	  way	  from	  a	  Sufi	  mystic,	  and	  I	  would	  expect	  a	  charismatic	  Christian	  who	  believes	  in	  all	  the	  
gifts	  of	  the	  Spirit	  to	  express	  their	  perceived	  experience	  in	  a	  very	  different	  way	  from	  a	  reformed	  
Baptist.	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Having	  introduced	  the	  type	  of	  texts	  that	  I	  intend	  to	  focus	  on,	  I	  am	  now	  able	  to	  proceed	  to	  an	  
introduction	  of	  the	  type	  of	  language	  that	  might	  help	  me	  to	  address	  my	  second	  research	  question.	  	  I	  
have	  already	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  I	  wish	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  language	  of	  experience	  and	  not	  the	  language	  of	  
theoretical	  doctrine,	  but	  these	  two	  categories	  are	  very	  broad	  and	  inevitably	  involve	  some	  degree	  of	  
overlap.	  	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  obvious	  pitfalls	  of	  analysing	  a	  text	  by	  forcing	  all	  of	  its	  language	  into	  
either	  an	  experiential	  or	  theoretical	  box,	  I	  will	  instead	  focus	  on	  types	  of	  language	  that	  often	  
characterise	  aspects	  of	  the	  language	  of	  personal	  experience,	  while	  also	  exhibiting	  schematic	  
presuppositions	  that	  are	  key	  to	  many	  religious	  worldviews.	  	  The	  types	  of	  language	  that	  I	  have	  chosen	  
to	  focus	  on	  are	  metaphors	  relating	  to	  movement	  and	  proximity	  to	  a	  divine	  entity.	  
My	  observation	  that	  these	  types	  of	  metaphor	  are	  often	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  experiential	  language	  of	  
believers	  can	  be	  demonstrated	  by	  returning	  to	  the	  testimonial	  extract	  I	  discussed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  
this	  chapter.	  In	  that	  extract,	  the	  convert	  is	  often	  concerned	  with	  where	  she	  will	  go	  when	  she	  dies,	  “If	  
I	  die	  tomorrow,	  where	  would	  I	  go?	  	  …	  I	  was	  scared	  I	  might	  be	  on	  my	  way	  to	  hell,	  not	  heaven”.	  	  The	  
reason	  she	  is	  afraid	  that	  she	  might	  be	  on	  her	  way	  to	  hell	  is	  because	  of	  the	  times	  “I	  had	  gone	  my	  own	  
way	  and	  messed	  up”	  instead	  of	  following	  God.	  	  The	  key	  theme	  of	  movement	  here	  can	  be	  related	  
back	  to	  my	  discussion	  of	  the	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  schema	  in	  the	  section	  above.	  	  It	  appears	  to	  be	  crucial	  
for	  many	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  to	  instantiate	  the	  abstract	  schematic	  
notion	  that	  they	  must	  have	  come	  from	  somewhere	  and	  be	  going	  somewhere	  through	  the	  use	  of	  
metaphor.	  	  In	  the	  two	  collections	  of	  testimonials	  that	  I	  will	  examine	  in	  this	  thesis,	  at	  least	  one	  
movement	  metaphor	  was	  present	  in	  every	  testimonial,	  and	  often	  clusters	  of	  such	  metaphors	  were	  
present.	  	  It	  therefore	  appears	  to	  be	  very	  difficult	  for	  many	  religious	  believers	  to	  talk	  about	  their	  
experience	  of	  becoming	  and	  being	  a	  believer,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  perceived	  interaction	  with	  a	  particular	  
divine	  entity,	  without	  drawing	  on	  movement	  metaphors.	  	  I	  justify	  this	  decision	  to	  focus	  on	  movement	  
and	  proximity	  metaphors	  in	  even	  more	  detail	  in	  section	  3.1.	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Another	  important	  area	  of	  investigation	  relates	  to	  the	  exploration	  of	  different	  types	  of	  movement	  
metaphors.	  	  In	  the	  above	  example,	  “I	  had	  gone	  my	  way”,	  the	  believer	  or	  non-­‐believer	  is	  positioned	  as	  
the	  agent	  in	  the	  process	  of	  their	  own	  movement,	  but	  in	  other	  examples	  someone	  or	  something	  other	  
than	  the	  believer	  is	  the	  agent	  in	  the	  process	  of	  the	  believer’s	  (or	  non-­‐believer’s)	  movement.	  The	  
testimonial	  under	  consideration	  contains	  two	  examples	  of	  this	  type	  of	  movement:	  the	  call	  to	  the	  
reader	  to	  allow	  Jesus	  to	  “lead	  you	  in	  life”	  and	  the	  statement	  encouraging	  the	  reader	  to	  trust	  in	  Jesus	  
and	  wait	  and	  see	  “where	  he	  takes	  you”.	  	  Yet	  another	  type	  of	  movement	  metaphor	  occurs	  when	  she	  
asks	  Jesus	  to	  “come	  into”	  her	  life.	  	  This	  type	  does	  not	  relate	  to	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  believer,	  but	  to	  
the	  movement	  of	  a	  divine	  entity	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  believer.	  	  This	  last	  example	  also	  contains	  the	  
preposition	  into,	  which	  denotes	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  proximity	  –	  in	  this	  case	  better	  characterised	  as	  a	  
type	  of	  unity	  –	  between	  the	  believer	  and	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  	  	  
It	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  above	  examples	  that	  movement	  and	  divine	  entity	  proximity	  metaphors	  can	  often	  
be	  used	  to	  express	  certain	  aspects	  of	  a	  conservative	  religious	  believer’s	  perceived	  experience.	  	  They	  
are	  also	  of	  interest	  to	  this	  thesis	  because	  of	  their	  possible	  relationship	  with	  a	  believer’s	  sense	  of	  
certainty.	  	  In	  the	  extract	  under	  consideration,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  according	  to	  her	  perceived	  
experience,	  “everything	  else	  became	  clear”	  once	  Jesus	  had	  “come	  into”	  her	  life.	  	  Human	  beings	  do	  
not	  always	  view	  themselves	  as	  agents	  of	  their	  own	  worldview	  shifts,	  and	  within	  religious	  discourse	  it	  
is	  common	  for	  some	  type	  of	  spiritual	  force	  or	  divine	  entity	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  the	  agent	  of	  persuasion	  
and	  subsequent	  certainty.	  	  It	  is	  also	  often	  the	  case	  that	  the	  use	  of	  movement	  and	  divine	  entity	  
proximity	  metaphors,	  and	  especially	  those	  that	  depict	  the	  believer	  as	  being	  acted	  upon,	  make	  no	  
sense	  without	  the	  user’s	  assumption	  that	  a	  divine	  entity	  with	  very	  specific	  characteristics	  and	  
capabilities	  exists.	  	  	  
When	  the	  believer	  in	  the	  testimonial	  extract	  I	  alluded	  to	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  introduction	  tells	  the	  
reader	  “wait	  …	  and	  see	  where	  he	  takes	  you”,	  she	  has	  moved	  far	  beyond	  any	  theoretical	  discussion	  
about	  whether	  he	  exists,	  or	  what	  gender	  he	  is,	  or	  whether	  he	  is	  theoretically	  capable	  of	  moving	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someone	  to	  another	  existential	  location.	  	  The	  metaphorical	  use	  of	  take	  here	  supersedes	  all	  of	  these	  
theoretical	  issues	  and	  simply	  presents	  an	  acting,	  male	  divine	  agent	  as	  a	  seemingly	  concrete,	  self-­‐
evident	  reality.	  Placing	  the	  divine	  entity	  in	  the	  subject	  position	  achieves	  this	  by	  first	  of	  all	  identifying	  
him	  as	  the	  primary	  topic	  or	  focus	  of	  the	  clause	  (cf.	  Goldberg	  2006:	  131,	  138;	  Langacker	  2008:	  370).	  	  
This	  also	  causes	  the	  divine	  entity	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  “an	  implicit	  point	  of	  reference”	  (Langacker	  2008:	  
78),	  or	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  an	  assumed	  perspective	  or	  deictic	  centre	  through	  which	  the	  addressee	  
is	  invited	  or	  even	  coerced,	  to	  some	  extent,	  to	  process	  the	  clause	  (cf.	  Gavins	  2007:	  46;	  Segal	  1995:	  15;	  
Zubin	  1995).	  Patterns	  of	  agency	  or	  transitivity,	  or,	  to	  put	  it	  in	  even	  simpler	  terms,	  a	  focus	  on	  patterns	  
of	  who	  does	  what	  to	  whom	  (cf.	  Halliday	  and	  Matthiessen	  2004),	  will	  therefore	  be	  a	  key	  part	  of	  my	  
analysis	  of	  the	  target	  metaphors.	  	  	  
What	  I	  am	  outlining	  here	  is	  an	  almost	  contradictory	  tension	  that	  will	  persist	  throughout	  this	  thesis.	  	  
One	  the	  one	  hand,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  perceived	  experience	  rather	  than	  primarily	  theoretical	  doctrinal	  
beliefs	  is	  what	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  a	  committed	  conservative	  religious	  believer’s	  sense	  of	  absolute	  
certainty.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  I	  will	  also	  argue	  that	  an	  analysis	  of	  perceived	  experiences	  can	  be	  useful	  
in	  demonstrating	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  talk	  in	  terms	  of	  clear,	  fixed	  differences	  between	  members	  of	  
different	  belief	  communities.	  What	  this	  means	  is	  that	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  draw	  on	  the	  variability	  
and	  relativity	  of	  perceived	  experiences	  in	  order	  to	  critically	  engage	  with	  the	  absolute	  views	  of	  the	  
world	  that	  are	  characteristic	  of	  conservative	  religious	  believers.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
When	  it	  comes	  to	  analysing	  occurrences	  of	  metaphorical	  language	  related	  to	  movement	  and	  divine	  
entity	  proximity	  in	  the	  texts,	  I	  will	  employ	  the	  Pragglejaz	  Group’s	  (2007)	  Metaphor	  Identification	  
Procedure	  (MIP).	  	  This	  procedure	  works	  with	  a	  definition	  of	  metaphor	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  lexical	  unit	  
that	  has	  a	  more	  basic	  meaning	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  more	  “concrete”,	  “precise”,	  “historically	  older”	  
and	  perhaps	  “related	  to	  bodily	  actions”)	  than	  the	  one	  encountered	  in	  the	  text	  (Pragglejaz	  2007:	  3).	  	  
There	  are	  of	  course	  numerous	  technical	  challenges	  relating	  to	  the	  precise	  definition,	  identification	  
and	  quantitative	  analysis	  of	  the	  types	  of	  metaphors	  under	  consideration,	  but	  any	  detailed	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exploration	  of	  these	  challenges	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  initial	  introduction	  and	  will	  be	  dealt	  with	  
in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  three	  below.	  	  However,	  there	  is	  one	  issue	  that	  should	  be	  discussed	  from	  the	  
outset.	  	  It	  must	  be	  recognised	  from	  the	  beginning	  that	  metaphor	  identification	  involves	  a	  subjective	  
dimension.	  	  What	  a	  metaphor	  researcher	  may	  identify	  as	  a	  metaphor	  is	  not	  necessarily	  what	  the	  user	  
would	  identify	  as	  a	  metaphor.	  	  A	  case	  in	  point	  is	  the	  references	  to	  going	  to	  heaven	  in	  the	  above	  
extract.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  movement	  described	  here	  is	  not	  the	  more	  
concrete	  physical	  movement	  from	  one	  geographical	  location	  to	  another	  that	  we	  could	  identify	  as	  the	  
basic	  meaning	  associated	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  going	  somewhere.	  	  However,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  
committed	  Christian	  may	  argue	  that	  this	  physical	  realm	  will	  one	  day	  pass	  away,	  and	  that	  the	  spiritual	  
realm	  that	  encompasses	  heaven	  and	  hell	  will	  endure	  for	  eternity.	  	  It	  would	  therefore	  be	  possible,	  
according	  to	  one	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Christian	  worldview,	  to	  view	  movement	  towards	  heaven	  or	  
hell	  as	  something	  that	  is	  even	  more	  basic	  than	  conventional	  physical	  movement.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  
impossible	  to	  proceed	  with	  an	  analysis	  without	  precise	  definitions,	  so	  this	  thesis	  will	  produce	  and	  
follow	  strict	  criteria	  for	  identifying	  and	  quantifying	  the	  target	  metaphors,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
acknowledging	  the	  fact	  that	  worldviews	  will	  inevitably	  cause	  participants	  and	  researchers	  to	  classify	  
language	  in	  different	  ways.	  	  
Another	  issue	  that	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  flagged	  from	  the	  beginning	  is	  my	  avoidance	  of	  capital	  letters	  that	  
are	  often	  used	  by	  some	  more	  traditional	  Cognitive	  Linguists	  to	  denote	  conceptual	  metaphors.	  	  This	  
term	  was	  first	  popularised	  by	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson’s	  (1980)	  development	  of	  conceptual	  metaphor	  
theory.	  	  As	  I	  mentioned	  above	  in	  section	  1.2,	  they	  argued	  that	  metaphors	  were	  essentially	  used	  to	  
say	  something	  about	  one	  domain,	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  target	  domain,	  by	  referring	  to	  an	  aspect	  from	  
another	  domain,	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  source	  domain.	  	  So,	  for	  example,	  the	  phrase	  “go	  my	  own	  way”	  in	  
the	  extract	  considered	  above	  makes	  use	  of	  a	  source	  domain	  that	  encapsulates	  the	  user	  choosing	  a	  
specific	  direction	  and	  physically	  moving	  along	  a	  path	  in	  that	  direction.	  	  This	  source	  domain	  is	  then	  
used	  to	  say	  something	  about	  the	  target	  domain	  of	  making	  your	  own	  choices	  and	  living	  life	  according	  
to	  your	  own	  desires,	  as	  opposed	  to	  deferring	  to	  a	  particular	  community’s	  understanding	  of	  God’s	  will	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and	  living	  life	  according	  to	  the	  stipulations	  of	  a	  specific	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Bible.	  	  	  Lakoff	  and	  
Johnson	  (1980;	  1999)	  would	  view	  this	  type	  of	  metaphor	  as	  an	  instantiation	  of	  a	  conceptual	  metaphor	  
related	  to	  viewing	  life	  as	  a	  journey,	  which	  they	  represent	  in	  capital	  letters	  as	  LIFE	  IS	  A	  JOURNEY.	  	  The	  
capital	  letters	  denote	  the	  proposed	  existence	  of	  a	  conceptual	  metaphor	  that	  underpins	  language	  and	  
has	  been	  produced	  through	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  mind,	  the	  body,	  the	  sensorimotor	  system	  
and	  the	  external	  environment	  (Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  1999:	  45-­‐59).	  	  Metaphors	  in	  speech,	  such	  as	  the	  
example	  above,	  are	  therefore	  viewed	  as	  instantiations	  of	  conceptual	  metaphors	  in	  the	  mind.	  	  	  
However,	  more	  recently,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  trend	  within	  the	  study	  of	  metaphor	  towards	  a	  greater	  
emphasis	  on	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  and	  discourse	  based	  dimensions	  of	  metaphor	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  
conceptual	  underpinnings.	  	  This	  has	  meant	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  Lakoff’s	  emphasis	  on	  a	  primarily	  
concept-­‐based	  approach	  –	  referred	  to	  by	  some	  researchers	  as	  a	  “systems	  perspective”	  –	  towards	  an	  
emphasis	  on	  metaphor	  and	  “language	  in	  use”	  (Cameron	  1999:	  4)	  –	  referred	  to	  by	  some	  as	  a	  “use	  
perspective”	  (Müller	  2008:	  18,30-­‐31)	  or	  an	  adoption	  of	  a	  “usage	  based”	  approach	  (Evans	  2009).	  	  
Researchers	  are	  now	  focusing	  their	  attention	  more	  on	  “discourse	  metaphors”	  (Zinken	  et	  al	  2008;	  
Musolff	  and	  Zinken	  2009)	  and	  influence	  from	  complex	  systems	  theory	  (Larsen-­‐Freeman	  and	  Cameron	  
2008)	  has	  produced	  a	  move	  away	  from	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  conceptual	  and	  the	  static	  and	  fixed	  X	  is	  Y	  
framework.	  	  Instead,	  the	  emphasis	  has	  shifted	  towards	  a	  fluctuating,	  variable	  and	  interconnected	  
view	  of	  the	  appearances	  of	  metaphor	  in	  different	  types	  of	  discourse	  (Deignan,	  Littlemore	  and	  Semino	  
2013)	  and	  at	  different	  points	  in	  that	  discourse	  (Cameron	  et	  al	  2009;	  Larsen-­‐Freeman	  and	  Cameron	  
2008;	  Steen	  1999:	  94-­‐95).	  	  Metaphor	  is	  now	  being	  seen	  as	  something	  more	  socially	  plastic,	  
changeable	  and	  reliant	  on	  the	  specific	  content	  of	  what	  was	  said	  before	  during	  the	  constant	  flow	  of	  
discourse	  rather	  than	  simply	  being	  the	  static,	  stable	  product	  of	  the	  unconscious	  embodied	  cognitive	  
systems	  of	  a	  homogenous	  group	  of	  language	  users	  (Müller	  2008:	  13-­‐14;	  Cameron	  et	  al	  2009:	  64-­‐68;	  
Cameron	  2010c:	  79).	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  processing	  of	  individual	  metaphors	  is	  no	  longer	  viewed	  as	  
a	  discrete	  process	  where,	  for	  example,	  the	  conceptual	  metaphor	  LIFE	  IS	  A	  JOUNRNEY	  is	  activated	  by	  a	  
relevant	  word	  or	  phrase	  and	  then	  immediately	  switched	  off	  again.	  	  Instead,	  the	  strength	  and	  type	  of	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activation	  of	  a	  conceptual	  metaphor	  is	  influenced	  by	  the	  strength	  and	  type	  of	  conceptual	  metaphor	  
activation	  that	  has	  occurred	  in	  the	  discourse	  leading	  up	  to	  that	  example,	  “Different	  metaphoric	  
information	  may	  be	  salient	  given	  the	  immediate	  past	  history	  of	  discourse	  participants	  that	  interacts	  
in	  complex,	  dynamic	  ways	  to	  create	  highly	  context-­‐specific	  interpretations	  of	  metaphoric	  meaning”	  
(Gibbs	  and	  Santa	  Cruz	  2012:	  309).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Throughout	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  embrace	  a	  usage	  based	  perspective	  while	  remaining	  sympathetic	  to	  
some	  of	  the	  key	  points	  relevant	  to	  a	  concept-­‐based	  approach	  to	  metaphor	  analysis.	  	  I	  will	  therefore	  
argue	  that	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  maintain	  that	  patterns	  of	  metaphor	  that	  are	  repeated	  over	  and	  over	  
again	  by	  members	  of	  a	  particular	  belief	  community	  are	  probably	  very	  important	  to	  and	  deeply	  
embedded	  within	  the	  conceptual	  frameworks	  of	  the	  users.	  	  However,	  I	  would	  also	  want	  to	  argue	  that	  
the	  precise	  nature	  of	  these	  embedded	  concepts	  within	  a	  user’s	  cognitive	  framework	  may	  be	  very	  
difficult	  to	  establish.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  I	  believe	  it	  is	  important	  to	  take	  seriously	  the	  key	  point	  of	  
complex	  systems	  theory	  that	  concepts,	  as	  well	  as	  language,	  are	  in	  a	  constant	  state	  of	  flux.	  	  When	  
conceptual	  metaphors	  such	  as	  viewing	  life	  as	  being	  on	  a	  journey	  are	  placed	  in	  capitals	  and	  
represented	  as	  an	  interaction	  between	  two	  nouns,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  suggestion	  of	  rigidity	  and	  
objectivity.	  	  This	  suggestion	  will	  often	  be	  the	  precise	  opposite	  of	  the	  point	  that	  a	  discourse-­‐based	  
approach	  would	  wish	  to	  make	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  metaphor.	  I	  will	  therefore	  avoid	  this	  X	  is	  Y	  
construal	  of	  metaphors	  in	  my	  own	  analysis,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  am	  in	  strong	  agreement	  with	  the	  
notion	  of	  target	  and	  source	  domains	  and	  the	  argument	  that	  metaphor	  usage	  can	  provide	  key	  insights	  
into	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  of	  conservative	  religious	  believers.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
One	  final	  area	  that	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  relation	  to	  both	  the	  second	  and	  third	  research	  question	  is	  the	  
controversial	  area	  of	  intentional	  or	  deliberate	  metaphor	  usage.	  	  Any	  consideration	  of	  metaphor	  has	  
to	  engage	  to	  some	  degree	  with	  this	  contemporary	  debate	  of	  whether	  certain	  metaphors	  are	  
consciously	  processed	  by	  both	  the	  user	  and	  the	  addressee	  or	  whether	  they	  have	  become	  so	  
conventionalised	  as	  to	  be	  used	  with	  very	  little	  or	  no	  activation	  of	  the	  source	  domain,	  or	  whether	  they	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are	  used	  unconsciously	  but	  still	  with	  full	  source	  domain	  activation,	  or	  finally	  whether	  they	  are	  
activated	  in	  some	  contexts	  but	  not	  in	  others	  (cf.	  Bowdle	  and	  Gentner	  2005;	  Müller	  2008;	  Steen	  2007:	  
47-­‐57;	  Cameron	  1999:	  114;	  Shen	  and	  Balaban	  1999).	  	  For	  example	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  when	  I	  say	  
there	  is	  “no	  way”	  that	  I	  will	  do	  something,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  this	  usage	  has	  become	  so	  conventionalised	  
that	  the	  source	  domain	  of	  a	  material	  “way”	  is	  not	  at	  all	  activated.	  	  However,	  if	  I	  say,	  as	  in	  the	  above	  
extract,	  “I	  had	  gone	  my	  own	  way”,	  does	  it	  become	  more	  possible	  that	  a	  path	  schema	  is	  being	  
activated?	  	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  such	  a	  phrase	  may	  generally	  not	  be	  processed	  as	  a	  metaphor	  by	  
most,	  but	  maybe	  in	  certain	  contexts	  by	  certain	  individuals	  (cf.	  Müller	  2008:	  198).	  Steen	  refers	  to	  this	  
situation	  as	  the	  “paradox	  of	  metaphor”,	  in	  that,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  define	  metaphor	  as	  using	  
one	  domain	  to	  say	  something	  about	  another	  domain,	  he	  argues	  that	  conventionalised	  metaphorical	  
language	  does	  not	  involve	  cross-­‐domain	  activation	  unless	  it	  is	  being	  used	  deliberately,	  	  
Conventional	  metaphors	  can	  be	  revitalized	  as	  metaphorical,	  and	  this	  is	  when	  they	  reveal	  their	  metaphorical	  
potential	  in	  full	  force	  again.	  When	  they	  are	  revitalized,	  they	  are	  deliberately	  used	  as	  genuine	  and	  active	  cross-­‐
domain	  mappings	  again,	  and	  are	  also	  presumably	  processed	  by	  comparison	  again	  …	  Yet,	  it	  is	  also	  the	  ground	  for	  
saying	  that	  these	  deliberately	  revitalizing	  uses	  are	  exceptional	  in	  that	  they	  exploit	  resuscitated	  cross-­‐domain	  
mappings	  in	  thinking:	  They	  are	  not	  necessarily	  representative	  of	  how	  most	  metaphors	  may	  work	  in	  discourse	  
processes,	  for	  these	  may	  still	  simply	  be	  processed	  by	  lexical	  disambiguation	  without	  further	  deep	  conceptual	  
processing.	  	  
(Steen	  2011:	  588-­‐589;	  cf.	  2008)	  	  
Steen	  (2008:	  15)	  closely	  relates	  his	  arguments	  to	  Glucksberg’s	  view	  that	  conventionalised	  metaphors	  
such	  as	  saying	  that	  lawyers	  are	  sharks	  are	  processed	  by	  the	  brain	  as	  examples	  of	  class-­‐inclusion	  and	  
not	  cross-­‐domain	  mappings,	  or,	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  categorisation	  and	  not	  comparison.	  	  What	  
Glucksberg	  (2008)	  means	  by	  this	  is	  that	  the	  idea	  that	  lawyers	  are	  sharks	  has	  been	  encountered	  
enough	  times	  for	  the	  superordinate	  category	  of	  sharks	  (or	  something	  similar	  to	  this)	  to	  be	  expanded	  
to	  include	  non-­‐literal	  examples	  of	  sharks	  that	  share	  particular	  features	  with	  their	  literal	  counterparts.	  
According	  to	  Glucksberg	  and	  Steen,	  this	  explains	  why	  conventionalised	  metaphors	  that	  are	  not	  
consciously	  processed	  by	  the	  brain	  do	  not	  require	  any	  process	  of	  cross-­‐domain	  mapping,	  in	  contrast	  
to	  deliberate	  or	  novel	  usages	  that	  do.	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This	  issue	  may	  at	  first	  appear	  to	  be	  relatively	  innocuous,	  but	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  creating	  a	  split	  in	  the	  field	  of	  
metaphor	  study	  within	  Cognitive	  Linguistics.	  	  While	  researchers	  such	  as	  Steen	  are	  putting	  forward	  
the	  argument	  that	  the	  rhetorical,	  persuasive	  and	  perspective	  changing	  power	  of	  metaphor	  lies	  in	  its	  
deliberate	  or	  conscious	  use	  of	  cross-­‐domain	  mappings,	  researchers	  such	  as	  Lakoff,	  Johnson	  and	  
Gibbs	  have	  continued	  to	  maintain	  that	  the	  ideological	  power	  of	  metaphor	  resides	  precisely	  in	  its	  
location	  beyond	  conscious	  awareness	  (Müller	  2008:	  14;	  Steen	  2008:	  231,	  Lakoff	  and	  Turner	  1989:	  
129;	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  1999:	  12-­‐15;	  Gibbs	  2005:	  2).	  	  This	  opposing	  position	  is	  based	  on	  evidence	  
drawn	  from	  numerous	  psycholinguistic	  experiments	  related	  to	  cross-­‐domain	  mapping	  activation	  
during	  the	  processing	  of	  conventional	  metaphors,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  fuller	  appreciation	  of	  “the	  complexity	  
of	  people’s	  fast,	  unconscious	  actions	  when	  using	  and	  understanding	  metaphorical	  language”	  (Gibbs	  
2011b:	  578).	  Another	  relevant	  issue	  relates	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  attaching	  too	  much	  significance	  to	  the	  
notion	  of	  intentionality	  (cf.	  Deignan,	  Littlemore	  and	  Semino	  2013).	  	  A	  great	  deal	  of	  recent	  research	  in	  
the	  area	  of	  neuroscience	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  even	  when	  we	  are	  convinced	  that	  we	  are	  
consciously	  deciding	  to	  do	  something,	  our	  brain	  already	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  activated	  several	  
seconds	  before	  (Gibbs	  2005).	  	  This	  adds	  a	  whole	  new	  level	  of	  complexity	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  
intentionality	  by	  suggesting	  that	  our	  minds	  are	  active	  at	  an	  unconscious	  level	  even	  when	  we	  think	  
that	  all	  our	  actions	  are	  being	  consciously	  and	  deliberately	  controlled.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Throughout	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  therefore	  work	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  it	  is	  very	  difficult,	  if	  not	  
impossible,	  to	  establish	  when	  metaphor	  usage	  is	  deliberate	  and	  conscious.	  	  I	  will	  also	  follow	  Gibbs’	  
view	  below	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  conscious	  processing	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  account	  for	  metaphor	  usage,	  	  
…	  a	  dynamical	  view	  of	  metaphor	  suggests	  how	  the	  creation	  of	  metaphorical	  language	  need	  not	  be	  deliberate	  or	  
conscious,	  yet,	  again,	  arise	  from	  the	  interaction	  of	  a	  system’s	  components.	  Speakers	  can	  just	  decide	  to	  
communicate	  their	  recent	  thought	  processes,	  and	  the	  environmental	  constraints	  take	  care	  of	  the	  fine-­‐grained	  
details	  of	  how	  these	  intentions	  are	  manifested	  in	  real-­‐world	  behavior	  (i.e.,	  saying	  something	  that	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  
metaphorical,	  literal,	  or	  ironic;	  or	  also	  making	  a	  relevant	  gesture,	  head	  nod,	  body	  posture,	  etc.).	  
(Gibbs	  2011a:	  554-­‐555)	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This	  position	  also	  includes	  the	  argument	  that	  even	  highly	  conventional,	  unconscious	  uses	  of	  
metaphor	  can	  involve	  some	  level	  of	  cross-­‐domain	  mapping.	  However,	  in	  agreement	  with	  Steen,	  I	  will	  
accept	  that	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  do,	  at	  times,	  use	  metaphors	  to	  “persuade	  others	  to	  
change	  their	  perspective”	  (Steen	  2008:	  222),	  although	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  linguistic	  data	  alone	  does	  
not	  permit	  certainty	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  process	  is	  completely	  conscious	  or	  unconscious.	  In	  addition,	  
even	  though	  I	  do	  not	  see	  the	  presence	  of	  clusters	  of	  metaphor	  as	  necessarily	  a	  marker	  of	  deliberate	  
usage,	  I	  do	  agree	  that	  such	  clustering	  should	  highlight	  the	  increased	  importance	  of	  the	  cross-­‐domain	  
mapping	  for	  the	  individual	  user’s	  cognitive	  models.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Having	  introduced	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  relating	  to	  the	  text	  type	  of	  conservative	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  
testimonials	  and	  the	  nature	  and	  identification	  of	  movement	  and	  divine	  entity	  proximity	  metaphors,	  I	  
will	  now	  turn	  my	  attention	  to	  the	  third	  research	  question.	  	  This	  will	  involve	  a	  change	  in	  focus	  from	  
looking	  for	  levels	  of	  difference	  between	  two	  collections	  of	  texts	  from	  different	  belief	  communities.	  	  
Instead,	  it	  will	  focus	  on	  levels	  of	  difference	  between	  the	  language	  of	  individuals	  from	  the	  same	  belief	  
community	  and	  levels	  of	  similarity	  between	  the	  language	  of	  individuals	  from	  different	  belief	  
communities.	  	  	  
	  	  	  
1.5	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Issues	  Related	  to	  Analysing	  Videoed	  Discussions	  between	  Muslims	  and	  
Christians	  
This	  section	  relates	  to	  the	  third	  research	  question:	  Is	  it	  possible	  to	  identify	  signs	  of	  convergence	  and	  
empathy	  in	  the	  language	  of	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  conservative	  believers	  when	  they	  are	  encouraged	  
to	  discuss	  their	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  believer	  during	  structured	  videoed	  discussions?	  	  Are	  there	  
similarities	  in	  the	  use	  of	  proximity	  and	  movement	  metaphors	  in	  the	  language	  of	  individual	  
conservative	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  religious	  believers,	  and	  differences	  in	  the	  use	  of	  this	  type	  of	  
language	  among	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  from	  the	  same	  belief	  community	  during	  the	  course	  
of	  those	  videoed	  discussions?	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There	  are	  several	  key	  limitations	  to	  the	  analysis	  proposed	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  of	  movement	  and	  
divine	  entity	  proximity	  metaphors	  in	  religious	  testimonials	  that	  make	  it	  unsuitable	  for	  addressing	  this	  
third	  research	  question.	  This	  section	  will	  therefore	  introduce	  the	  need	  for	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  analysis	  
by	  examining	  those	  key	  limitations	  and	  putting	  forward	  proposals	  relating	  to	  how	  they	  could	  be	  
addressed.	  	  I	  will	  then	  move	  on	  to	  a	  brief	  discussion	  of	  the	  key	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  structuring	  of	  
videoed	  discussions	  between	  Muslims	  and	  Christians.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  principal	  limitation	  of	  the	  analysis	  of	  testimonials	  is	  that	  it	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  the	  level	  
of	  difference	  between	  two	  collections	  of	  texts.	  	  This	  approach	  is	  naturally	  ideal	  for	  forming	  broad	  
opinions	  about	  differences	  between	  two	  belief	  communities,	  but	  this	  must	  be	  achieved	  by	  
backgrounding	  isolated	  occurrences	  of	  both	  atypical	  similarity	  and	  difference	  in	  individual	  texts.	  
What	  is	  therefore	  required	  in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  third	  research	  question	  is	  an	  approach	  that	  views	  
each	  text	  as	  initially	  an	  independent	  entity	  and	  not	  as	  something	  that	  is	  pre-­‐defined	  as	  part	  of	  one	  
collection	  of	  texts	  but	  not	  part	  of	  another	  collection.	  	  It	  is	  then	  possible	  to	  look	  for	  similarities	  and	  
differences	  between	  that	  text	  and	  any	  other	  text	  without	  preconceived	  constraints	  imposed	  by	  
membership	  of	  a	  particular	  collection.	  	  However,	  the	  analysis	  of	  testimonials	  will	  also	  still	  play	  a	  
valuable	  role.	  	  It	  will	  be	  useful	  to	  compare	  individual	  texts	  to	  general	  patterns	  derived	  from	  those	  
collections	  of	  texts	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  divergences	  from	  those	  general	  patterns,	  as	  well	  as	  individual	  
similarities	  and	  differences.	  	  The	  proposed	  analysis	  of	  collections	  of	  testimonials	  will	  therefore	  act	  as	  
a	  valuable	  precursor	  to	  the	  type	  of	  analysis	  that	  will	  be	  proposed	  in	  this	  section.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
A	  second	  limitation	  is	  that	  an	  analysis	  of	  testimonials	  of	  course	  restricts	  itself	  to	  one	  very	  specific	  and	  
very	  distinctive	  genre.	  Researchers	  in	  genre	  analysis	  maintain	  that	  people	  represent	  and	  construe	  
their	  ideas	  about	  their	  environments	  in	  different	  ways	  depending	  on	  the	  genre	  they	  use	  (Deignan,	  
Littlemore	  and	  Semino	  2013).	  	  It	  is	  hardly	  controversial	  to	  observe	  that	  a	  conservative	  religious	  
believer	  will	  use	  different	  language	  as	  well	  as	  a	  different	  perspective	  when	  preaching	  a	  sermon	  
compared	  to	  engaging	  in	  a	  debate	  with	  someone	  from	  another	  belief	  community.	  	  Any	  attempt	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therefore	  to	  say	  anything	  about	  the	  way	  that	  a	  conservative	  religious	  believer	  experiences	  his	  or	  her	  
religion	  would	  have	  to	  at	  least	  engage	  with	  the	  dynamics	  and	  unique	  aspects	  of	  two	  very	  different	  
genres	  in	  order	  to	  begin	  to	  form	  a	  rounded	  view.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  that	  the	  third	  research	  
question	  is	  addressed	  by	  focusing	  on	  a	  genre	  that	  is	  different	  from	  the	  genre	  of	  testimonials,	  while	  
retaining	  the	  focus	  on	  an	  individual’s	  language	  of	  experience.	  	  	  	  	  	  
A	  final	  limitation	  is	  that	  an	  analysis	  of	  testimonials	  restricts	  itself	  to	  the	  usage	  of	  language	  within	  the	  
context	  of	  a	  planned,	  written	  text.	  	  The	  extensive	  array	  of	  differences	  between	  the	  structure	  and	  
type	  of	  language	  in	  planned,	  written	  texts	  compared	  to	  unplanned,	  spoken	  discourse	  has	  been	  
researched	  in	  depth	  by	  a	  large	  number	  of	  applied	  linguistic	  researchers	  (for	  example,	  Cameron	  2001;	  
Drew	  and	  Curl	  2008;	  Eggins	  and	  Slade	  1997	  and	  Levinson	  1983).	  	  Therefore,	  as	  above,	  any	  attempt	  to	  
say	  anything	  about	  the	  way	  a	  believer	  experiences	  his	  or	  her	  religion	  should	  engage	  with	  both	  
unplanned,	  spoken	  interaction,	  as	  well	  as	  carefully	  planned,	  written	  texts.	  	  When	  we	  focus	  on	  
unplanned,	  spoken	  interaction	  we	  are	  immediately	  faced	  with	  issues	  such	  as	  turn	  taking,	  preferred	  
and	  dispreferred	  responses,	  maintaining	  face	  and	  politeness	  strategies,	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  
discourse	  convergence,	  language	  appropriation	  and	  unexpected	  emergent	  uses	  of	  words,	  phrases	  
and	  metaphors	  (Cameron	  2010a;	  Paltridge	  2006;	  Larsen-­‐Freeman	  and	  Cameron	  2008).	  
These	  issues	  also	  relate	  to	  the	  key	  notion	  of	  empathy.	  	  Cameron	  (2010a)	  defines	  empathy	  within	  the	  
context	  of	  reconciliation	  discourse	  as	  a	  process	  of	  rehumanization	  that	  can	  take	  place	  after	  
communities	  or	  individuals	  have	  dehumanized	  each	  other	  as	  a	  result	  of	  conflict.	  She	  also	  views	  it	  as	  a	  
process	  of	  “sympathy	  or	  emotional	  attunement	  with	  others”,	  as	  well	  as	  one	  which	  “requires	  that	  
people	  seek	  to	  understand	  the	  other	  person’s	  perspective	  on	  the	  world”	  (Cameron	  2010a:	  6).	  	  A	  
crucial	  element	  to	  empathy	  is	  of	  course	  the	  language	  that	  discourse	  participants	  initially	  use,	  and,	  
perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  how	  they	  respond	  to	  and	  make	  use	  of	  the	  language	  of	  the	  other.	  	  An	  
example	  of	  how	  language	  can	  be	  used	  to	  dehumanize	  the	  other	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  metonymic	  
cognitive	  strategies	  I	  briefly	  introduced	  in	  the	  section	  above.	  	  One	  illustration	  of	  this	  is	  the	  reference	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to	  people	  who	  are	  not	  born-­‐again	  Christians	  as,	  for	  example,	  souls	  in	  need	  of	  salvation.	  	  This	  has	  the	  
possible	  effect	  of	  reducing	  a	  person	  with	  a	  complex	  personality	  and	  a	  rich	  network	  of	  personal	  
stories	  to	  an	  impersonal,	  sexless	  thing	  that	  either	  is	  or	  is	  not	  saved.	  	  	  
There	  is	  another	  key	  consideration	  here	  that	  is	  closely	  connected	  to	  both	  the	  second	  and	  third	  
research	  question.	  	  It	  involves	  the	  connection	  between	  community	  sanctioned	  doctrine	  and	  personal	  
experience	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  conservative	  believer’s	  perceived	  sense	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  
divine	  entity.	  	  The	  standard	  way	  of	  describing	  this	  connection	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  cyclical	  relationship	  
between	  these	  three	  elements,	  so	  that	  doctrine	  informs	  perceived	  experience	  and	  vice	  versa,	  with	  
both	  doctrine	  and	  experience	  informing	  how	  a	  believer	  perceives	  the	  divine	  entity	  their	  beliefs	  
centre	  around	  (cf.	  Tremlin	  2005).	  	  However,	  if	  there	  are	  a	  surprising	  number	  of	  individual	  differences	  
in	  experience,	  but	  relatively	  few	  in	  terms	  of	  doctrine,	  it	  would	  follow	  that	  there	  is	  often	  some	  degree	  
of	  disconnection	  between	  a	  conservative	  religious	  believer’s	  acceptance	  of	  community	  sanctioned	  
doctrines	  and	  their	  own	  perceived	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Christian	  or	  Muslim.	  	  In	  addition,	  if	  it	  is	  
found	  that	  there	  is	  in	  some	  cases	  a	  level	  of	  disconnection,	  what	  might	  the	  implications	  be	  for	  the	  
area	  of	  inter-­‐faith	  dialogue?	  	  One	  important	  point	  here	  is	  that	  conservative	  religious	  belief	  invariably	  
precludes	  the	  possibility	  that	  people	  from	  other	  competing	  belief	  communities	  can	  have	  a	  true	  
experience	  of	  God.	  	  However,	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  that	  there	  is	  sometimes	  a	  disconnection	  from	  this	  
community	  sanctioned	  belief	  and	  the	  personal	  experience	  of	  individual	  believers.	  	  If	  this	  is	  indeed	  the	  
case,	  when	  two	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  are	  encouraged	  to	  talk	  to	  each	  other	  about	  their	  own	  
experiences	  and	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  other,	  will	  we	  see	  signs	  of	  empathy	  or	  just	  systematic	  
attempts	  to	  deny	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  other’s	  experience?	  	  Is	  it	  also	  possible	  that	  we	  will	  see	  
unexpected	  signs	  of	  similarity	  in	  their	  perceived	  experience,	  or	  just	  an	  attempt	  to	  express	  their	  own	  
experiences	  in	  ways	  that	  construe	  them	  as	  absolutely	  unique?	  	  My	  insistence	  on	  focusing	  on	  each	  
participant	  as	  an	  individual	  will	  be	  particularly	  suitable	  for	  addressing	  these	  key	  issues	  that	  relate	  to	  
the	  third	  research	  question.	  	  These	  interactions	  between	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  that	  appear	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to	  either	  cultivate	  or	  block	  empathy	  will	  also	  be	  important	  to	  this	  thesis	  in	  terms	  of	  identifying	  
possible	  applications	  to	  inter-­‐faith	  dialogue.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
I	  will	  therefore	  address	  this	  third	  research	  question	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  language	  of	  individuals	  rather	  
than	  the	  language	  of	  a	  group	  of	  individuals	  that	  are	  viewed	  as	  a	  collective	  entity.	  	  I	  will	  also	  focus	  on	  
a	  genre	  other	  than	  that	  of	  testimonials,	  while	  retaining	  my	  focus	  on	  the	  language	  of	  experience,	  and	  
will	  also	  focus	  on	  unplanned,	  spoken	  interaction	  instead	  of	  carefully	  planned,	  written	  texts.	  	  With	  
these	  three	  key	  points	  in	  mind,	  I	  will	  analyse	  three	  videoed	  discussions	  between	  conservative	  
Muslims	  and	  Christians.	  	  These	  discussions	  will	  produce	  three	  pieces	  of	  discourse	  which	  I	  will	  analyse	  
in	  two	  parts.	  	  The	  first	  part	  will	  focus	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  language	  of	  each	  participant,	  addressing	  
the	  issue	  of	  similarities	  and	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  they	  use	  movement	  and	  divine	  entity	  proximity	  
metaphors.	  	  The	  second	  part	  will	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  similarity	  and	  difference	  may	  be	  increased	  
or	  decreased	  during	  the	  process	  of	  discourse.	  	  It	  will	  therefore	  focus	  on	  instances	  of	  metaphor	  
appropriation	  and	  the	  use	  of	  personal	  stories	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  other.	  	  These	  instances	  will	  be	  
explored	  in	  terms	  of	  whether	  they	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  helping	  to	  cultivate	  empathy	  and	  decrease	  
distance	  and	  difference,	  or	  whether	  they	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  blocking	  empathy	  and	  increasing	  
distance	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  difference.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Having	  introduced	  many	  of	  the	  key	  issues	  that	  will	  be	  crucial	  in	  addressing	  the	  above	  three	  research	  
questions,	  I	  am	  now	  able	  to	  move	  on	  to	  a	  brief	  outline	  of	  the	  proceeding	  chapters.	  	  	  
	  
1.6	  An	  Overview	  of	  the	  Thesis	  
My	  aim	  so	  far	  has	  been	  to	  briefly	  introduce	  the	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  research	  questions	  that	  this	  
thesis	  will	  revolve	  around.	  	  This	  has	  included	  an	  introduction	  to	  the	  areas	  of	  cognitive	  models,	  the	  
nature	  and	  identification	  of	  metaphor,	  as	  well	  as	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  dynamically	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unfolding	  discourse	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  empathy.	  	  These	  notions	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  far	  more	  detail	  in	  
the	  following	  chapters.	  
In	  chapter	  two,	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  detailed	  overview	  of	  Lakoff’s	  theory	  of	  idealised	  cognitive	  models	  or	  
ICMs.	  	  This	  will	  include	  an	  exploration	  of	  how	  his	  ideas	  have	  recently	  been	  applied,	  not	  just	  to	  
isolated	  subject	  areas	  like	  the	  seven-­‐day	  week,	  but	  to	  entire	  theoretical	  frameworks.	  	  I	  will	  then	  
explicitly	  apply	  elements	  of	  his	  ideas	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  and	  the	  notion	  
of	  absolute	  certainty.	  	  This	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  consideration	  of	  Evans’	  LCCM	  theory,	  which	  updates	  Lakoff’s	  
approach	  to	  cognitive	  models	  by	  incorporating	  a	  usage-­‐based	  perspective,	  along	  with	  the	  
incorporation	  of	  other	  contributions	  related	  to	  the	  field	  of	  Cognitive	  Linguistics	  that	  include	  the	  
notions	  of	  episodic	  and	  semantic	  memory.	  	  After	  this	  exploration	  of	  cognitive	  models,	  I	  will	  conclude	  
the	  chapter	  by	  grounding	  the	  Cognitive	  Linguistic	  approach	  to	  how	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  
may	  categorise	  their	  environments	  within	  a	  wider	  philosophical	  context.	  	  I	  will	  therefore	  briefly	  
explore	  the	  contributions	  of	  scholars	  such	  as	  Wittgenstein,	  Wisdom	  and	  Mehan	  to	  the	  area	  of	  how	  
we	  organise	  our	  knowledge,	  and	  examine	  how	  these	  contributions	  share	  crucial	  points	  of	  agreement	  
and	  some	  key	  points	  of	  disagreement	  with	  the	  Cognitive	  Linguistic	  approach.	  Throughout	  this	  
chapter	  I	  will	  be	  concerned	  with	  how	  my	  investigation	  of	  cognitive	  models	  explains	  why	  conservative	  
religious	  believers	  perceive	  aspects	  of	  their	  environment	  in	  simplified,	  rigid	  terms.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
this	  chapter	  will	  also	  be	  concerned	  with	  the	  implications	  for	  conservative	  religious	  belief	  of	  the	  fact	  
that	  our	  cognitive	  models	  are	  in	  a	  state	  constant	  flux.	  	  	  	  
In	  chapter	  three,	  I	  will	  begin	  with	  an	  introduction	  of	  the	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  testimonials	  that	  will	  
provide	  the	  focus	  of	  my	  analysis.	  	  This	  will	  involve	  an	  outline	  of	  their	  underpinning	  beliefs	  and	  
functions.	  	  I	  will	  then	  proceed	  to	  an	  introduction	  of	  the	  target	  metaphors:	  metaphors	  related	  to	  
movement	  and	  divine	  entity	  proximity.	  	  This	  will	  be	  followed	  with	  an	  exploration	  of	  my	  chosen	  
methodology	  for	  identifying	  metaphor	  in	  text,	  along	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  presuppositions	  of	  those	  
target	  metaphors	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  certainty.	  	  I	  will	  then	  discuss	  the	  key	  differences	  between	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the	  usage	  and	  frequency	  of	  those	  metaphors	  in	  the	  two	  collections	  of	  texts	  and	  relate	  the	  results	  to	  
the	  possibility	  of	  varying	  patterns	  of	  perceptions	  about	  the	  reality	  of	  their	  beliefs.	  	  I	  will	  conclude	  by	  
briefly	  exploring	  the	  implications	  of	  being	  unable	  to	  identify	  clear,	  fixed	  differences	  between	  the	  uses	  
of	  movement	  and	  divine	  entity	  proximity	  metaphors	  in	  the	  two	  collections	  of	  texts.	  	  This	  will	  also	  
involve	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  advantages	  of	  being	  aware	  of	  the	  particular	  type	  of	  experiential	  language	  
to	  focus	  on	  during	  attempts	  at	  meaningful	  engagement	  with	  committed	  conservative	  believers.	  	  	  
The	  focus	  of	  chapter	  four	  will	  be	  my	  analysis	  of	  videoed	  discussions	  between	  Muslims	  and	  Christians.	  	  
I	  will	  begin	  by	  discussing	  the	  importance	  of	  focusing	  on	  differences	  and	  similarities	  between	  the	  
language	  of	  individuals,	  rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  collective	  patterns	  of	  similarity	  and	  difference	  
between	  two	  collections	  of	  texts.	  	  I	  will	  then	  proceed	  to	  an	  exploration	  of	  some	  of	  the	  key	  issues	  
relating	  to	  conversation	  analysis	  and	  the	  study	  of	  empathy.	  	  This	  will	  be	  followed	  by	  an	  outline	  of	  the	  
design	  of	  the	  discussions,	  including	  the	  pre-­‐discussion	  activities	  that	  the	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  
complete,	  and	  the	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  metaphorical	  language	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  focus	  on.	  	  I	  will	  
then	  move	  on	  to	  a	  two-­‐part	  analysis	  of	  the	  discussions.	  	  The	  first	  part	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  similarities	  
and	  differences	  in	  how	  each	  participant	  made	  use	  of	  particular	  movement	  and	  divine	  entity	  
proximity	  metaphors.	  	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  analysis	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  interactive	  aspects	  of	  the	  
discourse	  and	  how	  the	  participants	  appropriated	  the	  language	  of	  the	  other	  participants	  and	  made	  
use	  of	  personal	  stories	  that	  were	  related	  to	  the	  addressee.	  	  The	  findings	  of	  this	  analysis	  will	  then	  be	  
discussed	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  relatively	  new	  field	  of	  cognitive	  anthropology,	  as	  well	  as	  Evans’	  
work	  on	  cognitive	  models	  and	  the	  role	  of	  episodic	  memory.	  I	  will	  conclude	  this	  chapter	  by	  briefly	  
exploring	  the	  possible	  ramifications	  of	  identifying	  large	  differences	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  individual	  
believers	  from	  the	  same	  belief	  community.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	  chapter	  five	  I	  will	  draw	  together	  the	  various	  strands	  that	  have	  been	  explored	  in	  the	  above	  chapters.	  	  
I	  will	  begin	  by	  providing	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  how	  the	  three	  research	  questions	  have	  been	  addressed,	  
followed	  by	  an	  outline	  of	  how	  each	  chapter	  has	  contributed	  to	  a	  synthetic	  view	  of	  how	  conservative	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religious	  believers	  develop	  and	  maintain	  a	  sense	  of	  certainty.	  	  I	  will	  then	  move	  on	  to	  a	  final	  discussion	  
of	  how	  my	  findings	  may	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  area	  of	  inter-­‐faith	  dialogue.	  	  This	  thesis	  will	  be	  then	  be	  
concluded	  by	  posing	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  my	  investigations	  into	  a	  sense	  of	  certainty	  may	  be	  























Chapter	  Two:	  Cognitive	  and	  Epistemological	  Foundations:	  An	  Exploration	  of	  Idealised	  Cognitive	  
Models	  
	  
My	  intention	  throughout	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  explore	  Cognitive	  Linguistic	  research	  into	  how	  people	  
categorise	  their	  environments.	  	  This	  exploration	  will	  also	  lead	  to	  an	  examination	  of	  how	  such	  a	  
process	  could	  lead	  to	  and	  even	  encourage	  the	  conservative	  religious	  believer’s	  perception	  that	  key	  
aspects	  of	  reality	  are	  clearly	  reducible	  to	  simplified	  dual	  categories.	  	  This	  will	  involve	  an	  exploration	  
of	  the	  cognitive	  linguistic	  notion	  of	  cognitive	  models	  and	  how	  these	  models	  shape	  the	  way	  we	  view	  
reality	  by	  drawing	  on	  propositional	  frames,	  abstract	  image	  schemas,	  metonymy	  and	  metaphor.	  	  This	  
chapter	  will	  also	  engage	  with	  the	  ideas	  of	  scholars	  outside	  of	  Cognitive	  Linguistics	  who	  have	  made	  
important	  observations	  that	  could	  be	  relevant	  to	  this	  investigation	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  way	  conservative	  
religious	  believers	  perceive	  reality.	  	  	  
	  
2.1	  An	  Overview	  of	  Cognitive	  Models	  
My	  intention	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  explore	  one	  possible	  epistemological	  and	  cognitive	  framework	  for	  
how	  people	  categorise	  reality.	  	  By	  epistemology,	  I	  mean	  the	  study	  of	  how	  we	  know	  the	  things	  we	  do,	  
and	  the	  nature	  of	  that	  knowledge.	  	  One	  crucial	  area	  that	  this	  chapter	  will	  therefore	  be	  concerned	  
with	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world	  and	  the	  world	  itself.	  	  One	  of	  my	  key	  
premises	  is	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  view	  the	  subjects	  of	  epistemology	  and	  language	  is	  through	  the	  
perspective	  of	  cognitive	  models.	  I	  will	  therefore	  begin	  my	  exploration	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  these	  models	  
through	  an	  examination	  of	  Lakoff’s	  theory	  of	  idealised	  cognitive	  models	  (ICMs)	  first	  discussed	  in	  
detail	  in	  his	  book	  Women,	  Fire	  and	  Dangerous	  Things	  (1987).	  	  
ICMs	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  all-­‐encompassing	  mental	  or	  cognitive	  models	  within	  the	  human	  mind	  that	  act	  
as	  “complex	  structured	  systems	  of	  knowledge”	  (Evans	  and	  Green	  2006:	  279),	  or	  procedurally	  as	  “a	  
way	  in	  which	  we	  organise	  knowledge,	  not	  as	  a	  direct	  reflection	  of	  an	  objective	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  the	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world,	  but	  according	  to	  certain	  cognitive	  structuring	  principles”	  (Cienki	  2007:	  176).	  	  These	  quotes	  
suggest	  that	  knowledge	  is	  not	  something	  that	  is	  primarily	  absorbed	  from	  our	  external	  environment	  
and	  stored	  inside	  our	  brains	  as	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  representation	  of	  its	  source.	  	  Knowledge	  depends	  on	  
how	  objects	  and	  situations	  are	  understood	  and	  “there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  neutral	  way	  to	  
understand	  things”	  (Lakoff	  1987:	  300).	  The	  central	  premise	  is	  that	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  
depend	  and,	  up	  to	  a	  point,	  derive	  from	  the	  way	  our	  cognitive	  and	  conceptual	  frameworks	  are	  
organised,	  and	  it	  is	  often	  very	  difficult	  or	  impossible	  to	  objectively	  establish	  whether	  those	  
frameworks	  fit	  or	  do	  not	  fit	  the	  entity	  being	  represented	  in	  the	  external	  environment	  (cf.	  Lakoff	  
1987:	  292-­‐303;	  Al-­‐Zahrani	  2008).	  	  Another	  way	  of	  putting	  this	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  way	  we	  categorise	  
and	  use	  language	  to	  describe	  the	  world	  around	  us	  depends	  on	  our	  particular	  perspective,	  which	  
implies	  that	  “the	  world	  is	  not	  objectively	  reflected	  in	  the	  language:	  the	  categorization	  function	  of	  the	  
language	  imposes	  a	  structure	  on	  the	  world	  rather	  than	  just	  mirroring	  objective	  reality”	  (Geeraerts	  
and	  Cuyckens	  2007:	  5).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	  Women,	  Fire	  and	  Dangerous	  Things	  (1987),	  Lakoff	  proposed	  his	  theory	  of	  ICMs	  with	  the	  intention	  
of	  incorporating	  several	  major	  theories	  within	  Cognitive	  Linguistics.	  	  These	  theories	  led	  to	  his	  
(1987:68)	  postulation	  that	  the	  human	  cognitive	  framework	  is	  composed	  of	  the	  following	  elements:	  
• A	  propositional	  structure	  derived	  from	  Fillmore’s	  (1982)	  theory	  of	  frame	  semantics.	  	  This	  
involves	  the	  specification	  of	  specific	  elements	  that	  can	  often	  be	  represented	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  
statement,	  such	  as	  the	  term	  week	  resting	  on	  the	  proposition,	  “the	  week	  is	  a	  whole	  with	  
seven	  parts	  organised	  in	  a	  linear	  sequence;	  each	  part	  is	  called	  a	  day	  …”	  (Lakoff	  1987:	  68).	  
• An	  image	  schematic	  structure	  derived	  from	  Langacker	  (1986).	  	  This	  posits	  the	  existence	  of	  
underlying,	  highly	  abstract	  schemas	  such	  as	  Lakoff’s	  (1987:	  275;	  1999:	  32-­‐34)	  proposal	  of	  a	  
source-­‐path-­‐goal	  schema	  that	  claims	  that	  humans	  are	  cognitively	  constrained	  to	  view	  many	  
entities	  as	  in	  the	  process	  of	  moving	  along	  a	  trajectory	  (the	  path),	  from	  a	  particular	  point	  (the	  
source)	  and	  towards	  another	  point	  (the	  goal).	  Notions	  such	  as	  the	  linear	  sequence	  involved	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in	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  passing	  of	  time	  alluded	  to	  above	  are	  specific,	  detailed	  instantiations	  
that	  are	  derived	  from	  this	  very	  abstract	  schema.	  	  
• Lakoff’s	  own	  theory	  of	  metaphoric	  mental	  mappings	  (Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  1980).	  	  A	  
metaphoric	  mapping,	  according	  to	  Lakoff,	  is	  using	  one	  domain	  to	  say	  something	  about	  
another	  domain.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  example	  of	  this	  week	  has	  gone	  by	  so	  quickly	  we	  can	  see	  
the	  domain	  of	  spatially	  tracking	  the	  movement	  of	  a	  physical	  object	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  speaker	  
is	  being	  used	  to	  say	  something	  about	  the	  feeling	  of	  it	  being	  Friday.	  This	  metaphoric	  mapping	  
of	  course	  relies	  on	  the	  propositional	  ICM	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  week,	  as	  well	  as	  again	  being	  an	  
example	  of	  filling	  out	  the	  highly	  abstract,	  non-­‐specific	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  schema	  with	  specific	  
elements	  (an	  entity	  is	  being	  construed	  as	  moving	  along	  a	  specific	  path	  that	  at	  some	  point	  
passes	  the	  perceiver).	  
• Lakoff’s	  theory	  of	  metonymic	  mental	  mappings	  (Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  1980).	  A	  metonymic	  
mapping,	  according	  to	  Lakoff,	  is	  using	  one	  thing	  to	  represent	  or	  stand	  for	  another	  thing,	  so	  
for	  example	  when	  we	  talk	  about	  a	  difficult	  week,	  we	  are	  not	  usually	  referring	  to	  the	  whole	  
week,	  but	  to	  particular	  periods	  of	  time	  within	  that	  week.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  are	  using	  a	  
reference	  to	  the	  whole	  week	  to	  represent	  or	  stand	  for	  particular	  parts	  of	  it,	  or,	  to	  put	  it	  
another	  way,	  the	  phrase	  difficult	  week	  involves	  a	  whole-­‐for-­‐part	  metonym.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
According	  to	  Lakoff,	  these	  aspects	  give	  rise	  to	  four	  types	  of	  ICMs:	  propositional	  ICMs,	  image	  
schematic	  ICMs,	  metaphoric	  ICMs	  and	  metonymic	  ICMs.	  
Having	  provided	  a	  quick	  overview	  of	  the	  components	  of	  Lakoff’s	  notion	  of	  ICMs,	  I	  am	  now	  able	  to	  
proceed	  with	  a	  more	  detailed	  examination	  of	  these	  ideas.	  	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  will	  provide	  more	  
examples	  of	  ICMs	  and	  why	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  would	  find	  this	  approach	  to	  epistemology	  
threatening.	  	  This	  will	  introduce	  the	  key	  theme	  of	  the	  need	  for	  and	  perception	  of	  objective	  certainty	  
in	  conservative	  religious	  belief	  that	  will	  be	  further	  developed	  in	  the	  later	  sections.	  	  Section	  2.3	  will	  
move	  beyond	  the	  consideration	  of	  single	  entities	  like	  the	  terms	  week	  or	  mother	  towards	  an	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application	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  ICMs	  to	  collections	  of	  ideas,	  such	  as	  Darwin’s	  presentation	  of	  the	  
principles	  of	  natural	  selection.	  	  This	  will	  lead	  to	  an	  exploration	  of	  how	  this	  theory	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  
conservative	  religious	  belief	  systems	  in	  section	  2.4,	  along	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  the	  importance	  
of	  the	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  schema.	  	  Section	  2.5	  will	  go	  on	  to	  examine	  an	  alternative	  theory	  of	  cognitive	  
models	  to	  Lakoff’s	  own	  theory	  that	  has	  grown	  out	  of	  the	  emphasis	  on	  usage-­‐based	  approaches	  to	  the	  
analysis	  of	  language	  and	  its	  underpinning	  conceptualisations.	  	  Once	  I	  have	  completed	  a	  survey	  of	  the	  
idea	  of	  cognitive	  models,	  I	  will	  then	  provide	  a	  wider	  philosophical	  grounding	  for	  these	  ideas	  in	  
section	  2.6	  by	  exploring	  some	  key	  ideas	  relevant	  to	  epistemology	  and	  certainty	  outside	  of	  Cognitive	  
Linguistics.	  	  My	  justification	  for	  this	  departure	  from	  a	  pure	  concern	  with	  the	  Cognitive	  Linguistic	  
approach	  is	  twofold:	  first,	  any	  serious	  Cognitive	  Linguistic	  application	  to	  the	  language	  of	  belief	  
systems	  and	  religion	  must	  first	  interact	  with	  some	  of	  the	  ideas	  that	  appear	  to	  have	  helped	  shape	  
aspects	  of	  the	  Cognitive	  Linguistic	  approach,	  such	  as	  Wittgenstein’s	  work	  on	  language	  games.	  Second,	  
I	  believe	  that	  some	  of	  the	  ideas	  that	  grew	  out	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  work,	  such	  as	  Wisdom’s	  notion	  
of	  the	  arranging	  of	  connections	  in	  support	  of	  religious	  statements	  and	  Mehan’s	  exploration	  of	  
incorrigible	  propositions,	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  broadly	  agreeing	  and	  even	  enriching	  the	  Cognitive	  
Linguistic	  notion	  of	  ICMs.	  I	  will	  therefore	  complete	  this	  chapter	  by	  demonstrating	  how	  the	  various	  
strands	  relating	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  cognitive	  models	  and	  the	  arguments	  of	  Wisdom	  and	  Mehan	  can	  be	  
brought	  together	  to	  provide	  a	  full	  answer	  to	  my	  first	  research	  question.	  	  	  
	  
2.2	  Idealised	  Cognitive	  Models	  and	  the	  Desire	  for	  Objective	  Truth	  
In	  the	  introduction	  above	  I	  referred	  to	  Lakoff’s	  famous	  example	  of	  the	  seven	  day	  week	  to	  illustrate	  
propositional	  ICMs.	  	  He	  (1987:	  68-­‐69)	  refers	  to	  it	  as	  an	  “idealised”	  structuring	  of	  time	  on	  the	  grounds	  
that	  it	  does	  not	  objectively	  exist	  in	  the	  external	  world,	  but	  is	  rather	  one	  somewhat	  arbitrary	  human	  
idea	  imposed	  upon	  the	  world	  from	  among	  several	  possible	  alternatives.	  	  Many	  conservative	  religious	  
believers	  would	  of	  course	  disagree.	  	  Evangelical	  Christians,	  for	  example,	  would	  argue	  that	  the	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number	  seven	  is	  the	  perfect	  number	  and	  God’s	  decision	  to	  rest	  on	  the	  seventh	  day	  was	  a	  symbol	  of	  
the	  fact	  that	  a	  six	  day	  working	  week,	  with	  one	  day	  of	  rest	  consecrated	  to	  the	  worship	  of	  God,	  is	  
objectively	  the	  optimum	  framework	  for	  any	  society	  and	  a	  “basic	  principle	  of	  life”	  (Eveson	  2001:	  54-­‐
56).	  	  We	  can	  see	  now	  why	  the	  notion	  of	  epistemologically	  relative	  ICMs	  is	  very	  threatening	  to	  
conservative	  religious	  believers,	  as	  well	  as	  proponents	  of	  other	  related	  belief	  systems.	  	  One	  of	  the	  
principal	  reasons	  for	  this	  appears	  to	  be	  that	  objective	  knowledge	  is	  often	  naturally	  seen	  as	  a	  vital	  
prerequisite	  of	  certainty,	  and	  certainty	  appears	  to	  be	  often	  viewed	  as	  a	  vital	  characteristic	  of	  
conservative	  religious	  worldviews.	  This	  line	  of	  reasoning	  can	  be	  clearly	  seen	  in	  a	  prominent	  
Evangelical’s	  summary	  of	  the	  argument	  underpinning	  postmodernism:	  	  
At	  root,	  however,	  it	  operates	  by	  denying	  that	  objective	  ground	  exists	  for	  believing	  that	  anything	  is	  true	  or	  right	  …	  
There	  is	  no	  hub	  to	  hold	  the	  spokes;	  or	  if	  there	  is,	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  get	  our	  cognitive	  sights	  on	  it.	  	  
(Wells	  2007:	  40)	  
Wells	  (ibid.)	  goes	  on	  to	  examine	  how	  postmodernism	  impacts	  on	  modern	  society	  by	  discussing	  the	  
American	  TV	  show	  Seinfeld	  (1993-­‐2007),	  which	  he	  views	  as	  encapsulating	  the	  postmodern	  worldview.	  
He	  then	  frames	  his	  conclusions	  about	  the	  show	  with	  a	  metaphorical	  reference	  to	  a	  journey:	  	  	  
The	  journey	  into	  the	  postmodern	  world,	  from	  the	  writers	  of	  the	  literature	  of	  bewilderment	  into	  television	  shows	  
like	  this,	  is	  one	  from	  darkness	  in	  the	  depths	  to	  mockery	  on	  the	  surface,	  from	  suicide	  to	  shallow	  snickers	  …	  Such	  loss	  
of	  any	  grounding	  for	  meaning	  also	  eats	  away	  at	  hope.	  
(Wells	  2007:	  41)	  
This	  worldview	  that	  denies	  the	  possibility	  of	  objective	  meaning	  is	  clearly	  laid	  out	  as	  the	  enemy.	  The	  
Evangelical	  Christian	  Church	  should	  therefore	  confront	  this	  enemy	  with	  a	  worldview	  that	  must	  be	  
packaged	  as	  clear,	  purposeful	  and	  grounded	  in	  absolute	  and	  objective	  truth.	  For	  Evangelical	  
Christians,	  this	  takes	  the	  shape	  of	  “the	  triune	  God	  of	  whom	  Scripture	  speaks”:	  	  
He	  it	  is	  who	  not	  only	  sustains	  all	  of	  life,	  directing	  it	  to	  its	  appointed	  end,	  but	  who	  also	  is	  the	  measure	  of	  what	  is	  




We	  can	  see	  the	  same	  insistence	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  perception	  of	  the	  true	  knowledge	  of	  reality	  in	  
conservative	  Muslim	  polemics	  about	  unbelievers.	  	  Note	  the	  use	  of	  metaphorical	  language	  related	  to	  
the	  physical	  and	  concrete	  domains	  of	  movement	  and	  vision	  to	  express	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  
concrete	  and	  objective	  fact	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  Islam	  in	  this	  extract	  below	  (in	  addition	  to	  the	  reference	  to	  
“a	  man”,	  revealing	  the	  author’s	  ideological	  belief	  in	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  male	  perspective):	  
A	  man	  observes	  the	  vast	  panorama	  of	  nature,	  the	  superb	  mechanism	  that	  is	  ceaselessly	  working,	  the	  grand	  design	  
that	  is	  manifest	  in	  every	  aspect	  of	  creation	  –	  he	  observes	  this	  vast	  machine	  but	  he	  does	  not	  know	  anything	  of	  its	  
maker	  and	  director	  …	  How	  can	  a	  man,	  who	  has	  so	  blinded	  himself	  to	  reality	  approach	  true	  knowledge?	  	  How	  can	  
one	  who	  has	  made	  the	  wrong	  beginning	  reach	  the	  right	  destination?	  	  He	  will	  fail	  to	  find	  the	  key	  to	  Reality.	  	  The	  Right	  
Path	  will	  remain	  concealed	  for	  him	  and	  whatever	  his	  endeavours	  in	  science	  and	  arts,	  he	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  attain	  
truth	  and	  wisdom.	  He	  will	  be	  groping	  in	  the	  darkness	  of	  ignorance.	  	  
(Mawdudi	  1999:7-­‐8)	  	  	  	  	  
It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  Cognitive	  Linguistics,	  this	  intersection	  between	  a	  
belief	  that	  objective	  truth	  is	  self-­‐evidently	  obvious	  (unless	  we	  choose	  to	  blind	  ourselves)	  and	  the	  use	  
of	  metaphorical	  language	  to	  express	  that	  perception	  of	  obvious	  certainty	  exhibits	  some	  of	  the	  key	  
characteristics	  of	  a	  very	  sophisticated	  network	  of	  ICMs.	  However,	  before	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  apply	  the	  
notion	  of	  ICMs	  to	  complex	  worldviews,	  it	  is	  first	  important	  to	  further	  justify	  the	  crucial	  underlying	  
argument	  that	  objective	  knowledge	  about	  complex,	  abstract	  aspects	  of	  the	  Universe	  (such	  as	  the	  
purpose	  and	  goal	  of	  life)	  is	  unattainable.	  
The	  argument	  of	  many	  key	  Cognitive	  Linguistic	  researchers	  is	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  ICMs	  can	  be	  applied	  
to	  entities	  in	  the	  world	  that	  may	  appear	  indisputably	  objective	  to	  many	  people.	  	  Let	  us	  consider	  
Lakoff’s	  oft-­‐quoted	  examination	  of	  the	  term	  mother	  (Lakoff	  1987:	  74;	  see	  also	  Evans	  and	  Green	  2006:	  
271-­‐272;	  Taylor	  2003:	  89-­‐91).	  	  At	  first	  glance,	  this	  term	  appears	  to	  be	  straightforward	  and	  one	  could	  
imagine	  that	  a	  single,	  unproblematic	  definition	  would	  be	  possible.	  	  However,	  Lakoff	  (ibid.)	  postulates	  
the	  existence	  of	  several	  cognitive	  models	  such	  as	  the	  “birth	  model”,	  the	  “genetic	  model”	  and	  the	  
“nurturance	  model”	  that	  form	  “cluster	  models”	  inside	  our	  minds	  and	  must	  all	  be	  considered	  when	  
we	  come	  to	  define	  what	  a	  mother	  is.	  	  As	  well	  as	  foregrounding	  different	  aspects	  of	  the	  notion	  of	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being	  a	  mother,	  these	  different	  models	  also	  reflect	  distinctive	  arrangements	  of	  connotations	  
(Littlemore	  2009:	  76).	  	  	  
This	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  very	  similar	  to	  how	  people	  use	  the	  term	  God	  to	  stand	  for	  their	  own	  preferred	  
choice	  of	  model	  from	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  possible	  models	  for	  what	  or	  who	  a	  personal	  divine	  entity	  is	  
perceived	  to	  be.	  	  This	  can	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  central	  figures	  like	  Jesus	  where	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  identify	  
several	  key	  models	  such	  as	  Jesus	  as	  the	  forerunner	  of	  Mohammad,	  Jesus	  as	  a	  carpenter,	  Jesus	  as	  Son	  
of	  God	  and	  Jewish	  Messiah,	  or	  Jesus	  as	  God	  the	  Son	  and	  creator	  of	  the	  Universe.	  However,	  there	  
appears	  to	  be	  one	  important	  difference	  between	  the	  example	  of	  Jesus	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  mother.	  	  
When,	  for	  example,	  a	  conservative	  Christian	  talks	  about	  Jesus	  as	  God	  the	  Son	  and	  an	  agnostic	  
historian	  talks	  about	  Jesus	  as	  a	  carpenter	  who	  became	  a	  wandering	  rabbi,	  they	  are	  not	  just	  adopting	  
different	  perspectives	  but	  crucially	  they	  are	  referring	  to	  radically	  different	  entities	  with	  very	  diverse	  
spatial	  and	  temporal	  properties.	  	  The	  latter	  appears	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  spatially	  bounded	  and	  limited	  
to	  a	  specific	  point	  in	  time	  and	  completely	  excludes	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  former,	  while	  the	  former	  is	  
in	  many	  ways	  perceived	  as	  spatially	  and	  temporally	  unbounded	  and	  only	  includes	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  
latter	  as	  an	  important	  but	  nonetheless	  peripheral	  aspect.	  	  
Within	  the	  context	  of	  testimonials,	  it	  also	  even	  becomes	  possible	  to	  view	  usages	  of	  abstract	  entities	  
such	  as	  reason	  and	  logic	  as	  ICM	  frames	  and	  metonymic	  models.	  	  	  	  References	  to	  both	  these	  terms	  are	  
used,	  particularly	  in	  Muslim	  discourse,	  as	  a	  device	  for	  supporting	  the	  perceived	  clear	  establishment	  
of	  truth.	  Consider	  these	  examples,	  the	  first	  one	  being	  an	  extract	  from	  the	  Muslim	  testimonial	  data	  I	  
will	  examine	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  and	  the	  second	  an	  extract	  from	  another	  book	  published	  by	  the	  
Birmingham	  based	  Islamic	  Dawah	  Centre	  International:	  	  
One	  day	  a	  friend	  asked	  me	  why	  I	  didn't	  convert	  to	  Islam	  if	  I	  liked	  it	  so	  much.	  "But	  I	  am	  already	  Muslim."	  My	  answer	  
surprised	  me.	  But	  then,	  I	  realized	  that	  it	  was	  a	  simple	  matter	  of	  logic	  and	  common	  sense.	  Islam	  made	  sense.	  	  
(Muslim	  Text	  9)	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Rational	  Teaching:	  Since	  God	  bestowed	  reason	  and	  intellect	  on	  mankind,	  it	  is	  our	  duty	  to	  use	  it	  to	  distinguish	  truth	  
from	  falsehood.	  	  True	  undistorted	  revelation	  from	  God	  must	  be	  rational	  and	  can	  be	  reasoned	  out	  by	  unbiased	  
minds.	  	  
(Bucaille	  2000:	  16)	  
It	  appears	  to	  be	  reasonable	  to	  argue	  here	  that	  the	  propositional	  and	  schematic	  frameworks	  
underpinning	  the	  above	  usages	  of	  the	  term	  logic	  would	  be	  very	  different	  from	  the	  frameworks	  
employed	  by,	  for	  example,	  mathematicians	  when	  they	  explore	  the	  field	  of	  mathematical	  logic.	  	  The	  
argument	  here	  is	  that	  just	  as	  there	  are	  varying	  models	  relating	  to	  the	  term	  mother,	  there	  are	  varying	  
models	  relating	  even	  to	  the	  terms	  logic	  and	  reason.	  Each	  of	  these	  models	  differs	  in	  the	  
epistemological	  presuppositions	  that	  it	  begins	  with,	  along	  with	  their	  varying	  connotations	  and	  their	  
particular	  social	  and	  community	  contexts.	  	  
Yet	  another	  entity	  that	  is	  often	  assumed	  to	  be	  objectively	  definable	  and	  yet	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  
example	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  models	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  self.	  	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  (1999:	  267-­‐289)	  propose	  
a	  wide	  range	  of	  metaphors	  that	  relate	  to	  how	  we	  talk	  about	  ourselves,	  including:	  
• THE	  ESSENTIAL	  SELF	  METAPHOR,	  e.g.	  “He	  is	  afraid	  to	  reveal	  his	  inner	  self”	  
• THE	  MULTIPLE	  SELVES	  METAPHOR,	  e.g.	  “I	  keep	  going	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  the	  scientist	  and	  the	  priest	  in	  
me”	  
• THE	  SELF	  AS	  CONTAINER,	  e.g.	  “Are	  you	  out	  of	  your	  mind?”	  
• THE	  OBJECTIVE	  STANDPOINT	  METAPHOR,	  e.g.	  “You	  should	  take	  a	  good	  look	  at	  yourself”	  
	  
They	  (1999:	  288;	  see	  also	  Gibbs	  2005:	  20)	  conclude	  from	  their	  survey	  of	  metaphors	  about	  the	  self	  
that	  there	  is	  “no	  one	  consistent	  structuring	  of	  our	  inner	  lives”,	  and	  that	  the	  metaphors	  that	  we	  use	  to	  
talk	  about	  the	  self	  can	  be	  contradictory.	  	  Recent	  attempts	  to	  apply	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson’s	  models	  of	  
the	  concept	  of	  self	  to	  different	  languages	  (cf.	  Li	  2010;	  Pritzker	  2007;	  Robinson	  et	  al	  2006)	  have	  
further	  confirmed	  the	  variety	  of	  possible	  contradictory	  conceptions.	  	  For	  example,	  Li’s	  (2011:	  92)	  
survey	  of	  metaphors	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  self	  in	  Chinese	  autobiographical	  writing	  reveals	  a	  wide	  
range	  of	  spatial	  metaphors	  that	  are	  “far	  from	  fixed”	  in	  their	  negotiation	  “between	  the	  self,	  cognition	  
and	  culture”.	  	  In	  agreement	  with	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  and	  Gibbs,	  Li	  (ibid.)	  argues	  that	  the	  writers	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considered	  “draw	  from	  multiple	  and	  sometimes	  inconsistent	  models	  of	  the	  self	  and	  space	  in	  
understanding	  and	  writing	  about	  themselves”.	  	  I	  would	  therefore	  argue	  that	  just	  as	  we	  have	  different	  
models	  of	  a	  mother,	  we	  have	  just	  as	  many	  if	  not	  more	  competing	  models	  for	  our	  senses	  of	  self,	  mind	  
and	  consciousness.	  It	  is	  therefore	  no	  surprise	  that	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  growing	  support	  in	  the	  
neuroscience	  community	  for	  the	  argument	  of	  Varela,	  Thompson	  and	  Rosch	  (1993:	  105-­‐130;	  cf.	  
Mitchell	  2009)	  that	  our	  minds	  are	  in	  fact	  “selfless”	  examples	  of	  complex	  systems	  with	  dynamic	  
emergent	  properties	  –	  one	  of	  those	  properties	  being	  the	  “groundless”	  perception	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  
consciousness	  as	  a	  central	  command	  centre	  in	  our	  minds.	  	  	  
Having	  examined	  some	  of	  the	  key	  examples	  of	  ICMs	  used	  by	  Lakoff	  and	  other	  Cognitive	  Linguistic	  
researchers,	  I	  am	  now	  able	  to	  broaden	  my	  investigation	  by	  examining	  the	  relationship	  between	  ICMs	  
and	  larger	  more	  complex	  networks	  of	  ideas	  and	  processes.	  	  
	  
2.3	  Applying	  Idealised	  Cognitive	  Models	  to	  Collections	  of	  Ideas	  
I	  have	  so	  far	  restricted	  my	  consideration	  of	  cognitive	  models	  to	  entities	  such	  as	  mother,	  week,	  and	  
self,	  but	  if	  ICMs	  are	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  underpinning	  religious	  beliefs	  it	  must	  first	  be	  possible	  to	  point	  to	  
some	  evidence	  that	  ICMs	  underpin	  entire	  systems	  of	  thought	  and	  not	  just	  individual	  entities	  within	  
those	  systems.	  	  It	  is	  here	  where	  mainstream	  Cognitive	  Linguistics	  and	  the	  theory	  of	  social	  
constructionism	  have	  some	  agreement.	  Social	  constructionists	  essentially	  argue	  that	  all	  knowledge	  
and	  ways	  of	  viewing	  the	  world	  are	  the	  result	  of	  social	  context	  and	  conditioning	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  
objective	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world	  is	  impossible	  (Gergen	  2009;	  Gergen	  2003).	  	  This	  logically	  leads	  to	  a	  
questioning	  of	  the	  objective	  basis	  of	  all	  fields,	  including	  science.	  	  For	  example,	  Gergen	  (2009:	  34),	  
after	  briefly	  outlining	  and	  broadly	  agreeing	  with	  the	  central	  thesis	  of	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson’s	  conceptual	  
metaphor	  theory,	  argues	  that	  “metaphors	  dominate	  the	  scientific	  sphere”.	  	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  illustrate	  
this	  with	  examples	  from	  Psychiatry	  and	  even	  Physics,	  “to	  use	  metaphors	  is	  also	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  
their	  capacity	  to	  organize	  elements	  in	  different	  ways.	  	  Different	  forms	  of	  research	  were	  put	  in	  motion	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by	  viewing	  light	  in	  terms	  of	  waves	  as	  opposed	  to	  particles”	  (Gergen	  2009:	  35).	  	  As	  I	  shall	  discuss	  in	  the	  
section	  below	  on	  embodied	  realism,	  there	  are	  important	  differences	  between	  the	  more	  extreme	  
position	  of	  social	  constructionism	  and	  the	  position	  of	  Cognitive	  Linguistics	  within	  the	  subjectivist	  –	  
objectivist	  debate,	  but	  both	  approaches	  argue	  against	  a	  simple	  objectivist	  view	  of	  the	  empirical	  
sciences.	  	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  (1999:	  337-­‐550)	  argue	  at	  length	  that	  the	  whole	  field	  of	  philosophy	  is	  
based	  on	  various	  strands	  of	  subjective,	  metaphoric	  models,	  and	  also	  argue	  against	  a	  simple	  
objectivist	  approach	  to	  scientific	  paradigm,	  	  
There	  are	  no	  pure	  observation	  sentences	  from	  which	  a	  scientific	  theory	  can	  be	  arrived	  at	  through	  induction.	  	  There	  
can	  be	  no	  assumption-­‐free	  scientific	  observations.	  	  And	  there	  is	  no	  correct	  logic	  of	  induction	  that	  will	  yield	  correct	  
laws	  directly	  from	  observational	  data.	  Science,	  as	  Kuhn	  rightly	  observed,	  does	  not	  always	  proceed	  by	  the	  linear	  
accretion	  of	  objective	  knowledge.	  Science	  is	  a	  social,	  cultural,	  and	  historical	  practice,	  knowledge	  is	  always	  situated,	  
and	  what	  counts	  as	  knowledge	  may	  depend	  on	  matters	  of	  power	  and	  influence.	  	  	  
(Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  1999:	  88-­‐89)	  	  	  	  	  
One	  such	  scientific	  paradigm	  that	  has	  come	  under	  the	  scrutiny	  of	  cognitive	  linguists	  (Goatly	  2007;	  Al-­‐
Zahrani	  2008)	  is	  Darwin’s	  approach	  to	  the	  theory	  of	  evolution	  in	  his	  book	  Origin	  of	  the	  Species.	  	  I	  
must	  be	  clear	  here	  that	  my	  intention	  in	  surveying	  these	  arguments	  is	  not	  at	  all	  to	  question	  the	  
general	  theory	  of	  Evolution.	  	  Despite	  Cognitive	  Linguistic	  disagreements	  with	  objectivist	  approaches	  
to	  science,	  it	  is	  still	  viewed	  as	  important	  to	  accept	  (in	  terms	  of	  being	  beyond	  reasonable	  doubt)	  
numerous	  observations	  about	  the	  Universe.	  	  As	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  (1999:	  89)	  put	  it,	  “we	  are	  not	  
likely	  to	  discover	  that	  there	  are	  no	  such	  things	  as	  cells	  or	  that	  DNA	  does	  not	  have	  a	  double-­‐helix	  
structure.	  	  Many	  scientific	  results	  are	  stable”.	  I	  must	  also	  be	  clear	  that	  my	  intention	  is	  not	  in	  any	  way	  
to	  make	  a	  direct	  like-­‐for-­‐like	  comparison	  between	  Darwin’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  evolution	  
and	  conservative	  religious	  systems.	  There	  are	  far	  reaching	  qualitative	  differences	  between	  these	  two	  
frameworks	  that	  are	  widely	  recognised	  by	  most	  religious	  believers	  and	  non-­‐believers.	  However,	  in	  
line	  with	  main	  stream	  Cognitive	  Linguistics,	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  ICMs	  in	  our	  systems	  of	  thought	  must	  
be	  taken	  seriously	  and	  recent	  work	  on	  the	  theory	  of	  ICMs,	  especially	  involving	  converging	  research	  
between	  two	  scholars,	  should	  be	  reviewed	  before	  I	  turn	  to	  my	  own	  approach	  to	  ICMs	  in	  religious	  
43	  
	  
beliefs.	  One	  last	  point	  that	  makes	  a	  consideration	  of	  Darwin’s	  Origin	  of	  the	  Species	  particularly	  
pertinent	  to	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  schema	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  progress	  
towards	  a	  goal.	  
Al-­‐Zahrani’s	  article,	  Darwin’s	  Metaphors	  Revisited	  (2008),	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  articles	  that	  apply	  the	  
notion	  of	  ICMs	  to	  extended	  networks	  of	  ideas,	  although	  some	  of	  its	  key	  points	  were	  also	  made	  by	  
Goatly	  in	  his	  book	  Washing	  the	  Brain:	  Metaphor	  and	  Hidden	  Ideology	  (2007:	  341-­‐344;	  379-­‐380).	  	  The	  
article	  begins	  with	  the	  argument	  that	  Darwin’s	  theory	  revolves	  around	  the	  key	  concepts	  of	  NATURE,	  
LIFE	  and	  EVOLUTION	  and	  that	  in	  turn	  these	  concepts	  are	  presented	  through	  a	  network	  of	  metaphors	  
that	  form	  “structured	  gestalts	  used	  to	  interpret	  and	  understand	  experience”	  (Al-­‐Zahrani	  2008:	  52).	  	  
This	  is	  followed	  by	  an	  outline	  of	  Darwin’s	  explanation	  of	  the	  principles	  behind	  natural	  selection	  and	  
the	  fact	  that	  he	  came	  under	  intense	  criticism	  for	  his	  choice	  of	  a	  term	  that	  appears	  to	  exhibit	  such	  a	  
strong	  sense	  of	  personification	  in	  the	  form	  of	  “selecting”,	  “perfecting”	  and	  “seeking	  the	  good	  of	  the	  
species”	  (Al-­‐Zahrani	  2008:53-­‐54).	  
He	  argues	  that	  Darwin	  was	  determined	  to	  retain	  the	  term	  despite	  the	  intense	  criticism	  on	  the	  
grounds	  that	  it	  was	  intrinsically	  connected	  to	  the	  conceptual	  metaphor	  of	  NATURE	  IS	  A	  BREEDER.	  	  Al-­‐
Zahrani	  sees	  this	  conceptual	  metaphor,	  along	  with	  the	  related	  conceptual	  metaphor	  NATURE	  IS	  A	  
MOTHER,	  as	  linguistically	  instantiated	  in	  a	  number	  of	  passages	  from	  Darwin’s	  Origins,	  for	  example,	  
“Nature	  may	  be	  said	  to	  have	  taken	  pains	  to	  reveal	  her	  scheme	  of	  modifications	  …	  but	  we	  are	  too	  
blind	  to	  understand	  her	  meaning”	  (Darwin	  1872:	  636,	  quoted	  in	  Al-­‐Zahrani	  2008:	  59).	  Some	  of	  the	  
main	  characteristics	  that	  therefore	  become	  associated	  with	  nature	  are	  that	  “she”	  becomes	  a	  
personified	  agent	  with	  a	  particular	  purpose	  and	  goal	  (Al-­‐Zahrani	  2008:	  61).	  Darwin’s	  representation	  
of	  that	  goal	  involves	  the	  mapping	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  selectivity	  and	  planning	  from	  a	  breeder	  to	  
nature,	  which	  “ultimately	  allows	  us	  to	  comprehend	  nature	  in	  terms	  of	  human	  motivations,	  
characteristics	  and	  activities”	  (ibid.	  63).	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According	  to	  Al-­‐Zahrani	  (2008:	  64),	  two	  more	  key	  conceptual	  metaphors	  in	  Darwin’s	  work	  are	  LIFE	  IS	  
A	  RACE	  and	  LIFE	  IS	  A	  WAR	  (subsumed	  under	  LIFE	  IS	  STRUGGLE),	  which	  he	  views	  as	  connected	  to	  
NATURE	  IS	  A	  BREEDER	  through	  their	  shared	  requirement	  for	  a	  purposeful	  goal.	  	  These	  conceptual	  
metaphors	  pave	  the	  way	  to	  Darwin’s	  famous	  phrase:	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  fittest,	  which	  Al-­‐Zahrani	  
(2008:	  65)	  views	  as	  an	  “inference	  or	  by-­‐product	  of	  the	  ICM	  of	  struggle”.	  	  He	  also	  sees	  this	  phrase	  as	  
intimately	  connected	  to	  the	  metaphorical	  notion	  of	  evolution	  and	  the	  conceptual	  metaphor:	  
EVOLUTION	  IS	  PROGRESS	  (ibid.).	  Goatly	  also	  picks	  up	  on	  this	  theme	  in	  Darwin’s	  work	  and	  
demonstrates	  how	  Darwin	  applied	  the	  ideas	  of	  progress	  and	  advancement	  through	  struggle	  and	  
conflict	  to	  human	  societies	  and	  used	  it	  to	  rationalise	  colonialism:	  	  
The	  idea	  that	  societies	  competing	  against	  each	  other	  for	  supremacy	  was	  a	  realisation	  of	  the	  evolutionary	  struggle	  
for	  survival	  clearly	  provided	  an	  apologia	  for	  imperialism:	  
The	  more	  civilised	  so-­‐called	  Caucasian	  races	  have	  beaten	  the	  Turkish	  hollow	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  existence.	  	  
Looking	  to	  the	  world	  at	  no	  very	  distant	  date,	  what	  an	  endless	  number	  of	  lower	  races	  will	  have	  been	  
eliminated	  by	  the	  higher,	  civilised	  races	  throughout	  the	  world.	  (Letter	  of	  Darwin	  July	  3,	  1881	  quoted	  in	  
Rodgers	  (1972:274))	  	  
(Goatly	  2007:	  379-­‐380)	  
	  It	  is	  at	  this	  point	  that	  both	  Al-­‐Zahrani’s	  and	  Goatly’s	  arguments	  become	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  the	  
central	  concern	  of	  this	  thesis	  in	  metaphors	  related	  to	  movement	  and	  the	  underpinning	  notion	  of	  a	  
source-­‐path-­‐goal	  image	  schema.	  	  Not	  only	  does	  Darwin	  make	  use	  of	  language	  that	  personifies	  nature,	  
but	  he	  also	  insists	  on	  construing	  nature’s	  selections	  as	  purposefully	  progressing	  towards	  a	  goal:	  
[I]t	  may	  not	  be	  a	  logical	  deduction,	  but	  to	  my	  imagination,	  it	  is	  far	  more	  satisfactory	  to	  look	  at	  [different	  species	  of	  
organic	  beings]	  as	  …	  consequences	  of	  one	  general	  law	  leading	  to	  the	  advancement	  of	  all	  beings	  –	  namely	  multiply,	  
vary,	  let	  the	  strongest	  live	  and	  the	  weakest	  die.	  	  
(Darwin	  1993,	  p360,	  emphasis	  added)	  
[A]nd	  this	  [the	  amount	  of	  differentiation	  and	  specialization	  of	  the	  several	  organs]	  will	  include	  the	  advancement	  of	  
the	  brain	  for	  intellectual	  purposes.	  	  
(Ibid.	  p161,	  emphasis	  added)	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  Al-­‐Zahrani	  (2008:	  65)	  explicitly	  connects	  this	  purposeful	  progression	  to	  the	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  schema	  
(discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below),	  and	  argues	  that,	  for	  Darwin,	  the	  beginning	  of	  life	  on	  earth	  is	  
mapped	  on	  to	  the	  starting	  point	  part	  of	  the	  schema,	  instantiated	  in	  clauses	  such	  as	  “one	  general	  law	  
leading	  to	  the	  advancement	  of	  all	  beings”	  (Darwin	  1993:	  360)	  and	  biological	  “improvement”	  leading	  
to	  the	  “gradual	  advancement	  of	  the	  greater	  number	  of	  living	  beings”	  (ibid.	  160).	  	  	  
Al-­‐Zahrani	  (2008:	  70)	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  “human	  cultures	  elaborate	  and	  accentuate	  the	  struggle	  
gestalt	  by	  inventing	  struggle	  events	  such	  as	  games	  and	  races”.	  The	  argument	  here	  appears	  to	  be	  that	  
the	  creative	  construal	  of	  life	  as	  a	  path	  which	  “leads,	  in	  progressive	  waves	  of	  struggle,	  to	  more	  
advanced	  and	  higher	  conditions”	  is	  an	  embedded	  ICM	  within	  the	  cognitive	  frameworks	  of	  humans	  
across	  a	  range	  of	  different	  cultures	  (Al-­‐Zahrani	  2008:	  70,	  80).	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  no	  surprise	  that	  Darwin’s	  
ideas	  are	  dependent	  on	  this	  ICM.	  	  	  
He	  (2008:	  74-­‐80)	  subsequently	  attempts	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  these	  three	  integrated	  components	  
have	  the	  characteristics	  of	  ICMs	  by	  offering	  alternative	  reformulations.	  	  He	  argues,	  for	  example,	  that	  
the	  metaphor	  of	  struggle	  for	  existence	  could	  validly	  be	  replaced	  with	  the	  metaphor	  of	  “symbiotic	  
existence”	  (ibid.	  76).	  	  His	  evidence	  for	  this	  is	  a	  survey	  of	  examples	  where	  Darwin	  proposed	  a	  model	  of	  
subjugation,	  war	  and	  struggle	  whereas	  modern	  researchers	  have	  preferred	  to	  view	  the	  situation	  as	  
one	  of	  symbiotic	  interdependence	  (ibid.	  77-­‐78).	  	  Al-­‐Zahrani	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  metaphor	  of	  
natural	  selection	  does	  not	  fit	  the	  world	  as	  well	  as	  “natural	  elimination	  of	  the	  least	  fit”	  does	  (ibid.	  74).	  	  
He	  also	  demonstrates	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  fittest	  as	  much	  as	  it	  is	  the	  survival	  
of	  everything	  except	  the	  weakest,	  “the	  survival	  of	  the	  weaker,	  the	  weak,	  the	  strong,	  the	  stronger	  and	  
the	  strongest”	  (ibid.	  75).	  	  Goatly	  (2007:	  342)	  also	  emphasises	  this	  same	  point,	  “Darwin,	  while	  
acknowledging	  the	  interdependence	  of	  species,	  nevertheless	  tends	  to	  emphasise	  the	  competition	  
between	  members	  of	  the	  same	  species”.	  	  Goatly	  notes	  Darwin’s	  frequent	  use	  of	  military	  metaphors	  
throughout	  the	  Origin	  of	  the	  Species	  and	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  foregrounding	  of	  language	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related	  to	  conflict	  and	  war	  over	  symbiotic	  existence	  can	  have	  a	  negative	  ideological	  impact	  if	  
followed	  to	  its	  logical	  conclusion:	  
Despite	  some	  claims	  to	  the	  contrary,	  there	  is	  plenty	  of	  evidence	  that	  Darwin	  accepted	  progressivism,	  that	  the	  
inferior	  forms	  or	  species	  were	  those	  that	  became	  extinct	  …	  If	  we	  accept	  that	  our	  fundamental	  structural	  traits	  are	  
determined	  by	  success	  in	  the	  war	  of	  competition	  for	  survival,	  and	  that	  the	  best	  win	  the	  war,	  the	  logical	  conclusion	  is	  
that	  the	  best	  are	  the	  most	  warlike.	  	  	  	  	  
(Goatly	  2007:	  342-­‐343)	  	  
I	  am	  not	  overly	  concerned	  at	  this	  point	  with	  whether	  Goatly’s	  anxiety	  concerning	  ideological	  
extrapolations	  from	  Darwin’s	  choice	  of	  emphasis	  is	  valid	  or	  not,	  or	  whether	  all	  of	  Al-­‐Zahrani’s	  
proposed	  conceptual	  metaphors	  were	  present	  in	  Darwin’s	  mind.	  	  It	  may,	  for	  example,	  be	  possible	  to	  
argue	  that	  Darwin	  may	  have	  juxtaposed	  the	  notions	  of	  nature	  being	  a	  mother	  and	  natural	  selection	  
being	  a	  form	  of	  breeding	  without	  connecting	  them	  together	  in	  the	  form	  of	  conceptualising	  Mother	  
Nature	  as	  a	  breeder.	  However,	  what	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  is	  the	  central	  point	  that	  both	  Al-­‐Zahrani	  and	  
Goatly	  have	  recognised	  the	  existence	  of	  image	  schematic,	  propositional	  and	  metaphoric	  models	  
underneath	  Darwin’s	  collection	  of	  ideas	  and	  the	  language	  he	  uses	  to	  express	  them.	  This	  examination	  
of	  ICMs	  at	  a	  more	  complex	  level	  than	  the	  previous	  considerations	  of	  entities	  such	  as	  week,	  mother	  
and	  self	  is	  therefore	  particularly	  relevant	  for	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  the	  investigation	  in	  the	  next	  section	  
into	  how	  religious	  belief	  systems	  are	  underpinned	  by	  and	  subject	  to	  ICMs.	  	  	  
	  
2.4	  Applying	  Idealised	  Cognitive	  Models	  to	  Religious	  Belief	  Systems	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  examples	  from	  Muslim	  testimonials	  posted	  on	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  
website	  that	  will	  be	  analysed	  in	  terms	  of	  metaphor	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  My	  intention	  
here	  is	  to	  show	  that	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  apply	  Lakoff’s	  theory	  of	  ICMs	  to	  particular	  religious	  belief	  
systems.	  	  In	  order	  to	  lay	  the	  necessary	  theoretical	  groundwork	  for	  the	  methodology	  and	  analysis	  in	  
that	  chapter,	  I	  will,	  in	  terms	  of	  image	  schemas	  and	  metaphoric	  ICMs,	  limit	  my	  focus	  primarily	  to	  




Stacked	  Propositions	  and	  the	  Importance	  of	  the	  Source-­‐Path-­‐Goal	  Schema	  in	  Religious	  Belief	  
Systems	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Lakoff	  (1987:	  68),	  in	  his	  explanation	  of	  the	  propositional	  ICM	  underpinning	  the	  
notion	  of	  week,	  is	  able	  to	  specify	  the	  propositional	  content	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  statement,	  “the	  week	  is	  a	  
whole	  with	  seven	  parts	  organised	  in	  a	  linear	  sequence;	  each	  part	  is	  called	  a	  day	  …”.	  	  This	  
propositional	  specification	  can	  then	  be	  connected	  to	  image	  schematic,	  metaphoric	  and	  metonymic	  
models.	  Despite	  the	  complexity	  that	  underpins	  this	  notion	  of	  week,	  it	  is	  relatively	  simple	  compared	  to	  
more	  complex	  ICMs	  that	  can	  contain	  considerably	  more	  elements.	  	  For	  example,	  when	  Lakoff	  (1987:	  
72)	  describes	  the	  reason	  why	  people	  generally	  think	  that	  what	  they	  believe	  is	  true	  he	  views	  it	  as	  
necessary	  to	  make	  use	  of	  a	  sequence	  of	  propositions:	  
THE	  ICM	  OF	  ORDINARY	  COMMUNICATION	  
a) If	  people	  say	  something,	  they’re	  intending	  to	  help	  if	  and	  only	  if	  they	  believe	  it.	  
b) People	  intend	  to	  deceive	  if	  and	  only	  if	  they	  don’t	  intend	  to	  help.	  	  
THE	  ICM	  OF	  JUSTIFIED	  BELIEF	  
c) People	  have	  adequate	  reasons	  for	  their	  belief.	  
d) What	  people	  have	  adequate	  reason	  to	  believe	  is	  true	  	  
He	  makes	  use	  of	  a	  similar	  sequence	  of	  propositions	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  why	  people	  generally	  think	  
that	  what	  they	  don’t	  believe	  is	  false:	  
…	  in	  the	  idealized	  world	  of	  these	  ICMs	  if	  X	  believes	  a	  proposition	  P,	  then	  P	  is	  true.	  Conversely,	  if	  P	  is	  false,	  then	  X	  
doesn’t	  believe	  P.	  Thus	  falsity	  entails	  lack	  of	  belief.	  
(ibid.)	  
When	  Lakoff	  begins	  to	  use	  sequences	  of	  statements	  in	  order	  to	  describe	  propositional	  ICMs,	  the	  level	  
of	  complexity	  and	  sequential	  organisation	  begins	  to	  resemble	  what	  we	  may	  expect	  the	  ICMs	  of	  
religious	  belief	  systems	  to	  look	  like.	  	  Religious	  belief	  systems,	  I	  would	  argue,	  invariably	  rely	  upon	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what	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  as	  stacked	  propositions,	  or	  layers	  of	  propositional	  ICMs	  where	  the	  higher	  layers	  
depend	  on	  the	  acceptance	  of	  lower,	  more	  general	  layers,	  which	  in	  turn	  depend	  on	  an	  array	  of	  ICMs	  
underpinning	  individual	  entities	  like	  belief,	  truth,	  Christian,	  Muslim	  and	  God	  (although	  in	  reality,	  as	  
we	  shall	  see,	  this	  simple	  linearity	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  artificially	  imposed	  and	  itself	  understood	  
through	  an	  idealised	  schema	  of	  cause	  and	  effect).	  	  
Testimonials,	  or	  personal	  stories	  about	  a	  believer’s	  conversion	  experience,	  are	  ideal	  places	  to	  look	  for	  
more	  complete	  frameworks	  of	  stacked	  propositions,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  connections	  that	  believers	  wish	  to	  
make	  between	  the	  layers.	  I	  will	  now	  therefore	  illustrate	  the	  application	  of	  ICMs	  to	  religious	  belief	  
systems	  by	  selecting	  one	  such	  text,	  Nuh	  Ha	  Mim	  Keller’s	  testimonial	  on	  the	  website	  imamreza.net,	  
and	  considering	  it	  against	  the	  background	  of	  a	  possible	  underpinning	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  schema.	  	  	  	  	  
Nuh	  Ha	  Mim	  Keller’s	  testimonial	  is	  essentially	  a	  personal	  story	  that	  recounts	  his	  investigation	  into,	  
and	  reflection	  upon,	  Western	  philosophy	  and	  Islam,	  his	  experiences	  working	  on	  fishing	  boats,	  and	  his	  
encounters	  with	  Muslims	  in	  Cairo	  that	  led	  to	  him	  becoming	  a	  Muslim.	  	  The	  argument	  embedded	  in	  
the	  text	  relies	  on	  certain	  key	  presuppositions,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  that	  humanity	  must	  have	  an	  ultimate	  
purpose	  or	  goal.	  	  This	  presupposition	  becomes	  visible	  at	  several	  points	  in	  the	  text,	  particularly	  the	  
two	  examples	  listed	  below.	  	  The	  first	  extract	  is	  a	  response	  to	  the	  author	  observing	  a	  man	  who	  
appeared	  to	  have	  no	  other	  purpose	  than	  making	  as	  much	  money	  as	  he	  could,	  while	  the	  second	  
extract	  details	  the	  author’s	  first	  explorations	  into	  Islam	  (my	  emphasis):	  
Such	  people,	  good	  at	  making	  money	  but	  heedless	  of	  any	  ultimate	  end	  or	  purpose,	  made	  an	  impression	  on	  me,	  and	  I	  
increasingly	  began	  to	  wonder	  if	  men	  didn't	  need	  principles	  to	  guide	  them	  and	  tell	  them	  why	  they	  were	  there.	  
Without	  such	  principles,	  nothing	  seemed	  to	  distinguish	  us	  above	  our	  prey	  except	  being	  more	  thorough,	  and	  
technologically	  capable	  of	  preying	  longer,	  on	  a	  vaster	  scale,	  and	  with	  greater	  devastation	  than	  the	  animals	  we	  
hunted.	  
At	  this	  juncture,	  I	  read	  a	  number	  of	  works	  on	  Islam,	  among	  them	  the	  books	  of	  Seyyed	  Hossein	  Nasr,	  who	  believed	  
that	  many	  of	  the	  problems	  of	  western	  man,	  especially	  those	  of	  the	  environment,	  were	  from	  his	  having	  left	  the	  
divine	  wisdom	  of	  revealed	  religion,	  which	  taught	  him	  his	  true	  place	  as	  a	  creature	  of	  God	  in	  the	  natural	  world	  and	  to	  
understand	  and	  respect	  it.	  Without	  it,	  he	  burned	  up	  and	  consumed	  nature	  with	  ever	  more	  effective	  technological	  
styles	  of	  commercial	  exploitation	  that	  ruined	  his	  world	  from	  without	  while	  leaving	  him	  increasingly	  empty	  within,	  
because	  he	  did	  not	  know	  why	  he	  existed	  or	  to	  what	  end	  he	  should	  act.	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(my	  emphasis,	  http://www.imamreza.net/eng/imamreza.php?id=7058)	  
The	  first	  extract	  appears	  to	  presuppose	  that	  certain	  principles	  that	  separate	  us	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
animal	  kingdom	  must	  exist,	  while	  the	  second	  extract	  is	  not	  so	  much	  interested	  in	  debating	  whether	  
mankind	  has	  an	  ultimate	  purpose	  or	  end,	  but	  highlighting	  the	  damage	  that	  is	  caused	  when	  mankind	  
does	  not	  know	  what	  that	  pre-­‐existing	  purpose	  is.	  	  This	  foundational,	  deeply	  embedded	  
presupposition	  that	  there	  must	  be	  we	  an	  ultimate	  purpose	  or	  end	  or	  goal	  fits	  very	  closely	  with	  
Lakoff’s	  argument	  that	  the	  cognitive	  framework	  of	  most	  if	  not	  all	  human	  beings	  is	  structured	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  image	  schemas	  such	  as	  the	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  schema.	  	  
It	  is	  necessary	  at	  this	  point	  to	  look	  into	  Lakoff’s	  idea	  of	  image	  schemas,	  derived	  from	  the	  work	  of	  
Langacker,	  in	  a	  little	  more	  detail.	  	  These	  schemas	  are	  viewed	  as	  making	  use	  of	  pre-­‐conceptual	  
representations	  drawn	  from	  “schematized	  patterns	  of	  activity	  abstracted	  from	  everyday	  bodily	  
experience,	  especially	  pertaining	  to	  vision,	  space,	  motion	  and	  force”	  (Langacker	  2008:	  32).	  	  The	  
source-­‐path-­‐goal	  image	  schema	  (Lakoff	  1987:	  283;	  Evans	  and	  Green	  2006:	  280)	  is	  of	  particular	  
interest	  to	  this	  thesis,	  and	  I	  will	  therefore	  focus	  my	  attention	  on	  it.	  
Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  (1999:	  33)	  propose	  that	  this	  schema	  has	  the	  following	  elements:	  
A	  trajector	  that	  moves	  
A	  source	  location	  (the	  starting	  point)	  
A	  goal,	  that	  is,	  an	  intended	  destination	  of	  the	  trajectory	  
A	  route	  from	  the	  source	  to	  the	  goal	  
The	  actual	  trajectory	  of	  motion	  
The	  position	  of	  the	  trajector	  at	  a	  given	  time	  
The	  direction	  of	  the	  trajector	  at	  that	  time	  
The	  actual	  final	  location	  of	  the	  trajectory,	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  the	  intended	  destination	  
It	  is	  possible	  to	  define	  the	  above	  as	  an	  embedded	  sequence	  that	  provides	  one	  of	  the	  key	  parts	  of	  the	  
foundation	  for	  viewing	  reality	  as	  spatial	  (Evans	  and	  Green	  2006:	  280),	  as	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  argue:	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Our	  most	  fundamental	  knowledge	  of	  motion	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  schema,	  and	  this	  logic	  is	  
implicit	  in	  its	  structure.	  Many	  spatial-­‐relations	  concepts	  are	  defined	  using	  this	  schema	  and	  depend	  for	  their	  
meaning	  on	  its	  inherent	  spatial	  logic,	  for	  example,	  toward,	  away,	  through	  and	  along.	  
(Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  1999:34)	  
	  It	  is	  also	  used	  to	  represent	  our	  construal	  of	  abstract	  notions	  as	  moving	  through	  space	  in	  a	  specific	  
direction.	  	  This	  plays	  a	  part	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  metaphorical	  language,	  including	  the	  widely	  discussed	  
cluster	  of	  metaphors	  that	  view	  various	  abstract	  processes	  such	  as	  life,	  love,	  reconciliation	  and	  the	  
consolidation	  or	  development	  of	  a	  belief	  as	  a	  journey	  (cf.	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  1980;	  Turner	  1996:	  18;	  
Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  1999:	  34;	  Ritchie	  2008;	  Semino	  2008:	  7;	  Cameron	  2010b:	  14;	  Cameron,	  Low	  and	  
Maslen	  2010:	  123;	  Cameron	  2010a).	  The	  link	  between	  this	  image	  schema	  and	  propositional	  ICMs	  is	  
that	  humans	  tend	  to	  use	  propositions	  to	  fill	  out	  this	  highly	  abstract	  propensity	  to	  organise	  events	  
into	  sequences.	  	  They	  formulate	  networks	  of	  inferences	  and	  evaluations	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  objects,	  
participants	  and	  occurrences	  that	  make	  up	  those	  events	  (Turner	  1996:	  19-­‐21).	  	  This	  is	  the	  beginning	  
of	  what	  Turner	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  universal	  human	  habit	  of	  formulating	  sequences	  into	  “small	  spatial	  
stories”	  and	  his	  argument	  that	  “all	  these	  sequences	  are	  structured	  by	  the	  image	  schema	  of	  a	  point	  
moving	  along	  a	  directed	  path	  from	  a	  source	  to	  a	  goal”	  (Turner	  1996:	  19).	  This	  explains	  why	  personal	  
stories	  always	  “re-­‐present	  features	  of	  the	  world”	  while	  also	  envisaging	  “an	  end”	  (Cobley	  2001:	  228),	  
and	  why	  religion	  is	  able	  to	  offer	  “particularly	  powerful	  stories”	  that	  are	  able	  to	  so	  effectively	  convey	  
“a	  picture	  of	  security,	  stability	  and	  simple	  answers”	  (Kinvall	  2004:	  742).	  	  
The	  importance	  for	  this	  thesis	  of	  the	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  schema	  and	  the	  range	  of	  metaphors	  it	  
generates	  should	  now	  be	  clear.	  	  Not	  only	  does	  it	  provide	  a	  basis	  for	  viewing	  life	  as	  a	  journey,	  but,	  I	  
would	  argue,	  it	  also	  provides	  one	  of	  the	  crucial	  foundations	  for	  viewing	  life	  as	  a	  story.	  	  It	  also	  lies	  at	  
the	  heart	  of	  our	  propensity	  to	  structure	  our	  life	  as	  consisting	  of	  purposes	  and	  goals,	  and	  to	  
metaphorically	  view	  those	  purposes	  as	  locations	  that	  need	  to	  be	  reached,	  	  
…	  the	  source–path–goal	  schema	  develops	  as	  we	  move	  from	  one	  place	  to	  another	  in	  the	  world	  and	  as	  we	  track	  the	  
movement	  of	  objects.	  From	  such	  experiences,	  a	  recurring	  pattern	  becomes	  manifest,	  which	  can	  be	  projected	  onto	  
more	  abstract	  domains	  of	  understanding,	  including	  those	  having	  to	  do	  with	  any	  intentional	  action.	  Thus,	  the	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source–path–goal	  image	  schema	  gives	  rise	  to	  conceptual	  metaphors,	  such	  as	  “Purposes	  are	  destinations”	  (e.g.,	  “I	  
got	  sidetracked	  on	  my	  way	  to	  getting	  a	  PhD”).	  
(Gibbs	  2011:	  536)	  
We	  can	  now	  see	  how	  the	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  schema	  underpins	  those	  foundational	  existential	  
questions	  that	  occur	  so	  often	  in	  religious	  language,	  such	  as	  “why	  am	  I	  here?”,	  “where	  is	  my	  life	  
going?”,	  “who	  or	  what	  should	  I	  follow?”,	  and	  “where	  will	  I	  go	  when	  I	  die?”.	  	  What	  this	  means	  for	  
religious	  belief	  is	  that	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  must	  be	  an	  ultimate	  goal	  or	  purpose,	  or	  what	  William	  
James	  (the	  principal	  forefather	  of	  the	  field	  of	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Religion)	  famously	  referred	  to	  as	  “our	  
true	  end”	  (James	  1985:	  485),	  is	  not	  primarily	  derived	  from	  the	  objective	  nature	  of	  our	  environment	  
but	  primarily	  from	  the	  structure	  of	  our	  brains.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  this	  particular	  structuring	  of	  our	  
minds	  around	  the	  notions	  of	  origins	  and	  destinations	  has	  not	  been	  formed	  in	  the	  course	  of	  
interacting	  with	  our	  environments.	  	  Undoubtedly,	  it	  has	  (Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  1999;	  Gibbs	  2011).	  	  
However,	  what	  this	  means	  is	  that	  the	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  image	  schema	  has	  come	  to	  have	  functional	  
value	  in	  helping	  many	  humans	  to	  survive	  and	  flourish	  within	  their	  environments.	  	  It	  does	  not	  mean	  
that	  this	  image	  schema	  is	  some	  kind	  of	  epistemological	  mirror	  of	  the	  objective	  nature	  of	  our	  
environments.	  	  	  	  	  
Returning	  to	  our	  consideration	  of	  Nuh	  Ha	  Mim	  Keller’s	  testimonial,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  see	  how	  he	  
metaphorically	  fills	  out	  the	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  schema	  by	  using	  a	  reference	  to	  road	  signs	  to	  talk	  about	  
the	  clarity	  with	  which	  he	  felt	  his	  personal	  searching	  and	  consideration	  of	  Islam	  were	  pointing	  him	  
towards	  absolute	  truth.	  	  	  The	  author	  systematically	  outlines	  a	  line	  of	  reasoning	  that	  leads	  him	  to	  an	  
unequivocal	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  that	  “all	  moral	  and	  religious	  systems,	  were	  on	  the	  same	  plane,	  
unless	  one	  could	  gain	  certainty	  that	  one	  of	  them	  was	  from	  a	  higher	  source,	  the	  sole	  guarantee	  of	  the	  
objectivity,	  the	  whole	  force,	  of	  moral	  law”	  (my	  emphasis).	  	  He	  views	  the	  achievement	  of	  the	  
perception	  of	  objective	  certainty	  that	  Islam	  was	  that	  religious	  system	  from	  a	  higher	  source	  as	  the	  
result	  of	  following	  “clear	  signs”	  (my	  emphasis).	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We	  are	  immediately	  faced	  here	  with	  some	  of	  the	  key	  defining	  factors	  of	  conservative	  religious	  belief	  
systems.	  	  These	  include	  the	  level	  of	  absolute	  certainty	  they	  often	  appear	  to	  embody,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  this	  sense	  of	  certainty	  is	  often	  expressed	  through	  the	  use	  of	  movement	  metaphors.	  	  
This	  interaction	  between	  self-­‐evident	  certainty	  and	  language	  related	  to	  existential	  movement	  from	  
and	  to	  particular	  locations	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  concerns	  of	  this	  thesis	  simply	  because	  it	  features	  so	  
heavily	  in	  conservative	  religious	  texts	  such	  as	  the	  one	  above.	  	  In	  the	  collections	  of	  Christian	  and	  
Muslim	  testimonials	  I	  will	  analyse	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  found	  that	  every	  testimonial	  contained	  at	  
least	  one	  movement	  metaphor,	  with	  the	  vast	  majority	  containing	  clusters	  of	  such	  metaphors.	  
It	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  key	  aims	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  discuss	  this	  certainty	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  underpinning	  
cognitive	  framework	  of	  believers.	  	  I	  will	  now	  therefore	  turn	  to	  a	  consideration	  of	  certainty	  in	  relation	  
to	  cognitive	  model	  selection	  and	  the	  impact	  on	  certainty	  of	  shifts	  in	  patterns	  of	  agency.	  
	  
The	  “Strong	  Pull”	  towards	  Choosing	  “True”	  Models	  and	  the	  Perception	  of	  Unambiguity	  in	  Reversed	  
Agency	  Patterns	  in	  ICMs	  Related	  to	  Religious	  Belief	  	  
In	  Lakoff’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  mother	  model,	  he	  makes	  one	  observation	  that	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  
my	  focus	  on	  cognitive	  models	  and	  certainty:	  “many	  people	  feel	  the	  pressure	  to	  pick	  one	  model	  as	  
being	  the	  right	  one,	  the	  one	  that	  “really”	  defines	  what	  a	  mother	  is”	  (Lakoff	  1987:	  75;	  cf.	  Goldberg	  
1995:	  27).	  	  It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  apply	  this	  “pressure”	  to	  the	  cognitive	  models	  related	  to	  belief	  systems,	  
especially	  in	  discourse	  communities	  where	  membership	  depends	  on	  a	  precise	  doctrinal	  agreement	  
about	  which	  model	  should	  truly	  define	  an	  object	  of	  belief.	  	  Lakoff	  (ibid.)	  goes	  on	  to	  characterise	  this	  
need	  to	  choose	  one	  model	  over	  the	  others	  as	  a	  “strong	  pull”.	  	  The	  term	  “real	  mother”	  has	  become	  
common	  in	  modern	  Western	  culture	  (cf.	  Goldberg	  1995:27),	  occurring,	  for	  example,	  123	  times	  in	  the	  
Bank	  of	  English.	  	  Regardless	  of	  the	  chosen	  model,	  the	  existence	  of	  this	  term	  suggests	  that	  many	  
people	  assume	  that	  it	  is	  both	  possible	  and	  necessary	  to	  talk	  about	  an	  objectively	  real	  mother	  model.	  	  
This	  situation	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  religious	  language	  with	  the	  large	  number	  of	  hits	  and	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references	  that	  result	  from	  a	  Google	  search	  for	  the	  phrase	  “true	  God”	  related	  to	  Jewish,	  Christian	  
and	  Muslim	  websites.	  As	  Kinvall	  (2004:	  742)	  argues	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  social	  psychology,	  
religious	  believers	  rely	  on	  the	  need	  to	  portray	  their	  beliefs	  as	  “resting	  on	  solid	  ground,	  as	  being	  true,	  
thus	  creating	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  world	  really	  is	  what	  it	  appears	  to	  be”.	  	  	  	  	  	  
For	  Nuh	  Ha	  Mim	  Keller,	  this	  process	  of	  assuming	  the	  self-­‐evident	  truth	  of	  models	  or	  propositions	  
appears	  to	  progress	  from	  more	  general,	  schematic	  propositions	  to	  more	  specific	  propositions.	  	  	  For	  
example,	  propositions	  relating	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  God	  and	  the	  need	  for	  guiding	  principles	  appear	  
to	  progress	  to	  the	  necessity	  of	  divine	  revelation,	  and	  then	  to	  the	  perceived	  characteristics	  of	  the	  
Qur’an	  that	  make	  it	  the	  only	  possible	  candidate	  for	  such	  revelation.	  	  Each	  ensuing	  proposition	  
logically	  relies	  on	  the	  absolute	  acceptance	  of	  the	  preceding	  proposition	  and,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  
each	  proposition	  would	  be	  passionately	  contested	  by	  numerous	  competing	  belief	  communities,	  the	  
author	  still	  perceives	  them	  as	  self-­‐evidently,	  logically	  and	  obviously	  correct.	  	  This	  systematic	  stacking	  
of	  increasingly	  detailed	  and	  specific	  propositions	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  extract	  below:	  
I	  read	  other	  books	  on	  Islam	  …	  by	  the	  theologian	  and	  mystic	  Ghazali,	  who	  …	  realized	  that	  beyond	  the	  light	  of	  
prophetic	  revelation	  there	  is	  no	  other	  light	  on	  the	  face	  of	  the	  earth	  from	  which	  illumination	  may	  be	  received,	  the	  
very	  point	  to	  which	  my	  philosophical	  inquiries	  had	  led.	  Here	  was,	  in	  Hegel's	  terms,	  the	  Wise	  Man,	  in	  the	  person	  of	  a	  
divinely	  inspired	  messenger	  who	  alone	  had	  the	  authority	  to	  answer	  questions	  of	  good	  and	  evil.	  I	  also	  read	  A.J.	  
Arberrys	  translation	  "The	  Qur'an	  Interpreted",	  and	  I	  recalled	  my	  early	  wish	  for	  a	  sacred	  book.	  Even	  in	  translation,	  
the	  superiority	  of	  the	  Muslim	  scripture	  over	  the	  Bible	  was	  evident	  in	  every	  line,	  as	  if	  the	  reality	  of	  divine	  revelation,	  
dimly	  heard	  of	  all	  my	  life,	  had	  now	  been	  placed	  before	  my	  eyes.	  In	  its	  exalted	  style,	  its	  power,	  its	  inexorable	  finality,	  
its	  uncanny	  way	  of	  anticipating	  the	  arguments	  of	  the	  atheistic	  heart	  in	  advance	  and	  answering	  them;	  it	  was	  a	  clear	  
exposition	  of	  God	  as	  God	  and	  man	  as	  man,	  the	  revelation	  of	  the	  awe-­‐inspiring	  Divine	  Unity	  being	  the	  identical	  
revelation	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  justice	  among	  men.	  
(http://www.imamreza.net/eng/imamreza.php?id=7058)	  
What	  is	  even	  more	  interesting	  is	  that	  this	  arrangement	  of	  propositions	  could	  be	  repeated	  for	  an	  
Evangelical	  Christian	  worldview	  with	  very	  few	  changes	  beyond	  switching	  around	  the	  names	  of	  the	  
religions	  and	  their	  sacred	  texts.	  	  For	  one	  example	  of	  this,	  consider	  the	  almost	  identical	  use	  of	  




Scripture’s	  purity	  and	  clarity	  produces	  the	  benefit	  of	  “enlightening	  the	  eyes.”	  It	  provides	  illumination	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  
moral,	  ethical,	  and	  spiritual	  darkness.	  	  It	  reveals	  the	  knowledge	  of	  everything	  not	  otherwise	  readily	  seen	  (cf.	  Prov	  
6:23).	  	  One	  of	  the	  main	  reasons	  the	  Word	  of	  God	  is	  sufficient	  for	  all	  of	  humanity’s	  spiritual	  needs	  is	  because	  it	  leaves	  
no	  doubt	  regarding	  essential	  truth.	  	  Life	  itself	  is	  confusing	  and	  chaotic.	  	  Seeking	  truth	  apart	  from	  Scripture	  only	  adds	  
to	  the	  confusion.	  Scripture,	  by	  contrast,	  is	  remarkably	  clear.	  	  	  	  
(MacArthur	  2003:	  31)	  
Nuh	  Ha	  Mim	  Keller’s	  testimonial	  closes	  with	  a	  final	  proposition	  that	  is	  particularly	  important	  to	  any	  
consideration	  of	  certainty	  in	  religious	  belief	  systems,	  and	  is	  therefore	  worth	  examining	  in	  some	  detail.	  	  
It	  rests	  on	  a	  metaphor	  of	  the	  believer	  being	  purposefully	  moved:	  
I	  found	  that	  God	  had	  created	  within	  me	  a	  desire	  to	  belong	  to	  this	  religion,	  which	  so	  enriches	  its	  followers,	  from	  the	  
simplest	  hearts	  to	  the	  most	  magisterial	  intellects.	  It	  is	  not	  through	  an	  act	  of	  the	  mind	  or	  will	  that	  anyone	  becomes	  a	  
Muslim,	  but	  rather	  through	  the	  mercy	  of	  God,	  and	  this,	  in	  the	  final	  analysis,	  was	  what	  brought	  me	  to	  Islam	  in	  Cairo	  
in	  1977.	  
The	  idea	  here	  is	  that	  the	  ultimate	  source	  of	  belief	  is	  not	  a	  person’s	  line	  of	  reasoning	  but	  God’s	  action	  
(in	  creating	  the	  desire	  to	  believe	  and	  bringing	  or	  moving	  the	  believer	  to	  the	  state	  of	  belief).	  	  Here,	  the	  
human	  being	  is	  construed	  as	  being	  removed	  from	  the	  role	  of	  agent	  in	  the	  process	  of	  arriving	  at	  belief.	  	  
This	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  allowing	  the	  believer	  to	  perceive	  those	  who	  would	  disagree	  with	  that	  believer’s	  
line	  of	  reasoning	  as	  irrelevant,	  along	  with	  the	  arguments	  that	  they	  would	  use.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  
that	  the	  process	  of	  belief	  from	  this	  particular	  perspective	  is	  not	  perceived	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  words	  or	  
perspective	  of	  man,	  but	  on	  the	  perspective	  and	  actions	  of	  the	  object	  (viewed	  as	  subject)	  of	  belief,	  
which	  is	  in	  this	  case	  Allah,	  or	  the	  Muslim	  understanding	  of	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  	  However,	  conservative	  
religious	  texts	  are	  rarely	  restricted	  to	  a	  single	  perspective	  or	  a	  single	  agent	  but	  inevitably	  shift	  
between	  perspectives	  and	  agents.	  	  For	  example,	  just	  before	  Nuh	  Ha	  Mim	  Keller	  talks	  about	  being	  
moved	  by	  God	  to	  believe	  in	  Islam,	  he	  discusses	  the	  process	  of	  coming	  to	  belief	  as	  something	  that	  he	  
realized	  for	  himself	  from	  reflecting	  upon	  his	  environment,	  “When	  I	  reflected	  on	  those	  around	  me,	  I	  
realized	  that	  Islam	  seemed	  to	  furnish	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  and	  understandable	  way	  to	  practice	  
this	  on	  a	  daily	  basis”.	  	  One	  key	  concern	  of	  this	  thesis	  will	  therefore	  be	  tracking	  these	  shifts	  in	  
construal,	  which	  I	  will	  define	  as	  the	  idea	  that	  something	  is	  viewed	  from	  a	  particular	  perspective	  and,	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in	  terms	  of	  backgrounding	  and	  foregrounding,	  with	  a	  specific	  degree	  of	  prominence	  (cf.	  Langacker	  
2007:	  434-­‐438;	  Langacker	  2008:	  55-­‐78).	  
This	  move	  away	  from	  static	  representations	  of	  an	  individual’s	  view	  of	  the	  world	  towards	  a	  dynamic	  
focus	  on	  language	  in	  use	  (cf.	  Cameron	  1999:	  4-­‐5;	  Müller	  2008:	  15)	  can	  be	  further	  illustrated	  by	  
considering	  the	  extract	  below	  from	  a	  videoed	  discussion	  that	  took	  place	  at	  the	  University	  of	  
Birmingham	  between	  a	  Protestant	  Evangelical	  Christian	  (turns	  B1	  and	  B2)	  and	  a	  non-­‐believer	  (turns	  
A1	  and	  A2).	  	  This	  extract	  also	  further	  reinforces	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  focus	  on	  patterns	  of	  agency	  in	  
any	  exploration	  of	  a	  conservative	  religious	  believer’s	  worldview.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Non-­‐believer:	  A1	   The	  Bible	  has	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  say	  about	  things	  we	  must	  and	  must	  not	  do	  and	  it	  appears	  to	  me	  that	  
certain	  –	  I	  don’t	  know	  about	  you	  –	  but	  certain	  Christian	  groups	  don’t	  follow	  all	  of	  the	  teachings	  of	  
the	  Bible	  as	  to	  what	  you	  should	  and	  shouldn’t	  do.	  
Christian:	  B1	   OK,	  I	  understand	  that	  …	  the	  answer	  to	  that	  is	  that	  God	  decides,	  God	  says	  what	  is	  sin	  and	  what	  isn’t	  
sin	  and	  that	  he	  summarised	  that	  in	  his	  ten	  commandments.	  Now,	  again,	  an	  atheist	  or	  an	  
unbeliever	  might	  come	  along	  and	  say	  well	  that’s	  unfair,	  why	  can’t	  God	  go	  along	  with	  the	  way	  that	  I	  
want	  to	  behave,	  but	  the	  Bible	  summarises	  all	  sin,	  no	  matter	  what	  it	  is	  –	  lying,	  stealing,	  whatever,	  
we’re	  all	  sinners	  –	  summarises	  all	  of	  it	  as	  being	  a	  form	  of	  rebellion	  against	  God,	  so	  whatever	  form	  
we	  find	  sin	  is	  all	  of	  it	  is	  us	  rebelling	  against	  our	  creator.	  	  But	  yes	  if	  there	  has	  to	  be	  an	  absolute	  
standard	  then	  that	  standard	  must	  come	  from	  God	  and	  we	  believe,	  I	  believe,	  that	  standard	  comes	  
in	  the	  ten	  commandments.	  	  
Non-­‐believer:	  A2	   OK,	  but	  what	  about	  the	  specific	  rules	  –	  I	  think	  it	  would	  be	  fair	  to	  say	  –	  that	  are	  set	  down	  in	  say	  
parts	  of	  Leviticus	  about	  how	  humanity	  needs	  to	  behave.	  	  
Christian:	  B2	   OK,	  thank	  you	  for	  asking	  me	  that	  –	  I	  was	  hoping	  you	  would.	  	  The	  question	  might	  go	  on	  should	  we	  
for	  example	  stone	  to	  death	  adulterers	  today	  because	  in	  the	  Bible	  because	  in	  the	  Old	  Testament	  the	  
Bible	  says	  that	  adulterers	  should	  be	  stoned	  to	  death,	  and	  of	  course	  there	  are	  examples	  of	  people	  
who	  have	  been	  put	  to	  death	  in	  the	  Old	  Testament.	  	  It’s	  not	  unfair	  to	  put	  a	  Christian	  on	  the	  spot	  and	  
say	  what	  would	  you	  do	  in	  that	  situation	  if	  you	  were	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  you	  had	  absolute	  power,	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what	  would	  you	  do?	  I	  thought	  about	  this	  at	  length	  and	  I	  don’t	  know	  what	  I	  would	  do.	  I	  think	  first	  of	  
all	  we	  need	  to	  establish	  what	  is	  right	  and	  what’s	  wrong	  from	  the	  scriptures,	  and	  secondly	  how	  
would	  those	  laws	  in	  the	  Old	  Testament	  apply	  to	  our	  society	  today.	  
	  
In	  A1,	  the	  non-­‐believer	  is	  clearly	  wishing	  to	  question	  the	  Christian	  about	  the	  well-­‐known	  difficulties	  
(in	  terms	  of	  Christians	  who	  embrace	  the	  infallibility	  of	  the	  Bible)	  related	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
rules	  and	  laws	  in	  the	  Old	  Testament	  and	  how	  the	  decision	  is	  made	  concerning	  what	  to	  keep	  and	  what	  
to	  discard.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  Christian	  is	  locked	  into	  a	  pattern	  of	  language	  that	  foregrounds	  
the	  perception	  of	  pure	  unambiguity	  instantiated	  through	  the	  use	  of	  divine	  agency	  (“…	  God	  decides,	  
God	  says	  …	  an	  absolute	  standard”).	  	  He	  is	  therefore	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  in	  B1	  to	  process	  and	  respond	  
to	  a	  question	  that	  is	  asking	  him	  to	  consider	  the	  decision	  making	  process	  from	  the	  far	  more	  
ambiguous	  and	  opinion-­‐like	  perspective	  of	  the	  believer	  as	  subject.	  The	  non-­‐believer	  responds	  in	  A2	  
by	  revealing	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  is	  intending	  to	  question	  the	  believer	  about	  the	  notoriously	  difficult	  area	  
of	  the	  Levitical	  law.	  	  This	  appears	  to	  force	  the	  believer	  to	  make	  a	  shift	  in	  agency	  in	  order	  to	  pre-­‐empt	  
the	  argument	  that	  he	  knows	  is	  coming.	  	  In	  B2,	  this	  process	  of	  pre-­‐emption	  results	  in	  phrases	  like	  
“should	  we”,	  “what	  would	  you	  do?”,	  “I	  don’t	  know	  what	  I	  would	  do”	  and	  “we	  need	  to	  establish”.	  	  
What	  we	  have	  here	  are	  two	  very	  different,	  and	  in	  some	  sense	  diametrically	  opposed,	  ways	  of	  talking	  
about	  religious	  belief	  originating	  from	  the	  same	  person	  over	  just	  two	  turns	  of	  discourse.	  	  However	  
we	  choose	  to	  approach	  an	  analysis	  of	  this	  extract	  and	  its	  surrounding	  context,	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  
deny	  that	  something	  very	  important	  is	  happening	  here	  in	  terms	  of	  construal	  as	  the	  discourse	  
dynamically	  unfolds.	  	  	  
Nuh	  Ha	  Mim	  Keller’s	  testimomial	  and	  the	  dialogue	  considered	  above	  highlight	  two	  inter-­‐related	  
components	  involved	  in	  this	  notion	  of	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  construing	  themselves	  as	  
passive	  participants	  in	  the	  belief	  process.	  	  The	  first	  is	  the	  desire	  in	  certain	  situations	  to	  view	  the	  world	  
from	  the	  perceived	  perspective	  of	  a	  particular	  divine	  entity,	  while	  the	  second	  is	  the	  desire	  for	  the	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believer	  in	  certain	  situations	  to	  view	  him	  or	  herself	  as	  being	  acted	  on	  by	  that	  divine	  entity.	  	  The	  
process	  of	  forming	  a	  belief	  about	  something	  can	  often	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  process	  of	  weighing	  arguments	  
and	  experiences	  about	  something	  until	  a	  relatively	  stable	  opinion	  begins	  to	  form.	  	  However,	  this	  first	  
component	  views	  the	  process	  from	  the	  opposite	  direction,	  so	  that	  it	  is	  the	  object	  of	  belief	  that	  acts	  
as	  the	  subject	  considering	  the	  potential	  believer.	  	  Examples	  of	  this	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  titles	  of	  two	  
books	  by	  well-­‐known	  Evangelicals:	  Blanchard’s	  (2000)	  “Does	  God	  Believe	  in	  Atheists?”	  and	  Comfort’s	  
(1993)	  “God	  Doesn't	  Believe	  in	  Atheists:	  Proof	  That	  the	  Atheist	  Doesn't	  Exist”.	  	  	  In	  these	  examples,	  
there	  is	  an	  unusual	  shift	  in	  perspective	  –	  in	  our	  modern	  society	  we	  are	  accustomed	  to	  hearing	  about	  
how	  atheists	  view	  the	  idea	  of	  belief	  in	  a	  God,	  but	  we	  are	  not	  so	  accustomed	  to	  this	  perceptual	  deictic	  
shift	  to	  how	  a	  perceived	  God	  views	  the	  idea	  of	  atheism	  (cf.	  Zubin	  and	  Hewitt	  1995:	  134;	  Stockwell	  
2002:	  43-­‐45).	  	  It	  appears	  that	  at	  the	  root	  of	  this	  desire	  to	  move	  the	  divine	  entity	  into	  the	  deictic	  
centre	  –	  or	  the	  object	  of	  belief	  into	  the	  subject	  position	  –	  is	  a	  determination	  to	  view	  what	  humans	  
think	  is	  true	  or	  how	  they	  think	  they	  should	  behave	  as	  essentially	  unimportant	  or	  irrelevant.	  	  It	  could	  
therefore	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  key	  motivation	  for	  this	  move	  is	  the	  need	  to	  absolutely	  eradicate	  the	  
perception	  of	  having	  a	  subjective	  opinion,	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  eradicate	  the	  possibility	  of	  
uncertainty.	  	  Kinvall	  and	  Linden	  (2010:	  599)	  view	  this	  as	  a	  move	  towards	  “securitizing	  subjectivity”,	  
which	  tends	  to	  manifest	  itself	  in	  “forms	  of	  totalistic	  modes	  of	  reasoning,	  black-­‐and-­‐white	  thinking,	  
religious	  or	  secular	  fundamentalism,	  and	  …	  intolerance	  of	  ambiguity”.	  	  This	  is	  achieved	  by	  
conservative	  believers	  perceiving	  themselves	  as	  turning	  away	  from	  what	  they	  think	  in	  order	  to	  
completely	  accept	  what	  a	  particular	  divine	  entity	  thinks.	  	  This	  attempt	  to	  (at	  certain	  moments	  during	  
discourse)	  cultivate	  the	  perception	  that	  human	  opinion	  can	  be	  removed	  from	  the	  belief	  process	  is	  
summed	  up	  in	  the	  extract	  below	  from	  another	  prominent	  Evangelical	  Christian,	  
In	  the	  1970s	  one	  occasionally	  saw	  a	  bumper	  sticker	  on	  cars	  driven	  by	  Christians.	  	  The	  bumper	  sticker	  stated:	  God	  
said	  it.	  	  I	  believe	  it.	  	  That	  settles	  it.	  The	  implication	  of	  such	  logic	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  declaration	  of	  the	  authority	  of	  
Scripture.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  some	  harmony	  between	  God’s	  and	  the	  car	  owner’s	  view	  of	  Scripture	  somehow	  settled	  the	  
issue	  of	  the	  authority	  of	  Scripture	  is	  not	  merely	  flawed	  –	  it	  is	  blatantly	  wrong.	  	  The	  ratification	  by	  people	  has	  nothing	  
to	  do	  with	  truth.	  	  The	  bumper	  sticker	  should	  have	  been	  worded:	  God	  said	  it.	  	  That	  settles	  it.	  (And	  it	  just	  so	  happens	  
that)	  I	  believe	  it.	  	  It	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  God	  said	  it	  that	  confirms	  it.	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(MacArthur	  2003:	  231)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
This	  need	  to	  cultivate	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  believer	  is	  at	  times	  viewing	  reality	  from	  the	  divine	  
entity’s	  perspective	  is	  further	  consolidated	  by	  the	  second	  component	  –	  the	  need	  for	  the	  believer	  to	  
view	  him	  or	  herself	  as	  being	  acted	  on	  by	  that	  divine	  entity.	  	  We	  have	  already	  looked	  at	  examples	  of	  
this	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  Muslim	  author	  considered	  above	  perceiving	  himself	  as	  being	  “brought	  to	  Islam	  
by	  the	  mercy	  of	  God”.	  	  This	  type	  of	  language	  often	  draws	  on	  metaphor,	  such	  as	  the	  above	  use	  of	  
brought,	  and	  construes	  the	  believer	  as	  the	  object	  or	  the	  receiver	  of	  a	  divine	  entity’s	  action.	  	  In	  the	  
next	  chapter	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  these	  examples	  as	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  metaphors,	  and	  will	  examine	  in	  
greater	  detail	  the	  powerful	  epistemological	  presuppositions	  they	  employ.	  	  	  	  	  
Researchers	  working	  within	  the	  fields	  of	  sociology	  and	  psychology	  often	  pass	  over	  the	  importance	  of	  
these	  two	  components	  and	  the	  way	  they	  make	  use	  of	  particular	  patterns	  of	  agency.	  	  Rambo	  (1993)	  
and	  Rambo	  and	  Farhadian	  (1999)	  provide	  a	  good	  example	  of	  this	  in	  their	  proposal	  of	  seven	  
psychological/sociological	  stages	  (context,	  crisis,	  quest,	  encounter,	  interaction,	  commitment,	  
consequences).	  	  Even	  the	  encounter	  stage	  is	  primarily	  focused	  on	  the	  social	  interaction	  between	  
believer	  and	  advocate	  (the	  person/community	  spreading	  the	  belief	  system)	  and	  makes	  very	  little	  
mention	  of	  the	  believer’s	  perception	  of	  encountering	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  In	  many	  ways	  it	  is	  
understandable	  that	  researchers	  wish	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  social	  dimensions	  of	  the	  conversion	  process	  
rather	  than	  analyse	  the	  theological	  expressions	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  person	  converting.	  	  However,	  
from	  both	  an	  applied	  linguistic	  and	  cognitive	  perspective,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  analyse	  the	  way	  that	  a	  
religious	  believer	  constructs	  the	  world	  around	  them	  without	  listening	  to	  and	  factoring	  in	  all	  their	  
primary	  patterns	  of	  perception	  instantiated	  in	  the	  language	  they	  use.	  	  The	  fact	  that,	  for	  example,	  
conservative	  Christians	  or	  Muslims	  may	  view	  themselves	  at	  various	  points	  during	  a	  discourse	  (and	  
with	  varying	  levels	  of	  frequency)	  as	  being	  brought	  to	  their	  belief	  by	  the	  object	  of	  their	  belief,	  and	  at	  
other	  points	  as	  choosing	  it,	  must	  be	  integrated	  into	  our	  hypotheses	  concerning	  the	  cognitive	  models	  
that	  believers’	  perceptions	  draw	  on.	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Another	  important	  point	  to	  make	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  just	  agency	  that	  is	  subject	  to	  shifting	  patterns	  of	  
construal.	  	  Other	  arrangements,	  such	  as	  spatial	  configurations,	  also	  exhibit	  such	  shifting	  patterns.	  	  
One	  example	  of	  this	  which	  will	  be	  a	  key	  focus	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  involves	  believers	  referring	  to	  the	  
notion	  of	  proximity	  during	  perceived	  interactions	  with	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  At	  one	  point	  in	  a	  text	  or	  during	  
a	  dynamically	  unfolding	  conversation,	  the	  believer	  may	  refer	  to	  the	  perceived	  experience	  of	  being	  
near	  or	  with	  the	  divine	  entity,	  or	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  divine	  entity	  moving	  towards	  them	  or	  vice	  versa.	  	  
However,	  at	  another	  point	  this	  may	  shift	  to	  a	  description	  of	  the	  perceived	  experience	  of	  the	  divine	  
entity	  being	  in	  some	  sense	  inside	  the	  believer.	  	  The	  key	  point	  here	  is	  that	  again	  there	  is	  no	  single,	  
static	  description,	  only	  shifting	  configurations	  that	  can	  be	  detected	  when	  we	  analyse	  authentic	  
language	  in	  use.	  	  What	  this	  means	  is	  that	  when	  we	  come	  to	  compare	  collections	  of	  texts	  from	  two	  
different	  belief	  communities,	  it	  should	  be	  impossible	  to	  identify	  clear	  fixed	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  
they	  talk	  about	  their	  perceived	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  believer.	  	  Instead,	  we	  should	  only	  be	  able	  to	  
identify	  particular	  patterns	  of	  construal	  that	  tend	  to	  be	  emphasised	  more	  in	  one	  collection	  of	  texts	  
than	  they	  are	  in	  another	  collection.	  By	  choosing	  to	  focus	  on	  these	  constant	  shifts	  in	  construal,	  I	  aim	  
to	  take	  seriously	  the	  application	  of	  complex	  systems	  theory	  to	  the	  description	  of	  the	  cognitive	  
models	  of	  conservative	  religious	  believers.	  	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  frameworks	  of	  belief	  should	  no	  
longer	  be	  viewed	  as	  static,	  fixed	  “things”,	  but	  as	  constantly	  shifting	  processes	  where	  the	  structure	  of	  
propositions	  may	  shift	  and	  warp	  as	  a	  result	  of	  self-­‐organisation	  within	  particular	  streams	  of	  discourse,	  
particular	  moments	  in	  discourse	  or	  at	  various	  points	  in	  a	  text	  (cf.	  Cameron	  2010c;	  Larsen-­‐Freeman	  
and	  Cameron	  2008;	  Miller	  and	  Page	  2007;	  Mitchell	  2009).	  	  However,	  it	  should	  also	  be	  remembered	  
that	  complex	  systems	  theory	  also	  embraces	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  temporary	  stabliisation	  is	  
also	  possible	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  repeated	  pattern	  of	  movement	  between	  two	  attractor	  states	  or	  
movement	  within	  a	  single	  attractor	  state,	  although	  it	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  any	  analysis	  that	  
observes	  such	  temporary	  stability	  must	  always	  allow	  for	  future	  fluctuations	  and	  changes	  (Larsen-­‐
Freeman	  and	  Cameron	  2008).	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In	  this	  section	  I	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  Lakoff’s	  multi-­‐faceted	  notion	  of	  ICMs	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  
religious	  belief,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  all	  integrated	  aspects,	  such	  as	  image	  schemas	  and	  
propositions,	  as	  well	  as	  metaphoric	  and	  metonymic	  models,	  at	  work	  underneath	  the	  language	  
produced	  by	  religious	  believers.	  	  It	  is	  necessary	  also	  to	  note	  the	  limited	  focus	  of	  my	  investigation.	  It	  is	  
limited	  in	  that	  it	  has	  restricted	  itself	  to	  the	  consideration	  of	  texts	  and	  discourse,	  but	  it	  must	  be	  
stressed	  that	  cognitive	  linguists	  are	  also	  gradually	  extending	  their	  interest	  to	  visual	  areas	  such	  as	  
conceptual	  explorations	  of	  gesture	  and	  pictures	  (e.g.	  Müller	  2008;	  Cienki	  2010).	  Forceville	  (2005)	  
explicitly	  applies	  this	  interest	  in	  multi-­‐modal	  expressions	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  ICMs	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  
visual	  representation	  of	  the	  ICM	  of	  anger	  in	  Asterix	  comics.	  	  He	  (2005:	  83)	  argues	  that	  a	  number	  of	  
visual	  effects	  such	  as	  “bulging	  eyes”	  and	  “red	  face”	  can	  be	  related	  to	  specific	  instantiations	  of	  an	  
anger	  ICM	  that	  includes	  conceptual	  metaphors	  such	  as	  ANGER	  IS	  A	  HOT	  FLUID	  IN	  A	  PRESSURIZED	  
CONTAINER	  (cf.	  Kövecses	  2006:	  167-­‐169;	  Lakoff	  1987:	  383).	  	  This	  present	  piece	  of	  research	  is	  focused	  
on	  the	  analysis	  of	  language	  in	  testimonials,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  the	  argument	  that	  
ICMs	  and	  the	  conceptual	  metaphors	  that	  are	  related	  to	  them	  are	  not	  just	  expressed	  through	  
language,	  but	  also	  through	  pictures	  and	  gesture.	  	  	  	  	  	  
I	  have	  now	  examined	  the	  relatively	  traditional	  idea	  of	  ICMs	  as	  it	  was	  first	  suggested	  by	  Lakoff	  in	  1987.	  	  
Lakoff’s	  theory	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  both	  comprehensive	  and	  robust	  and,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  continues	  to	  
be	  drawn	  on	  in	  many	  books	  and	  journal	  articles.	  	  However,	  the	  new	  emphasis	  on	  language	  in	  use	  that	  
I	  have	  started	  to	  explore	  in	  this	  section	  has	  caused	  Evans	  (2006;	  2009)	  to	  propose	  a	  significantly	  
nuanced	  version	  of	  the	  original	  theory	  involving	  a	  reappraisal	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  cognitive	  models	  and	  
their	  relationship	  to	  lexical	  concepts	  and	  meaning	  construction.	  	  I	  will	  therefore	  move	  on	  to	  an	  
outline	  of	  Evans’	  new	  theory,	  exploring	  it	  through	  an	  application	  of	  its	  arguments	  to	  an	  example	  of	  





2.5	  LCCM	  Theory	  and	  its	  Application	  to	  Religious	  Language	  
In	  the	  previous	  section	  I	  integrated	  a	  more	  fluid	  perspective	  and	  an	  approach	  that	  was	  more	  	  
discourse	  based	  than	  Lakoff’s	  theory	  of	  Idealised	  Cognitive	  Models.	  Evans’	  (2006,	  2009)	  more	  
comprehensive	  attempts	  to	  do	  much	  the	  same	  thing	  have	  resulted	  in	  his	  proposal	  of	  a	  revised	  
approach	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  cognitive	  models.	  	  I	  will	  therefore	  now	  move	  on	  to	  an	  examination	  of	  
Evans’	  Lexical	  Concept	  Cognitive	  Model	  (LCCM)	  theory.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Evans’	  theory	  updates	  the	  work	  of	  researchers	  like	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  the	  notion	  of	  
cognitive	  models	  in	  line	  with	  a	  new	  focus	  on	  a	  “usage	  based”	  approach	  to	  language	  that	  stresses	  its	  
unique	  “situated	  communicative	  intention”	  (Evans	  2009:	  22).	  	  LCCM	  theory	  is	  based	  on	  the	  argument	  
that	  “words	  don’t	  have	  meanings	  in	  and	  of	  themselves.	  Rather	  meaning	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  utterance	  
in	  which	  a	  word	  is	  embedded,	  and	  the	  complex	  process	  of	  lexical	  concept	  integration”	  (Evans	  2006:	  
492;	  2009:	  4).	  The	  theory	  distinguishes	  between	  lexical	  concepts	  (as	  linguistic	  entities)	  and	  cognitive	  
models	  (as	  non-­‐linguistic	  entities),	  arguing	  that	  meaning	  is	  achieved	  through	  these	  highly	  schematic	  
and	  impoverished	  lexical	  concepts	  providing	  access	  to	  the	  semantically	  richer	  domains	  of	  cognitive	  
models	  (Evans	  2009:	  105;	  2006:	  496-­‐497,	  500).	  	  In	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  meaning	  is	  achieved	  
according	  to	  LCCM	  theory	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  apply	  it	  to	  an	  example	  of	  religious	  language.	  I	  will	  therefore	  
draw	  on	  the	  following	  sentence	  from	  a	  Muslim	  testimonial	  (Muslim	  Text	  1	  in	  the	  collection	  of	  Muslim	  
Testimonials	  from	  islamfortoday.com	  analysed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter):	  “Islam	  is	  the	  way	  to	  salvation”.	  
LCCM	  theory	  embraces	  many	  of	  the	  key	  ideas	  of	  Goldberg’s	  construction	  grammar,	  arguing	  that	  
constructions	  contribute	  their	  own	  meanings	  to	  sentences	  (Evans	  2009:	  92;	  2006:	  503;	  cf.	  Goldberg	  
1995:	  28;	  2006:	  20).	  	  In	  the	  example	  under	  consideration,	  the	  predicative	  nominative	  construction	  X	  
is	  (the)	  Y	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  semantic	  “vehicle”	  in	  itself,	  telling	  us	  that	  thing	  Y	  is	  predicated	  about	  thing	  
X	  (Evans	  2009:	  289).	  	  The	  subject	  slot	  must	  therefore	  be	  filled	  with	  a	  nominal	  entity	  (a	  noun),	  which	  
in	  LCCM	  theory	  is	  regarded	  as	  an	  “open-­‐class	  lexical	  concept”	  that	  can	  provide	  access	  to	  a	  range	  of	  
cognitive	  models	  (Evans	  2009:	  205).	  	  The	  noun	  phrase	  “the	  way	  to	  salvation”	  consists	  of	  a	  determiner,	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noun,	  preposition	  and	  noun	  that	  must	  all	  be	  integrated	  before	  undergoing	  more	  complex	  integration	  
with	  “Islam”	  within	  the	  semantic	  confines	  established	  by	  the	  predicative	  nominative	  construction	  (cf.	  
Evans	  2009:	  246-­‐247).	  The	  phrase	  “way	  to	  salvation”	  provides	  a	  context	  for	  giving	  the	  definite	  article	  
the	  meaning	  of	  there	  being	  only	  one	  possible	  thing	  (in	  this	  case	  a	  “way	  to	  salvation”)	  and	  not	  others.	  	  
Prepositions	  in	  LCCM	  theory	  are	  regarded	  as	  “closed-­‐class	  vehicles”	  and	  therefore	  not	  able	  to	  
provide	  access	  to	  cognitive	  models	  in	  and	  of	  themselves	  (Evans	  2009:	  110).	  	  However,	  they	  are	  able	  
to	  indicate	  relationships	  between	  lexical	  concepts	  and	  provide	  schematic	  information	  as	  well	  as	  
provide	  meaning	  once	  associated	  with	  an	  open-­‐class	  lexical	  unit	  (Evans	  2009:	  110).	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  
preposition	  “to”	  relates	  “way”	  with	  “salvation”	  by	  setting	  up	  a	  path	  schema	  with	  a	  designated	  entity	  
as	  an	  end	  point	  (“salvation”).	  	  Semantically,	  this	  is	  as	  far	  as	  the	  lexical	  concepts	  can	  take	  us	  according	  
to	  LCCM	  theory.	  	  They	  allow	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  entity	  X	  which	  possesses	  the	  attribute	  of	  being	  a	  
Y	  which	  has	  Z	  as	  an	  end	  point.	  	  As	  can	  be	  seen,	  this	  information	  is	  highly	  schematic,	  and	  while	  it	  is	  
able	  to	  mark	  out	  relations	  between	  the	  various	  vehicles,	  it	  is	  not	  able	  to	  provide	  detailed	  information.	  	  
This	  information	  is	  supplied	  by	  the	  open-­‐class	  lexical	  concepts	  “Islam”,	  “way”	  and	  “salvation”,	  
providing	  us	  with	  access	  to	  our	  cognitive	  models	  for	  those	  concepts.	  	  	  
LCCM	  theory	  argues	  that	  lexical	  concepts	  first	  access	  “primary	  cognitive	  models”	  associated	  with	  
them	  (Evans	  2009:	  263;	  2006:	  513).	  	  For	  example	  “way”	  may	  have	  a	  primary	  cognitive	  model	  
associated	  with	  a	  physical	  path	  (i.e.	  “this	  way	  leads	  back	  to	  the	  house”).	  	  A	  “clash”	  occurs	  when	  this	  
primary	  cognitive	  model	  cannot	  be	  appropriately	  matched	  to	  the	  activated	  primary	  cognitive	  model	  
associated	  with	  the	  abstract	  state	  “salvation”	  (a	  state	  of	  being	  saved	  from	  a	  negative	  situation)	  (cf.	  
Evans	  2009:	  263).	  “Clash	  resolution”	  occurs	  through	  accessing	  secondary	  cognitive	  models,	  which	  in	  
this	  case	  may	  include	  a	  means	  of	  achieving	  an	  abstract	  goal	  (i.e.	  “I	  need	  to	  find	  a	  way	  to	  solve	  this	  
problem”)	  (Evans	  2009:	  264).	  	  In	  LCCM	  theory,	  a	  meaning	  construction	  process	  that	  involves	  a	  
rejection	  of	  primary	  cognitive	  models	  that	  receive	  secondary	  activation	  and	  the	  acceptance	  of	  
secondary	  cognitive	  models	  that	  receive	  primary	  activation	  is	  one	  “defining	  feature	  of	  a	  figurative	  
conception”	  (Evans	  2009:	  289).	  	  However,	  if	  a	  term	  is	  used	  in	  a	  figurative	  manner	  frequently	  enough,	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its	  figurative	  meaning	  may	  become	  a	  “pre-­‐assembled	  conception”	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “concept	  
collocation”	  that	  may,	  through	  this	  process	  of	  conventionalisation,	  become	  even	  more	  salient	  than	  
literal	  primary	  cognitive	  models	  (Evans	  2009:	  299).	  	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  metaphorical	  “way”	  
has	  gone	  through	  such	  a	  “career”	  of	  conventionalisation	  (cf.	  Gentner	  and	  Bowdle	  2001).	  	  Once	  the	  
cognitive	  models	  of	  “way”	  and	  “salvation”	  have	  been	  matched,	  it	  is	  then	  possible	  to	  complete	  the	  
establishing	  of	  meaning	  by	  attributing	  “way	  to	  salvation”	  to	  “Islam”.	  
LCCM	  theory	  stresses	  the	  vast	  amount	  of	  rich	  conceptual	  information	  that	  lexical	  concepts	  provide	  
access	  to.	  	  Terms	  like	  “Islam”,	  “salvation”	  and	  complete	  integrated	  sentences	  such	  as	  “Islam	  is	  the	  
way	  to	  salvation”	  open	  up	  huge	  networks	  of	  extra-­‐linguistic	  simulations	  and	  encyclopaedic	  
knowledge	  that	  will	  significantly	  vary	  from	  individual	  to	  individual,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  one	  situated	  point	  
in	  a	  single	  individual’s	  life	  to	  another	  point.	  	  The	  theory	  proposes	  that	  the	  range	  of	  primary	  and	  
secondary	  cognitive	  models	  that	  can	  be	  related	  to	  any	  open-­‐class	  lexical	  concept	  each	  consist	  of	  their	  
own	  frames	  comprised	  of	  “individuals”	  and	  “types”	  (relating	  to	  things)	  and	  “situations	  “	  and	  “events”	  
(Evans	  2009:	  195-­‐197).	  	  This	  is	  based	  on	  the	  extensive	  amount	  of	  research	  that	  has	  been	  conducted	  
into	  the	  notions	  of	  semantic	  and	  episodic	  memory	  (Tulving	  1985).	  	  The	  principal	  distinction	  between	  
these	  two	  types	  of	  information	  processing	  is	  that	  that	  episodic	  memory	  focuses	  on	  “unique	  spatial-­‐
temporal	  contexts”,	  while	  semantic	  memory	  focuses	  on	  “facts	  and	  concepts”	  (Ryan,	  Hoscheidt	  and	  
Nadel	  2008:	  5).	  	  More	  recent	  research	  has	  also	  proposed	  that	  episodic	  memory	  “allows	  the	  
rememberer	  to	  have	  the	  conscious	  experience,	  or	  autonoesis,	  of	  being	  mentally	  present	  once	  again	  
within	  the	  spatial-­‐temporal	  context	  of	  the	  original	  experience	  –	  the	  phenomenal	  experience	  of	  
remembering”	  (ibid.).	  	  It	  has	  also	  highlighted	  the	  intimate	  relationship	  between	  emotion	  and	  episodic	  
memory,	  both	  in	  the	  form	  of	  emotion	  influencing	  the	  formation	  and	  processing	  of	  episodic	  memory	  
and	  emotion	  acting	  as	  a	  contextual	  marker	  of	  episodic	  memory	  (Allen,	  Kaut	  and	  Lord	  2008).	  I	  will	  be	  
particularly	  interested	  in	  these	  notions	  of	  semantic	  and	  episodic	  memory	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  due	  
to	  their	  close	  respective	  alignment	  with	  the	  notions	  of	  knowledge	  about	  a	  thing	  and	  the	  
autobiographical	  experience	  of	  things	  within	  an	  unfolding	  situation.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  will	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introduce	  the	  term	  action	  and	  relationship	  language,	  which	  I	  see	  as	  closely	  aligned	  with	  the	  
expression	  through	  language	  of	  perceived	  episodic	  memories,	  and	  in	  chapter	  four	  I	  will	  return	  to	  a	  
detailed	  exploration	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  episodic	  memory	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  language	  of	  
conservative	  religious	  believers.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
It	  is	  possible	  to	  illustrate	  what	  Evans	  means	  by	  individuals,	  types,	  situations	  and	  events	  by	  returning	  
to	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  term	  Islam.	  	  It	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  identify	  related	  primary	  cognitive	  models	  
relating	  to	  Islam	  as	  a	  cultural	  entity	  and	  Islam	  as	  a	  theological	  belief	  system.	  	  The	  former	  cognitive	  
model	  would	  consist	  of	  individual	  frames	  that	  would	  relate	  to	  Mosques	  I	  have	  visited,	  particular	  
styles	  of	  hijabs,	  burqas,	  and	  niqabs	  I	  have	  noticed,	  food	  I	  have	  seen	  in	  Muslim	  countries,	  particular	  
descriptions	  or	  definitions	  of	  specific	  doctrines,	  or	  any	  entity	  that	  I	  associate	  with	  the	  cultural	  aspect	  
of	  Islam.	  	  When	  I	  abstract	  across	  all	  those	  individual	  frames	  I	  arrive	  at	  type	  frames	  such	  as	  “the	  
mosque”	  or	  “the	  hijab”.	  	  Following	  the	  argument	  of	  LCCM	  theory,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  point	  at	  a	  particular	  
individual	  frame,	  such	  as	  the	  Blue	  Mosque	  in	  Istanbul,	  or	  a	  particular	  definition	  or	  description	  of	  a	  
doctrine,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  point	  at	  a	  type	  frame,	  such	  as	  the	  notion	  of	  “the	  mosque”	  or	  the	  
Muslim	  doctrine	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  God	  that	  I	  carry	  in	  my	  mind,	  because	  it	  only	  exists	  as	  an	  abstraction	  
across	  all	  the	  mosques	  or	  all	  the	  descriptions	  and	  definitions	  that	  I	  have	  seen	  and	  read	  about	  (cf.	  
Evans	  2009:	  196).	  
In	  contrast,	  according	  to	  Evans	  (2009:	  198),	  situation	  frames	  consist	  of	  “a	  series	  of	  images”	  relating	  to	  
particular	  individuals	  “viewed	  from	  a	  particular	  perspective”.	  Events	  are	  defined	  as	  “a	  series	  of	  two	  
or	  more	  situations”	  that	  are	  “related	  in	  a	  coherent	  manner”	  and	  “lead	  to	  a	  significant	  outcome”	  
(Evans	  2009:	  198).	  Just	  as	  there	  are	  individuals	  and	  type	  frames	  to	  encapsulate	  entities,	  there	  are	  
also	  two	  types	  of	  situations:	  “episodic”	  and	  “generic”	  (Evans	  2009:	  198-­‐199).	  Generic	  situations	  
relate	  to	  type	  frames	  in	  that	  they	  are	  abstractions	  across	  a	  range	  of	  encountered	  episodic	  situations	  
(Evans	  2009:	  199).	  To	  return	  to	  my	  consideration	  of	  the	  term	  Islam,	  a	  good	  example	  of	  episodic	  
situation	  frames	  taken	  from	  the	  primary	  cognitive	  model	  of	  Islam	  as	  a	  monotheistic	  theological	  belief	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system	  would	  be	  my	  memories	  of	  specific	  discussions	  with	  Muslim	  PhD	  students	  about	  Islam	  at	  the	  
University	  of	  Birmingham	  during	  my	  time	  there.	  	  My	  memories	  related	  to	  one	  of	  those	  discussions	  -­‐	  
including	  my	  evaluative	  judgements,	  point	  of	  view	  and	  perceptions	  regarding	  the	  content	  of	  the	  
discussion	  and	  its	  outcome	  -­‐	  could	  be	  regarded	  as	  one	  event	  frame	  for	  my	  cognitive	  model	  of	  Islam	  
as	  a	  belief	  system.	  	  LCCM	  theory	  also	  argues	  that	  this	  cognitive	  model	  would	  also	  include	  a	  range	  of	  
situations	  that	  I	  believe	  are	  not	  or	  will	  never	  be	  associated	  with	  Islam	  as	  a	  belief	  system	  
(“counterfactual	  situations”)	  as	  well	  as	  situations	  that	  I	  believe	  will	  be	  associated	  with	  Islam	  as	  a	  
belief	  system	  in	  the	  future	  (“prospective	  situations”)	  (Evans	  2009:	  198-­‐199).	  	  Continuing	  with	  this	  
example,	  I	  also	  have	  a	  stored	  generic	  situation	  inside	  my	  mind	  of	  a	  perceived	  common	  structure	  that	  
discussions	  about	  Islam	  with	  Muslims	  usually	  have.	  	  Needless	  to	  say,	  my	  cognitive	  models	  for	  the	  
lexical	  concept	  Islam	  will	  be	  very	  different	  from	  the	  cognitive	  models	  of	  Islam	  possessed	  by	  a	  
committed	  Muslim,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  different	  from	  my	  cognitive	  models	  of	  Islam	  from	  a	  few	  years	  
ago.	  	  
According	  to	  LCCM	  theory,	  another	  layer	  of	  conceptual	  meaning	  relates	  to	  “attributes”	  and	  “values”	  
that	  are	  assigned	  to	  the	  various	  frames:	  “Frames	  consist	  of	  sets	  of	  attributes	  and	  values.	  An	  attribute	  
concerns	  some	  aspect	  of	  a	  given	  frame,	  while	  a	  value	  is	  a	  specification	  of	  that	  aspect”	  (Evans	  2009:	  
200).	  	  To	  return	  to	  my	  example,	  the	  abstracted	  type	  frames	  that	  I	  associate	  with	  the	  primary	  
cognitive	  model	  of	  Islam	  as	  a	  theological	  belief	  system	  would	  include	  belief	  in	  Allah,	  belief	  in	  
Mohammad,	  belief	  in	  the	  Qur’an,	  belief	  that	  humanity	  is	  in	  need	  of	  salvation,	  etc.	  The	  attributes	  that	  
I	  would	  associate,	  for	  example,	  with	  the	  type	  frame	  belief	  in	  Mohammad	  would	  include:	  the	  belief	  he	  
is	  the	  messenger	  of	  Allah,	  the	  belief	  that	  he	  wrote	  the	  Qur’an,	  the	  belief	  that	  he	  is	  to	  be	  highly	  
respected,	  etc.	  The	  values	  I	  would	  associate,	  for	  example,	  with	  the	  attribute	  of	  the	  belief	  that	  
Mohammad	  wrote	  the	  Qur’an	  would	  include	  the	  specification	  that	  he	  wrote	  it	  through	  divine	  
inspiration	  which	  would	  link	  to	  the	  attribute	  of	  Mohammad	  as	  the	  messenger	  of	  Allah,	  while	  also	  
leading	  in	  my	  mind	  to	  the	  further	  specification	  of	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  angel	  Gabriel	  relayed	  verses	  of	  
the	  Qur’an	  to	  Mohammad.	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In	  addition	  to	  this	  vast	  array	  of	  information	  that	  can	  be	  accessed	  when	  I	  use	  or	  hear	  the	  term	  Islam,	  
LCCM	  theory	  also	  argues	  that	  the	  location	  of	  the	  term	  in	  a	  particular	  sentence	  at	  a	  particular	  point	  in	  
a	  text	  or	  discourse	  for	  a	  particular	  purpose	  also	  impacts	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term.	  	  For	  example,	  
the	  integrated	  sentence	  “Islam	  is	  the	  way	  of	  salvation”	  would	  cause	  “primary	  activation”	  of	  my	  
primary	  cognitive	  model	  for	  Islam	  as	  a	  monotheistic	  theological	  belief	  system	  but	  only	  “secondary	  
activation”	  of	  the	  primary	  cognitive	  model	  for	  Islam	  as	  a	  cultural	  entity	  (cf.	  Evans	  2009:	  269).	  	  It	  
would	  also	  cause	  me	  to	  “highlight”	  specific	  frames	  and	  attributes	  in	  that	  primary	  cognitive	  model	  
over	  other	  frames	  and	  attributes.	  	  For	  example	  the	  type	  frame	  relating	  to	  the	  belief	  that	  humans	  are	  
in	  need	  of	  salvation	  would	  certainly	  be	  highlighted	  while	  the	  beliefs	  relating	  to	  the	  role	  of	  women	  in	  
an	  Islamic	  society	  may	  not	  be	  (cf.	  Evans	  2009:	  270).	  	  Another	  key	  element	  to	  this	  is	  LCCM’s	  notion	  of	  
the	  “discourse	  model”	  –	  “a	  dynamic	  mental	  model	  constructed	  during	  ongoing	  discourse,	  to	  which	  
information	  is	  continually	  added”	  (Evans	  2009:	  276,	  71).	  It	  is	  because	  of	  this	  ever	  expanding,	  
updating	  and	  evolving	  network	  of	  individual,	  type,	  situation	  and	  event	  frames	  combined	  with	  the	  
shifting	  intentions	  and	  context	  of	  an	  addresser	  and	  the	  dynamic	  flow	  of	  discourse,	  that	  LCCM	  theory	  
argues	  that	  no	  utterance	  can	  ever	  have	  the	  exact	  same	  meaning	  as	  another	  utterance	  (Evans	  2009:	  
71).	  	  	  
LCCM	  theory	  should	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  attack	  on	  Lakoff’s	  theory	  of	  ICMs,	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  
significantly	  nuanced	  update	  of	  it	  that	  integrates	  a	  number	  of	  key	  Cognitive	  Linguistic	  strands	  (Evans	  
2009:	  60,	  193-­‐196,	  299,	  335-­‐336).	  	  The	  biggest	  difference	  between	  Lakoff’s	  view	  of	  ICMs	  and	  the	  
view	  proposed	  by	  LCCM	  theory	  is	  that	  Lakoff	  is	  attempting	  to	  recover	  relatively	  fixed	  and	  stable	  
cognitive	  models	  from	  a	  range	  of	  different	  lexical	  concepts,	  while	  Evans	  is	  attempting	  to	  map	  how	  a	  
range	  of	  different	  usages	  and	  combinations	  of	  lexical	  concepts	  provide	  shifting	  levels	  of	  access	  to	  an	  
even	  larger	  range	  of	  dynamically	  developing	  cognitive	  models.	  	  	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Lakoff’s	  theory	  of	  ICMs	  is	  invaluable	  in	  foregrounding	  the	  pressure	  that	  
conservative	  believers	  feel	  under	  to	  foreground	  particular	  models	  and	  perspectives	  and	  to	  perceive	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them	  as	  rigid	  and	  fixed.	  	  Lakoff’s	  theory	  is	  also	  ideal	  in	  aiding	  any	  investigation	  into	  how	  the	  
worldview	  of	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  can	  be	  further	  barricaded	  through	  the	  structuring	  
influence	  of	  the	  various	  elements	  of	  ICMs.	  	  These	  include	  particular	  image	  schemas	  like	  the	  source-­‐
path-­‐goal	  schema,	  the	  stacking	  of	  propositions,	  the	  use	  of	  metaphor	  to	  portray	  abstract	  perceptions	  
as	  concrete,	  basic	  entities	  and	  the	  use	  of	  metonymy	  to	  represent	  highly	  complex	  situations	  as	  very	  
simple,	  binary	  entities.	  	  	  
In	  contrast,	  Evans’	  usage	  based	  approach	  to	  cognitive	  models	  is	  invaluable	  in	  foregrounding	  the	  fact	  
that	  conservative	  religious	  believers’	  experience	  of	  the	  world	  is	  far	  from	  fixed	  and	  rigid.	  	  What	  Evans’	  
theory	  emphasises	  is	  that	  the	  variables	  become	  infinite	  when	  we	  view	  belief	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  
experience	  and	  the	  expression	  of	  that	  experience	  at	  a	  particular	  point	  in	  a	  text	  or	  during	  an	  unfolding	  
discourse.	  	  The	  inevitable	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  that	  our	  cognitive	  model	  selection	  and	  expression	  
must	  always	  be	  to	  some	  degree	  shifting	  and	  unique:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
…	  the	  range	  of	  linguistic	  units	  available	  to	  the	  language	  user	  massively	  underdetermine	  the	  range	  of	  situations,	  
events,	  states,	  relationships	  and	  other	  interpersonal	  functions	  that	  the	  language	  user	  may	  potentially	  seek	  to	  use	  
language	  to	  express	  and	  fulfil.	  One	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  language	  users	  live	  in	  a	  socio-­‐physical	  ‘matrix’	  that	  is	  
continually	  shifting	  and	  evolving.	  No	  two	  situations,	  feelings	  or	  relationships,	  at	  any	  given	  point	  in	  time,	  are	  exactly	  
alike.	  We	  are	  continually	  using	  language	  to	  express	  unique	  meanings,	  about	  unique	  states	  of	  affairs	  and	  
relationships,	  in	  unique	  ways.	  	  
(Evans	  2006:	  497)	  
Evans’	  LCCM	  theory	  therefore	  provides	  a	  foundation	  for	  a	  critical	  engagement	  with	  the	  conservative	  
religious	  believer’s	  worldview	  that	  I	  will	  develop	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  However,	  I	  am	  concerned	  at	  
this	  point	  that	  my	  investigation	  into	  how	  and	  why	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  perceive	  reality	  in	  
absolute	  terms	  has	  so	  far	  remained	  restricted	  to	  cognitive	  linguistic	  research	  into	  cognitive	  models.	  	  
My	  intention	  now	  is	  therefore	  to	  further	  ground	  this	  investigation	  into	  how	  absolute	  views	  of	  reality	  
can	  appear	  to	  be	  self-­‐evidently	  obvious	  by	  critically	  comparing	  this	  cognitive	  linguistic	  approach	  with	  




2.6	  Relating	  ICMs	  to	  the	  Ideas	  of	  Wittgenstein,	  Wisdom	  and	  Mehan	  
This	  section	  examines	  two	  core	  ideas	  within	  the	  fields	  of	  epistemology	  and	  the	  philosophy	  of	  religion	  
and	  one	  study	  which	  demonstrates	  those	  core	  ideas.	  	  The	  conclusions	  which	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  
these	  ideas	  will	  then	  be	  compared	  and	  contrasted	  with	  the	  Cognitive	  Linguistic	  notion	  of	  ICMs.	  The	  
first	  of	  these	  ideas	  relate	  to	  logical	  positivism	  and	  the	  early	  work	  of	  Wittgenstein.	  	  They	  relate	  to	  the	  
insistence	  that	  statements	  about	  reality	  are	  only	  meaningful	  when	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  empirically	  verify	  
their	  veracity.	  	  The	  second	  idea,	  relating	  to	  the	  later	  work	  of	  Wittgenstein	  and	  Wisdom,	  stands	  in	  
marked	  contrast	  to	  this	  insistence.	  	  It	  proposes	  that	  humans	  carry	  “pictures”	  of	  reality	  in	  their	  minds	  
and	  use	  those	  pictures	  to	  see	  reality	  as	  one	  thing	  rather	  than	  another.	  	  This	  idea	  relates	  to	  the	  
argument	  that	  humans	  do	  not	  tend	  to	  use	  evidence	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  conclusion,	  but	  rather	  use	  evidence	  
to	  support,	  consolidate	  or	  clarify	  an	  existing	  conclusion	  or	  picture	  of	  reality	  or	  at	  least	  a	  feeling	  or	  
instinct	  that	  leans	  in	  a	  particular	  direction.	  	  The	  study	  by	  Mehan	  consolidates	  these	  ideas	  through	  a	  
study	  that	  demonstrates	  how	  a	  group	  of	  psychiatrists	  and	  the	  patient	  they	  examine	  both	  appear	  to	  
interpret	  data	  in	  a	  way	  that	  supports	  their	  respective	  worldviews	  –	  even	  though	  the	  data	  appears	  to	  
contradict	  those	  worldviews.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  a	  consideration	  of	  very	  abstract	  belief	  
systems	  that	  rely	  on	  indirect	  evidence	  to	  form	  conclusions,	  then	  this	  second	  idea	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  
compatible	  with	  many	  elements	  relating	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  ICMs.	  
Before	  I	  proceed,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  offer	  some	  justification	  for	  my	  focus	  on	  Wittgenstein,	  Wisdom	  
and	  Mehan.	  	  The	  later	  work	  of	  Wittgenstein	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  one	  of	  the	  starting	  points	  for	  a	  
sustained	  challenge	  of	  the	  objectivist	  perspective,	  and	  therefore	  one	  of	  the	  crucial	  foundations	  for	  
Lakoff`s	  work	  on	  cognitive	  models	  (for	  example,	  see	  Taylor`s	  references	  to	  Wittgenstein	  when	  
discussing	  categorisation	  and	  cognitive	  linguistics	  in	  Taylor	  2003).	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  
explore	  the	  influence	  of	  Wittgenstein	  during	  any	  exploration	  encompassing	  the	  notions	  of	  objectivity	  
and	  subjectivity.	  	  My	  decision	  to	  focus	  on	  Wisdom`s	  article	  relates	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  is	  interested	  in	  
extending	  the	  ideas	  of	  Wittgensetin	  while	  explicitly	  applying	  them	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  objectivity	  and	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subjectivity	  in	  religious	  believers.	  	  His	  parable	  of	  the	  garden	  (discussed	  below)	  is	  also	  the	  most	  lucid	  
attempt	  that	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  to	  illustrate	  the	  element	  of	  subjectivity	  in	  issues	  relating	  to	  the	  origins	  of	  
the	  Universe	  and	  the	  acceptance	  or	  rejection	  of	  religious	  belief.	  	  My	  choice	  to	  focus	  on	  Mehan`s	  
study	  and	  the	  conclusions	  he	  draws	  from	  that	  study	  is	  based	  on	  three	  reasons:	  the	  first	  is	  that	  
Mehan`s	  work	  returns	  the	  focus	  to	  an	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  discourse,	  the	  second	  is	  that	  his	  study	  has	  
been	  recognised	  as	  influential	  within	  the	  field	  of	  disocurse	  analysis	  (for	  example,	  Jaworski	  and	  
Coupland	  (2006:	  xii	  and	  477)	  refer	  to	  it	  as	  a	  “key	  article”	  in	  discourse	  studies,	  in	  addition	  to	  being	  a	  
“poignant	  and	  powerful	  demonstration	  of	  the	  power/knowledge	  interface	  in	  discourse”)	  and	  the	  
third	  is	  that	  his	  conclusions	  consolidate	  the	  theoretical	  ideas	  of	  Wittgenstein	  and	  Wisdom	  despite	  the	  
fact	  that	  they	  do	  not	  come	  from	  within	  the	  field	  of	  philosophy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Objectivism,	  Subjectivism	  and	  Embodied	  Realism	  
Any	  discussion	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  contributions	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  language	  
and	  reality	  must	  first	  begin	  with	  his	  first	  major	  work,	  Tractatus	  Logico-­‐Philosophicus,	  first	  published	  
in	  1921	  and	  first	  translated	  into	  English	  in	  1922.	  	  This	  earlier	  treatise	  subsequently	  became	  the	  
inspiration	  for	  the	  logical	  positivists,	  a	  group	  of	  philosophers	  who	  insisted	  that	  language	  could	  only	  
be	  meaningful	  when	  it	  was	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  things	  that	  could	  in	  some	  way	  be	  empirically	  verified	  
(Stiver	  1996:	  42,	  59).	  	  The	  arguments	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  work	  that	  attracted	  the	  logical	  positivists	  
included	  the	  claim	  that	  any	  proposition	  must	  have	  the	  characteristic	  of	  clarity,	  and	  if	  that	  necessity	  
for	  clarity	  cannot	  be	  met,	  then	  what	  the	  proposition	  refers	  to	  should	  be	  deemed	  as	  beyond	  the	  limits	  
of	  language,	  and	  therefore	  “we	  must	  pass	  over	  [it]	  in	  silence”	  (Wittgenstein	  1922/2001:	  7).	  	  Logical	  
positivists	  developed	  this	  argument	  further	  with	  their	  insistence	  that	  propositions	  must	  be	  
empirically	  verifiable,	  or	  be	  regarded	  as	  nonsense	  and	  not	  worthy	  of	  discussion	  (Hick	  2004:	  177;	  
Cheetham	  2003:	  21).	  	  This	  of	  course	  had	  serious	  implications	  for	  religious	  language	  because	  logical	  
positivists	  were	  insisting	  that	  any	  proposition	  originating	  from	  faith	  in	  a	  divine	  being	  was	  impossible	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to	  empirically	  verify.	  However,	  the	  movement	  of	  logical	  positivism	  soon	  collapsed	  in	  on	  itself	  due	  to	  
the	  self-­‐defeating	  nature	  of	  its	  own	  argument	  –	  the	  central	  point	  that	  the	  argument	  that	  meaningful	  
language	  must	  be	  empirically	  verifiable	  was	  itself	  an	  abstract	  principle	  which	  could	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  
empirical	  verification	  (Stiver	  1996:	  45-­‐46).	  	  However,	  despite	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  movement,	  
many	  scholars	  related	  to	  the	  philosophy	  of	  religion	  argue	  that	  the	  underpinning	  ideas	  have	  been	  
quietly	  absorbed	  into	  the	  worldviews	  of	  certain	  scientists	  and	  thinkers	  in	  the	  modern	  world	  (Stiver	  
1996:	  47;	  Hick	  2004:	  177;	  Cheetham	  2003:	  22;	  McFague	  1982:	  5).	  	  	  
The	  logical	  positivist	  viewpoint	  has	  some	  key	  disagreements	  with	  the	  epistemological	  theory	  known	  
as	  objectivism,	  but	  one	  similarity	  is	  that	  both	  positions	  maintain	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  arrive	  at	  
objective	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world	  around	  us.	  	  This	  similarity	  is	  important	  because,	  as	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  
this	  chapter,	  the	  cognitive	  linguistic	  theory	  of	  cognitive	  models	  is	  based	  around	  the	  fundamental	  
argument	  that	  pure,	  objective	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world,	  whether	  achieved	  through	  experimentation,	  
logic	  or	  mathematics,	  is	  not	  possible.	  	  However,	  my	  examination	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  contribution	  to	  
the	  philosophy	  of	  knowledge	  is	  not	  yet	  complete.	  	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  cognitive	  linguistic	  
approach	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  diametrically	  opposed	  to	  many	  of	  the	  central	  tenants	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  
Logico-­‐Philosophicus	  (1922/2001),	  Wittgenstein	  went	  on	  to	  develop	  his	  views	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  
knowledge	  in	  a	  radically	  different	  direction.	  This	  brings	  me	  to	  a	  consideration	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  
Philosophical	  Investigations	  (1953/2009).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	  Women,	  Fire	  and	  Dangerous	  Things,	  Lakoff	  acknowledges	  that	  his	  ideas	  on	  categorisation	  and	  
Idealised	  Cognitive	  Models	  emerged	  from	  a	  line	  of	  reasoning	  that	  began	  in	  the	  later	  work	  of	  
Wittgenstein	  (Lakoff	  1987:	  11;	  see	  also	  the	  frequent	  engagement	  with	  the	  later	  Wittgenstein	  in	  
Taylor	  2003).	  	  In	  Philosophical	  Investigations,	  Wittgenstein	  distanced	  himself	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  some	  
language	  is	  clearly	  meaningful	  and	  some	  is	  clearly	  meaningless,	  and	  moved	  toward	  describing	  
language	  through	  the	  metaphor	  of	  a	  game	  (Wittgenstein	  1953/2009:	  8).	  	  What	  he	  meant	  by	  this	  was	  
that	  how	  humans	  define	  language	  or	  categorise	  meaning	  depends	  upon	  the	  specific	  context	  of	  how	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that	  language	  is	  to	  be	  used,	  or,	  to	  pursue	  the	  metaphor,	  what	  the	  rules	  of	  a	  particular	  game	  are	  
(Wittgenstein	  1953/2009:	  238;	  Gergen	  2009:	  8;	  Taylor	  2003:	  42-­‐43).	  	  Wittgenstein	  gives	  the	  example	  
of	  a	  builder	  teaching	  his	  assistant	  about	  building.	  	  The	  word	  “block”	  is	  learned	  in	  relation	  to	  how	  a	  
block	  will	  be	  used	  within	  that	  context	  of	  building	  (Wittgenstein	  1953/2009:	  6).	  	  If	  the	  context	  and	  use	  
is	  changed,	  if	  a	  different	  type	  of	  “game”	  is	  played,	  then	  the	  word	  “block”	  could	  well	  take	  on	  a	  
different	  meaning.	  	  Wittgenstein	  concludes	  that	  words	  are	  classified	  depending	  on	  the	  contingent	  
aim	  or	  inclination	  of	  the	  classifier	  and	  are	  not	  dependent	  on	  some	  a	  priori	  criterion	  (Wittgenstein	  in	  
Gergen	  2003:	  19),	  or	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way	  “the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  is	  its	  use	  in	  the	  language”	  
(Wittgenstein	  1953/2009:	  25,	  238).	  	  Wittgenstein	  (1953/2009:	  238)	  relates	  this	  to	  the	  seemingly	  
objective	  world	  of	  mathematics	  where	  he	  argues	  that	  mathematics	  may	  be	  a	  “body	  of	  knowledge”,	  
but	  that	  it	  is	  also	  an	  “activity”	  with	  its	  own	  agreed	  upon	  rules.	  	  This	  means	  that	  if,	  for	  whatever	  
reason,	  everybody	  was	  to	  be	  taught	  that	  two	  and	  two	  comes	  to	  five	  and	  that	  was	  to	  become	  the	  
agreed	  upon	  rule,	  then	  the	  “game”	  where	  two	  and	  two	  being	  five	  is	  regarded	  as	  false	  “would	  have	  
been	  abrogated”	  (ibid.).	  	  It	  is	  often	  difficult	  to	  interpret	  Wittgenstein,	  but	  here	  he	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  
be	  saying	  that	  two	  and	  two	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  objectively	  equal	  four.	  	  Instead,	  his	  argument	  appears	  
to	  be	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  words	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  game	  they	  are	  played	  within,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  
often	  impossible	  to	  lay	  aside	  function	  and	  context	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  establish	  which	  game	  best	  matches	  
the	  objective	  entity	  or	  situation	  in	  the	  environment	  (cf.	  Stiver	  1996:	  67-­‐68).	  	  	  
This	  notion	  of	  language	  games	  also	  relates	  to	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  duck-­‐rabbit	  picture.	  	  This	  is	  a	  
picture	  that	  can	  look	  like	  a	  rabbit	  to	  some	  and	  a	  duck	  to	  others.	  	  Wittgenstein	  poses	  a	  list	  of	  
questions	  related	  to	  the	  act	  of	  seeing	  what	  is	  in	  the	  duck-­‐rabbit	  picture	  and	  other	  similar	  drawings.	  	  
One	  of	  these	  questions	  relates	  to	  the	  basis	  upon	  which	  we	  are	  able	  to	  give	  a	  “perfectly	  specific	  
description”	  of	  a	  picture:	  “was	  it	  seeing,	  or	  was	  it	  a	  thought?”	  (Wittgenstein	  1953/2009:	  215).	  	  The	  
implication	  appears	  to	  be	  that	  the	  two	  cannot	  be	  divorced:	  
“Is	  it	  a	  genuine	  visual	  experience?”	  The	  question	  is:	  in	  what	  way	  is	  it	  one?	  	  Here	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  that	  what	  is	  at	  




The	  conclusion	  appears	  to	  be	  that	  we	  do	  not	  just	  see	  things,	  but	  that	  we	  see	  things	  as	  something	  
even	  when	  we	  do	  not	  realise	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case.	  	  When	  we	  keep	  staring	  at	  the	  rabbit	  and	  it	  
suddenly	  appears	  to	  switch	  to	  a	  duck,	  we	  are	  not	  seeing	  something	  new,	  just	  conceptualising	  the	  
data	  in	  a	  different	  way.	  	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  one	  of	  the	  key	  points	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  Philosophical	  
Investigations	  is	  that	  these	  different	  ways	  of	  conceptualising	  words,	  propositions	  and	  things	  are	  
determined	  by	  the	  different	  socio-­‐cultural	  language	  games	  we	  construct	  and	  the	  uses	  we	  put	  those	  
games	  to.	  In	  his	  Lectures	  and	  Conversations,	  Wittgenstein	  went	  on	  to	  postulate	  that	  we	  all	  live	  our	  
lives	  according	  to	  differing	  “pictures”	  embedded	  in	  our	  minds,	  “I	  think	  differently,	  in	  a	  different	  way.	  	  
I	  say	  different	  things	  to	  myself.	  	  I	  have	  different	  pictures”	  (Wittgenstein	  1978:	  62).	  	  	  
Returning	  now	  to	  the	  primary	  topic	  of	  Cognitive	  Linguistics	  and	  ICMs,	  I	  would	  now	  like	  to	  address	  the	  
question	  of	  how	  well	  Wittgenstein’s	  view	  of	  language	  fits	  in	  with	  the	  cognitive	  linguistic	  approach	  tp	  
categorisation.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  question	  because	  Wittgenstein	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
important	  philosophers	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  epistemological	  move	  away	  from	  an	  objectivist	  paradigm.	  	  It	  
is	  therefore	  very	  important	  to	  trace	  the	  connections	  between	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  trends	  in	  
the	  philsophy	  of	  knowledge	  and	  the	  cognitive	  linguistic	  approach.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  as	  I	  pointed	  out	  
above,	  cognitive	  linguist	  researchers	  such	  as	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  and	  Taylor	  have	  linked	  some	  of	  the	  
aspects	  of	  their	  examination	  of	  categorisation	  with	  an	  explicit	  engagement	  with	  Wittgenstein’s	  ideas.	  	  
I	  would	  argue	  that	  Lakoff,	  Johnson,	  Evans	  and	  Taylor	  are	  the	  cognitive	  linguistic	  researchers	  that	  have	  
devoted	  the	  most	  time	  to	  researching	  cognitive	  models.	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  so	  far	  examined	  in	  some	  
detail	  the	  ideas	  of	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  and	  Evans,	  but	  has	  yet	  to	  examine	  the	  arguments	  of	  Taylor.	  	  I	  
will	  therefore	  now	  turn	  briefly	  to	  a	  consideration	  of	  his	  2003	  monograph	  on	  categorisation,	  and	  how	  
he	  locates	  his	  views	  on	  cognitive	  models	  in	  relation	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  work.	  	  	  
Taylor	  (2003)	  essentially	  agrees	  with	  Wittgenstein’s	  notion	  of	  language	  games	  and	  applies	  it	  to	  the	  
human	  propensity	  to	  form	  conceptual	  and	  linguistic	  categories	  of	  meaning	  through	  which	  we	  interact	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with	  the	  world.	  	  However,	  in	  line	  with	  Lakoff’s	  notion	  of	  prototypicality	  effects	  in	  ICMs,	  Taylor	  (2003)	  
also	  pushes	  the	  idea	  further	  and	  argues	  that	  these	  different	  games	  are	  not	  viewed	  equally	  by	  
everybody.	  	  Certain	  uses	  of	  words	  will	  be	  prototypical	  for	  certain	  individuals	  within	  particular	  socio-­‐
cultural	  contexts	  at	  particular	  times,	  but	  not	  for	  others.	  	  Taylor	  (2003:	  91-­‐93)	  also	  applies	  this	  notion	  
of	  prototypicality	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  propositional	  frames	  that	  I	  examined	  above	  (section	  2.2),	  focusing	  
on	  Lakoff’s	  examples	  of	  the	  term	  mother	  and	  the	  days	  of	  the	  week	  (Taylor	  focuses	  on	  the	  term	  
Monday).	  
Despite	  this	  agreement	  between	  the	  notion	  of	  language	  games	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  categories	  of	  meaning	  
and	  prototypicality	  effects	  within	  ICMs,	  there	  is	  an	  important	  difference	  between	  the	  subjectivism	  of	  
the	  later	  Wittgenstein	  and	  the	  cognitive	  linguistic	  argument	  for	  embodied	  realism.	  	  I	  will	  now	  turn	  to	  
a	  brief	  exploration	  of	  this	  important	  epistemological	  difference.	  	  	  
Embodied	  realism	  argues	  that	  our	  bodies	  and	  the	  “wetware”	  of	  our	  brains	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  
“coupled	  to	  our	  environment”	  and	  not	  rigidly	  distinct	  from	  it	  (ibid.	  91),	  so	  that	  the	  use	  of	  our	  physical	  
bodies	  in	  the	  navigation	  and	  understanding	  of	  our	  environments	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  fusion	  
between	  aspects	  of	  those	  environments	  with	  our	  cognitive	  frameworks	  (Evans	  2009:	  29-­‐30;	  Gibbs	  
2005).	  	  Taylor	  (2003:	  1-­‐17)	  provides	  a	  good	  example	  of	  this	  when	  he	  considers	  the	  language	  of	  colour.	  
He	  goes	  some	  way	  in	  arguing	  that	  colour	  is	  not	  something	  that	  exists	  as	  a	  pre-­‐given	  in	  the	  external	  
world	  and	  crucially	  depends	  on	  how	  a	  particular	  brain	  interprets	  incoming	  data	  and	  chooses	  to	  
demarcate	  “discrete	  colour	  categories”	  (Taylor	  2003:	  3).	  	  However,	  he	  stops	  short	  of	  a	  full	  subjectivist	  
view	  of	  the	  language	  of	  colour	  by	  noting	  the	  evidence	  for	  the	  notion	  that	  certain	  colour	  ranges	  have	  
focal	  prominence	  in	  all	  humans	  (ibid.	  8-­‐11).	  	  He	  concludes,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  cognitive	  linguistic	  trend	  
toward	  a	  middle	  road	  between	  subjectivism	  and	  objectivism,	  that	  culture	  clearly	  influences	  the	  
categorisation	  of	  colour,	  but	  that	  this	  categorisation	  is	  possibly	  constrained	  to	  a	  degree	  by	  external	  
environmental	  factors	  (ibid.	  14).	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This	  leads	  to	  the	  possibility	  that,	  in	  some	  domains	  of	  knowledge,	  high	  or	  even	  near-­‐absolute	  levels	  of	  
certainty	  in	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world	  are	  possible.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  argument	  of	  embodied	  
realism	  is	  that	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world	  encapsulated	  within	  our	  cognitive	  models	  has	  been	  
formed	  through	  our	  interaction	  with	  it,	  and	  the	  reason	  that	  humans	  have	  survived	  and	  multiplied	  is	  
that,	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  “external”	  world,	  we	  have	  developed	  a	  vast	  body	  of	  knowledge	  that	  can	  be	  
trusted.	  	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  successful	  physical	  navigation	  and	  survival	  within	  a	  given	  environment	  
depends	  on	  extensive	  networks	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  objective	  world	  that	  must	  be	  consistently	  
reliable	  and	  unambiguous.	  	  The	  cognitive	  linguistic	  approach	  also	  rejects	  any	  philosophical	  approach	  
that	  views	  the	  mind	  as	  disembodied	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  separate	  from	  the	  physical	  body	  and	  the	  
world	  around	  it.	  	  This	  notion	  of	  embodied	  realism	  therefore	  rejects	  the	  pure	  subjectivism	  of	  social	  
constructionist	  scholars	  like	  Gergen	  (cf.	  Gergen	  2009)	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  our	  minds	  and	  bodies	  do	  
not	  just	  interface	  with	  the	  world	  around	  them,	  but	  are	  also	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  that	  world	  (Lakoff	  
1999:	  91).	  	  What	  this	  amounts	  to	  in	  philosophical	  terms	  is	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  strict	  “subject-­‐object	  
dichotomy”	  that	  underpins	  pure	  subjectivism,	  along	  with	  an	  equally	  strong	  rejection	  of	  objectivist	  
views	  of	  human	  knowledge	  (Lakoff	  1999:	  93).	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  usage	  based	  Cognitive	  Linguistic	  
approach	  still	  recognises	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  any	  word	  is	  dependent	  on	  a	  specific	  context,	  
perspective	  and	  usage,	  and	  underpinned	  by	  a	  concept	  that	  is	  subject	  to	  shifting	  prototypicality	  
effects	  at	  its	  core,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  level	  of	  “fuzziness”	  often	  encountered	  along	  its	  boundaries	  (Evans	  and	  
Green	  2006:	  253-­‐254;	  Evans	  2009:	  41;	  Kövecses	  2006:	  77;	  Littlemore	  2009:	  88).	  	  There	  is	  therefore	  no	  
conflict	  between	  embodied	  realism	  and	  Evans’	  (2009:	  76)	  argument	  that	  his	  approach	  “assumes	  the	  
semantic	  contribution	  associated	  with	  a	  word	  will	  vary	  slightly	  every	  time	  it	  is	  used”.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Having	  argued	  for	  an	  epistemological	  position	  between	  objectivism	  and	  pure	  subjectivism,	  it	  is	  now	  
necessary	  to	  re-­‐focus	  our	  attention	  on	  worldviews	  related	  to	  highly	  abstract	  notions	  such	  as	  the	  
ultimate	  purpose	  of	  human	  life	  and	  the	  Universe.	  	  This	  is	  important	  because	  the	  further	  we	  move	  
from	  concrete,	  basic	  categories	  relating	  to	  our	  physical	  bodies	  and	  environment,	  the	  more	  
metaphorical	  and	  metonymic	  our	  knowledge	  tends	  to	  become,	  and	  the	  more	  it	  appears	  to	  rely	  on	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abstract	  image	  schemas	  and	  increasingly	  higher	  stacks	  of	  propositions.	  	  What	  this	  inevitably	  means	  is	  
that	  there	  is	  even	  more	  room	  for	  construal,	  along	  with	  the	  ideological	  ramifications	  associated	  with	  
any	  process	  of	  construal.	  	  It	  is	  when	  we	  come	  to	  deal	  with	  such	  highly	  abstract	  views	  relating	  to	  the	  
nature	  of	  life	  that	  the	  ideas	  of	  Wittgenstein	  become	  more	  applicable.	  	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  I	  will	  
now	  turn	  to	  a	  philosopher	  of	  religion	  who	  explicitly	  applied	  Wittgenstein’s	  ideas	  to	  religious	  belief	  
systems.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  
Wisdom’s	  Connections	  and	  Mehan’s	  Incorrigible	  Propositions	  
In	  my	  discussion	  of	  cognitive	  models,	  I	  examined	  Lakoff’s	  observation	  that	  human	  beings	  often	  feel	  a	  
pull	  to	  choose	  particular	  cognitive	  models	  over	  others	  and	  to	  view	  them	  as	  more	  correct.	  	  The	  ideas	  
of	  Wisdom	  and	  Mehan	  that	  I	  will	  explore	  in	  this	  section	  move	  beyond	  this	  observation	  by	  exploring	  
why	  it	  is	  that	  we	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  interpret	  relevant	  data	  as	  supporting	  our	  worldviews	  than	  we	  are	  
to	  interpret	  it	  as	  undermining	  them.	  	  	  	  	  
John	  Wisdom	  (1904-­‐1993)	  was	  well	  known	  in	  philosophy	  of	  religion	  circles	  for	  his	  development	  of	  the	  
work	  of	  the	  later	  Wittgenstein	  and	  his	  contributions	  to	  the	  field	  of	  philosophy	  of	  religion.	  	  This	  
development	  was	  principally	  focused	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  why	  people	  were	  often	  able	  to	  examine	  the	  
same	  data	  and	  yet	  arrive	  at	  mutually	  opposing	  conclusions,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  appearing	  to	  be	  
absolutely	  convinced	  of	  the	  validity	  of	  their	  respective	  conclusion.	  	  His	  most	  well-­‐known	  contribution	  
to	  these	  epistemological	  issues	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  parable	  of	  the	  invisible	  gardener	  which	  I	  will	  
briefly	  examine	  below.	  	  The	  parable	  became	  a	  central	  focus	  point	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  religion	  and	  
has	  been	  subsequently	  adopted	  and	  revised	  by	  the	  former	  atheist	  apologist	  Antony	  Flew	  (see	  Flew	  
1968).	  	  It	  is	  widely	  seen	  as	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  summaries	  of	  the	  subjectivist	  position	  in	  the	  
philosophy	  of	  religion	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  consider	  it	  here.	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The	  parable	  first	  appeared	  in	  his	  influential	  article	  Gods	  (Wisdom	  2000).	  	  It	  begins	  with	  two	  men	  who	  
return	  to	  an	  area	  of	  land	  “and	  find	  among	  the	  weeds	  a	  few	  old	  plants	  surprisingly	  vigorous”	  (Wisdom	  
2000:	  282).	  	  One	  of	  the	  men	  (I	  shall	  refer	  to	  him	  as	  the	  “believer”)	  concludes	  that	  a	  gardener	  must	  
have	  come	  in	  their	  absence	  and	  cultivated	  those	  plants,	  while	  the	  other	  man	  (I	  shall	  refer	  to	  him	  as	  
the	  “non-­‐believer”)	  is	  not	  persuaded	  (ibid.).	  	  	  Wisdom	  interprets	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  disagreement	  on	  
the	  factors	  of	  care,	  purpose	  and	  beauty:	  
• Care:	  The	  believer	  maintains	  that	  the	  plants	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  cared	  for	  while	  the	  non-­‐
believer	  disagrees	  (“Anybody	  who	  cared	  about	  these	  plants	  would	  have	  kept	  down	  these	  
weeds”	  (ibid.)).	  
• Purpose:	  The	  believer	  maintains	  that	  the	  plants	  have	  been	  arranged	  in	  a	  particular	  order	  for	  
a	  particular	  reason	  (“Look	  at	  the	  way	  these	  are	  arranged.	  There	  is	  purpose	  and	  a	  feeling	  of	  
beauty	  here”	  (ibid.)).	  The	  non-­‐believer	  may	  see	  some	  natural	  order	  emerging	  from	  chaos,	  but	  
feels	  no	  necessity	  to	  infer	  intelligent	  purpose	  from	  that	  order.	  	  
• Beauty:	  The	  believer	  maintains	  that	  the	  plants	  have	  been	  arranged	  in	  an	  order	  that	  
demonstrates	  a	  sense	  of	  aesthetics,	  suggesting	  the	  work	  of	  a	  personal	  being	  who	  has	  a	  sense	  
of	  beauty	  (ibid.).	  	  The	  non-­‐believer	  sees	  no	  reason	  to	  infer	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  beauty	  is	  
anywhere	  else	  except	  in	  the	  eye	  of	  the	  beholder.	  
	  
The	  parable	  continues	  with	  the	  two	  men	  examining	  the	  plants	  and	  investigating	  the	  surrounding	  area	  
in	  every	  possible	  way,	  but	  still	  coming	  to	  different	  conclusions.	  	  Wisdom	  argues	  that	  “at	  this	  stage,	  in	  
this	  context,	  the	  gardener	  hypothesis	  has	  ceased	  to	  be	  experimental”	  in	  that	  any	  possible	  data	  that	  
could	  be	  generated	  would	  always	  be	  interpreted	  in	  different	  ways	  by	  the	  two	  men	  (ibid.).	  The	  point	  is	  
that	  to	  apply	  data	  to	  the	  question	  in	  hand	  requires	  the	  making	  of	  connections	  and	  the	  arranging	  of	  
those	  connections	  into	  a	  particular	  argument	  (Stiver	  1996:	  73-­‐74),	  and	  therein	  lies	  the	  problem	  for	  an	  
objectivist	  view:	  “The	  paths	  we	  need	  to	  trace	  from	  other	  cases	  to	  the	  case	  in	  question	  are	  often	  
numerous	  and	  difficult	  to	  detect	  and	  the	  person	  with	  whom	  we	  are	  discussing	  the	  matter	  may	  well	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draw	  attention	  to	  connections	  which,	  while	  not	  incompatible	  with	  those	  we	  have	  tried	  to	  emphasize,	  
are	  of	  an	  opposite	  inclination”	  (Wisdom	  2000:	  286).	  This	  seems	  in	  line	  with	  the	  arguments	  of	  Lakoff	  
and	  Johnson	  (1999:	  88-­‐89)	  that	  have	  already	  been	  examined	  above,	  “There	  can	  be	  no	  assumption-­‐
free	  scientific	  observations.	  	  And	  there	  is	  no	  correct	  logic	  of	  induction	  that	  will	  yield	  correct	  laws	  
directly	  from	  observational	  data”.	  	  	  
Having	  explored	  Wisdom’s	  ideas	  on	  how	  individuals	  can	  arrive	  at	  certain	  but	  mutually	  opposing	  
conclusions	  from	  examining	  the	  same	  data,	  I	  am	  now	  able	  to	  complete	  this	  chapter	  by	  following	  
those	  ideas	  to	  their	  logical	  conclusion.	  	  Mehan	  (2006:	  533)	  has	  argued	  that	  many	  people	  view	  reality	  
through	  the	  lens	  or	  interpretative	  framework	  of	  an	  incorrigible	  proposition	  which	  he	  defines	  as	  a	  
“proposition	  that	  one	  never	  admits	  to	  be	  false	  whatever	  happens;	  one	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  any	  
and	  every	  conceivable	  state	  of	  affairs”.	  	  Mehan’s	  thesis	  is	  that	  such	  fundamental	  propositions	  do	  not	  
just	  underpin	  the	  worldviews	  of	  primitive	  or	  very	  religious	  people,	  but	  in	  fact	  suffuse	  modern	  society	  
to	  the	  point	  where	  he	  sees	  evidence	  of	  it	  in	  the	  discourse	  of	  psychiatrists	  evaluating	  a	  patient	  
diagnosed	  with	  schizophrenia	  and,	  perhaps	  not	  so	  surprisingly,	  vice	  versa.	  	  He	  views	  these	  
propositions	  as	  part	  of	  a	  process	  which	  adheres	  to	  the	  following	  pattern:	  
A	  basic	  premise	  or	  a	  fundamental	  proposition	  is	  presented	  which	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  argument.	  
When	  confronted	  with	  evidence	  which	  is	  potentially	  contradictory	  to	  a	  basic	  position,	  the	  evidence	  is	  ignored,	  
repelled,	  or	  denied.	  
The	  presence	  of	  evidence	  which	  opposes	  a	  basic	  position	  is	  used	  reflexively	  as	  further	  support	  of	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  
basic	  position.	  
(Mehan	  2006:	  537)	  
These	  processes	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  even	  more	  extreme	  restatement	  of	  Wisdom’s	  arrangement	  of	  
connections.	  	  Not	  only	  is	  the	  data	  being	  arranged	  to	  support	  core	  beliefs,	  as	  Wisdom	  argued,	  but	  
data	  that	  appears	  to	  contradict	  those	  core	  beliefs	  are	  somehow	  construed	  as	  supporting	  it.	  	  It	  is	  
worth	  looking	  at	  an	  extract	  from	  Mehan’s	  data	  before	  venturing	  into	  a	  critical	  evaluation	  of	  this	  
notion.	  	  During	  an	  interview	  between	  a	  panel	  of	  psychiatrists	  and	  a	  patient,	  the	  patient	  makes	  it	  clear	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that	  he	  does	  not	  want	  to	  continue	  taking	  medicine	  because	  he	  does	  not	  need	  it	  and	  it	  is	  harming	  him	  
(Mehan	  2006:	  539).	  	  After	  the	  patient	  has	  gone,	  the	  psychiatrists	  conclude	  that	  the	  patient’s	  concern	  
about	  the	  medicine	  and	  his	  desire	  not	  to	  take	  it	  clearly	  demonstrate	  the	  need	  to	  increase	  his	  dosage	  
of	  tranquilizers	  (Mehan	  2006:	  540).	  	  For	  the	  patient,	  his	  anxiety	  over	  taking	  medicine	  is	  evidence	  of	  
its	  harm	  to	  him	  and	  the	  need	  to	  stop	  taking	  it,	  but	  for	  the	  psychiatrists	  the	  same	  anxiety	  is	  evidence	  
of	  paranoia	  and	  the	  need	  to	  increase	  what	  he	  is	  being	  given.	  	  The	  same	  data	  is	  evaluated	  to	  support	  
two	  diametrically	  opposing	  conclusions,	  and	  what	  is	  most	  interesting	  about	  this	  is	  that	  the	  two	  
conclusions	  appeared	  self-­‐evident	  and	  obvious	  to	  the	  two	  parties.	  	  One	  of	  the	  psychiatrists	  also	  adds,	  
“He	  argues	  in	  a	  perfectly	  paranoid	  pattern.	  	  If	  you	  accept	  his	  basic	  premise	  the	  rest	  of	  it	  is	  logical.	  	  But,	  
the	  basic	  premise	  is	  not	  true”	  (Mehan	  2006:	  541).	  	  The	  psychiatrist	  sees	  no	  problem	  with	  the	  
patient’s	  ability	  to	  reason	  in	  a	  logical	  manner	  –	  the	  problem	  is	  with	  the	  patient’s	  starting	  point,	  or,	  to	  
refer	  back	  to	  the	  later	  Wittgenstein,	  the	  patient’s	  underlying	  “picture”	  of	  reality.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
I	  have	  already	  outlined	  Lakoff’s	  (1987:	  75)	  argument	  that	  “many	  people	  feel	  the	  pressure	  to	  pick	  one	  
model	  as	  being	  the	  right	  one”.	  	  If	  this	  is	  accepted,	  it	  provides	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  people’s	  
propensity	  to	  view	  their	  worldview	  choices	  as	  correct,	  while	  Mehan’s	  incorrigible	  propositions	  
demonstrates	  how	  such	  choices	  are	  maintained	  or	  validated.	  	  The	  arguments	  of	  Wisdom	  and	  Mehan	  
are	  aimed	  at	  establishing	  the	  “widespread	  appearance	  of	  belief-­‐validating	  practices”	  as	  a	  “more	  
extensive	  feature	  of	  reasoning”	  in	  humans	  in	  general	  than	  was	  previously	  thought	  (Mehan	  2006:	  
544).	  	  There	  are	  many	  cases	  where	  Wisdom’s	  and	  Mehan’s	  ideas	  appear	  to	  fit	  perfectly,	  but	  there	  are	  
of	  course	  also	  cases	  where	  people	  often	  exhibit	  a	  kind	  of	  “swing-­‐voter”	  mentality	  where	  they	  
oscillate	  indecisively	  between	  multiple	  perspectives,	  or	  an	  agnostic	  response	  where	  they	  maintain	  
that	  they	  just	  do	  not	  know.	  	  However,	  this	  thesis	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  people	  in	  general.	  	  Its	  scope	  
at	  this	  point	  is	  restricted	  to	  conservative	  religious	  believers,	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  that	  group	  of	  people,	  
Wisdom’s	  and	  Mehan’s	  ideas	  appear	  to	  be	  particularly	  relevant.	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It	  is	  therefore	  now	  possible	  to	  combine	  these	  ideas	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  cognitive	  models	  and	  conclude	  
this	  chapter	  by	  proposing	  a	  set	  of	  presuppositions	  that	  will	  frame	  my	  investigation	  in	  chapters	  three	  
and	  four	  of	  the	  two	  research	  questions	  discussed	  in	  the	  introduction.	  	  	  
The	  first	  presupposition	  is	  that	  language	  is	  underpinned	  by	  various	  abstract	  image	  schemas,	  as	  well	  
as	  organised	  and	  expressed	  through	  the	  use	  of	  stacked	  propositions,	  metaphoric	  cross	  domain	  
mappings	  and	  metonymic	  domain	  internal	  mappings.	  	  The	  second	  presupposition	  is	  that	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  
apply	  this	  idea	  that	  language	  is	  underpinned	  by	  schemas,	  stacked	  propositions,	  metaphor	  and	  
metonymy	  specifically	  to	  the	  language	  of	  conservative	  religious	  believers.	  	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  
place	  questions	  such	  as,	  “Why	  am	  I	  here?”,	  “Where	  am	  I	  going?”,	  “What	  is	  the	  purpose	  or	  goal	  of	  my	  
existence?”	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  schema.	  	  It	  is	  also	  useful,	  for	  example,	  to	  
consider	  religious	  metaphorical	  language	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  desire	  to	  construe	  something	  
abstract	  as	  something	  concrete	  and	  tangible,	  and	  conservative	  religious	  metonymic	  language	  as	  the	  
desire	  to	  represent	  an	  idea	  or	  a	  person	  with	  many	  complex	  characteristics	  as	  something	  very	  simple	  
and	  reductive.	  	  These	  presuppositions	  could	  then	  be	  extended	  to	  suggest	  the	  additional	  premise	  that	  
conservative	  religious	  believers	  feel	  compelled	  to	  look	  for	  a	  clear,	  specific,	  overarching	  existential	  
purpose	  for	  human	  life	  involving	  an	  active	  divine	  entity,	  resulting	  in	  a	  strong	  pull	  to	  accept	  one	  
abstract	  worldview	  that	  answers	  the	  need	  for	  an	  existential	  purpose	  as	  obviously	  true	  and	  certain	  
and	  others	  as	  clearly	  false.	  	  Such	  believers	  would	  then	  use	  stacked	  propositions,	  metaphor	  and	  
metonymy	  as	  key	  tools	  in	  the	  maintenance	  of	  that	  choice.	  	  	  
All	  of	  these	  points	  offer	  one	  possible	  perspective	  for	  viewing	  how	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  
have	  developed	  and	  are	  able	  to	  continue	  to	  maintain	  oversimplified	  worldviews.	  	  These	  
presuppositions	  have	  been	  developed	  by	  first	  examining	  research	  relating	  to	  theories	  about	  how	  
people	  in	  general	  process	  and	  categorise	  their	  environments,	  and	  then	  applying	  those	  theories	  to	  a	  
set	  of	  presuppositions	  about	  how	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  may	  process	  and	  categorise	  their	  
environments.	  However,	  it	  must	  be	  remembered	  that	  the	  above	  points	  can	  only	  address	  the	  issue	  of	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how	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  perceive	  reality.	  	  As	  I	  discussed	  above	  in	  the	  section	  on	  Evans’	  
usage	  based	  theory	  of	  cognitive	  models,	  I	  have	  yet	  to	  investigate	  in	  detail	  whether	  the	  language	  of	  
specific	  communities	  of	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  are	  in	  fact	  as	  rigid	  and	  static	  as	  the	  
perceptions	  that	  those	  models	  produce.	  	  To	  put	  it	  another	  way:	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  believers	  
appears	  to	  often	  perceive	  the	  world	  in	  rigid,	  binary,	  oversimplified	  terms,	  do	  the	  expressions	  of	  their	  
experience	  match	  this	  perception	  of	  static,	  either-­‐or	  simplicity?	  	  These	  are	  questions	  that	  I	  will	  
















Chapter	  Three:	  An	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I	  concluded	  the	  last	  chapter	  with	  a	  set	  of	  presuppositions	  with	  which	  to	  approach	  the	  study	  of	  
conservative	  religious	  language.	  	  These	  included	  the	  perspective	  that	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  
derive	  the	  sense	  that	  their	  worldviews	  are	  obviously	  correct	  through	  the	  interaction	  of	  powerful	  
cognitive	  elements	  such	  as	  the	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  image	  schema,	  stacked	  propositional	  frameworks,	  
metonymy	  and	  metaphor.	  	  When	  all	  these	  elements	  are	  combined,	  the	  result	  is	  a	  view	  of	  the	  world	  
that	  is	  perceived	  as	  clear,	  certain	  and	  fixed.	  	  However,	  the	  question	  that	  I	  began	  to	  raise	  in	  the	  
previous	  chapter	  is	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  disconnection	  between	  how	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  
perceive	  reality	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  all-­‐encompassing	  statements	  of	  belief	  and	  how	  they	  express	  their	  
personal,	  individual	  experience	  of	  that	  reality.	  	  This	  question	  of	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  talk	  about	  
clear,	  fixed	  differences	  in	  the	  language	  that	  conservative	  believers	  from	  different	  religions	  use	  to	  
express	  their	  experience	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  Please	  note	  that	  this	  chapter	  is	  a	  slightly	  
expanded	  version	  of	  the	  Metaphor	  and	  the	  Social	  World	  article	  A	  closer	  walk:	  A	  study	  of	  the	  
interaction	  between	  metaphors	  related	  to	  movement	  and	  proximity	  and	  presuppositions	  about	  the	  
reality	  of	  belief	  in	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  testimonials	  (Richardson	  2012).	  	  	  
Conservative	  religious	  believers	  are	  very	  good	  at	  summarising	  the	  differences	  between	  themselves	  
and	  other	  belief	  communities	  in	  rigid,	  binary	  terms.	  	  One	  example	  of	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  a	  2001	  
Evangelical	  Times	  article	  by	  Alan	  Clifford	  where	  he	  quotes	  from	  a	  1645	  document	  outlining	  the	  
questions	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  answered	  in	  the	  affirmative	  before	  a	  person	  could	  be	  baptised.	  	  He	  
praises	  the	  questions	  as	  valuable	  in	  helping	  modern	  Evangelical	  Christians	  to	  “assess	  correctly	  the	  




Q5:	  Do	  you	  ...	  believe	  that	  Muhammad	  was	  [a	  false	  prophet,]	  and	  that	  his	  Qur’an	  is	  ...	  broached	  on	  design	  to	  set	  up	  
a	  false	  and	  abominable	  religion?	  
A:	  Yes.	  	  
(http://www.evangelical-­‐times.org/archive/item/1040/Cults-­‐and-­‐other-­‐religions/Islam-­‐-­‐a-­‐Reformed-­‐response/)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  portrayal	  of	  Islam	  as	  an	  entity	  that	  is	  qualitatively	  different	  from	  Christianity	  is	  clear	  here.	  	  
However,	  the	  question	  that	  I	  shall	  address	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  view	  in	  the	  same	  
clear,	  fixed	  terms	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  particular	  groups	  of	  conservative	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  
believers	  use	  certain	  types	  of	  metaphors.	  	  To	  put	  it	  in	  more	  precise	  terms,	  I	  will	  be	  investigating	  the	  
following	  research	  question:	  Are	  there	  clear,	  fixed	  differences	  between	  Evangelical	  Times	  Christian	  
testimonial	  authors	  and	  islamfortoday.com	  Muslim	  testimonial	  authors	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  use	  of	  
movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  to	  express	  their	  way	  of	  believing?	  	  I	  will	  begin	  by	  introducing	  the	  
background	  to	  this	  question	  and	  how	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  set	  of	  presuppositions	  discussed	  in	  the	  
previous	  chapter.	  	  I	  will	  then	  discuss	  my	  restricted	  focus	  on	  the	  communities	  represented	  by	  




I	  ended	  the	  previous	  chapter	  with	  a	  set	  of	  presuppositions	  as	  opposed	  to	  conclusions.	  	  The	  reason	  
why	  I	  refer	  to	  those	  concluding	  points	  as	  presuppositions	  is	  because	  they	  will	  act	  as	  a	  frame	  for	  the	  
analyses	  that	  I	  will	  conduct	  in	  this	  chapter	  and	  the	  next.	  	  They	  also	  contain	  a	  perspective	  that	  cannot	  
be	  empirically	  demonstrated	  because	  they	  make	  tentative	  claims	  about	  conservative	  religious	  
language	  in	  general.	  However,	  this	  chapter	  will	  focus	  in	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  certain	  types	  of	  language	  in	  
two	  particular	  groups	  of	  conservative	  religious	  believers.	  	  This	  will	  allow	  me	  to	  explore	  the	  validity	  of	  
the	  specific	  premise	  that	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  use	  metaphor	  and	  schemas	  in	  order	  to	  
reinforce	  their	  view	  of	  the	  world	  as	  clear,	  certain	  and	  fixed.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  emphasise	  
83	  
	  
that	  it	  will	  only	  be	  possible	  to	  apply	  the	  conclusions	  to	  the	  particular	  groups,	  genre	  of	  text	  and	  type	  
of	  metaphor	  that	  this	  study	  focuses	  on.	  	  	  
My	  intention	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  also	  to	  find	  out	  whether	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  researchers	  to	  analyse	  the	  
differences	  in	  the	  use	  of	  this	  language	  between	  two	  groups	  as	  variable,	  situated	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  
as	  opposed	  to	  rigid,	  binary	  differences.	  	  As	  I	  emphasised	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  investigating	  this	  
contrast	  between	  certain	  types	  of	  metaphor	  and	  schema	  being	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  a	  clear	  and	  fixed	  view	  
of	  the	  world	  for	  the	  believer,	  and	  yet	  being	  a	  marker	  of	  the	  relativity	  of	  belief	  for	  the	  researcher	  is	  
central	  to	  this	  thesis.	  	  
This	  chapter	  will	  therefore	  be	  interested	  in	  both	  the	  use	  of	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  by	  
both	  groups	  to	  express	  their	  sense	  of	  certainty,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  
that	  form	  around	  their	  use	  of	  language.	  	  I	  will	  also	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  analyse	  such	  patterns	  of	  
emphasis	  because	  they	  could	  provide	  valuable	  insights	  into	  where	  the	  sense	  of	  certainty	  of	  specific	  
groups	  of	  Christians	  and	  Muslims	  is	  located.	  	  These	  types	  of	  insights	  could	  then	  have	  useful	  
implications	  for	  the	  area	  of	  inter-­‐faith	  dialogue.	  
Throughout	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  as	  examples	  of	  language	  
that	  expresses	  a	  conservative	  believer’s	  experience.	  	  These	  types	  of	  metaphors	  will	  also	  be	  referred	  
to	  as	  examples	  action	  and	  relationship	  language.	  	  I	  will	  define	  this	  phrase	  as	  language	  relating	  to	  the	  
religious	  domain	  that	  involves	  an	  individual	  doing	  something	  or	  having	  something	  done	  to	  him	  or	  her,	  
or	  saying	  something	  about	  a	  relationship	  that	  forms	  a	  central	  part	  of	  their	  way	  of	  believing.	  	  I	  will	  
argue	  that	  such	  language	  is	  important	  for	  two	  reasons.	  	  The	  first	  reason	  is	  that	  it	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  
the	  believer’s	  certainty	  and	  sense	  of	  reality	  concerning	  his	  or	  her	  beliefs.	  	  A	  statement	  such	  as	  “Oh	  
for	  a	  closer	  walk	  with	  Christ”	  (extract	  from	  a	  Christian	  testimonial,	  Christian	  Text	  9,	  discussed	  in	  
section	  3.3	  below)	  only	  makes	  sense	  if	  the	  believer	  first	  feels	  absolutely	  certain	  that	  there	  is	  a	  divine	  
entity	  which	  can	  be	  existentially	  approached.	  The	  second	  reason	  is	  that	  this	  language	  is	  inherently	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more	  fluid,	  shared	  and	  personal	  than	  language	  purely	  focused	  on	  the	  theoretical	  discussion	  of	  
doctrine.	  	  	  
Given	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis	  on	  the	  language	  of	  experience,	  it	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  natural	  choice	  to	  
restrict	  this	  first	  study	  to	  the	  specific	  genre	  of	  the	  religious	  testimonial	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  tends	  to	  
emphasise	  such	  language.	  	  Conservative	  religious	  testimonials	  often	  take	  the	  form	  within	  Islam	  and	  
Christianity	  of	  a	  personal	  narrative	  where	  the	  author	  explains	  how	  he	  or	  she	  successfully	  engaged	  in	  
a	  journey,	  quest	  or	  struggle	  (cf.	  Rambo	  1993)	  to	  advance	  towards	  a	  state	  of	  resolution	  (cf.	  Labov	  and	  
Waletzky	  2003)	  in	  the	  form	  of	  finding	  truth	  and	  ultimate	  purpose.	  	  These	  personal	  stories	  also	  tend	  
to	  juxtapose	  the	  language	  of	  being	  on	  a	  journey	  with	  the	  language	  characteristic	  of	  religious	  and	  
particularly	  monotheistic	  religious	  belief	  that	  reflect	  reversed	  participant	  roles,	  such	  as	  being	  led,	  
brought,	  taken	  or	  guided	  towards	  the	  truth	  (cf.	  Coleman	  1980).	  	  As	  we	  have	  already	  seen	  in	  the	  
extract	  included	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  chapter	  one	  and	  the	  Muslim	  testimonial	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  
two,	  a	  key	  characteristic	  of	  these	  testimonials	  is	  their	  fusion	  of	  personal	  stories	  with	  metaphorical	  
language	  that	  expresses	  a	  process	  of	  the	  believer	  both	  moving	  and	  being	  moved	  towards	  a	  specific	  
goal	  such	  as	  heaven.	  	  Examples	  of	  other	  related	  metaphors	  also	  include	  cases	  of	  the	  believer	  or	  a	  
divine	  entity	  being	  the	  goal	  of	  movement,	  resulting	  in	  both	  movement	  and	  divine	  entity	  proximity	  
metaphors	  that	  indicate	  a	  believer	  or	  a	  divine	  entity	  moving	  closer	  or	  being	  with	  or	  even	  inside	  the	  
other.	  
I	  have	  also	  chosen	  to	  focus	  on	  testimonials	  that	  have	  already	  been	  produced	  and	  disseminated,	  
rather	  than	  choosing	  to	  interview	  Christians	  and	  Muslims	  in	  order	  to	  elicit	  their	  personal	  experiences.	  	  
One	  of	  my	  motivations	  for	  choosing	  to	  work	  with	  texts	  that	  have	  already	  been	  produced	  in	  a	  natural	  
environment	  and	  for	  a	  natural	  purpose	  is	  based	  on	  my	  experience	  during	  pilot	  studies	  where	  I	  
interviewed	  Christians	  and	  Muslims	  and	  asked	  a	  Christian	  and	  atheist	  to	  discuss	  their	  beliefs.	  	  I	  
discovered	  that	  the	  language	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  contexts	  of	  interviews	  contained	  far	  less	  
occurrences	  of	  metaphor	  than	  the	  occurrences	  in	  naturally	  produced	  testimonials.	  	  It	  was	  as	  if	  the	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participants	  in	  the	  interviews	  and	  discussions	  were	  choosing	  their	  words	  far	  more	  carefully	  because	  
they	  were	  aware	  that	  their	  language	  would	  be	  analysed.	  	  I	  therefore	  chose	  to	  focus	  on	  texts	  that	  had	  
been	  produced	  outside	  of	  the	  context	  of	  arranged	  interviews	  and	  discussions	  for	  this	  first	  study.	  	  	  	  
This	  chapter	  will	  compare	  and	  contrast	  a	  range	  of	  such	  metaphors	  occurring	  in	  testimonials	  
contained	  within	  the	  2010	  and	  2011	  Christmas	  editions	  of	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  with	  Muslim	  
testimonials	  on	  the	  website	  islamfortoday.com.	  My	  decision	  to	  select	  these	  two	  sources	  of	  data	  was	  
based	  on	  my	  need	  to	  focus	  on	  relatively	  prominent,	  homogenous	  communities	  rather	  than	  individual	  
testimonials	  scattered	  over	  a	  number	  of	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  groups.	  	  The	  Evangelical	  Times	  offered	  
the	  largest	  single	  collection	  of	  Christian	  testimonials	  that	  I	  could	  find,	  while	  representing	  an	  
important	  section	  of	  the	  Evangelical	  Christian	  community.	  	  Islamfortoday.com	  also	  contained	  the	  
largest	  single	  collection	  of	  Muslim	  testimonials	  in	  English	  that	  I	  could	  find,	  while	  representing	  a	  large	  
community	  of	  English	  speaking	  Muslims.	  	  However,	  the	  decision	  to	  work	  with	  a	  UK	  Christian	  
community	  and	  a	  US	  Muslim	  community	  is	  of	  course	  problematic	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  very	  different	  
social	  contexts.	  	  Throughout	  my	  analysis	  I	  have	  remained	  sensitive	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  cultural	  
backgrounds	  to	  these	  two	  collections	  of	  texts	  are	  very	  different	  and	  that	  any	  possible	  explanations	  
for	  differences	  in	  the	  language	  must	  consider	  socio-­‐cultural	  as	  well	  as	  theological	  differences.	  	  	  	  	  
I	  now	  wish	  to	  turn	  my	  attention	  to	  my	  reasons	  for	  restricting	  this	  analysis	  to	  movement	  and	  
proximity	  metaphors.	  	  Although	  at	  least	  one	  example	  of	  a	  movement	  or	  proximity	  metaphor	  was	  
present	  in	  every	  testimonial	  I	  examined,	  and	  often	  the	  testimonials	  contained	  clusters	  of	  such	  
metaphors,	  my	  decision	  to	  focus	  on	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  was	  not	  primarily	  based	  on	  
frequency.	  	  The	  limited	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter	  on	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  relating	  to	  a	  
divine	  entity	  has	  grown	  out	  of	  the	  observation	  that	  such	  metaphors	  appear	  to	  play	  such	  a	  key	  role	  in	  
large	  areas	  of	  religious	  language	  and	  epistemology	  (the	  study	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  knowing	  and	  
knowledge	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  chapter	  two	  above)	  that	  they	  deserve	  a	  specialised	  study.	  	  
Chapter	  two	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  image	  schemas	  and	  the	  metaphorical	  language	  that	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relates	  to	  them.	  	  I	  argued	  in	  chapter	  two	  that	  the	  most	  important	  of	  these	  schemas	  for	  religious	  
belief	  is	  the	  source-­‐path-­‐goal	  schema.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  all	  religious	  thought	  is	  underpinned	  
by	  a	  sense	  of	  a	  very	  specific	  purpose	  and	  direction	  or	  goal	  for	  human	  existence.	  	  This	  purposeful	  
movement	  towards	  a	  goal	  is	  also	  shaped	  by	  that	  goal	  sometimes	  being	  the	  divine	  entity,	  and	  at	  other	  
times	  the	  divine	  entity	  being	  construed	  as	  being	  with	  and	  helping	  the	  believer	  to	  reach	  a	  specific	  goal.	  	  
This	  often	  means	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  divorce	  movement	  from	  proximity	  to	  a	  divine	  entity,	  or	  at	  
least	  the	  two	  can	  often	  cluster	  together.	  	  It	  is	  also	  relevant	  to	  my	  aims	  that	  movement	  metaphors	  
can	  also	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  reconciliation	  discourse	  and	  processes	  of	  rehumanisation	  (cf.	  Cameron	  
2010a:	  58-­‐73).	  	  However,	  the	  key	  test	  in	  whether	  this	  decision	  to	  restrict	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  
these	  particular	  types	  of	  metaphor	  is	  justifiable	  or	  not	  is	  whether	  the	  analysis	  in	  section	  3.5	  below	  
can	  produce	  valuable	  insights	  into	  the	  research	  questions	  that	  this	  thesis	  revolves	  around.	  	  	  
Having	  made	  these	  arguments	  for	  my	  focus	  on	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors,	  it	  is	  important	  
also	  to	  recognise	  that	  it	  is	  not	  just	  these	  metaphors	  that	  deserve	  special	  attention	  –	  studies	  that	  
specialise	  in	  the	  significance	  of	  religious	  language	  drawing	  on	  other	  domains	  such	  as	  growth,	  conflict	  
and	  struggle,	  human	  relationships,	  and	  light	  and	  clarity	  could	  also	  be	  very	  valuable.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  an	  introduction	  to	  the	  underpinning	  beliefs	  and	  functions	  of	  these	  testimonials,	  
before	  exploring	  a	  methodology	  for	  identifying	  metaphor	  in	  text	  and	  discussing	  the	  presuppositions	  
of	  those	  target	  metaphors.	  	  I	  will	  then	  discuss	  the	  key	  differences	  between	  the	  usage	  and	  frequency	  
of	  those	  metaphors	  in	  the	  two	  collections	  of	  texts	  and	  relate	  the	  results	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  varying	  
perceptions	  about	  the	  reality	  of	  their	  beliefs.	  I	  will	  conclude	  by	  briefly	  exploring	  the	  advantages	  of	  
being	  aware	  of	  the	  particular	  type	  of	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  to	  focus	  on	  during	  attempts	  at	  





3.2	  The	  Underpinning	  Beliefs	  and	  Functions	  of	  the	  Target	  Testimonials	  	  
Before	  I	  focus	  in	  on	  the	  language	  related	  to	  the	  process	  of	  belief,	  it	  is	  first	  important	  to	  outline	  a	  
definition	  and	  function	  of	  the	  situated	  beliefs	  represented	  in	  the	  target	  testimonials.	  The	  
testimonials	  represent	  the	  beliefs	  of	  one	  Evangelical	  Christian	  community,	  which	  is	  taken	  as	  one	  
example	  of	  committed,	  conservative	  Christian	  belief.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  defining	  the	  beliefs	  of	  Evangelical	  
Christianity,	  Flinn	  (1999:	  63)	  identifies	  two	  key	  ideas:	  firstly,	  Evangelicals	  believe	  that	  salvation	  is	  
completely	  dependent	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Christ	  (his	  death	  on	  the	  cross	  and	  resurrection)	  as	  opposed	  to	  
the	  “works”	  of	  the	  believer	  (and	  the	  various	  nuanced	  positions	  of	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  viewpoint),	  
and	  secondly,	  they	  believe	  that	  every	  part	  of	  the	  Bible	  is	  both	  the	  divinely	  inspired	  word	  of	  God	  and	  
absolutely	  error-­‐free	  or	  infallible.	  	  This	  definition	  would	  be	  in	  line	  with	  the	  doctrinal	  standpoint	  of	  the	  
UK	  based	  Evangelical	  Times.	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  the	  publication’s	  function,	  the	  annual	  Christmas	  edition	  appears	  to	  be	  primarily	  focused	  
on	  evangelisation,	  or	  the	  attempt	  to	  convert	  others.	  	  Evidence	  for	  this	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  
bulk	  orders	  can	  be	  made	  at	  a	  “greatly	  reduced	  cost”	  in	  order	  to	  encourage	  distribution	  to	  the	  local	  
community	  (http://www.evangelical-­‐times.org/Website_Pages/About.php),	  and	  the	  two	  editions	  
examined	  contained	  a	  sizeable	  number	  of	  personal	  testimonials	  (ten	  in	  the	  2010	  edition,	  eleven	  in	  
the	  2011	  edition).	  	  Many	  of	  these	  testimonials	  contain	  explicit	  language	  aimed	  at	  converting	  a	  reader,	  
for	  example,	  “Come	  to	  God	  in	  prayer;	  ask	  for	  forgiveness”	  (Christian	  Testimonial	  1,	  subsequently	  
referred	  to	  as	  CT1).	  	  It	  may	  also	  be	  possible	  to	  argue	  for	  a	  second	  key	  function	  based	  on	  the	  premise	  
that	  persuading	  others	  can	  further	  consolidate	  and	  add	  meaning	  to	  existing	  beliefs.	  	  This	  can	  be	  
linked	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  language	  and	  the	  conceptualisations	  beneath	  it	  are	  used	  to	  shape	  our	  
experience	  as	  well	  as	  express	  it	  (Goatly	  2007;	  Gumperz	  and	  Levinson	  1996;	  Lakoff	  1987).	  	  	  	  
It	  is	  possible	  to	  follow	  a	  similar	  type	  of	  description	  in	  defining	  the	  type	  of	  Islam	  represented	  by	  the	  
American	  based	  website	  Islamfortoday.com.	  A	  complete	  dependence	  on	  the	  “work”	  of	  Christ	  can	  be	  
replaced	  by	  adherence	  to	  the	  five	  pillars	  of	  Islam:	  the	  profession	  of	  faith,	  praying	  at	  specified	  times,	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the	  giving	  of	  alms,	  pilgrimage	  and	  fasting.	  	  The	  belief	  that	  the	  Bible	  is	  the	  word	  of	  God	  can	  be	  
replaced	  with	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  Qur’an	  is	  the	  revealed	  word	  of	  Allah	  recorded	  by	  the	  Prophet	  
Mohammad.	  The	  huge	  impact	  of	  the	  post-­‐9/11	  situation	  in	  America	  and	  the	  suspicion	  with	  which	  
some	  US	  Muslims	  perceive	  themselves	  to	  be	  viewed	  by	  non-­‐Muslims	  (expressed	  and	  popularised	  in	  
well-­‐known	  books	  such	  as	  Mohsin	  Hamid’s	  The	  Reluctant	  Fundamentalist	  (2007))	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  
a	  key	  factor	  influencing	  the	  way	  that	  some	  Muslims	  believe	  and	  how	  they	  express	  that	  belief.	  	  	  	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  above	  two	  core	  aspects	  of	  Islamic	  belief	  and	  engagement	  with	  the	  post-­‐9/11	  US	  
context,	  the	  website	  also	  emphasises	  an	  inclusive	  approach	  to	  the	  two	  major	  Islamic	  sects:	  Sunni	  and	  
Shia,	  while	  distancing	  itself	  from	  extremism	  and	  controversial	  Islamic	  sects	  such	  as	  the	  Nation	  of	  
Islam.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  emphasise	  that	  this	  inclusiveness	  is	  not	  indicative	  of	  a	  liberal	  
approach	  to	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Islamic	  belief	  in	  general.	  	  Particular	  articles	  on	  the	  website	  still	  argue	  for	  
interpretations	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  that	  would	  be	  considered	  very	  traditional	  and	  conservative	  by	  many	  
non-­‐Muslim	  Western	  communities,	  such	  as	  interpreting	  Sura	  4:34	  as	  an	  instruction	  to	  a	  husband	  to	  
“lightly”	  hit	  his	  wife	  in	  circumstances	  related	  to	  “extreme	  cases	  of	  disobedience”	  such	  as	  “refusing	  
intercourse	  without	  cause	  frequently”	  or	  “refusing	  to	  tell	  him	  where	  she	  had	  been”	  
(http://www.islamfortoday.com/how_to_make_your_wife_happy.htm).	  
In	  terms	  of	  role	  and	  function,	  the	  main	  page	  of	  the	  website	  states	  that	  it	  has	  been	  designed	  for	  
“Westerners	  seeking	  a	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  of	  Islam”,	  while	  the	  main	  testimonial	  page	  
opens	  with	  the	  following	  quote	  from	  the	  Qu’ran,	  “Invite	  to	  the	  way	  of	  your	  Lord	  with	  wisdom	  and	  
beautiful	  preaching"	  (16:	  125).	  	  This,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  polemical	  and	  clarifying	  scope	  and	  tone	  of	  
many	  of	  the	  articles	  and	  the	  high	  number	  of	  personal	  testimonials	  (forty	  seven	  on	  the	  main	  page	  and	  
links	  to	  many	  more),	  suggests	  the	  functions	  of	  consolidating	  the	  existing	  belief	  of	  new,	  English	  
speaking	  converts,	  carving	  out	  an	  identity	  separate	  from	  extremist	  groups,	  as	  well	  as	  attempting	  to	  
convert	  others.	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Both	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  and	  islamfortoday.com	  attest	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  specific	  discourse	  
communities	  within	  the	  larger	  discourse	  communities	  of	  Christianity	  and	  Islam	  respectively.	  	  In	  terms	  
of	  drawing	  conclusions	  on	  any	  analysis	  of	  their	  language,	  it	  must	  be	  borne	  in	  mind	  that	  there	  are	  
other	  discourse	  communities	  within	  these	  religions	  that	  would	  produce	  language	  with	  very	  different	  
patterns	  of	  emphasis.	  	  It	  must	  also	  be	  stressed	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  disentangle	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  
process	  of	  belief	  from	  a	  very	  specific	  time,	  setting	  and	  cultural	  context,	  and	  the	  influence	  of	  a	  specific	  
function,	  text	  format,	  size	  and	  genre	  (cf.	  Deignan,	  Littlemore	  and	  Semino	  2013;	  Steen	  2007:	  352-­‐353).	  	  	  
Having	  briefly	  defined	  Evangelical	  Christianity	  and	  the	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  inclusive	  Islam	  represented	  by	  
Islamfortoday.com,	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  an	  examination	  of	  how	  I	  selected	  the	  target	  texts	  and	  the	  
methodology	  chosen	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  metaphorical	  language	  in	  those	  texts.	  
	  
3.3	  Text	  Selection	  and	  Metaphor	  Identification	  	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  the	  number	  of	  testimonials	  selected	  for	  the	  analysis,	  all	  twenty	  testimonials	  from	  the	  
Evangelical	  Times	  2010	  and	  2011	  issues	  were	  included,	  and	  have	  been	  reproduced	  in	  appendix	  1.1	  on	  
the	  CD.	  	  The	  Muslim	  testimonials	  were	  generally	  longer	  than	  their	  Christian	  counterparts,	  prompting	  
the	  decision	  to	  include	  the	  first	  five	  testimonials	  along	  with	  a	  further	  ten	  testimonials	  based	  on	  their	  
smaller	  size.	  	  These	  have	  been	  reproduced	  in	  appendix	  1.2	  on	  the	  CD.	  The	  number	  and	  total	  size	  of	  
the	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  testimonials	  are	  listed	  below	  in	  table	  3.1.	  
	  
Table	  3.1	  Number	  and	  Size	  of	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  Texts.	  
	   No.	  of	  testimonials	   Total	  size	  (words)	  
Muslim	  Testimonials	   15	   29067	  




When	  it	  came	  to	  analysing	  occurrences	  of	  metaphorical	  language	  related	  to	  movement	  and	  divine	  
entity	  proximity	  in	  those	  texts,	  I	  chose	  to	  work	  with	  the	  Pragglejaz	  Group’s	  (2007)	  Metaphor	  
Identification	  Procedure	  (MIP).	  	  This	  procedure	  works	  with	  a	  definition	  of	  metaphor	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  
a	  lexical	  unit	  that	  has	  a	  more	  basic	  meaning	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  more	  “concrete”,	  “precise”,	  
“related	  to	  bodily	  actions”	  and	  perhaps	  “historically	  older”)	  than	  the	  one	  encountered	  in	  the	  text	  
(Pragglejaz	  2007:	  3).	  	  MIP	  was	  subsequently	  used	  to	  identify	  lexical	  units	  in	  the	  texts	  that	  could	  be	  
considered	  to	  be	  metaphorical.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  occurrence	  of	  follower	  in	  “follower	  of	  Jesus	  Christ”	  
(CT10)	  was	  marked	  as	  an	  example	  of	  metaphorical	  language	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  a	  more	  basic	  and	  
concrete	  usage	  would	  be	  to	  purposefully	  walk	  behind	  someone	  in	  the	  same	  direction.	  	  Also	  in	  line	  
with	  the	  MIP	  approach,	  a	  dictionary	  (in	  this	  case	  the	  online	  2009-­‐2012	  version	  of	  the	  MacMillan	  
Dictionary	  (macmillandictionary.com))	  was	  also	  consulted	  as	  an	  aid	  in	  identifying	  modern,	  basic	  
meanings,	  and	  instances	  of	  metaphor	  were	  identified	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  lexical	  unit	  (cf.	  Pragglejaz	  
2007:	  5,	  16).	  	  Language	  relevant	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  metaphorical	  movement	  therefore	  included	  any	  
lexical	  unit	  that	  referred	  to	  a	  past,	  present,	  future	  or	  hypothetical	  metaphorical	  change	  in	  location,	  
while	  language	  relevant	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  metaphorical	  proximity	  relating	  to	  a	  divine	  entity	  included	  
any	  lexical	  unit	  that	  referred	  to	  a	  past,	  present,	  future	  or	  hypothetical	  proximity	  between	  two	  or	  more	  
entities,	  where	  at	  least	  one	  was	  perceived	  as	  non-­‐physical	  and	  divine.	  	  Issues	  related	  to	  collocation	  
and	  immediate	  context	  were	  also	  considered	  during	  the	  identification	  process.	  	  It	  was	  therefore	  
recognised	  that	  some	  situated	  usages	  of	  lexical	  units	  are	  not	  related	  to	  movement	  or	  proximity	  while	  
other	  meanings	  may	  be.	  	  For	  example,	  with	  in	  “God	  was	  with	  me”	  (CT3	  )	  or	  “enjoying	  eternity	  with	  
him	  [God]	  in	  heaven”(CT11)	  was	  marked	  as	  an	  example	  related	  to	  divine	  entity	  proximity	  on	  the	  
grounds	  that	  a	  more	  basic,	  physical	  meaning	  could	  also	  be	  identified	  (such	  as	  one	  person	  being	  
together	  with	  another	  person	  (http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/with)).	  	  
However,	  the	  instance	  of	  with	  in	  “he	  [Jesus]	  …	  persevered	  with	  me”	  (CT10)	  was	  not	  marked	  as	  an	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example	  related	  to	  divine	  entity	  proximity	  in	  that	  the	  meaning	  here	  appears	  to	  be	  focused	  primarily	  
on	  simply	  marking	  a	  target	  for	  the	  notion	  of	  perseverance.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  term	  lexical	  unit	  was	  applied	  to	  any	  unit	  of	  meaning	  that	  could	  not	  be	  further	  broken	  down	  into	  
other	  discrete	  units	  of	  meaning	  (cf.	  Pragglejaz	  2007:	  25-­‐26)	  that	  could	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  
metaphorical	  movement	  or	  proximity.	  	  This	  meant	  that,	  for	  example,	  go	  and	  to	  in	  “go	  to	  heaven”	  
(CT12)	  were	  marked	  as	  two	  lexical	  units	  relating	  to	  metaphors	  of	  movement	  because	  both	  go	  
(indicating	  the	  existence	  of	  abstract,	  non-­‐physical	  movement)	  and	  to	  (indicating	  that	  the	  specified	  
movement	  is	  goal	  orientated)	  were	  considered	  as	  usefully	  contributing	  some	  meaning.	  	  Another	  
example	  was	  go	  and	  through	  in	  “God	  will	  help	  me	  to	  go	  through	  it	  [a	  challenging	  life	  experience]”	  
(Muslim	  Text	  3,	  subsequently	  referred	  to	  as	  MT3).	  	  In	  this	  example	  go	  again	  was	  viewed	  as	  indicating	  
the	  action	  of	  movement	  while	  through	  provided	  crucial	  schematic	  information	  about	  the	  type	  of	  
movement	  taking	  place	  (“from	  one	  end	  or	  side	  of	  something	  to	  the	  other”	  
(http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/through)).	  	  Again,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  “he	  will	  
lead	  them	  from	  darkness	  into	  light”	  (MT11),	  lead	  indicates	  the	  existence	  of	  abstract,	  existential	  
movement	  that	  has	  a	  more	  basic	  meaning	  (“to	  walk	  …	  in	  front	  of	  a	  group	  of	  people”	  
(http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/lead))	  while	  from	  and	  into	  provide	  further	  
crucial	  information	  by	  explicitly	  specifying	  that	  the	  movement	  is	  both	  source	  and	  goal	  orientated,	  
with	  the	  goal	  taking	  the	  form	  of	  “entering	  a	  container	  or	  a	  space”	  (Pragglejaz	  2007:	  11).	  	  This	  
example	  was	  therefore	  counted	  as	  possessing	  three	  lexical	  units	  relevant	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  
metaphorical	  movement.	  	  	  
This	  decision	  to	  break	  phrases	  up	  into	  individual	  lexical	  units	  such	  as	  lead,	  from	  and	  into	  in	  “lead	  
them	  from	  darkness	  into	  light”	  is	  not	  simply	  an	  arbitrary	  methodological	  decision.	  	  One	  of	  the	  
reasons	  why	  I	  am	  attracted	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Metaphor	  Identification	  Procedure	  (MIP)	  is	  that	  it	  
highlights	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  more	  metaphorical	  material	  that	  goes	  into	  the	  production	  of	  a	  
particular	  metaphor,	  the	  more	  important	  that	  metaphor	  may	  be	  for	  both	  the	  author	  and	  the	  reader.	  I	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would	  argue	  that	  the	  isolated	  use	  of	  lead	  could	  lack	  the	  level	  of	  emphasis,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  detail	  of	  
description,	  that	  the	  use	  of	  lead,	  from	  and	  into	  provide	  when	  occurring	  together.	  This	  is	  my	  principal	  
reason	  for	  choosing	  MIP	  rather	  than	  other	  possible	  metaphor	  identification	  frameworks.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	  some	  cases	  it	  was	  not	  useful	  to	  further	  semantically	  decompose	  a	  group	  of	  words,	  especially	  in	  
examples	  where	  the	  words	  in	  the	  group	  could	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  “semantic	  sum	  of	  their	  parts”	  
(Pragglejaz	  2007:	  26).	  	  	  One	  example	  from	  the	  data	  is	  the	  phrase	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  in	  examples	  like	  
“in	  the	  presence	  of	  God”	  (CT12).	  	  The	  phrase	  as	  a	  whole	  suggests	  a	  formal	  description	  of	  divine	  entity	  
proximity,	  and	  nothing	  can	  usefully	  be	  gleaned	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  notion	  of	  proximity	  from	  semantically	  
decomposing	  it	  further	  by,	  for	  example,	  analysing	  the	  use	  of	  in	  separately	  from	  presence.	  This	  phrase	  
was	  therefore	  marked	  as	  a	  single	  lexical	  unit	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  examining	  metaphorical	  language	  
related	  to	  proximity.	  	  	  
One	  implication	  of	  stressing	  the	  importance	  of	  collocation	  and	  immediate	  context	  was	  that	  in	  some	  
cases	  lexical	  units	  that	  were	  not	  considered	  to	  have	  a	  more	  basic	  meaning	  related	  to	  movement	  or	  
proximity	  according	  to	  the	  MacMillan	  dictionary	  entries	  were	  still	  marked	  as	  such	  if	  they	  were	  
qualified	  by	  a	  lexical	  unit	  that	  did	  have	  such	  a	  more	  basic,	  explicitly	  relevant	  entry.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
point	  out	  that	  this	  particular	  methodological	  decision	  does	  mark	  a	  departure	  from	  the	  Pragglejaz	  
method.	  	  To	  give	  some	  examples,	  the	  verbs	  saved	  and	  rescued	  were	  not	  normally	  classed	  as	  
metaphors	  related	  to	  a	  change	  in	  location,	  but	  whenever	  they	  occurred	  with	  from	  in,	  for	  instance,	  
“saved	  from	  the	  Hell	  fire”	  (MT10)	  or	  “rescued	  from	  the	  depths	  of	  ignorance”	  (MT4),	  they	  were	  
considered	  to	  be	  describing	  an	  action	  that	  did	  involve	  a	  change	  in	  location	  (“starting	  at	  a	  particular	  
point	  and	  moving	  away”	  (http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/from)).	  	  The	  verbs	  
in	  these	  instances	  were	  therefore	  marked	  as	  lexical	  units	  related	  to	  metaphorical	  movement	  because	  
they	  provided	  crucial	  information	  about	  a	  type	  of	  movement	  taking	  place	  –	  namely	  a	  situation	  where	  
the	  believer	  was	  relatively	  passive	  and	  in	  some	  way	  unable	  to	  change	  its	  location	  without	  some	  
dependency	  on	  being	  moved	  by	  an	  outside	  agency.	  	  The	  lexical	  unit	  from	  was	  then	  also	  marked	  as	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related	  to	  metaphorical	  movement,	  not	  just	  because	  it	  fleshed	  out	  the	  movement	  related	  meaning	  of	  
the	  verb,	  but	  also	  because	  it	  added	  crucial	  information	  about	  that	  movement	  being	  structured	  
around	  movement	  from	  a	  source.	  	  	  	  	  	  
One	  serious	  problem	  in	  metaphor	  identification	  that	  is	  relatively	  unique	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  religious	  
discourse	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  more	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  will	  view	  some	  examples	  of	  religious	  
language	  as	  being	  more	  basic,	  concrete	  and	  literal,	  while	  metaphor	  researchers	  who	  are	  not	  
conservative	  religious	  believers	  would	  view	  them	  as	  more	  abstract	  and	  therefore	  metaphorical.	  	  It	  
must	  be	  remembered	  that	  many	  conservative	  Christian	  believers,	  for	  example,	  hold	  the	  view	  that	  the	  
spiritual	  dimension	  is	  eternal	  and	  enduring,	  while	  the	  concrete,	  physical	  dimension	  is	  transient	  and	  
passing	  (cf.	  Biblical	  references	  such	  as	  1	  John	  2:	  17;	  1	  Corinthians	  7:	  31).	  	  This	  may	  unavoidably	  and	  
understandably	  cause	  some	  committed	  believers	  to	  view	  some	  of	  the	  presuppositions	  of	  the	  
Pragglejaz	  approach	  (in	  terms	  of	  what	  is	  viewed	  as	  truly	  concrete	  and	  basic,	  and	  what	  is	  viewed	  as	  
only	  metaphorical)	  with	  extreme	  suspicion.	  This	  suspicion	  can	  be	  compounded	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
language	  relating	  to	  locations	  such	  as	  heaven	  and	  hell.	  	  In	  the	  analysis	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  
consistently	  marked	  verbs	  such	  as	  go	  and	  to	  in	  “go	  to	  heaven”	  as	  metaphorical	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  
heaven	  is	  not	  generally	  regarded	  as	  a	  physical	  location	  that	  can	  be	  pointed	  to	  and	  therefore	  
movement	  towards	  it	  can	  be	  contrasted	  with	  a	  more	  basic	  meaning	  of	  movement	  towards	  a	  
specifiable,	  physical	  location.	  	  However,	  I	  recognise	  that	  many	  committed	  believers	  perceive	  heaven	  
to	  be	  a	  very	  real	  location.	  	  The	  main	  point	  is	  that	  it	  is	  crucial	  that	  a	  standard	  procedure	  of	  metaphor	  
identification	  is	  established,	  but,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  is	  also	  crucial	  that	  disagreements	  between	  how	  
a	  researcher	  categorises	  a	  lexical	  unit	  and	  how	  a	  believer	  may	  do	  so	  are	  taken	  seriously.	  	  These	  
disagreements	  are	  invaluable	  at	  highlighting	  the	  presuppositions	  of	  both	  the	  researcher	  and	  the	  
believer	  and	  should	  certainly	  be	  a	  focus	  in	  further	  research	  in	  the	  form	  of	  follow-­‐up	  interviews	  with	  
believers.	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One	  of	  the	  natural	  results	  of	  focusing	  purely	  on	  metaphors	  related	  to	  movement	  and	  proximity	  is	  a	  
tendency	  to	  foreground	  those	  elements	  when	  analysing	  a	  text.	  	  This	  results	  in	  the	  categorisation	  of	  
words	  as	  metaphors	  of	  movement	  that	  would	  otherwise	  perhaps	  be	  categorised	  in	  a	  different	  
manner	  if	  other	  categories	  were	  vying	  for	  consideration.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  Cameron,	  Low	  and	  
Maslen’s	  (2010:	  126)	  grouping	  of	  metaphors	  in	  their	  study	  of	  a	  speech	  by	  Tony	  Blair	  they	  have	  placed	  
taken	  in	  “taken	  me	  far	  from	  home”	  in	  the	  category	  of	  GIVE/TAKE.	  	  This	  contrasts	  with	  my	  own	  
decision	  to	  categorise	  taken	  in	  “I	  began	  to	  think	  how	  life	  was	  so	  precious	  and	  so	  fragile	  that	  it	  could	  
be	  taken	  in	  a	  moment”	  (CT6)	  as	  a	  metaphor	  of	  movement.	  	  This	  relates	  to	  a	  number	  of	  verbs	  that	  
would	  generally	  involve	  a	  change	  in	  location	  when	  applied	  to	  the	  author,	  such	  as	  the	  author	  being	  
brought	  or	  sent	  to	  a	  location	  or	  taken	  or	  delivered	  from	  something	  or	  somewhere.	  	  I	  do	  not	  view	  this	  
possible	  variation	  in	  classification	  as	  a	  flaw,	  but	  as	  the	  natural	  consequence	  of	  researchers	  working	  
with	  different	  numbers	  and	  types	  of	  categories	  for	  different	  purposes.	  
Having	  discussed	  the	  complex	  issues	  relating	  the	  identification	  and	  classification	  of	  the	  target	  
metaphors,	  I	  am	  now	  able	  to	  move	  on	  to	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  relative	  frequencies	  were	  calculated,	  
as	  well	  as	  provide	  an	  outline	  of	  some	  of	  the	  key	  results	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  section	  
3.5	  below.	  Relative	  frequencies	  were	  calculated	  by	  dividing	  the	  number	  of	  occurrences	  by	  the	  total	  
word	  count	  of	  the	  texts	  (Muslim	  texts:	  29067;	  Christian	  texts:	  15225	  words)	  and	  multiplying	  it	  by	  one	  
thousand.	  	  This	  formula	  will	  subsequently	  be	  used	  throughout	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  results	  when	  
calculating	  relative	  frequencies.	  	  For	  example,	  occurrences	  in	  the	  Muslim	  testimonials	  relating	  to	  
divine	  proximity	  metaphors	  had	  a	  relative	  frequency	  of	  0.31,	  while	  occurrences	  in	  the	  Christian	  
testimonials	  had	  a	  relative	  frequency	  of	  1.78.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  results,	  occurrences	  in	  the	  Muslim	  
testimonials	  relating	  to	  movement	  metaphors	  where	  the	  author	  was	  construed	  as	  passive	  had	  a	  
relative	  frequency	  of	  0.24	  compared	  to	  0.79	  in	  the	  Christian	  testimonials.	  	  In	  contrast,	  occurrences	  in	  
the	  Muslim	  testimonials	  relating	  to	  movement	  metaphors	  where	  there	  is	  only	  an	  influence	  on	  the	  
direction	  of	  the	  author	  had	  a	  relative	  frequency	  of	  0.72	  compared	  to	  the	  0.33	  in	  the	  Christian	  
testimonials.	  	  I	  will	  discuss	  possible	  explanations	  for	  these	  differences	  and	  their	  implications	  in	  detail	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in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  results	  in	  section	  3.5	  below.	  	  However,	  before	  I	  move	  on	  to	  a	  consideration	  of	  
the	  results,	  it	  is	  first	  important	  to	  further	  explore	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  relating	  to	  cognitive	  models	  that	  
were	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
3.4	  The	  Presuppositions	  of	  Movement	  and	  Divine	  Entity	  Proximity	  Metaphors	  in	  Religious	  
Testimonials	  
In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  I	  briefly	  analysed	  a	  Muslim	  testimonial	  that	  made	  use	  of	  movement	  
metaphors.	  	  I	  then	  went	  on	  to	  connect	  the	  use	  of	  such	  metaphors	  in	  religious	  discourse	  to	  the	  
source-­‐path-­‐goal	  image	  schema,	  arguing	  that	  this	  schema	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  
and	  pervasive	  pre-­‐requisites	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  religion.	  	  I	  also	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  notions	  
for	  understanding	  the	  need	  for	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  to	  perceive	  existence	  as	  having	  a	  
purpose	  that	  is	  perceived	  as	  clear	  and	  concrete.	  	  It	  provides	  the	  schematic	  foundation	  for	  viewing	  life	  
and	  the	  process	  of	  belief	  as	  a	  journey,	  while	  also	  appearing	  to	  combine	  with	  the	  foundational	  need	  
for	  the	  conservative	  religious	  believer	  to	  view	  him	  or	  herself	  as	  a	  passive	  entity	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
belief.	  	  The	  result	  of	  this	  combination	  is	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  metaphors	  that	  construe	  the	  believer	  as	  
being	  moved	  by	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  	  
One	  of	  the	  key	  themes	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  the	  use	  of	  metaphor	  involves	  both	  a	  process	  of	  selection	  
and	  construal	  that	  tends	  to	  foreground	  and	  background	  particular	  aspects	  of	  the	  target	  domain	  
through	  strategic	  selections	  from	  the	  source	  domain	  (Deignan	  2005:	  23-­‐24;	  Lakoff	  1980:	  10).	  	  This	  
can	  be	  summarised	  in	  the	  statement	  that	  “metaphors	  are	  seldom	  neutral”	  (Semino	  2008:	  32).	  	  This	  
characteristic	  of	  metaphor	  makes	  it	  particularly	  suited	  for	  the	  conscious	  or	  subconscious	  expression	  
of	  ideology	  or	  the	  consolidation	  of	  certain	  perspectives	  over	  others	  (Goatly	  2007;	  Semino	  2008:	  32-­‐
34).	  	  Related	  to	  this	  is	  the	  subtle	  persuasive	  pull	  of	  metaphor	  in	  that	  it	  requires	  “receivers	  of	  
metaphor	  to	  enter	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  producer	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  it”,	  while	  also	  being	  able	  
to	  act	  as	  a	  membership	  marker	  of	  a	  particular	  belief	  community	  (Cameron	  2003:	  111).	  	  I	  would	  argue	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that	  all	  of	  these	  characteristics	  are	  particularly	  present	  in	  the	  agency	  choices	  that	  accompany	  the	  use	  
of	  specific	  types	  of	  movement	  and	  divine	  entity	  proximity	  metaphors	  in	  religious	  testimonials.	  I	  
examine	  some	  of	  these	  possible	  presuppositions	  below:	  	  	  	  
Believer-­‐as-­‐agent	  movement	  metaphors:	  This	  type	  covers	  those	  metaphors	  that	  fit	  the	  definition	  of	  
movement	  metaphors	  listed	  above	  in	  addition	  to	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  construing	  the	  agent	  in	  the	  
movement	  process	  as	  the	  believer.	  Examples	  include	  “I	  came	  to	  Christ”	  (CT7)	  or	  “I	  wanted	  to	  …	  
follow	  him	  [God]”	  (CT11).	  	  These	  metaphors	  rely	  for	  their	  meaning	  on	  the	  fundamental	  
presupposition	  of	  the	  user	  that	  the	  divine	  entity	  referred	  to	  self-­‐evidently	  exists,	  in	  addition	  to	  being	  
construed	  as	  a	  basic	  and	  tangible	  thing	  occupying	  or	  moving	  through	  a	  specific	  space.	  	  This	  function	  
of	  talking	  about	  something	  abstract	  by	  drawing	  on	  a	  more	  basic	  and	  concrete	  domain	  is	  a	  well-­‐
recognised	  characteristic	  of	  metaphor	  (Charteris-­‐Black	  2004:	  21;	  Gibbs	  2005:	  99).	  	  The	  repeated	  
combination	  of	  these	  two	  factors	  provide	  the	  foundation	  for	  a	  sense	  of	  assumed	  certainty	  with	  
respect	  to	  an	  individual’s	  belief	  in	  that	  divine	  entity’s	  reality,	  nature	  and	  relationship	  to	  the	  believer.	  
Believer-­‐as-­‐agent	  movement	  metaphors	  can	  also	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  emphasising	  the	  responsibility,	  
accountability	  and	  implicit	  value	  of	  the	  believer.	  	  I	  will	  argue	  below	  for	  the	  importance	  for	  the	  
believer	  of	  language	  that	  construes	  the	  believer	  as	  a	  passive	  entity,	  but	  this	  type	  of	  believer-­‐as-­‐
patient	  language	  loses	  its	  power	  unless	  it	  is	  juxtaposed	  with	  believer-­‐as-­‐agent	  language.	  	  It	  appears	  
to	  be	  crucial	  for	  many	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  to	  perceive	  themselves	  as	  both	  valued	  as	  a	  
subject	  and	  viewed	  as	  an	  object	  at	  different	  moments	  in	  their	  experience.	  	  Particular	  belief	  
communities	  and	  individual	  believers	  may	  want	  to	  emphasise	  one	  pattern	  over	  another,	  and	  the	  
emphasis	  of	  a	  particular	  pattern	  may	  vary	  according	  to	  different	  situations	  and	  genres,	  but	  it	  appears	  
to	  be	  highly	  unusual	  for	  a	  believer	  to	  eliminate	  one	  pattern	  altogether.	  	  	  
External	  Movement	  and	  Divine	  Entity	  Proximity:	  This	  grouping	  of	  metaphors	  covers	  examples	  where	  
an	  external	  entity	  is	  viewed	  as	  an	  agent	  moving	  towards	  the	  believer	  (e.g.	  “the	  Good	  Shepherd	  came	  
looking	  for	  me”	  (CT6))	  or	  being	  in	  proximity	  to	  or	  within	  the	  believer	  (e.g.	  “the	  Holy	  Spirit	  who	  lives	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within	  me”	  (CT10)).	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  presuppositions	  outlined	  above,	  these	  metaphors	  appear	  to	  
operate	  with	  the	  implicit	  understanding	  that	  the	  entity	  referred	  to	  does	  not	  only	  exist,	  but	  is	  also	  
able	  to	  enter	  into	  some	  form	  of	  a	  powerful,	  intimate	  relationship	  with	  the	  believer.	  	  
Believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  movement	  metaphors:	  This	  type	  covers	  those	  metaphors	  that	  fit	  the	  definition	  of	  
movement	  metaphors	  listed	  above	  in	  addition	  to	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  construing	  the	  believer	  as	  in	  
some	  way	  the	  patient	  in	  the	  movement	  process.	  	  This	  includes	  the	  believer	  being	  moved	  (e.g.	  “and	  
this	  [the	  mercy	  of	  God]	  …	  brought	  me	  to	  Islam”	  (MT2)),	  helped	  to	  move	  (e.g.	  “he	  [God]	  …	  has	  led	  me	  
from	  strength	  to	  strength”	  (CT5)),	  or	  in	  some	  way	  having	  his	  or	  her	  direction	  influenced	  by	  a	  divine	  
entity	  (e.g.	  “God	  directs	  us	  to	  investigate”	  (MT4)).	  	  	  	  These	  examples	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  operating	  with	  
the	  same	  presuppositions	  outlined	  above,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  entity	  is	  also	  able	  to	  
powerfully	  influence	  the	  existential	  movement,	  location	  and	  direction	  of	  that	  believer.	  
My	  point	  in	  all	  of	  the	  above	  cases	  is	  that	  certainty	  of	  belief	  primarily	  resides	  in	  the	  implicit	  
presuppositions	  behind	  the	  language	  of	  doing	  and	  being	  acted	  upon.	  	  A	  committed	  believer	  who,	  for	  
example,	  perceives	  him	  or	  herself	  to	  be	  guided	  by	  God	  is	  not	  making	  an	  explicit	  argument	  for	  the	  
existence	  of	  God.	  	  However,	  the	  language	  of	  divine	  guidance	  makes	  no	  sense	  at	  all	  unless	  that	  
believer	  already	  unquestionably	  presupposes	  that	  there	  is	  a	  God	  who	  is	  capable	  of	  and	  wishes	  to	  
guide	  believers.	  	  It	  is	  these	  powerful	  underspecified	  (cf.	  Radden	  et	  al	  2007)	  presuppositions	  implicit	  in	  
the	  process	  language	  of	  acting	  and	  being	  acted	  upon	  (rather	  than	  explicit	  statements	  of	  certainty)	  
that	  are	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  this	  chapter.	  	  However,	  what	  I	  would	  like	  to	  do	  in	  this	  study	  is	  move	  
beyond	  the	  unsurprising	  statement	  that	  committed	  believers	  must	  already	  be	  certain	  about	  their	  
assumptions	  concerning	  a	  divine	  entity	  in	  order	  to	  coherently	  use	  the	  language	  that	  they	  do.	  	  What	  I	  
would	  like	  to	  explore	  is	  precisely	  in	  which	  strands	  of	  the	  process	  of	  believing	  those	  assumptions	  of	  
the	  reality	  of	  their	  belief	  are	  primarily	  located,	  in	  addition	  to	  addressing	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  
there	  are	  overlaps	  or	  clear,	  fixed	  differences	  between	  the	  strands	  used	  in	  the	  Muslim	  testimonials	  
from	  islamfortoday.com	  and	  the	  strands	  used	  in	  the	  Christian	  testimonials	  in	  the	  Evangelical	  Times.	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Having	  introduced	  a	  methodology	  for	  identifying	  metaphors	  and	  highlighted	  my	  interest	  in	  
metaphors	  related	  to	  movement	  and	  their	  epistemological	  assumptions,	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  a	  
description	  and	  discussion	  of	  the	  occurrences	  of	  those	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  in	  the	  
target	  testimonials.	  	  
	   	  
3.5.	  The	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Results	  
The	  analysis	  of	  the	  texts	  revealed	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  metaphors	  related	  to	  movement	  and	  divine	  entity	  
proximity	  in	  both	  collections	  of	  texts.	  	  The	  collection	  of	  twenty	  Christian	  testimonials	  was	  found	  to	  
contain	  336	  occurrences	  of	  metaphorical	  language	  (relative	  frequency:	  22)	  related	  to	  movement	  and	  
proximity,	  while	  the	  fifteen	  Muslim	  testimonials	  were	  found	  to	  contain	  480	  occurrences	  (relative	  
frequency:	  17).	  	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  from	  the	  outset	  that	  the	  above	  totals	  reveal	  nothing	  about	  how	  these	  
types	  of	  metaphor	  can	  relate	  to	  certainty.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  instances	  were	  also	  of	  course	  not	  explicitly	  
related	  to	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  belief.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  usage	  of	  fell,	  into,	  and	  followed	  in,	  
“	  …	  I	  fell	  into	  a	  relapse	  of	  my	  thyroid	  illness,	  and	  medical	  depression	  soon	  followed”	  (CT4)	  and	  the	  
usage	  of	  brought	  and	  up	  in	  “Although	  brought	  up	  in	  a	  non-­‐Christian	  home	  …”	  (CT5)	  were	  counted	  as	  
interesting	  examples	  of	  both	  metaphors	  of	  movement	  and	  agency	  patterns,	  but	  they	  are	  only	  
indirectly	  related	  to	  experiencing	  the	  perceived	  reality	  of	  a	  particular	  belief.	  	  The	  above	  results	  (listed	  
in	  full	  in	  appendix	  2.1	  and	  2.2	  on	  the	  CD)	  were	  therefore	  used	  as	  an	  initial	  jumping-­‐off	  point	  for	  the	  
analysis	  below.	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  view	  the	  above	  language	  in	  terms	  of	  
vehicles	  and	  topics,	  rather	  than	  metaphorical	  source	  and	  target	  domains.	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  categorise	  some	  of	  the	  usages	  of	  the	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  that	  I	  
encountered,	  as	  well	  as	  comparing	  the	  frequency	  of	  their	  usage	  in	  the	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  
collections	  of	  texts.	  	  My	  central	  aim	  is	  to	  focus	  on	  similarities	  and	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  that	  
different	  kinds	  of	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  were	  used	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  divine	  entity.	  I	  
99	  
	  
begin	  by	  focusing	  on	  movement	  metaphors	  that	  construe	  the	  believer	  as	  the	  agent	  in	  the	  movement	  
process.	  	  
	  
Believer-­‐as-­‐Agent	  Movement	  Metaphors	  
Metaphorical	  language	  related	  to	  the	  construal	  of	  the	  believer	  as	  the	  agent	  of	  his	  or	  her	  own	  
movement	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  expected	  pattern	  of	  movement	  metaphors,	  and	  often	  takes	  the	  well-­‐
documented	  form	  of	  viewing	  life	  as	  a	  journey	  (cf.	  Cameron	  2010a;	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  1980,	  1999;	  
Semino	  2008).	  	  It	  is	  common	  to	  construe	  belief	  as	  a	  believer’s	  conscious	  choice	  or	  decision	  to	  follow	  a	  
set	  of	  ideas.	  	  As	  I	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  if	  religious	  language	  were	  only	  to	  emphasise	  
movement	  metaphors	  that	  construed	  the	  believer	  as	  acted	  upon,	  then	  the	  believer	  would	  be	  
construed	  as	  a	  puppet	  or	  machine.	  	  This	  would	  negatively	  impact	  on	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  self	  has	  
real	  and	  eternal	  value	  (a	  notion	  crucial	  to	  some	  key	  aspects	  of	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  religious	  belief).	  	  
What	  we	  would	  therefore	  expect	  to	  see	  is	  some	  level	  of	  dual	  emphasis	  in	  both	  patterns	  of	  agency,	  as	  
we	  saw	  in	  the	  dialogue	  between	  the	  Christian	  and	  the	  atheist	  in	  section	  2.4.	  	  This	  may	  appear	  to	  
involve	  a	  logical	  contradiction	  or	  tension	  where	  the	  believer	  oscillates	  between	  agent	  and	  patient	  in	  
the	  process	  of	  belief,	  but	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  a	  clearly	  present	  phenomenon	  in	  both	  collections	  of	  texts	  
and	  one	  that	  is	  not	  viewed	  as	  problematic	  by	  believers.	  	  
Attempts	  can	  be	  made	  to	  integrate	  these	  two	  agency	  patterns,	  for	  example,	  “If	  we	  sincerely	  seek	  the	  
truth	  of	  this	  life,	  which	  is	  Islam	  (peaceful	  submission	  to	  the	  Will	  of	  God),	  God	  will	  guide	  us	  there,	  God	  
Willing”	  (MT4).	  	  In	  this	  example,	  the	  believer	  can	  only	  become	  an	  object	  in	  a	  process	  of	  movement	  
(being	  guided)	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  he	  or	  she	  first	  initiates	  the	  process	  as	  the	  subject	  (by	  actively	  
seeking).	  	  However,	  it	  is	  more	  common	  for	  opposing	  agency	  patterns	  to	  appear	  in	  the	  same	  text	  
without	  any	  gloss	  or	  integration.	  	  In	  the	  Muslim	  testimonial	  I	  examined	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  
observed	  how	  the	  author	  made	  use	  of	  several	  believer-­‐as-­‐agent	  journey	  metaphors	  throughout	  his	  
testimonial,	  for	  example,	  “I	  then	  embarked	  on	  a	  search	  that	  is	  perhaps	  not	  unfamiliar	  to	  many	  young	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people	  in	  the	  West,	  a	  quest	  for	  meaning	  in	  a	  meaningless	  world”.	  	  However,	  he	  sums	  up	  his	  
conversion	  experience	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  testimonial	  as	  a	  process	  of	  being	  brought	  to	  Islam	  by	  God,	  “It	  
is	  not	  through	  an	  act	  of	  the	  mind	  or	  will	  that	  anyone	  becomes	  a	  Muslim,	  but	  rather	  through	  the	  
mercy	  of	  God,	  and	  this,	  in	  the	  final	  analysis,	  was	  what	  brought	  me	  to	  Islam”.	  	  A	  more	  extreme	  
example	  of	  this	  can	  be	  found	  in	  one	  of	  the	  Christian	  testimonials	  (CT10)	  where	  the	  notion	  of	  being	  a	  
“willing	  servant”	  in	  conjunction	  with	  having	  “placed	  my	  trust	  in	  the	  Lord	  Jesus	  Christ”	  (not	  an	  act	  that	  
can	  normally	  be	  forced	  upon	  someone)	  is	  juxtaposed	  with	  explicit	  and	  extreme	  military	  and	  
movement	  metaphors.	  	  These	  metaphors	  relate	  to	  having	  engaged	  in	  “rebellion	  against	  God”	  and	  
“stubbornly	  resisted	  him”	  although	  in	  the	  end	  “even	  …	  the	  most	  stubborn	  will	  is	  not	  too	  difficult	  for	  
him	  to	  crack	  …	  In	  spite	  of	  my	  resistance,	  he	  brought	  me	  to	  repentance	  and	  faith”.	  	  The	  juxtaposition	  
of	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  with	  metaphors	  from	  other	  source	  domains	  was	  relatively	  
common	  in	  the	  data	  I	  examined,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  unrelated	  discourse	  data	  examined	  by	  other	  
researchers	  (cf.	  Kimmel	  2010).	  	  Sometimes	  these	  metaphors	  also	  overlapped	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  
movement,	  as	  they	  did	  in	  the	  occurrences	  of	  find	  examined	  below.	  	  However,	  the	  primary	  concerns	  
of	  this	  thesis	  are	  the	  occurrences	  of	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors.	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  shared	  language	  between	  the	  two	  collections	  of	  testimonials,	  they	  both	  make	  use	  of	  the	  
verb	  follow	  or	  the	  related	  noun	  follower	  to	  describe	  being	  a	  Muslim	  or	  Christian	  (e.g.	  “Islam	  …	  its	  
[Islam’s]	  followers”	  (MT2),	  “follow	  him	  [God]”	  (MT4),	  “follower	  of	  Jesus	  Christ”	  (CT10),	  “follow	  him	  
[God]”	  (CT11)).	  They	  also	  both	  make	  use	  of	  the	  noun	  way	  (e.g.	  “way	  to	  salvation”	  and	  “way	  to	  
heaven”	  (MT1));	  “the	  Lord	  opened	  the	  way	  for	  me”	  (CT4)	  and	  “the	  only	  way	  of	  escape	  was	  to	  submit	  
to	  Jesus”	  (CT10))	  and	  verbs	  such	  as	  come	  and	  go.	  
One	  interesting	  difference	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  use	  of	  come	  is	  that	  the	  Islamic	  texts	  frequently	  use	  the	  
verb	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  second	  verb	  and	  an	  impersonal	  object,	  for	  example,	  “the	  story	  of	  how	  my	  
husband	  and	  I	  came	  to	  embrace	  Islam”	  (MT1),	  but	  not	  so	  frequently	  in	  the	  simpler	  come	  +	  
PREPOSITON	  	  +	  [personal	  divine	  entity]	  pattern.	  	  There	  are	  therefore	  no	  examples	  in	  the	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islamfortoday.com	  testimonials	  of	  coming	  to	  Allah	  or	  coming	  to	  God,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  come	  to	  
and	  came	  to	  is	  used	  a	  combined	  total	  of	  21	  times	  (relative	  frequency:	  0.72).	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  notion	  
of	  coming	  to	  Jesus	  or	  coming	  to	  God	  occurs	  four	  times	  in	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  texts:	  “come	  to	  God	  
in	  prayer”	  (CT1);	  “He	  [Jesus	  Christ]	  says,	  ‘Come	  to	  me’”	  (CT4);	  “I	  came	  to	  Christ”	  (CT7);	  and	  “I	  had	  to	  
come	  to	  God	  in	  repentance”	  (CT14)	  out	  of	  15	  total	  occurrences	  (relative	  frequency:	  0.99)	  of	  come	  to	  
and	  came	  to.	  	  
We	  see	  the	  same	  pattern	  with	  the	  use	  of	  follow	  and	  follower.	  The	  Muslim	  testimonials	  used	  follow,	  
followed,	  following	  and	  follower	  a	  total	  of	  27	  times	  (relative	  frequency:	  0.93),	  with	  occurrences	  that	  
cover,	  for	  example,	  following	  a	  verse	  from	  the	  Quran,	  the	  prophet,	  and	  the	  religion	  of	  Islam,	  but	  
never	  involving	  the	  use	  of	  God	  or	  Allah	  as	  the	  explicit	  object.	  	  The	  closest	  the	  language	  of	  the	  Muslim	  
testimonials	  comes	  to	  this	  type	  of	  reference	  is	  in	  the	  example	  of,	  “I	  saw	  Jesus	  (peace	  be	  upon	  him)	  as	  
my	  example	  on	  how	  to	  be	  a	  good	  follower	  of	  and	  submitter	  to	  God's	  will,	  but	  not	  as	  God	  himself”	  
(MT8).	  	  But	  even	  here	  what	  is	  being	  followed	  is	  not	  God,	  but	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  God.	  	  Again,	  in	  contrast,	  
the	  Christian	  testimonials	  contained	  17	  occurrences	  (relative	  frequency:	  1.12)	  of	  follow,	  followed,	  
following	  and	  follower,	  with	  8	  of	  those	  references	  using	  Jesus	  or	  God	  as	  the	  explicit	  object,	  “Will	  you	  
follow	  him	  [the	  Lord]?”	  (CT7);	  “I	  was	  absolutely	  determined	  that	  I	  would	  never	  become	  a	  follower	  of	  
Jesus	  Christ	  …	  I	  am	  now	  24	  years	  old.	  I	  love	  God	  and	  am	  a	  follower	  of	  Jesus	  Christ”	  (CT10)	  and	  “God	  
made	  it	  clear	  to	  me	  there	  are	  only	  two	  kinds	  of	  people	  –	  those	  who	  rebel	  against	  God	  and	  those	  who	  
follow	  him	  [God]	  completely	  …	  Those	  who	  follow	  God	  get	  to	  enjoy	  a	  living	  relationship	  with	  him	  …	  I	  
wasn’t	  following	  God	  completely	  …	  one	  night	  I	  quietly	  asked	  God	  to	  forgive	  my	  sin	  and	  help	  me	  to	  
follow	  him	  [God]	  …	  I	  wanted	  to	  be	  obedient	  to	  God	  and	  follow	  him	  [God]”	  (CT11).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
These	  explicit	  references	  to	  God	  and	  the	  suggestion	  of	  proximity	  that	  is	  activated	  by	  the	  use	  of	  follow	  
provides	  some	  evidence	  that	  the	  Christian	  texts	  use	  more	  language	  that	  depicts	  the	  divine	  entity	  as	  
less	  distant	  and	  more	  active	  in	  the	  daily	  life	  of	  the	  believer	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  language	  used	  in	  the	  
islamfortoday.com	  testimonials.	  	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  below,	  this	  initial	  tentative	  conclusion	  can	  be	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further	  reinforced	  and	  expanded	  by	  a	  consideration	  of	  external	  movement	  and	  divine	  entity	  
proximity	  metaphors.	  
	  
External	  Movement	  and	  Divine	  Entity	  Proximity	  Metaphors	  
Far	  fewer	  occurrences	  were	  found	  of	  language	  referring	  to	  the	  proximity	  of	  a	  divine	  entity	  in	  the	  
Muslim	  texts	  (relative	  frequency:	  0.31)	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  Christian	  texts	  (relative	  frequency:	  1.78).	  	  
The	  references	  can	  be	  broadly	  divided	  into	  two	  groupings:	  the	  first	  drawing	  on	  language	  related	  to	  
being	  physically	  near	  or	  nearer	  to	  someone,	  such	  as	  close,	  with,	  stand	  by	  (me),	  being	  there,	  
companion,	  closer	  and	  the	  use	  of	  the	  preposition	  to	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  towards,	  and	  the	  second	  making	  
use	  of	  prepositions	  such	  as	  in,	  into	  and	  within	  where	  the	  believer	  or	  the	  believer’s	  life	  is	  construed	  as	  
entering,	  being	  entered	  by	  or	  becoming	  part	  of	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  All	  the	  examples	  in	  the	  Muslim	  texts	  
can	  be	  placed	  in	  the	  first	  group,	  with	  no	  references	  relating	  to	  the	  second	  group.	  The	  examples	  in	  the	  
Muslim	  texts	  relating	  to	  language	  such	  as	  closer	  are	  also	  restricted	  to	  movement	  by	  the	  believer	  
towards	  the	  divine	  entity,	  while	  the	  Christian	  texts	  exhibit	  examples	  of	  movement	  in	  both	  directions.	  	  
The	  occurrences	  are	  listed	  below	  in	  table	  3.2	  (only	  metaphorical	  language	  related	  to	  proximity	  has	  
been	  underlined):	  	  
Table	  3.2	  Occurrences	  in	  the	  Testimonials	  Related	  to	  Divine	  Proximity.	  
	   Muslim	  Testimonials	   Christian	  Testimonials	  
Relative	  frequency	   0.31	   1.78	  
Occurrences	  related	  to	  being	  
physically	  near	  a	  divine	  entity	  
[1]	  …	  gain	  the	  pleasure	  of	  God	  and	  be	  
closer	  to	  Him	  amid	  the	  endless	  delights	  
of	  Paradise.	  (MT4)	  
[2]	  and	  [3]	  Did	  I	  really	  think	  that	  God	  
would	  be	  upset	  at	  me	  for	  wanting	  to	  
[1]	  Come	  to	  God	  in	  prayer	  and	  ask	  for	  
forgiveness.	  (CT1)	  
[2]	  God	  was	  with	  me	  …	  (CT3)	  
[3]	  He	  [Jesus	  Christ]	  says,	  ‘Come	  to	  me,	  
all	  you	  who	  labour	  and	  are	  heavy	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get	  closer	  to	  Him	  …	  Jesus	  would	  be	  
upset	  with	  me	  for	  trying	  to	  get	  closer	  
to	  God?	  (MT5)	  
[4]	  I	  have	  never	  been	  so	  close	  to	  God	  as	  
I	  have	  been	  since	  becoming	  Muslim.	  
(MT5)	  
[5]	  I	  just	  knew	  that	  I	  wanted	  to	  connect	  
with	  God.	  (MT5)	  
[6]	  and	  [7]	  Each	  time	  I	  went,	  I	  felt	  …	  
closer	  and	  closer	  to	  the	  Prophet	  Jesus	  
and	  God.	  (MT7)	  
[8]	  God	  is	  with	  me	  every	  moment	  …	  
(MT8)	  
[9]	  …	  I	  felt	  a	  closeness	  to	  God	  that	  
penetrated	  my	  heart	  and	  soul.	  (MT14)	  
	  
laden,	  and	  I	  will	  give	  you	  rest’.	  (CT4)	  
[4]	  I	  came	  to	  Christ,	  confessing	  my	  sin	  
and	  proud	  unbelief.	  	  I	  was	  humbled	  
before	  him.	  (CT7)	  
[5]	  and	  [6]	  Oh	  for	  a	  closer	  walk	  with	  
Christ,	  where	  the	  relationship	  …	  is	  so	  
intimate	  and	  direct	  …	  (CT9)	  
[7]	  The	  Lord	  Jesus	  Christ	  is	  my	  friend,	  
companion,	  rescuer,	  helper,	  shepherd	  
and	  king.	  (CT10)	  
[8]	  and	  [9]	  I’ve	  learned	  that	  he	  [Jesus]	  
is	  always	  with	  me	  …	  stands	  by	  me	  in	  
difficult	  times	  …	  (CT11)	  
[10]	  I	  wanted	  to	  go	  to	  heaven	  –	  to	  be	  in	  
the	  presence	  of	  God	  …	  (CT12)	  
[11]	  I	  can	  clearly	  remember	  …	  realising	  
the	  Holy	  Spirit	  was	  indeed	  with	  me	  …	  
(CT13)	  
[12]	  In	  reality,	  he	  [God]	  had	  always	  
been	  there	  …	  (CT13)	  
[13]	  …	  	  I	  had	  to	  come	  to	  God	  in	  
repentance.	  (CT14)	  
[14]	  I	  felt	  safe,	  knowing	  he	  was	  with	  
me.	  (CT15)	  
[15]	  and	  [16]	  And	  God	  raised	  us	  up	  




[17]	  So	  what	  started	  out	  as	  a	  journey	  
running	  away	  from	  something	  (a	  lost	  
eternity)	  has	  become	  a	  journey	  running	  
to	  someone	  [God].	  (CT18)	  
[18]	  and	  [19]	  I	  [Christ]	  shall	  come	  in	  
and	  dine	  with	  him	  [the	  believer],	  and	  
he	  with	  me.	  (CT19)	  
[20]	  …	  things	  became	  better	  and	  I	  grew	  
closer	  to	  Jesus	  Christ	  …	  (CT20)	  
	  
Occurrences	  related	  to	  union	  with	  a	  
divine	  entity	  
	   [21]	  I	  asked	  Jesus	  to	  come	  into	  my	  life	  
as	  Saviour	  …	  (CT1)	  
[22]	  …	  through	  faith	  in	  him	  I	  could	  be	  
united	  with	  his	  father	  in	  heaven.	  (CT5)	  
[23]	  Jesus	  came	  into	  my	  life	  …	  (CT6)	  
[24]	  …	  through	  the	  Holy	  Spirit,	  who	  
lives	  within	  me.	  (CT10)	  	  	  	  
[25]	  …	  seated	  us	  with	  [see	  [11]]	  him	  in	  
the	  heavenly	  realms	  in	  Christ	  Jesus	  …	  
(CT18)	  
[26]	  I	  [Christ]	  shall	  come	  in	  and	  dine	  
with	  him	  [the	  believer]	  …	  (CT19)	  
[27]	  I	  wanted	  to	  know	  him	  better	  and	  





This	  relatively	  low	  frequency	  in	  the	  Muslim	  texts	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  Christian	  texts	  may	  have	  
two	  possible	  causes.	  	  The	  first	  is	  that	  the	  kind	  of	  Islam	  represented	  by	  the	  website	  depicts	  Allah	  as	  a	  
more	  distant	  and	  less	  intimate	  entity	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  having	  the	  characteristic	  of	  absolute	  otherness.	  	  
In	  contrast,	  the	  kind	  of	  deity	  represented	  by	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  testimonials	  is	  an	  entity	  that	  lends	  
itself	  to	  descriptions	  that	  readily	  draw	  on	  the	  language	  of	  human	  relationships	  and	  intimacy.	  	  The	  
second	  possible	  cause	  is	  that	  the	  genre	  of	  the	  testimonials	  is	  approached	  in	  different	  ways	  in	  terms	  
of	  rhetorical	  devices	  by	  the	  two	  communities,	  with	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  texts	  preferring	  more	  
detached	  language	  in	  order	  to	  perhaps	  convey	  an	  appearance	  of	  academic	  objectivity.	  	  A	  certain	  
amount	  of	  overlap	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  these	  experiential	  and	  rhetorical	  explanations	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  
probable	  that	  the	  explanation	  lies	  in	  some	  combination	  of	  the	  two.	  	  In	  addition,	  a	  valuable	  avenue	  of	  
further	  research	  here	  would	  be	  to	  compare	  these	  occurrences	  to	  the	  proximity	  language	  used	  in	  the	  
Qur’an	  and	  the	  Bible.	  	  	  
Further	  evidence	  for	  a	  marked	  difference	  in	  language	  related	  to	  the	  perception	  of	  objectivity	  that	  
could	  support	  both	  possibilities	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  higher	  frequency	  of	  language	  relating	  to	  
science	  and	  logic	  in	  the	  Islamic	  texts	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  Christian	  texts.	  	  The	  number	  of	  occurrences	  
and	  their	  relative	  frequencies	  are	  listed	  below	  in	  table	  3.3:	  	  
	  
Table	  3.3	  Occurrences	  of	  words	  related	  to	  science	  and	  logic.	  
	   Occurrences	  in	  the	  
Muslim	  testimonials	  
Relative	  frequency	  of	  
occurrences	  in	  the	  
Muslim	  testimonials	  
Occurrences	  in	  the	  
Christian	  testimonials	  
Relative	  frequency	  of	  
occurrences	  in	  the	  
Christian	  testimonials	  
Scientific,	  science	  and	  
scientifically	  
16	   0.55	   0	   0	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Logic,	  logical,	  illogical	  
and	  logically	  
6	   0.21	   1	   0.07	  
	  
It	  must	  be	  stressed	  that	  the	  references	  to	  science	  were	  not	  always	  an	  interpretation	  of	  scientific	  data	  
to	  support	  belief	  in	  Islam,	  and	  were	  sometimes	  an	  attack	  on	  atheist	  and	  materialist	  interpretations	  of	  
science.	  	  However,	  the	  point	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  greater	  concern	  with	  engaging	  in	  subjects	  related	  to	  
the	  domain	  of	  science	  in	  the	  Muslim	  texts.	  This	  may	  also	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  in	  line	  with	  an	  emphasis	  in	  the	  
Muslim	  texts	  on	  the	  perception	  of	  reaching	  truth	  through	  regular	  thought	  processes	  and	  research	  
rather	  than	  explicit	  dependence	  on	  divine	  agency.	  	  This	  emphasis	  will	  be	  explored	  below	  in	  an	  
examination	  of	  through.	  	  
	  
The	  Use	  of	  ‘Through’	  in	  the	  Texts	  
The	  preposition	  through	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  the	  argument	  of	  this	  chapter	  because	  of	  its	  close	  
relationship	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  movement	  and	  the	  additional	  level	  of	  complexity	  that	  it	  can	  contribute	  
to	  agency.	  	  The	  MacMillan	  Online	  dictionary	  lists	  the	  most	  basic,	  concrete	  meaning	  of	  through	  as	  
“from	  one	  end	  or	  side	  of	  something	  to	  another”	  
(http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/through).	  	  Some	  of	  the	  more	  metaphorical	  
meanings	  include	  “happening	  because	  of	  something”,	  “by	  means	  of	  something”	  or	  “to	  the	  end	  of	  a	  
bad	  or	  difficult	  experience”.	  The	  usage	  of	  through	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  happening	  because	  of	  someone	  or	  
something/by	  means	  of	  something	  definition	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  complicating	  the	  agency	  patterns	  in	  
that	  the	  agency	  is	  qualified	  with	  the	  implication	  that	  the	  subject	  can	  only	  do	  something	  by	  means	  of	  
or	  because	  of	  something	  else.	  Consider	  the	  example	  “I	  have	  the	  power	  to	  live	  a	  changed	  life	  through	  
the	  Holy	  Spirit,	  who	  lives	  within	  me”	  (CT10).	  The	  question	  in	  a	  sentence	  like	  this	  of	  who	  really	  is	  
perceived	  to	  have	  the	  power	  –	  the	  believer	  or	  the	  Holy	  Spirit,	  or	  some	  combination	  of	  the	  two	  –	  is	  a	  
valid	  one	  because	  the	  prepositional	  phrase	  introduces	  a	  notion	  of	  dependency.	  	  This	  subsequently	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makes	  the	  question	  of	  who	  is	  transferring	  energy	  to	  bring	  about	  this	  perceived	  effect	  of	  a	  “changed	  
life”	  a	  difficult	  one	  to	  answer.	  	  	  
The	  list	  of	  occurrences	  is	  provided	  below	  in	  table	  3.4.	  	  The	  first	  two	  of	  the	  above	  definitions	  of	  
through	  have	  been	  placed	  together	  because	  of	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  similarity	  and	  interdependence	  in	  
their	  meaning.	  	  	  
Table	  3.4	  Occurrences	  of	  through	  with	  the	  meaning	  happening	  because	  of	  someone	  or	  something	  or	  by	  means	  of	  something.	  
	   Muslim	  testimonials	   Christian	  testimonials	  
Relative	  frequency	   0.79	   0.72	  
Occurrences	   [1]	  …	  get	  answers	  that	  I	  confirmed	  
through	  further	  research.	  (MT1)	  
[2]	  …	  I	  became	  aware	  through	  studies	  
…	  that	  philosophy	  had	  not	  been	  
successful	  …	  (MT2)	  
[3]	  …	  applying	  to	  them	  a	  
thoroughgoing	  scientific	  atheism,	  a	  
sort	  of	  salvation	  through	  pure	  science.	  
(MT2)	  
[4]	  and	  [5]	  It	  is	  not	  through	  an	  act	  of	  
the	  mind	  or	  will	  that	  anyone	  becomes	  a	  
Muslim,	  but	  rather	  through	  the	  mercy	  
of	  God	  …	  (MT2)	  
[6]	  This	  realization	  was	  the	  impetus	  
that	  led	  me	  to	  search	  for	  the	  truth	  
through	  diverse	  avenues.	  (MT4)	  
[7]	  I	  was	  able	  to	  find	  inner	  peace	  
[1]	  …	  God’s	  Son	  …	  could	  give	  lasting	  
peace	  through	  his	  death,	  resurrection	  
and	  life-­‐giving	  Spirit.	  	  (CT2)	  	  
[2]	  The	  Lord	  graciously	  brought	  me	  to	  
know	  him	  through	  thyrotoxicosis	  …	  
(CT4)	  	  
[3]	  Through	  …	  fears	  …	  about	  my	  
father’s	  spiritual	  well-­‐being,	  I	  fell	  into	  a	  
relapse	  …	  illness	  …	  depression	  …	  (CT4)	  	  
[4]	  …	  his	  death	  [Jesus’]	  paid	  for	  my	  sins	  
and	  through	  faith	  in	  him	  I	  could	  be	  
united	  with	  his	  Father	  in	  heaven.	  (CT5)	  	  
[5]	  I	  began	  to	  seek	  God	  and	  sensed	  God	  
speaking	  to	  me	  through	  Galatians	  4:13	  
…	  	  (CT6)	  	  
[6]	  I	  wondered	  if	  God	  was	  redirecting	  
me	  through	  circumstances	  to	  preach	  in	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through	  meditation	  techniques.	  (MT4)	  
[8]	  …	  TV	  commercials,	  ‘Be	  all	  you	  can	  
be’,	  through	  endeavors	  in	  fire-­‐walking,	  
skydiving	  and	  martial	  arts.	  	  (MT4)	  
[9]	  …	  I	  chose	  to	  continue	  my	  search	  for	  
the	  truth	  through	  Christianity	  and	  
Islam.	  (MT4)	  
[10]	  Through	  booklets,	  cassettes	  and	  
videotapes	  …	  I	  …	  found	  out	  …	  a	  lack	  of	  
harmony	  in	  Christian	  beliefs.	  (MT4)	  	  
[11]…	  area	  of	  controversy	  I	  read	  about	  
was	  'original	  sin'	  and	  salvation	  through	  
'the	  crucifixion'	  of	  Jesus	  (pbuh).	  (MT4)	  
[12]	  and	  [13]	  …	  after	  Jesus	  (pbuh),	  
salvation	  was	  achieved	  through	  his	  
crucifixion	  so	  they	  said	  …	  salvation	  
through	  the	  crucifixion	  of	  Jesus	  (pbuh).	  
(MT4)	  
[14],	  [15]	  and	  [16]	  …	  man	  is	  saved	  
through	  obedience	  and	  submission	  to	  
God	  …	  they	  changed	  this	  doctrine	  …	  
making	  salvation	  through	  the	  
crucifixion	  	  …	  The	  theory	  of	  salvation	  
through	  crucifixion	  …	  (MT4)	  
[17]	  …	  seduced	  by	  the	  capitalist	  system	  
that	  tends	  to	  work	  through	  the	  
invention	  of	  false	  needs	  …	  (MT4)	  
[18]	  …	  American	  Catholic	  teacher	  
England.	  (CT6)	  	  
[7]	  I	  have	  the	  power	  to	  live	  a	  changed	  
life	  through	  the	  Holy	  Spirit,	  who	  lives	  
within	  me.	  	  (CT10)	  	  
[8]	  Through	  a	  sermon	  I	  heard	  one	  
Sunday,	  God	  made	  it	  clear	  to	  me	  …	  
(CT11)	  	  
[9]	  …	  the	  happiness	  others	  sought	  in	  
the	  wrong	  places	  had	  already	  been	  
given	  to	  me	  through	  Christ.	  (CT11)	  
[10]	  This	  strengthened	  my	  faith	  
through	  the	  good	  teaching	  that	  I	  
gained.	  (CT15)	  	  
[11]	  ‘…	  by	  grace	  you	  have	  been	  saved	  
through	  faith	  …	  not	  from	  yourselves	  …	  





found	  fulfilment	  and	  direction	  through	  
her	  new	  job	  at	  a	  Muslim	  school.	  (MT5)	  
[19]	  …	  I've	  learned	  to	  pray	  (something	  I	  
had	  tried	  to	  teach	  myself	  through	  the	  
Web	  and	  videos	  for	  years!).	  (MT7)	  	  
[20]	  Through	  my	  interrogation	  of	  Islam	  
I	  gained	  God’s	  most	  precious	  gift	  -­‐	  
Islam,	  or	  surrender	  to	  the	  peace.	  (MT8)	  
[21]	  …	  and	  through	  his	  own	  
transformation	  he	  had	  shown	  that	  
change	  …	  was	  possible.	  (MT12)	  
[22]	  Through	  research,	  I	  found	  that	  up	  
to	  35	  per	  cent	  of	  enslaved	  blacks	  …	  
were	  Muslim.	  (MT12)	  
[23]	  Islam	  has	  through	  its	  truth	  taught	  
me	  humility	  and	  the	  true	  worship	  of	  
Allah	  (God).	  (MT14)	  
	  
	  
One	  important	  difference	  is	  the	  frequency	  of	  references	  to	  one’s	  arrival	  at	  a	  belief	  by	  means	  of	  divine	  
agency	  in	  the	  Christian	  texts	  compared	  to	  one’s	  arrival	  at	  a	  belief	  by	  means	  of	  regular	  thought	  
processes	  in	  the	  Muslim	  texts.	  	  In	  the	  Muslim	  texts,	  only	  [5]	  provides	  an	  example	  of	  special	  divine	  
interference	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  being	  “brought”	  to	  Islam	  by	  means	  of	  the	  “mercy	  of	  God”).	  	  Extract	  [14]	  
refers	  to	  attaining	  salvation	  through	  submission	  and	  obedience,	  but	  this	  only	  relates	  to	  language	  
about	  Allah	  rather	  than	  any	  indication	  that	  Allah	  interferes	  in	  that	  process	  of	  attainment.	  	  Extracts	  
[11],	  [12],	  [13],	  [15]	  and	  [16]	  all	  refer	  to	  the	  attainment	  of	  salvation	  through	  such	  special	  divine	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interference	  (salvation	  through	  the	  crucifixion	  of	  Jesus),	  but	  are	  all	  references	  to	  the	  author’s	  
disagreement	  with	  Christian	  belief.	  Many	  of	  the	  references	  in	  the	  Muslim	  texts	  pick	  up	  on	  the	  theme	  
of	  research	  established	  in	  example	  [1]:	  extract	  [2]	  refers	  to	  investigating	  religion,	  [6]	  refers	  to	  
searching	  for	  truth,	  [9]	  refers	  to	  continuing	  a	  search	  for	  truth	  through	  an	  investigation	  of	  Christianity	  
and	  Islam,	  [10]	  refers	  to	  a	  process	  of	  study	  leading	  to	  the	  discovery	  of	  problems	  with	  the	  Christian	  
Bible,	  [20]	  describes	  the	  author’s	  research	  of	  his	  religion	  as	  an	  “interrogation”,	  and	  [22]	  explicitly	  
refers	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  research.	  	  What	  appears	  to	  be	  present	  here	  is	  a	  pattern	  of	  metaphorical	  
language	  that	  emphasises	  the	  presupposition	  that	  belief	  can	  be	  experienced	  as	  a	  process	  of	  unbiased	  
research	  and	  reflection	  moving	  from	  ignorance	  to	  absolute	  clarity.	  
In	  contrast,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Christian	  extracts	  above	  attest	  to	  a	  systematic	  divine	  intervention	  in	  
terms	  of	  their	  arrival	  at	  belief.	  	  Extract	  [1]	  refers	  to	  the	  attainment	  of	  lasting	  peace	  “through	  his	  
[Jesus’]	  death,	  resurrection	  and	  life-­‐giving	  Spirit”,	  [2]	  refers	  to	  God	  using	  a	  disease	  to	  bring	  the	  author	  
to	  Christianity,	  [4]	  refers	  to	  the	  attainment	  of	  salvation	  through	  faith	  in	  Jesus’	  death,	  [5]	  refers	  to	  
God	  speaking	  to	  the	  author	  through	  a	  Bible	  text,	  [6]	  refers	  to	  the	  author’s	  life	  being	  changed	  
“through	  the	  Holy	  Spirit”	  [8]	  refers	  to	  God	  communicating	  the	  importance	  of	  following	  him	  to	  the	  
author	  “through	  a	  sermon”,	  [9]	  refers	  to	  the	  author	  receiving	  happiness	  “through	  Christ”	  and	  [11]	  
draws	  on	  a	  quote	  from	  Ephesians	  stating	  that	  salvation	  is	  attained	  by	  the	  grace	  of	  God	  and	  believed	  
“through	  faith”.	  	  We	  can	  therefore	  see	  two	  very	  different	  patterns	  of	  presuppositions	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
perceptions	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  belief	  in	  the	  metaphorical	  language	  of	  the	  two	  collections	  of	  testimonials.	  	  
How	  can	  we	  explain	  these	  different	  patterns?	  A	  number	  of	  factors	  could	  be	  involved.	  	  US	  based	  
Muslims	  may	  wish	  to	  emphasise	  research	  and	  reflection	  because	  they	  perceive	  the	  need	  to	  justify	  
themselves	  to	  an	  audience	  (the	  American	  public)	  that	  generally	  evaluates	  them	  in	  a	  more	  negative	  
manner	  than	  the	  British	  public	  evaluates	  Christians.	  The	  belief	  that	  the	  Qur’an	  was	  delivered	  through	  
a	  single	  author	  may	  also	  be	  a	  factor	  in	  that	  any	  process	  of	  research	  focused	  on	  the	  sacred	  text	  is	  less	  
likely	  to	  uncover	  what	  could	  be	  viewed	  by	  some	  as	  possible	  contradictions	  and	  variations	  in	  agenda.	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Regardless	  of	  the	  motivation,	  one	  key	  observation	  is	  that	  this	  emphasis	  on	  research	  and	  reflection	  
appears	  to	  be	  in	  line	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  human	  responsibility	  in	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  testimonial	  
language.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Through	  with	  the	  meaning	  to	  the	  end	  of	  a	  bad	  or	  difficult	  experience	  also	  attests	  to	  another	  
difference	  in	  emphasis.	  	  	  The	  Christian	  texts	  use	  through	  with	  this	  meaning	  (9	  occurrences,	  relative	  
frequency:	  0.58)	  to	  produce	  relatively	  more	  references	  to	  a	  feeling	  of	  struggle	  and	  being	  helped	  
through	  difficult	  life	  experiences	  than	  the	  Muslim	  texts	  (11	  occurrences,	  relative	  frequency:	  0.38).	  	  
This	  stronger	  emphasis	  in	  the	  Christian	  texts	  on	  feelings	  related	  to	  life	  experience	  will	  be	  further	  
developed	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  find	  below.	  
	  
Occurrences	  of	  ‘Finding’	  in	  the	  Texts	  	  
Metaphorical	  occurrences	  of	  finding	  were	  not	  marked	  as	  metaphors	  of	  movement	  in	  my	  quantitative	  
analysis	  unless	  they	  co-­‐occurred	  with	  language	  that	  explicitly	  indicated	  movement,	  such	  as	  “finding	  
my	  way”	  (MT5).	  	  However,	  even	  when	  an	  explicit	  marker	  of	  movement	  was	  not	  included,	  these	  
notions	  often	  implied	  a	  key	  sense	  of	  purposeful,	  goal-­‐orientated	  movement	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  a	  journey	  
or	  quest.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  they	  also	  appeared	  to	  reinforce	  the	  differences	  explored	  above,	  
particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  occurrences	  of	  through.	  	  	  These	  points	  justify	  a	  brief	  exploration	  of	  
these	  notions,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  occurrences	  examined	  were	  not	  counted	  as	  
movement	  metaphors	  in	  my	  quantitative	  analysis.	  	  The	  occurrences	  are	  listed	  below	  in	  table	  3.5:	  
Table	  3.5	  Occurrences	  of	  metaphorical	  usages	  of	  find	  and	  finding	  +	  OBJECT.	  
	   Muslim	  testimonials	   Christian	  testimonials	  
Relative	  frequency	   0.65	   0.53	  
Occurrences	   [1]	  find	  proof	  of	  God’s	  existence	  (MT1)	   [1]	  find	  love	  (CT1)	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[2]	  find	  God	  (MT1)	  
[3]	  find	  it	  [the	  historical	  Jesus]	  (MT2)	  
[4]	  find	  the	  divine	  (MT2)	  
[5]	  most	  cogent	  arguments	  for	  atheism	  
that	  I	  could	  find	  (MT2)	  
[6]	  find	  a	  way	  out	  of	  them	  [arguments	  
for	  atheism]	  (MT2)	  
[7]	  find	  inner	  peace	  through	  meditation	  
(MT4)	  
[8]	  find	  the	  truth	  (MT4)	  
[9]	  find	  the	  truth	  (MT4)	  
[10]	  finding	  my	  way	  (MT5)	  
[11]	  find	  the	  truth	  (MT5)	  
[12]	  I	  wanted	  to	  beat	  myself	  to	  death	  
for	  not	  finding	  it	  [the	  true	  Islam]	  earlier	  
(MT6)	  
[13]	  can't	  find	  the	  words	  to	  say	  what	  
it’s	  like	  (MT8)	  	  	  
[14]	  Did	  he	  [Allah]	  not	  find	  you	  
orphaned	  (MT8)	  
[15]	  he	  [Allah]	  …	  find	  you	  lost	  and	  
guide	  you	  (MT8)	  
[16]	  he	  [Allah]	  …	  find	  you	  in	  hunger	  and	  
provide	  (MT8)	  
[2]	  find	  happiness	  (CT2)	  
[3]	  finding	  rescue	  from	  my	  troubles	  
(CT2)	  
[4]	  find	  happiness	  (CT2)	  
[5]	  find	  rest	  for	  your	  souls	  (CT4)	  
[6]	  “find	  in	  him	  no	  fault	  at	  all”	  (John	  
18:35-­‐38).	  (CT7)	  
[7]	  find	  some	  sort	  of	  community	  in	  a	  
church	  (CT14)	  
[8]	  the	  best	  way	  I	  could	  find	  to	  get	  




[17]	  I	  left	  the	  church	  and	  set	  out	  on	  a	  
quest	  to	  find	  the	  correct	  way,	  belief	  
and	  religion.	  [MT11)	  
[18]	  most	  people	  may	  find	  this	  crazy	  
(MT11)	  
[19]	  hard	  to	  find	  anything	  [in	  Islam]	  I	  




In	  the	  Christian	  texts,	  the	  use	  of	  find	  in	  [7]	  and	  [8]	  must	  be	  handled	  with	  care	  because	  in	  both	  cases	  it	  
refers	  to	  the	  pre-­‐conversion	  stage	  of	  the	  testimonials,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  interesting	  that	  the	  concern	  is	  
with	  personal	  circumstances.	  	  The	  most	  consistent	  pattern	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  first	  five	  examples,	  
where	  the	  objects	  that	  are	  found	  all	  relate	  to	  feelings	  of	  happiness,	  love,	  and	  peace	  (or	  rest)	  and	  
feelings	  of	  relief	  and	  security	  connected	  to	  the	  perception	  of	  being	  personally	  rescued	  from	  one’s	  
troubles.	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  the	  Muslim	  texts,	  [10]	  relates	  explicitly	  to	  individual	  life	  experience	  with	  the	  reference	  to	  
“my	  way”.	  	  A	  single	  quote	  from	  the	  Qur’an	  (Sura	  93)	  in	  Muslim	  Text	  8	  accounts	  for	  the	  usages	  of	  find	  
in	  [14],	  [15]	  and	  [16],	  which	  also	  all	  have	  some	  relation	  to	  individual	  life	  experience.	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  
that	  [7]	  appears	  to	  be	  alluding	  to	  an	  introspective	  feeling,	  but	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  explanation	  of	  the	  author	  
concerning	  his	  view	  of	  the	  positive	  but	  transitory	  and	  ultimately	  valueless	  emotions	  experienced	  
while	  experimenting	  with	  meditation.	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  references,	  there	  is	  an	  extensive	  pattern	  of	  
usage	  that	  relates	  to	  finding	  evidence	  or	  arguments	  for	  or	  against	  belief	  in	  God	  and	  Islam	  ([1],	  [5],	  [6],	  
[19]),	  finding	  God	  ([2],	  [4]),	  finding	  Islam	  ([12],	  [17])	  and	  finding	  truth	  ([8],	  [9],	  [11]).	  	  The	  primary	  
focus	  here	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  on	  how	  the	  process	  of	  attaining	  truth,	  meaning	  and	  God	  make	  the	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Muslim	  believers	  feel	  (as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  Christian	  texts),	  but	  on	  the	  perceived	  objective	  reality	  of	  the	  
process	  itself	  and	  its	  goals.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  crucial	  at	  this	  point	  to	  consider	  cultural	  as	  well	  as	  
theological	  factors.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  some	  of	  the	  testimonial	  authors	  of	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  texts	  
were	  not	  native	  speakers	  of	  English,	  and	  therefore	  may	  have	  come	  from	  communities	  where	  
emotions	  were	  not	  so	  publicly	  expressed	  or	  discussed.	  	  However,	  any	  cultural	  background	  that	  
discourages	  a	  focus	  on	  discussing	  emotions	  may	  itself	  have	  been	  indirectly	  influenced	  by	  a	  
community’s	  religion	  (which	  in	  turn	  has	  been	  influenced	  by	  culture),	  so	  it	  becomes	  very	  difficult	  if	  not	  
impossible	  to	  clearly	  attribute	  factors	  to	  cultural	  context	  or	  theological	  perspective.	  	  	  	  	  
I	  will	  now	  go	  on	  to	  discuss	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  in	  those	  metaphors	  that	  construed	  the	  believer	  as	  in	  
some	  way	  the	  patient	  in	  the	  movement	  process.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Believer-­‐as-­‐Patient	  Movement	  Metaphors	  
Both	  the	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  testimonials	  contain	  frequent	  references	  to	  language	  related	  to	  a	  
divine	  entity	  or	  a	  sacred	  text	  or	  religion	  based	  around	  that	  entity	  exerting	  some	  kind	  of	  influence	  on	  
the	  movement	  or	  direction	  of	  the	  believer.	  This	  shared	  frequency,	  along	  with	  some	  key	  differences	  in	  
the	  spread	  and	  type	  of	  language	  used,	  will	  be	  examined	  below,	  concluding	  with	  the	  observation	  that	  
the	  Christian	  testimonials	  often	  favour	  language	  that	  portrays	  the	  believer	  as	  more	  passive.	  	  	  	  	  
It	  has	  long	  been	  recognised	  that	  words	  and	  phrases	  trigger	  connections	  and	  implicit	  meanings	  in	  the	  
minds	  of	  addressers	  and	  addressees	  (Fauconnier	  and	  Turner	  2002;	  Radden	  et	  al	  2007),	  or,	  to	  put	  it	  
another	  way,	  the	  use	  of	  words	  and	  phrases	  activate	  our	  store	  of	  encyclopaedic	  knowledge	  related	  to	  
them	  (Evans	  2009:	  195-­‐197).	  	  I	  would	  therefore	  argue	  that	  the	  range	  of	  movement	  metaphors	  I	  have	  
focused	  on	  also	  trigger	  certain	  implied	  meanings	  when	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  believer	  being	  viewed	  as	  
the	  patient.	  	  When	  words	  such	  as	  bring,	  put,	  send,	  take,	  save	  (from),	  pluck	  (from)	  or	  deliver	  (from)	  
are	  used	  with	  the	  author	  as	  object,	  the	  implication	  appears	  to	  be	  that	  the	  author	  is	  being	  construed	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as	  having	  little	  or	  no	  part	  to	  play	  in	  the	  process	  of	  movement	  or	  the	  direction	  of	  that	  movement.	  The	  
Muslim	  testimonials	  contain	  several	  examples	  of	  this	  type	  of	  language,	  but,	  relative	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  
texts,	  the	  Christian	  testimonials	  contain	  over	  three	  times	  as	  many	  occurrences.	  The	  occurrences	  in	  
both	  collections	  of	  texts	  have	  been	  listed	  below	  in	  table	  3.6	  (only	  the	  lexical	  units	  related	  to	  believer-­‐
as-­‐patient	  movement	  metaphors	  have	  been	  underlined):	  
Table	  3.6	  Occurrences	  of	  movement	  metaphors	  where	  the	  author	  is	  construed	  as	  passive.	  
	   Muslim	  testimonials	   Christian	  testimonials	  
Relative	  frequency	   0.24	   0.79	  
Occurrences	   [1]	  He	  [God]	  would	  judge	  man	  …	  and	  
send	  him	  to	  eternal	  reward	  or	  
punishment.	  (MT2)	  
[2]	  …	  the	  mercy	  of	  God	  …	  was	  what	  
brought	  me	  to	  Islam	  …	  (MT2)	  
[3]	  …	  by	  the	  Mercy	  of	  God,	  I	  have	  been	  
rescued	  from	  the	  depths	  of	  ignorance.	  
(MT4)	  
[4]	  Islam	  took	  me	  on	  an	  enlightening	  
tour	  of	  me,	  everyone	  else,	  and	  God.	  
(MT8)	  
[5]	  Allah	  picked	  me	  for	  this	  religion.	  
(MT10)	  
[6]	  I	  feel	  like	  I	  have	  been	  saved	  from	  
the	  Hell	  fire	  …	  (MT10)	  
[7]	  …	  and	  plucked	  [me]	  from	  the	  ashes.	  
(MT10)	  
[1]	  If	  we	  believe	  in	  him,	  then	  we	  are	  
forgiven	  and	  saved	  from	  hell.	  (CT1)	  
[2]	  …wait	  in	  faith	  and	  excitement	  to	  
see	  where	  he	  takes	  you.	  (CT1)	  
[3]	  The	  Lord	  graciously	  brought	  me	  to	  
know	  him	  …	  (CT4)	  
[4]	  …	  the	  Lord	  sent	  a	  Pastor	  to	  visit	  …	  
(CT4)	  
[5]	  …	  he	  could	  forgive	  my	  sin	  and	  save	  
me	  from	  hell.	  (CT10)	  
[6]	  In	  spite	  of	  my	  resistance,	  he	  [God]	  
brought	  me	  to	  repentance	  and	  faith.	  
(CT10)	  	  
[7]	  I	  know	  that	  I	  am	  privileged	  to	  be	  
part	  of	  his	  [God’s]	  plan	  to	  bring	  others	  
into	  his	  family.	  (CT11)	  
[8]	  A	  wise	  Christian	  once	  told	  me	  that	  I	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should	  never	  forget	  that	  God	  has	  put	  
me	  in	  a	  great	  position	  …	  (CT12)	  
[9]	  …	  he	  [Jesus]	  came	  into	  the	  world	  to	  
save	  us	  from	  sin.	  (CT13)	  	  	  	  
[10]	  …	  if	  you	  [God]	  deliver	  me	  from	  this	  
mess,	  I	  will	  serve	  you	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  my	  
life!’	  (CT16)	  
[11]	  His	  hand	  was	  upon	  my	  life,	  
delivering	  me	  from	  sin,	  death	  and	  hell.	  
(CT16)	  
[12]	  I	  have	  been	  brought	  to	  the	  most	  
important	  relationship	  in	  the	  universe	  
…	  (CT17)	  
	  
A	  reoccurring	  theme	  shared	  by	  both	  collections	  of	  texts	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  being	  rescued,	  saved	  or	  
delivered	  from	  punishment,	  judgement	  or	  hell.	  	  This	  moves	  the	  construal	  of	  conservative	  religion	  
away	  from	  the	  perception	  of	  it	  being	  a	  subjective,	  theoretical	  opinion	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  static	  
divine	  entity	  and	  towards	  the	  view	  of	  it	  being	  a	  life	  journey	  culminating	  in	  concrete	  destinations	  
relating	  to	  eternal	  destruction	  or	  bliss.	  	  However,	  despite	  the	  similarities	  between	  the	  Muslim	  and	  
Christian	  texts	  in	  this	  respect,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  greater	  tendency	  in	  the	  Christian	  texts	  to	  use	  
language	  that	  construes	  the	  believer	  as	  more	  passive.	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  type	  of	  occurrences	  above,	  verbs	  such	  as	  lead	  may	  not	  imply	  such	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  
passivity	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  object.	  	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  Talmy’s	  (2000:	  425-­‐426)	  description	  of	  agents	  
sometimes	  acting	  as	  a	  “weaker	  antagonist”.	  	  He	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  help	  in	  the	  sentence,	  
“Smoothing	  the	  earth	  helped	  the	  logs	  roll	  down	  the	  slope”	  to	  illustrate	  such	  a	  situation.	  	  If	  we	  return	  
to	  the	  testimonial	  data,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  in	  the	  example,	  “I	  believe	  he	  will	  lead	  me	  all	  the	  way”	  (CT9),	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the	  implication	  may	  be	  that	  the	  author	  is	  not	  completely	  passive	  and	  that	  there	  is	  a	  shared	  agency	  in	  
the	  act	  of	  movement	  that	  may	  sometimes	  be	  typified	  by	  actions	  such	  as	  leading	  someone	  by	  the	  
hand	  or	  leading	  a	  group	  on	  a	  tour	  through	  a	  particular	  area.	  	  Shared	  movement	  may	  not	  be	  implied	  
in	  verbs	  such	  as	  attract	  or	  draw,	  but	  a	  sense	  of	  agency	  being	  shared	  through	  an	  added	  attracting	  
force	  does	  appear	  to	  be	  implied,	  although	  not	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  being	  forced	  or	  carried	  as	  in	  the	  first	  
type	  discussed	  above.	  This	  second	  type	  follows	  a	  similar	  pattern	  of	  frequency	  in	  the	  Muslim	  and	  
Christian	  texts	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  first	  type,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  table	  3.7	  below:	  
Table	  3.7	  Occurrences	  of	  movement	  metaphors	  where	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  shared	  agency	  in	  the	  act	  of	  movement.	  
	   Muslim	  testimonials	   Christian	  testimonials	  
Relative	  frequency	   0.14	   0.33	  
Occurrences	   [1]	  …	  asking	  Him	  that	  if	  He	  did	  exist	  to	  
lead	  me	  to	  someone	  who	  could	  help	  
me	  to	  believe.	  (MT1)	  
[2]	  But	  God	  will	  help	  me	  to	  go	  through	  
it.	  (MT3)	  
[3]	  What	  could	  have	  led	  me	  to	  this	  …	  
what	  happened	  to	  me	  was	  from	  Allah	  
…	  (MT10)	  
[4]	  He	  will	  lead	  them	  from	  darkness	  
into	  light.	  (MT11)	  
[1]	  …	  he	  [God]	  …	  led	  me	  from	  strength	  
to	  strength.	  (CT5)	  
[2]	  …	  God	  has	  helped	  me	  through	  it.	  
(CT6)	  
[3]	  the	  Lord	  always	  draws	  me	  back	  to	  
himself	  …	  (CT9)	  
[4]	  I	  believe	  he	  will	  lead	  me	  all	  the	  way.	  
(CT9)	  
	  [5]	  …	  and	  pray	  God	  will	  see	  me	  






There	  are	  two	  possibilities	  that	  could	  account	  for	  the	  sizeable	  differences	  in	  the	  frequencies.	  The	  first	  
possibility	  relates	  to	  the	  Evangelical	  Christian	  belief	  in	  the	  humanity	  (as	  well	  as	  divinity)	  of	  Jesus	  
Christ	  as	  Son	  of	  God/God	  the	  Son.	  	  The	  doctrine	  of	  God	  coming	  to	  earth	  in	  human	  form	  can	  be	  
viewed	  as	  symbolising	  the	  desire	  of	  the	  New	  Testament	  to	  close	  the	  distance	  in	  every	  sense	  between	  
God	  and	  humanity,	  resulting	  in	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  use	  of	  the	  language	  of	  close	  human	  relationships	  
and	  intimacy.	  	  It	  could	  therefore	  be	  expected	  that	  this	  increased	  desire	  for	  divine	  entity	  proximity	  
and	  intimacy	  (as	  compared	  to	  the	  absolute	  otherness	  of	  Allah	  expressed	  in	  aspects	  of	  belief	  such	  as	  
the	  command	  to	  never	  attempt	  to	  visually	  represent	  him)	  would	  produce	  more	  language	  that	  relates	  
to	  the	  domain	  of	  physical	  contact	  and	  interaction.	  	  	  
The	  second	  possibility,	  that	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  complementary	  to	  the	  first,	  is	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  
death	  of	  Christ	  in	  the	  procurement	  of	  salvation.	  	  Evangelical	  Christians	  primarily	  attribute	  their	  
salvation	  to	  being	  saved	  by	  faith	  in	  the	  atoning	  death	  of	  Christ.	  	  Any	  suggestion	  of	  attaining	  or	  even	  
maintaining	  one’s	  salvation	  through	  works	  is	  often	  avoided.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  many	  Muslims	  
primarily	  attribute	  their	  salvation	  to	  the	  believer’s	  commitment	  to	  follow	  the	  path	  of	  Islam,	  and	  
secondarily	  attribute	  it	  to	  the	  “behind-­‐the-­‐scenes”	  will	  or	  grace	  of	  Allah.	  These	  two	  well-­‐known	  
differences	  appear	  to	  provide	  some	  explanation	  for	  the	  above	  differences	  in	  frequency.	  	  However,	  a	  
more	  nuanced	  explanation	  may	  be	  required	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  Muslim	  texts	  exhibit	  a	  higher	  
frequency	  of	  a	  third	  type	  of	  movement	  metaphor	  that	  construes	  the	  believer	  as	  the	  patient.	  	  
This	  third	  type,	  involving	  verbs	  such	  as	  guide	  and	  direct,	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  primarily	  implying	  an	  
influence	  on	  a	  person’s	  direction	  rather	  than	  shared	  agency	  in	  the	  movement	  process.	  	  Another	  
important	  feature	  of	  these	  verbs	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  the	  guiding	  or	  directing	  entity	  to	  be	  in	  
proximity	  to	  their	  object.	  	  There	  are	  many	  examples	  within	  the	  domain	  of	  navigation,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  lighthouses,	  stars	  or	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Sun,	  where	  the	  entity	  is	  visible	  but	  static	  and	  is	  able	  
to	  “point”	  towards	  the	  correct	  direction	  from	  a	  distance.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  this	  third	  type,	  the	  trend	  
established	  above	  is	  reversed	  in	  that	  the	  use	  of	  guide	  is	  far	  more	  common	  in	  the	  Muslim	  texts.	  	  One	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explanation	  for	  this	  is	  the	  funnelling	  effect	  produced	  by	  the	  Muslim	  emphasis	  on	  human	  autonomy	  
and	  responsibility	  and	  God’s	  absolute	  otherness	  on	  one	  side,	  and	  the	  perceived	  power	  and	  
importance	  of	  being	  acted	  on	  by	  a	  divine	  power	  on	  the	  other.	  	  As	  I	  argued	  above	  in	  section	  4.3,	  this	  
perception	  of	  being	  acted	  upon	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  containing	  more	  presuppositions	  concerning	  the	  
perceived	  reality	  of	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  It	  is	  this	  perception	  of	  being	  tangibly	  acted	  on	  that,	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  
the	  believer,	  lifts	  belief	  out	  of	  the	  domain	  of	  subjective	  opinion.	  	  We	  should	  therefore	  expect	  to	  find	  
a	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  such	  language	  in	  any	  religion	  that	  wishes	  to	  emphasise	  the	  importance	  of	  
experiencing	  absolute	  truth	  through	  divine	  revelation.	  	  If	  we	  take	  all	  of	  these	  points	  together,	  we	  
would	  expect	  the	  Muslim	  texts	  to	  exhibit	  a	  high	  frequency	  of	  movement	  metaphors	  construing	  the	  
believer	  as	  patient	  while	  avoiding	  any	  systematic	  pattern	  suggestive	  of	  high	  levels	  of	  passivity	  and	  
divine	  entity	  proximity,	  and	  this,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  tables	  3.6	  and	  3.7	  above	  and	  table	  3.8	  below,	  is	  
what	  we	  see:	  
Table	  3.8	  Occurrences	  of	  movement	  metaphors	  where	  there	  is	  only	  an	  influence	  on	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  author.	  
	   Muslim	  testimonials	   Christian	  testimonials	  
Relative	  frequency	   0.72	   0.33	  
Occurrences	   [1]	  …	  sacred	  scripture	  …	  that	  could	  
furnish	  guidance.	  (MT	  2)	  
[2]	  …	  men	  …	  need	  principles	  to	  guide	  
them	  …	  (MT2)	  
[3]	  …	  the	  Qur'an	  directs	  us	  to	  believe	  in	  
God	  …	  (MT4)	  
[4]	  Islam	  …	  code	  of	  life	  which	  guides	  
man.	  (MT4)	  
[5]	  God	  will	  guide	  us	  there	  …	  (MT4)	  
[6]	  He	  [God]	  directs	  us	  to	  examine	  …	  
[1]	  As	  I	  continued	  to	  pray	  for	  guidance	  
…	  (CT1)	  
[2]	  …	  the	  Lord	  opened	  the	  way	  for	  me	  
to	  …	  (CT4)	  
[3]	  …	  God	  was	  redirecting	  me	  …	  (CT6)	  
[4]	  …	  a	  door	  opened	  up	  for	  me	  to	  …	  
(CT6)	  




the	  Sunnah	  …	  (MT4)	  
[7]	  God	  directs	  us	  to	  investigate	  …	  the	  
Qur'an.	  (MT4)	  
[8]	  God	  is	  with	  me	  every	  moment,	  
guiding	  me	  …	  (MT8)	  
[9]	  …	  from	  …	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	  …	  to	  
embracing	  guidance.	  (MT8)	  	  
[10]	  From	  …	  a	  life	  in	  confusion,	  I	  am	  
being	  guided.	  (MT8)	  
[11]	  Did	  he	  (God)	  not	  find	  …	  you	  lost	  
and	  guide	  you.	  (MT8)	  
[12]	  …	  blessed	  by	  the	  way	  Allah	  guided	  
me	  to	  Islam.	  (MT10)	  
[13]	  …	  feel	  a	  bit	  awed	  that	  I	  was	  guided	  
…	  (MT10)	  
[14]	  …	  Allah	  picked	  me	  to	  be	  guided	  …	  
(MT10)	  
[15]	  …	  what	  was	  it	  that	  guided	  me	  …	  I	  
realized	  …	  from	  Allah	  …	  (MT10)	  
[16]	  He	  [Allah]	  alone	  has	  guided	  me.	  
(MT10)	  
[17]	  Allah	  picked	  me	  for	  this	  religion	  of	  
guidance.	  (MT10)	  
[18]	  …	  my	  being	  guided	  to	  Islam	  by	  
Allah	  …	  (MT10)	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[19]	  Allah	  says	  for	  all	  who	  truly	  want	  
guidance	  …	  (MT11)	  	  
[20]	  …	  the	  practical	  guidance	  Islam	  
provides	  …	  (MT13)	  
[21]	  …	  with	  Islam	  I'm	  sort	  of	  more	  
guided	  …	  (MT13)	  
	  
	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  many	  of	  the	  Muslim	  examples	  of	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  movement	  
metaphors	  in	  the	  above	  three	  tables	  do	  not	  relate	  directly	  to	  a	  divine	  entity,	  but	  indirectly	  through	  
references	  to	  Islam	  or	  the	  Qur’an	  (e.g.	  [1],	  [3],	  [4],	  [17],	  [20]	  and	  [21]	  in	  table	  8).	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  this,	  
all	  the	  examples	  from	  the	  Christian	  texts	  in	  tables	  6,	  7	  and	  8	  relate	  directly	  to	  a	  divine	  entity	  acting	  on	  
the	  believer.	  	  This	  is	  further	  evidence	  for	  the	  point	  I	  made	  in	  section	  3.4.2	  above	  that	  the	  kind	  of	  
Islam	  represented	  by	  the	  website	  islamfortoday.com	  depicts	  the	  divine	  entity	  as	  more	  distant	  and	  
less	  directly	  active	  in	  the	  daily	  life	  of	  the	  believer	  compared	  to	  the	  divine	  entity	  in	  the	  Christian	  texts.	  
Having	  noted	  the	  higher	  frequency	  of	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  metaphorical	  language	  in	  the	  Christian	  
texts,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  reverse	  is	  the	  case	  when	  the	  focus	  is	  not	  on	  the	  domain	  of	  
divine	  entity	  language.	  	  If	  we	  consider	  the	  domain	  of	  arguments,	  observations	  and	  realisations,	  we	  
discover	  that	  there	  are	  considerably	  more	  references	  to	  the	  second	  type	  of	  movement	  metaphor	  
discussed	  above	  in	  the	  Muslim	  texts.	  The	  occurrences	  are	  listed	  in	  table	  3.9	  below:	  
Table	  3.9	  Occurrences	  of	  movement	  metaphors	  where	  an	  argument	  or	  realisation	  is	  the	  agent.	  
	   Muslim	  testimonials	   Christian	  testimonials	  
Relative	  frequency	   0.31	   0.07	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Occurrences	   [1]	  …	  her	  …	  investigations	  of	  Islam	  led	  
first	  herself	  then	  her	  husband	  to	  their	  
final	  spiritual	  home.	  (MT1)	  
[2]	  	  For	  Hegel,	  the	  movement	  of	  
philosophical	  investigation	  always	  led	  
from	  the	  abstract	  to	  the	  concrete	  …	  
(MT2)	  	  
[3]	  …	  philosophy	  necessarily	  led	  to	  
theology	  …	  (MT2)	  
[4]	  This	  realization	  was	  the	  impetus	  
that	  led	  me	  to	  search	  for	  the	  truth	  
through	  diverse	  avenues.	  (MT4)	  
[5]	  …	  her	  …	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  
doctrine	  of	  Jesus	  as	  God	  and	  her	  
discovery	  of	  the	  rights	  given	  to	  women	  
in	  Islam	  led	  her	  to	  become	  a	  Muslim.	  
(MT7)	  
[6]	  …	  the	  Qur'an	  gives	  women	  more	  
rights	  than	  the	  Bible	  …	  That	  was	  one	  of	  
the	  things	  that	  first	  drew	  me	  …	  (MT7)	  	  
[7]	  …	  difficulties	  with	  church	  teaching	  
about	  Jesus	  as	  God	  led	  him	  from	  
Catholicism	  to	  Islam.	  (MT7)	  
[8]	  …	  autobiography	  of	  Malcolm	  X	  
guided	  a	  white,	  middle-­‐class,	  American	  
teenager	  from	  "cow	  country"	  to	  Islam.	  
[MT10]	  
[9]	  I	  thought	  it	  was	  very	  peaceful,	  and	  
[1]	  ‘…	  doesn’t	  religion	  cause	  wars	  and	  
separate	  people?’	  That	  led	  me	  to	  
question	  what	  was	  unique	  about	  ‘my’	  
faith	  …	  (CT3)	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they	  seemed	  to	  have	  so	  much	  faith	  
while	  doing	  it.	  This	  is	  the	  first	  thing	  
that	  attracted	  me	  to	  Islam.	  [MT13]	  
	  
	  
There	  appears	  to	  be	  more	  of	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  Muslim	  texts	  with	  construing	  
arguments,	  lines	  of	  reasoning	  and	  observations	  as	  moving	  objects	  that	  act	  on	  the	  believer.	  	  This	  
reinforces	  the	  idea	  that	  one	  of	  the	  principal	  areas	  for	  the	  Muslim	  testimonials	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
presupposed	  reality	  of	  belief	  is	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  quest	  involving	  objective	  research	  and	  reflection	  
leading	  to	  unambiguous	  truth.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
3.6.	  Conclusion	  
Bearing	  in	  mind	  the	  limited	  scope	  of	  this	  study	  in	  terms	  of	  two	  particular	  communities	  and	  their	  
specific	  social	  contexts,	  I	  will	  now	  draw	  together	  the	  strands	  outlined	  above	  as	  well	  as	  point	  to	  some	  
possible	  practical	  applications.	  
In	  the	  Muslim	  texts	  from	  islamfortoday.com,	  the	  metaphorical	  language	  of	  movement	  suggests	  that	  
the	  believers	  presuppose	  that	  their	  beliefs	  are	  real	  and	  basic	  primarily	  because	  of:	  (1)	  a	  perceived	  
process	  of	  finding/being	  led	  to	  truth	  through	  unbiased	  research	  and	  critical	  reflection	  experienced	  as	  
existentially	  moving	  out	  of	  an	  environment	  of	  incorrect	  thinking	  (sometimes	  expressed	  as	  darkness)	  
towards	  an	  environment	  of	  truth	  and	  clear	  thinking	  (sometimes	  expressed	  as	  the	  light),	  and	  (2)	  a	  
perceived	  experience	  of	  constant	  divine	  guidance	  towards	  truth.	  
In	  the	  Christian	  texts	  from	  the	  Evangelical	  Times,	  the	  metaphorical	  language	  of	  movement	  suggests	  
that	  the	  believers	  presuppose	  that	  their	  beliefs	  are	  real	  and	  basic	  primarily	  because	  of:	  (1)	  a	  
perceived	  experience	  of	  an	  intimate,	  close	  and	  personal	  relationship	  with	  a	  divine	  entity	  that	  carries	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or	  helps	  the	  believer	  get	  through	  struggles	  and	  difficult	  times	  and	  enables	  him	  or	  her	  to	  experience	  
spiritual	  peace	  and	  happiness	  during	  and	  after	  these	  difficult	  times,	  and	  (2)	  a	  perceived	  experience	  of	  
being	  brought/led	  to	  believe	  by	  the	  work	  of	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
My	  argument	  throughout	  has	  been	  that	  certainty	  is	  not	  based	  primarily	  on	  the	  things	  believed,	  but	  
on	  the	  presuppositions	  underpinning	  action	  and	  relationship	  language.	  	  This	  language	  and	  the	  
underlying	  processes	  beneath	  it	  are	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  a	  committed	  religious	  believer.	  	  
These	  personal	  stories	  and	  experiences	  of	  being	  lost	  and	  then	  found,	  feeling	  that	  something	  is	  
missing	  and	  going	  on	  a	  quest	  or	  journey	  to	  find	  it,	  being	  guided	  or	  led	  are	  crucial	  to	  the	  believer’s	  
sense	  of	  being	  certain	  and	  right.	  	  However,	  these	  are	  also	  fluid,	  shifting	  processes	  that	  can	  be	  shared	  
to	  some	  degree	  across	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  belief	  systems,	  and	  can	  also	  be	  employed	  to	  express	  a	  
mutual	  conciliation	  between	  two	  competing	  experiences	  and	  views	  of	  the	  world	  (cf.	  Cameron	  2010a:	  
58-­‐80).	  This	  chapter	  has	  focused	  on	  differences	  between	  one	  specific	  situated	  community	  within	  
Islam	  and	  one	  in	  Christianity,	  but	  the	  data	  also	  reveals	  important	  differences	  in	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  
between	  individuals	  within	  the	  same	  community.	  	  	  For	  example,	  a	  cursory	  glance	  at	  tables	  6,	  7	  and	  8	  
reveals	  that	  the	  author	  of	  MT10	  makes	  use	  of	  several	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  metaphors	  while	  the	  author	  
of	  MT5	  avoids	  them	  altogether.	  	  This	  phenomenon	  of	  individual	  experiential	  variation	  within	  a	  
community	  that	  holds	  to	  the	  same	  doctrines	  is	  an	  important	  area	  of	  research	  and	  will	  provide	  the	  
basis	  for	  my	  analysis	  of	  videoed	  discussions	  between	  Muslims	  and	  Christians	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  
The	  reason	  for	  its	  importance	  is	  that	  it	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  perception	  of	  differences	  in	  
patterns	  of	  emphasis	  within	  members	  of	  the	  same	  group	  may	  contribute	  to	  the	  relativizing	  of	  
differences	  in	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  between	  members	  of	  opposing	  groups.	  	  This	  emphasis	  on	  action	  
and	  relationship	  language	  can	  also	  be	  practically	  applied	  to	  an	  experiential	  model	  of	  conflict	  
resolution	  that	  aims	  to	  produce	  empathy	  through	  encouraging	  participants	  to	  do	  something	  together,	  
such	  as	  telling	  and	  listening	  to	  personal	  experiences	  and	  stories,	  rather	  than	  academically	  airing	  
doctrinal	  differences	  (cf.	  Cameron	  2010a;	  Holden	  2009).	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However,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  be	  realistic	  about	  the	  practical	  applications	  of	  the	  emphasis	  
discussed	  above.	  	  A	  primary	  focus	  on	  the	  language	  of	  doing	  rather	  than	  differences	  in	  the	  things	  
believed	  will	  not	  magically	  lead	  to	  a	  co-­‐operative	  process	  (cf.	  Deutsch	  1973,	  Pearson	  d'Estrée	  2003)	  
replacing	  a	  competitive	  process	  of	  engagement.	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  recognise	  that	  certain	  types	  of	  
action	  language,	  such	  as	  those	  expressed	  through	  metaphors	  drawn	  from	  the	  domain	  of	  war	  and	  
fighting,	  may	  even	  encourage	  competitive	  reactions.	  In	  addition,	  committed,	  conservative	  believers	  
will	  often	  attempt	  to	  shift	  conversations	  on,	  for	  example,	  metaphors	  of	  movement	  to	  a	  focus	  on	  
movement	  to	  some	  thing.	  	  However,	  a	  general	  re-­‐orientation	  towards	  action	  and	  relationship	  
language	  may	  help	  to	  reduce	  the	  degree	  of	  competition	  and	  dogmatic	  thinking,	  while	  increasing	  
opportunities	  for	  empathy.	  	  
I	  would	  also	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  very	  important	  to	  be	  able	  to	  first	  identify	  the	  type	  of	  action	  and	  
relationship	  language	  that	  tends	  to	  be	  emphasised	  by	  a	  particular	  belief	  community	  or	  individual.	  	  
This	  may	  include	  patterns	  that	  focus	  on	  a	  quest	  of	  research	  or	  reflection,	  experiences	  of	  being	  helped	  
through	  or	  comforted	  during	  difficult	  situations,	  a	  series	  of	  doors	  being	  opened	  to	  new	  opportunities	  
and	  ways	  of	  thinking,	  etc.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  look	  for	  an	  individual’s	  deviation	  from	  the	  expected	  
pattern	  of	  emphasis	  of	  his	  or	  her	  community	  and	  its	  theoretical	  doctrinal	  beliefs.	  	  This	  allows	  the	  
non-­‐believer	  to	  more	  effectively	  look	  for	  points	  of	  interest,	  as	  well	  as	  points	  of	  connection	  between	  
his	  or	  her	  own	  personal	  journey	  and	  those	  processes	  that	  are	  perceived	  as	  personally	  important	  and	  
real	  to	  the	  committed,	  conservative	  believer.	  	  	  	  
Having	  completed	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  two	  collections	  of	  testimonials,	  it	  is	  now	  possible	  to	  return	  to	  a	  
consideration	  of	  the	  research	  question	  that	  this	  chapter	  set	  out	  to	  explore:	  are	  there	  clear,	  fixed	  
differences	  between	  Evangelical	  Times	  Christian	  testimonial	  authors	  and	  islamfortoday.com	  Muslim	  
testimonial	  authors	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  use	  of	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  to	  express	  their	  way	  
of	  believing?	  	  This	  chapter	  has	  provided	  evidence	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  key	  differences	  between	  the	  
experiences	  of	  members	  of	  different	  belief	  communities,	  but	  it	  has	  been	  impossible	  to	  state	  such	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differences	  in	  clear,	  fixed	  terms.	  	  Instead,	  the	  evidence	  has	  compelled	  me	  to	  describe	  these	  
differences	  in	  terms	  of	  varying	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  dependent	  upon	  a	  particular	  community’s	  use	  of	  
a	  specific	  genre	  (the	  religious	  testimonial),	  at	  a	  particular	  time	  and	  place	  (post-­‐911	  America	  and	  the	  
UK).	  	  The	  use	  of	  divine	  entity	  proximity	  metaphors,	  believer-­‐as-­‐agent	  and	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  
movement	  metaphors	  provide	  clear	  examples	  of	  these	  different	  patterns	  of	  emphasis.	  	  Both	  the	  
Muslim	  and	  Christian	  testimonial	  authors	  made	  use	  of	  these	  types	  of	  language,	  but	  they	  emphasised	  
different	  aspects	  in	  different	  ways	  and	  with	  differing	  levels	  of	  frequency.	  This	  is	  a	  key	  point	  in	  terms	  
of	  applying	  these	  results	  to	  the	  area	  of	  inter-­‐faith	  dialogue	  because	  it	  demonstrates	  that	  there	  are	  
important	  shared	  processes	  across	  the	  cognitive	  models	  of	  different	  conservative	  religious	  believers.	  
What	  this	  means	  is	  that,	  while	  members	  of	  conservative	  belief	  communities	  may	  use	  the	  language	  of	  
experience	  to	  mark	  out	  absolute	  differences,	  researchers	  will	  view	  this	  type	  of	  language	  as	  evidence	  
for	  elements	  of	  overlapping	  similarity,	  as	  well	  as	  difference.	  	  
This	  conclusion	  also	  provides	  evidence	  for	  the	  argument	  that,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  
testimonials	  and	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  testimonials,	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  view	  doctrine	  and	  
experience	  as	  the	  expressions	  of	  different	  processes.	  	  It	  should	  of	  course	  be	  accepted	  that	  doctrine	  
has	  a	  very	  strong	  influence	  in	  terms	  of	  shaping	  perceived	  experiences,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  
doctrine	  determines	  experience.	  	  As	  I	  briefly	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  two,	  there	  are	  two	  possible	  reasons	  
why	  it	  might	  be	  useful	  to	  consider	  doctrine	  and	  experience	  as	  two	  quite	  different	  aspects	  of	  religious	  
belief.	  	  The	  first	  is	  that	  doctrine	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  primarily	  a	  product	  of	  a	  belief	  community,	  while	  
experience	  is	  often	  primarily	  the	  product	  of	  an	  individual.	  The	  second	  possible	  reason	  is	  that	  
doctrinal	  statements	  may	  often	  be	  processed	  and	  encoded	  using	  semantic	  memory,	  or,	  to	  put	  it	  
another	  way,	  they	  may	  often	  be	  encoded	  and	  remembered	  as	  static	  things.	  In	  contrast,	  it	  is	  possible	  
to	  argue	  that	  experiences	  are	  often	  processed	  and	  encoded	  using	  episodic	  memory,	  or	  as	  connected	  
chains	  of	  dynamically	  unfolding,	  autobiographical	  events	  involving	  multiple	  things	  viewed	  from	  a	  
constantly	  evolving	  perspective.	  
127	  
	  
In	  terms	  of	  inter-­‐faith	  dialogue,	  it	  should	  therefore	  now	  be	  clear	  why	  any	  attempt	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  
conservative	  religious	  believers’	  perception	  of	  absolute	  rigidity	  should	  always	  begin	  with	  a	  
comparative	  exploration	  of	  their	  individual	  experiences.	  	  My	  argument	  here	  is	  that	  a	  dialogue	  that	  
revolves	  around	  a	  discussion	  of	  theoretical	  doctrine	  will	  tend	  to	  emphasise	  clear	  differences	  at	  the	  
level	  of	  the	  community.	  	  In	  contrast,	  a	  dialogue	  that	  revolves	  around	  whether,	  for	  example,	  God	  is	  
experienced	  as	  being	  close	  to	  the	  believer	  on	  a	  daily	  basis	  may	  well	  result	  in	  a	  “messy”	  conversation	  
that	  may	  highlight	  individual	  similarities	  between	  some	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  believers	  and	  some	  
differences	  between	  believers	  from	  the	  same	  religion.	  	  However,	  this	  point	  highlights	  an	  important	  
limitation	  of	  the	  above	  study.	  	  I	  may	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  describe	  the	  
differences	  between	  the	  two	  collections	  of	  texts	  in	  absolute,	  rigid	  terms,	  but,	  by	  searching	  for	  
general	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  in	  each	  collection,	  I	  have	  inevitably	  passed	  over	  individual	  differences	  
between	  each	  text.	  	  The	  question	  that	  the	  above	  study	  therefore	  cannot	  address	  is	  whether	  it	  is	  also	  
impossible	  to	  describe	  the	  similarities	  between	  the	  experiences	  expressed	  in	  the	  texts	  belonging	  to	  
the	  same	  belief	  community	  in	  absolute,	  rigid	  terms.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  will	  therefore	  move	  on	  to	  
report	  a	  study	  that	  has	  been	  designed	  to	  investigate	  individual	  similarities	  and	  differences	  rather	  









Chapter	  Four:	  A	  Follow-­‐up	  Study	  involving	  Three	  Videoed	  Discussions	  between	  Conservative	  
Muslims	  and	  Evangelical	  Christians	  
	  
The	  previous	  chapter	  compared	  a	  collection	  of	  Muslim	  testimonials	  and	  a	  collection	  of	  Christian	  
testimonials	  in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  there	  were	  clear,	  fixed	  differences	  in	  how	  
conservative	  religious	  believers	  from	  different	  communities	  experienced	  their	  way	  of	  believing.	  	  I	  
concluded	  with	  the	  argument	  that	  there	  were	  important	  differences,	  but	  that	  these	  differences	  could	  
only	  be	  described	  as	  varying	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  rather	  than	  clear,	  fixed	  differences.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  
I	  intend	  to	  shift	  my	  focus	  towards	  a	  consideration	  of	  individual	  texts.	  	  The	  questions	  I	  would	  like	  to	  
investigate	  are	  firstly,	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  identify	  signs	  of	  convergence	  and	  empathy	  in	  the	  language	  of	  
Muslim	  and	  Christian	  conservative	  believers	  when	  they	  are	  encouraged	  to	  discuss	  their	  experience	  of	  
being	  a	  believer	  during	  structured	  videoed	  discussions?	  	  Secondly,	  are	  there	  any	  similarities	  in	  the	  
use	  of	  proximity	  and	  movement	  metaphors	  in	  the	  language	  of	  individual	  conservative	  Christian	  and	  
Muslim	  religious	  believers,	  and	  differences	  in	  the	  use	  of	  this	  type	  of	  language	  among	  conservative	  
religious	  believers	  from	  the	  same	  belief	  community	  during	  the	  course	  of	  those	  videoed	  discussions?	  	  
This	  chapter	  will	  therefore	  report	  on	  a	  study	  conducted	  with	  three	  pairs	  of	  conservative	  Muslim	  and	  
Christian	  believers.	  	  Each	  pair	  was	  asked	  to	  perform	  two	  sets	  of	  tasks	  that	  focused	  them	  on	  some	  of	  
the	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  as	  well	  as	  encouraging	  
them	  to	  focus	  on	  and	  engage	  with	  the	  beliefs	  of	  the	  other	  participant.	  	  These	  tasks	  were	  then	  
followed	  by	  a	  period	  of	  discussion,	  which	  further	  encouraged	  the	  participants	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  
beliefs	  of	  the	  other	  within	  the	  frame	  of	  some	  of	  the	  target	  language	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  






In	  terms	  of	  addressing	  this	  question,	  the	  approach	  to	  analysis	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  is	  unsuitable	  
because	  it	  was	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  the	  level	  of	  difference	  between	  two	  collections	  of	  texts.	  	  
Focusing	  on	  collections	  of	  texts	  is	  ideal	  for	  forming	  broad	  opinions	  about	  differences	  between	  two	  
belief	  communities,	  but	  this	  must	  be	  achieved	  by	  backgrounding	  isolated	  occurrences	  of	  both	  
atypical	  similarity	  and	  difference	  in	  individual	  texts.	  One	  example	  of	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  an	  extract	  
from	  one	  of	  the	  Muslim	  testimonials	  examined	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter:	  
I've	  heard	  Christians	  say	  that	  with	  Christianity	  you	  "know	  God	  on	  a	  personal	  level."	  In	  Islam,	  your	  relationship	  with	  
God	  is	  so	  much	  deeper	  than	  that.	  God	  is	  with	  me	  every	  moment,	  guiding	  me,	  teaching	  me,	  loving	  me,	  protecting	  me,	  
liberating	  me,	  enlightening	  me,	  comforting	  me...	  	  
(Muslim	  Text	  8)	  
In	  my	  conclusion	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  testimonials	  I	  argued	  that	  one	  of	  the	  presuppositions	  of	  the	  
authors	  of	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  testimonials	  appeared	  to	  be	  that	  their	  beliefs	  were	  real	  and	  basic	  
because	  of	  a	  perceived	  experience	  of	  an	  intimate,	  close	  and	  personal	  relationship	  with	  God.	  	  In	  
contrast,	  I	  made	  no	  mention	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  personal	  relationship	  with	  God	  in	  my	  conclusions	  
relating	  to	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  testimonials.	  	  The	  evidence	  for	  these	  conclusions	  was	  derived	  from	  
the	  fact	  that	  there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  references	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  personal	  relationship	  with	  a	  divine	  
entity	  across	  several	  of	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  testimonials,	  but	  only	  isolated	  references	  (such	  as	  the	  
extract	  above)	  in	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  testimonials.	  Such	  isolated	  references	  were	  not	  included	  in	  
my	  conclusions	  concerning	  general	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  precisely	  because	  of	  their	  isolation.	  	  This	  
provides	  us	  with	  an	  example	  where	  an	  individual	  believer	  wishes	  to	  foreground	  an	  aspect	  of	  their	  
experience	  that	  doesn’t	  tend	  to	  be	  foregrounded	  by	  other	  individuals	  in	  their	  community,	  but	  is	  
foregrounded	  by	  members	  of	  other	  belief	  communities.	  	  If	  we	  focus	  our	  attention	  purely	  on	  
differences	  and	  similarities	  between	  collections	  of	  texts,	  these	  individual	  irregularities	  will	  often	  be	  
rendered	  invisible.	  	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  this	  chapter	  will	  move	  away	  from	  a	  focus	  on	  collections	  of	  
texts	  and	  towards	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  language	  of	  specific	  individuals.	  However,	  the	  analysis	  of	  collections	  
130	  
	  
of	  testimonials	  will	  still	  play	  a	  valuable	  role.	  	  It	  will	  be	  useful	  to	  compare	  the	  language	  of	  individuals	  
to	  the	  general	  patterns	  which	  were	  derived	  from	  those	  collections	  of	  texts	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  
similarities	  to	  and	  divergences	  from	  those	  general	  patterns,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  language	  of	  other	  
individuals.	  	  The	  analysis	  of	  collections	  of	  testimonials	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  will	  therefore	  act	  as	  a	  
valuable	  reference	  tool	  for	  the	  type	  of	  analysis	  that	  is	  proposed	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
A	  second	  limitation	  of	  the	  analysis	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  was	  that	  it	  restricted	  itself	  to	  the	  very	  
specific	  and	  very	  distinctive	  genre	  of	  testimonials.	  	  Researchers	  in	  genre	  analysis	  maintain	  that	  “the	  
forms	  and	  functions	  of	  figurative	  language	  can	  differ	  significantly	  from	  genre	  to	  genre	  and	  across	  
registers,	  and	  that	  this	  reflects	  the	  goals,	  conventions,	  expertise	  and	  ideologies	  of	  the	  members	  of	  
the	  discourse	  communities	  associated	  with	  different	  genres”	  (Deignan,	  Littlemore	  and	  Semino	  2013:	  
1).	  	  Any	  attempt	  therefore	  to	  begin	  to	  form	  a	  rounded	  view	  of	  how	  a	  conservative	  religious	  believer	  
uses	  metaphorical	  language	  to	  express	  his	  or	  her	  experience	  would	  have	  to	  at	  least	  engage	  with	  the	  
dynamic	  and	  unique	  aspects	  of	  two	  very	  different	  genres.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  that	  the	  third	  
research	  question	  is	  addressed	  by	  focusing	  on	  a	  genre	  that	  is	  different	  from	  the	  genre	  of	  testimonials,	  
while	  retaining	  the	  focus	  on	  an	  individual’s	  language	  of	  experience.	  The	  previous	  study	  was	  also	  
limited	  to	  mostly	  UK	  participants	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  and	  US	  participants	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	  islamfortoday.com	  website.	  	  It	  would	  therefore	  be	  useful,	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  seeking	  to	  form	  a	  
more	  rounded	  view	  of	  how	  conservative	  Christians	  and	  Muslims	  express	  their	  experience,	  to	  widen	  
the	  focus	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  nationality	  of	  participants.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
A	  final	  limitation	  of	  the	  previous	  analysis	  of	  testimonials	  is	  that	  it	  restricted	  itself	  to	  the	  usage	  of	  
language	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  planned,	  written	  text.	  	  I’ve	  already	  argued	  above	  that	  my	  research	  
should	  not	  limit	  itself	  purely	  to	  one	  genre.	  	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  any	  attempt	  to	  say	  anything	  about	  the	  
way	  a	  believer	  experiences	  his	  or	  her	  religion	  should	  also	  engage	  with	  both	  unplanned,	  spoken	  
interaction,	  as	  well	  as	  carefully	  planned,	  written	  texts.	  	  When	  we	  focus	  on	  unplanned,	  spoken	  
interaction	  we	  are	  immediately	  faced	  with	  other	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  impact	  of	  turn	  taking,	  discourse	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convergence,	  politeness,	  and	  increased	  opportunities	  for	  empathy.	  These	  issues	  will	  be	  introduced	  
and	  discussed	  in	  the	  section	  below.	  	  	  	  
It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  highlight	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  interest	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  individual	  rather	  than	  
the	  language	  of	  the	  collective	  also	  relates	  to	  exploring	  the	  connection	  between	  community-­‐
sanctioned	  doctrine	  and	  personal	  experience.	  	  The	  standard	  way	  of	  describing	  this	  connection	  is	  that	  
there	  is	  a	  cyclical	  relationship	  between	  these	  three	  elements,	  so	  that	  doctrine	  informs	  perceived	  
experience	  and	  vice	  versa,	  with	  both	  doctrine	  and	  experience	  informing	  how	  a	  believer	  perceives	  
their	  interaction	  with	  a	  divine	  entity	  (cf.	  Tremlin	  2005).	  	  This	  notion	  of	  a	  cyclical	  relationship	  can	  also	  
be	  described	  in	  discourse	  dynamic	  terms	  as	  the	  “feedback”	  and	  “feedforward”	  process	  that	  occurs	  
between	  two	  or	  more	  people	  engaged	  in	  discourse	  and	  the	  “socio-­‐cultural	  cloud”	  (Cameron	  2012).	  	  	  
This	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  connection	  was	  reinforced	  by	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  testimonials,	  so	  that,	  for	  
example,	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  offer	  some	  explanation	  for	  the	  general	  emphasis	  on	  the	  language	  of	  
intimacy	  and	  personal	  relationship	  in	  the	  Christian	  testimonials	  by	  referring	  to	  Evangelical	  doctrinal	  
beliefs	  concerning	  the	  Son	  of	  God	  becoming	  human.	  	  Focusing	  on	  collections	  of	  testimonials	  and	  
general	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  within	  those	  collections	  will	  tend	  to	  foreground	  this	  link	  between	  
collective	  community	  beliefs	  or	  doctrinal	  frameworks	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  individuals	  within	  that	  
community.	  
However,	  just	  as	  there	  is	  a	  distinction	  between	  semantic	  and	  episodic	  memory,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  
distinction	  between	  the	  things	  believed	  and	  the	  complex	  situations	  that	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  
personally	  encountered.	  	  The	  first	  should	  be	  more	  easily	  controlled	  and	  monitored	  by	  the	  community,	  
but	  the	  second	  should	  be	  far	  harder.	  	  This	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  we	  should	  expect	  general	  patterns	  of	  
discontinuity	  between	  the	  language	  of	  doctrinal	  belief	  and	  the	  language	  of	  personal	  experience,	  but	  
it	  should	  be	  reasonable	  to	  predict	  that	  there	  will	  be	  many	  individual	  discontinuities.	  	  These	  individual	  
discontinuities	  would	  of	  course	  be	  rendered	  invisible	  if	  a	  researcher	  is	  only	  searching	  for	  general	  
patterns	  of	  emphasis,	  as	  I	  was	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  However,	  they	  should	  come	  to	  the	  surface	  if	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the	  focus	  remains	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  individual,	  as	  they	  will	  in	  this	  chapter.	  And	  if	  it	  is	  found	  that	  
there	  is	  in	  some	  cases	  a	  level	  of	  disconnection,	  what	  might	  the	  implications	  be	  for	  the	  area	  of	  inter-­‐
faith	  dialogue?	  	  This	  is	  an	  issue	  that	  I	  will	  discuss	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  
One	  final	  issue	  that	  I	  wish	  to	  consider	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  
language	  of	  experience	  in	  building	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  way	  that	  an	  individual	  Christian	  or	  Muslim	  
perceives	  their	  religion.	  	  As	  an	  example	  of	  this,	  consider	  this	  quote	  from	  the	  data	  relating	  to	  a	  Muslim	  
believer	  that	  I	  will	  be	  considering	  below:	  “I	  have	  a	  private	  relationship	  with	  God”.	  	  When	  we	  come	  to	  
build	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  particular	  divine	  entity	  that	  an	  individual	  believes	  in,	  it	  is	  of	  course	  important	  to	  
draw	  on	  the	  doctrinal	  beliefs	  of	  that	  individual.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  draw	  on	  the	  
language	  that	  individual	  uses	  to	  describe	  their	  perceived	  interaction	  with	  that	  divine	  entity.	  	  It	  should	  
not	  be	  forgotten	  that	  sentences	  like	  the	  one	  above	  may	  not	  be	  classed	  as	  doctrinal	  statements,	  but	  
nonetheless	  they	  say	  something	  very	  important	  about	  how	  that	  believer	  perceives	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  
The	  qualification	  of	  relationship	  with	  the	  adjective	  private	  has	  important	  implications	  that	  provide	  
invaluable	  information.	  	  However,	  that	  information	  might	  not	  provide	  a	  clear	  match	  with	  the	  
information	  that	  we	  might	  derive	  from	  the	  doctrinal	  beliefs	  of	  the	  community	  that	  individual	  belongs	  
to,	  such	  as	  the	  absolute	  otherness	  of	  God	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  These	  differences	  are	  
often	  dismissed	  by	  conservative	  believers	  as	  essentially	  inconsequential,	  but	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  this	  
chapter	  that	  they	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  highly	  significant.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  it	  opens	  up	  the	  
possibility	  of	  two	  individuals	  believing	  in	  the	  same	  theoretical	  doctrines,	  but	  having	  very	  different	  
perceived	  experiences.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  challenges	  the	  notion	  that	  believers	  with	  the	  same	  doctrinal	  
beliefs	  have	  exactly	  the	  same	  conception	  of	  the	  divine	  entity	  they	  believe	  in.	  	  	  	  	  	  
I	  will	  therefore	  address	  this	  third	  research	  question	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  language	  of	  individuals	  as	  
individuals	  rather	  than	  primarily	  viewing	  that	  language	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  membership	  to	  a	  particular	  
belief	  community.	  	  I	  will	  also	  focus	  on	  a	  genre	  other	  than	  that	  of	  testimonials,	  while	  retaining	  my	  
focus	  on	  the	  language	  of	  experience,	  and	  will	  also	  focus	  on	  unplanned,	  spoken	  interaction	  instead	  of	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carefully	  planned,	  written	  texts.	  	  With	  these	  three	  key	  points	  in	  mind,	  I	  will	  gather	  data	  from	  three	  
videoed	  discussions	  between	  conservative	  Muslims	  and	  Christians.	  	  This	  will	  produce	  three	  pieces	  of	  
discourse	  which	  I	  will	  analyse	  in	  two	  parts.	  	  The	  first	  part	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  question	  of	  how	  much	  the	  
movement	  and	  divine	  relationship	  language	  of	  each	  participant	  may	  have	  been	  influenced	  to	  varying	  
degrees	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  took	  place	  within	  the	  context	  of	  dynamic	  interaction.	  	  It	  will	  therefore	  
focus	  on	  instances	  of	  metaphor	  appropriation	  and	  the	  use	  of	  personal	  stories	  that	  are	  told	  to	  the	  
other	  participant	  for	  a	  particular	  reason.	  	  These	  instances	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  terms	  of	  whether	  they	  
could	  be	  viewed	  as	  helping	  to	  cultivate	  empathy	  between	  the	  participants	  and	  decrease	  distance	  and	  
difference,	  or	  whether	  they	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  blocking	  empathy	  and	  increasing	  distance	  and	  a	  
sense	  of	  difference.	  	  The	  second	  part	  will	  then	  critically	  compare	  each	  participant’s	  use	  of	  language	  
relating	  to	  movement	  and	  divine	  relationship	  metaphors	  with	  the	  general	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  
identified	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  testimonials	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters.	  The	  intention	  behind	  this	  
second	  part	  of	  the	  analysis	  will	  be	  to	  identify	  key	  similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  the	  language	  
of	  experience	  of	  each	  individual	  and	  the	  general	  patterns	  of	  emphasis.	  I	  will	  then	  go	  on	  to	  discuss	  the	  
possible	  implications	  these	  key	  differences	  and	  similarities	  might	  have	  for	  the	  domains	  of	  religious	  
studies	  and	  cognitive	  anthropology.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
I	  will	  begin	  by	  discussing	  issues	  related	  to	  this	  expansion	  beyond	  written	  testimonials	  to	  unplanned,	  
interactive	  discourse.	  	  This	  discussion	  centres	  on	  an	  outline	  of	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  the	  field	  of	  
conversation	  analysis	  and	  the	  extensive	  differences	  between	  the	  careful	  expressions	  of	  ideas	  in	  a	  
planned,	  written	  text	  as	  compared	  to	  an	  unplanned,	  dynamic	  interaction	  with	  a	  participant	  that	  
holds	  to	  opposing	  beliefs.	  	  I	  then	  move	  on	  to	  address	  the	  question	  of	  who	  the	  study	  was	  aimed	  at	  
and	  how	  the	  participants	  were	  chosen.	  	  This	  involves	  a	  consideration	  of	  what	  questions	  will	  be	  asked	  
to	  determine	  the	  participants’	  placement	  within	  the	  categories	  of	  Evangelical	  Christian	  and	  
conservative	  Muslim.	  This	  will	  lead	  to	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  study,	  including	  a	  
justification	  of	  its	  explicit	  targeting	  of	  the	  language	  highlighted	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  The	  chapter	  
concludes	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  transcripts	  of	  the	  participants’	  interactions	  during	  the	  study	  and	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how	  the	  conclusions	  of	  that	  analysis	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  my	  central	  thesis	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  
metaphors	  related	  to	  movement	  and	  proximity	  and	  assumptions	  of	  certainty,	  and	  the	  implications	  
for	  dialogue.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
4.2	  Conversation	  Analysis	  and	  the	  Differences	  between	  Written	  Texts	  and	  Spoken	  Interactions	  
One	  of	  the	  key	  differences	  between	  planned,	  written	  texts	  and	  unplanned	  spoken	  interactions	  is	  the	  
fact	  that	  a	  text	  such	  as	  a	  testimonial	  is	  primarily	  (although	  never	  completely)	  constructed	  by	  an	  
individual	  thinking	  alone,	  whereas	  a	  spoken	  interaction	  is	  “co-­‐constructed”	  by	  two	  or	  more	  
participants	  (Larsen-­‐Freeman	  and	  Cameron	  2008:	  166).	  	  The	  study	  that	  is	  reported	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  
based	  on	  a	  combination	  of	  these	  elements.	  	  It	  has	  an	  initial,	  written	  element	  free	  of	  the	  immediate	  
pressure	  to	  converge	  or	  diverge	  in	  the	  form	  of	  pre-­‐discussion	  tasks	  given	  to	  each	  participant,	  
followed	  by	  a	  section	  of	  spoken	  interaction.	  	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  data	  analysed	  in	  the	  previous	  
chapter,	  which	  was	  derived	  purely	  from	  planned,	  written	  texts.	  	  My	  intention	  in	  constructing	  a	  study	  
that	  includes	  an	  unplanned,	  interactive	  component	  is	  to	  explore	  whether	  the	  co-­‐construction	  that	  
can	  often	  take	  place	  in	  interactive	  discourse	  will	  produce	  examples	  of	  convergence	  or	  unusual	  uses	  
of	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  that	  were	  not	  present	  in	  the	  testimonial	  language.	  	  It	  is	  
therefore	  necessary	  to	  first	  explore	  some	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  interactive	  conversations	  before	  I	  
proceed	  to	  an	  examination	  of	  this	  study’s	  structure.	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  process	  of	  co-­‐construction	  during	  unplanned	  discourse	  leads	  to	  a	  principle	  that	  is	  of	  particular	  
interest	  to	  any	  comparison	  between	  expressions	  of	  belief	  in	  planned,	  written	  texts	  and	  unplanned,	  
spoken	  interactions:	  what	  is	  said	  in	  spoken	  interactions	  must,	  to	  some	  degree,	  owe	  both	  its	  origin	  
and	  its	  perspective	  and	  content	  to	  the	  “connecting	  influences”	  of	  what	  was	  just	  said	  and	  may	  be	  said	  
in	  the	  near	  future	  by	  another	  participant	  (Cameron	  2010c:	  84-­‐85;	  Paltridge	  2006:	  108;	  Bhaktin	  2006:	  
105-­‐107).	  	  Larsen-­‐Freeman	  and	  Cameron	  (2008:	  166)	  use	  the	  language	  of	  complex	  systems	  theory	  to	  
describe	  this	  process	  of	  convergence	  as	  a	  “coupling”	  of	  two	  systems.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  how	  a	  religious	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believer	  may	  choose	  to	  express	  his	  or	  her	  beliefs,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  underestimate	  the	  effect	  of	  this	  
coupling	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  more	  (although	  far	  from	  completely)	  disconnected	  nature	  of	  
planned,	  written	  texts.	  	  Larsen-­‐Freeman	  and	  Cameron	  (2008:	  173)	  succinctly	  capture	  this	  effect	  in	  
their	  observation	  that	  “speakers	  influence	  each	  other	  on	  various	  dimensions,	  including	  the	  physical,	  
emotional,	  and	  conceptual	  or	  ideational,	  when	  they	  formulate	  talk	  contributions	  with	  the	  other	  
person	  ‘in	  mind’,	  designing	  utterances	  that,	  for	  example,	  will	  not	  offend,	  that	  will	  explain	  adequately	  
and	  appropriately,	  or	  that	  will	  be	  effective	  in	  achieving	  goals”.	  	  Grice	  (1975:	  45)	  alludes	  to	  this	  same	  
influence	  within	  the	  context	  of	  his	  co-­‐operative	  principle	  with	  the	  statement	  that	  when	  you	  take	  part	  
in	  any	  functioning	  conversation	  you	  will	  always	  endeavour	  to	  make	  each	  contribution	  “such	  as	  is	  
required,	  at	  the	  stage	  at	  which	  it	  occurs,	  by	  the	  accepted	  purpose	  or	  direction	  of	  the	  talk	  exchange	  in	  
which	  you	  are	  engaged”.	  	  This	  point	  that	  discourse	  opens	  up	  the	  participants	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  
influencing	  and	  being	  influenced	  by	  each	  other	  is	  further	  reinforced	  by	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  
conversations.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  dividing	  of	  conversations	  into	  turns	  and	  adjacency	  pairs	  places	  
pressure	  on	  the	  participants	  to	  respond	  in	  an	  appropriate	  manner	  and	  at	  an	  appropriate	  moment	  
(Paltridge	  2006,	  Sacks	  et	  al	  2004).	  	  	  	  	  	  
Having	  established	  the	  influence	  that	  participants	  in	  a	  conversation	  must	  have	  on	  each	  other,	  I	  now	  
wish	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  specific	  characteristic	  of	  appropriation.	  	  This	  aspect	  will	  allow	  me	  to	  further	  
explore	  how	  this	  process	  of	  coupling	  contributes	  to	  the	  essential	  fabric	  of	  conversations	  taking	  place	  
within	  the	  frame	  of	  a	  discussion	  or	  debate:	  	  	  	  	  	  
Appropriation:	  There	  can	  be	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  social	  factors	  operating	  underneath	  processes	  such	  as	  
turn	  taking	  that	  may	  influence	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  discussion	  or	  debate.	  	  These	  would	  
certainly	  include	  well-­‐known	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  increased	  influence	  of	  politeness,	  empathy	  and	  
behaviour	  mirroring	  in	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  encounters	  (cf.	  Levinson	  2006:	  311-­‐323;	  Paltridge	  2006:	  72-­‐78;	  
Hoffman	  2000:	  37-­‐45;	  Larsen-­‐Freeman	  2008:	  170;	  Cameron	  2010a).	  	  Strong	  evidence	  for	  this	  can	  be	  
drawn	  from	  research	  into	  the	  mirroring	  of	  gestures	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  among	  participants	  in	  a	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conversation,	  for	  example,	  “if	  one	  person	  in	  a	  group	  places	  his	  or	  her	  hands	  behind	  his	  or	  her	  head,	  
the	  likelihood	  is	  that	  other	  members	  of	  the	  group	  will	  follow	  this	  action”	  (Larsen-­‐Freeman	  2008:	  170).	  
Another	  phenomenon	  that	  can	  be	  related	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  empathy	  is	  appropriation,	  or	  one	  
participant	  in	  a	  conversation	  picking	  up	  and	  using	  the	  language	  of	  another,	  often	  adapting	  it	  in	  some	  
way	  for	  their	  own	  purposes.	  	  One	  example	  of	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  first	  discussion	  I	  will	  analyse	  
below.	  	  The	  Muslim	  believer	  makes	  the	  point	  that	  people	  are	  free	  to	  choose	  what	  they	  want	  to	  
believe	  in,	  “…	  ultimately	  we	  decide,	  we	  make	  the	  decision	  which	  direction	  we	  want	  to	  go”.	  	  When	  the	  
Christian	  believer	  takes	  his	  turn,	  he	  responds	  by	  picking	  up	  on	  the	  Muslim’s	  use	  of	  direction,	  “…	  you	  
said	  all	  those	  friends	  that	  you	  had	  in	  school,	  different	  directions	  and	  decisions,	  I	  wish	  you	  had	  me	  as	  a	  
friend	  because	  I	  feel	  like	  some	  of	  what	  you	  are	  saying,	  although	  I	  hear	  your	  heart	  in	  it,	  is	  based	  on	  
misunderstanding”.	  	  This	  is	  a	  common	  form	  of	  appropriation	  that	  involves	  making	  use	  of	  another	  
participant’s	  metaphors	  –	  a	  strategy	  that	  Cameron	  (2011)	  associates	  with	  a	  possible	  indication	  of	  
empathy	  in	  discourse.	  However,	  we	  will	  also	  consider	  that,	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  debate	  or	  a	  
discussion,	  appropriation	  can	  also	  sometimes	  be	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  a	  particular	  strategy	  aimed	  at	  
providing	  the	  perception	  that	  one	  has	  “won”	  a	  discussion	  or	  argument.	  	  	  	  
I	  have	  so	  far	  discussed	  some	  important	  differences	  between	  planned,	  written	  texts	  and	  unplanned,	  
spoken	  interaction,	  but	  I	  have	  yet	  to	  identify	  the	  practical	  relation	  of	  this	  discussion	  to	  the	  study	  that	  
forms	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  I	  believe	  the	  principal	  point	  is	  that	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  take	  into	  
consideration	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  participants	  in	  a	  spoken	  interaction	  are	  locked	  into	  consistently	  
responding	  to	  each	  other.	  	  It	  must	  therefore	  be	  accepted	  as	  highly	  probable	  that	  participants’	  
language	  will	  to	  some	  degree	  converge	  with	  each	  other,	  or	  perhaps	  at	  times	  diametrically	  diverge.	  	  
What	  should	  not	  be	  expected	  is	  that	  the	  participants’	  language	  will	  remain	  completely	  unaffected	  by	  
the	  other’s	  language.	  	  
However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  beware	  of	  exaggerating	  the	  differences	  between	  non-­‐interactive,	  planned	  
written	  texts	  and	  interactive,	  spoken	  discourse.	  	  Discussions	  and	  debates,	  no	  matter	  how	  high-­‐
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pressure	  they	  may	  be,	  and	  no	  matter	  how	  much	  a	  part	  convergence	  may	  play,	  cannot	  completely	  
highjack	  a	  participant’s	  ability	  to	  express	  what	  he	  or	  she	  thinks	  in	  his	  or	  her	  own	  words.	  	  Planned,	  
written	  texts	  should	  also	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  completely	  immune	  to	  a	  process	  of	  convergence	  and	  some	  
form	  of	  extended	  turn	  taking	  (they	  must	  in	  some	  way	  be	  a	  response	  to	  something),	  or	  be	  viewed	  as	  
disconnected	  from	  the	  wider	  discourse	  around	  them.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  deny	  that	  there	  is	  
more	  of	  an	  increased,	  immediate	  and	  consistent	  pressure	  to	  meaningfully	  and	  appropriately	  engage	  
with	  another’s	  topic,	  direction	  and	  language	  than	  there	  is	  in	  a	  planned,	  written	  text.	  	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	  it	  is	  also	  probably	  more	  difficult	  for	  a	  participant	  in	  a	  discussion	  to	  fall	  back	  on	  
conventionalised,	  formulaic	  repetitions	  of	  what	  should	  be	  said.	  	  It	  should	  be	  recognised	  that	  both	  are,	  
to	  some	  unspecified	  degree,	  valuable	  in	  different	  ways.	  This	  point	  justifies	  the	  need	  for	  an	  study	  that	  
combines	  both	  aspects:	  an	  initial,	  written	  element	  free	  of	  the	  immediate	  pressure	  to	  converge	  or	  
diverge,	  followed	  by	  a	  section	  of	  spoken	  interaction	  intentionally	  designed	  to	  encourage	  and	  explore	  
the	  results	  of	  such	  pressure.	  
Having	  explored	  some	  of	  the	  key	  issues	  in	  the	  differences	  between	  written	  texts	  and	  spoken	  
interaction	  and	  briefly	  introduced	  the	  advantages	  of	  combining	  them,	  I	  am	  able	  to	  move	  on	  to	  an	  
exploration	  of	  the	  precise	  structure	  of	  the	  study	  proposed	  above.	  
	  
4.3	  Participant	  Selection	  
In	  my	  analysis	  of	  religious	  language	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  my	  focus	  was	  on	  authors	  of	  one	  
particular	  genre	  of	  text	  (religious	  testimonials)	  from	  two	  particular	  discourse	  communities	  identified	  
by	  their	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  their	  affiliation	  to	  a	  particular	  publication	  or	  website.	  	  In	  this	  study	  I	  wish	  
to	  move	  beyond	  the	  precise	  confines	  of	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  and	  islamfortoday.com	  while	  still	  
retaining	  my	  focus	  on	  Evangelical	  Christians	  and	  conservative	  Muslims.	  	  This	  requires	  some	  form	  of	  
identifying	  criteria	  that	  can	  allow	  potential	  participants	  to	  be	  accurately	  assessed	  as	  belonging	  to	  
these	  categories	  of	  believers.	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In	  section	  3.2	  I	  provided	  a	  brief	  working	  definition	  of	  both	  Evangelical	  Christianity	  and	  Conservative	  
Islam.	  	  In	  summary,	  I	  stated	  that	  Evangelical	  Christians	  could	  be	  essentially	  defined	  by	  their	  absolute	  
belief	  in	  the	  inspiration	  of	  the	  Bible	  and	  their	  commitment	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  salvation	  is	  attained	  
through	  faith	  in	  the	  atoning	  death	  of	  Christ	  and	  not	  through	  works.	  	  I	  then	  went	  on	  to	  state	  that	  
conservative	  Muslims	  could	  be	  essentially	  defined	  by	  their	  belief	  in	  the	  absolute	  truth	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  
and	  their	  commitment	  to	  the	  five	  pillars	  of	  Islam:	  Shahada,	  Salat,	  Zakat,	  Hajj,	  and	  Sawm.	  	  Using	  these	  
definitions,	  I	  created	  two	  pairs	  of	  questions	  that	  required	  affirmative	  answers	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  
that	  all	  the	  participants	  I	  used	  in	  the	  study	  could	  be	  placed	  within	  my	  categories	  of	  Evangelical	  
Christian	  or	  conservative	  Muslim.	  	  The	  questions	  have	  been	  included	  below	  in	  table	  4.1:	  
	  
Table	  4.1:	  Questions	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  	  
Questions	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  Evangelical	  Christians:	  	  
• Do	  you	  have	  an	  unqualified	  belief	  in	  the	  full	  divine	  inspiration	  of	  the	  Bible?	  
• Are	  you	  saved	  through	  faith	  in	  the	  atoning	  death	  of	  Jesus	  Christ,	  and	  not	  through	  your	  own	  works?	  	  	  
Questions	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  conservative	  Muslims:	  
• Do	  you	  have	  an	  unqualified	  belief	  that	  the	  Qur’an	  is	  the	  word	  of	  God?	  
• Do	  you	  adhere	  to	  and	  practice	  some	  form	  of	  the	  five	  pillars	  of	  Islam:	  the	  declaration	  of	  faith	  (Shahada),	  prayers	  
(Salat),	  fasting	  (Sawm),	  alms	  giving	  (Zakat)	  and	  pilgrimage	  (Hajj)?	  	  	  
	  
My	  intention	  in	  designing	  the	  study	  was	  to	  encourage	  a	  discussion	  based	  around	  the	  lexical	  and	  
grammatical	  elements	  that	  had	  been	  highlighted	  in	  the	  testimonial	  analysis.	  	  This	  required	  enough	  
participants	  to	  make	  a	  sizeable	  qualitative	  analysis	  possible,	  but	  not	  too	  many	  as	  to	  make	  the	  
transcribing	  process	  unmanageable.	  	  It	  was	  therefore	  decided	  to	  use	  a	  total	  of	  six	  participants:	  three	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Muslims	  and	  three	  Christians	  in	  three	  separate	  studies.	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  what	  
these	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  do.	  
	  
4.4	  The	  Structure	  of	  the	  Study	  	  	  	  	  
The	  study	  was	  designed	  around	  two	  written	  tasks,	  with	  a	  ten-­‐minute	  period	  of	  discussion	  following	  
the	  completion	  of	  each	  task.	  	  Each	  period	  of	  discussion	  was	  based	  around	  the	  participants’	  responses	  
when	  they	  were	  allowed	  to	  see	  what	  the	  other	  participant	  had	  written	  for	  each	  task.	  These	  language	  
tasks	  were	  designed	  to	  fulfil	  a	  dual	  purpose:	  firstly,	  provide	  a	  stimulating	  foundation	  for	  the	  
discussion	  stages,	  and	  secondly,	  enable	  participants	  to	  work	  with	  the	  language	  that	  was	  highlighted	  
in	  the	  previous	  testimonial	  analysis.	  	  A	  brief	  discussion	  about	  early	  designs	  and	  a	  detailed	  
examination	  of	  the	  structure,	  rationale	  and	  instructions	  for	  each	  task	  and	  period	  of	  discussion	  are	  
outlined	  below:	  
Early	  Designs:	  This	  second	  study	  went	  through	  several	  stages	  of	  development	  before	  it	  reached	  the	  
present	  form.	  	  My	  aim	  was	  always	  to	  design	  a	  follow-­‐up	  study	  that	  would	  focus	  on	  the	  language	  and	  
agency	  patterns	  that	  I	  had	  highlighted	  as	  interesting	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  testimonials,	  but	  I	  
considered	  several	  different	  approaches.	  	  My	  first	  idea	  was	  a	  series	  of	  statements	  related	  to	  a	  person	  
talking	  about	  their	  perceived	  encounter	  with	  a	  spirit.	  	  Examples	  of	  these	  statements	  were,	  “I	  believe	  
there	  is	  a	  spirit	  that	  guides	  me	  in	  my	  life”	  and	  “The	  spirit	  is	  often	  with	  me”.	  	  Participants	  were	  asked	  
to	  arrange	  the	  statements	  in	  order	  of	  how	  certain	  they	  thought	  the	  person	  was	  that	  the	  ghost	  truly	  
existed.	  	  I	  rejected	  this	  idea	  of	  a	  study	  because	  of	  its	  focus	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  spirit,	  which	  I	  felt	  to	  be	  
too	  artificial.	  	  Instead,	  a	  new	  version	  was	  developed	  that	  asked	  participants	  to	  imagine	  a	  visit	  from	  
five	  pairs	  of	  two	  Jehovah’s	  Witnesses.	  	  Each	  pair	  centred	  their	  description	  of	  their	  beliefs	  around	  a	  
different	  key	  statement:	  “I	  follow	  this	  belief”,	  “I	  am	  certain	  that	  this	  belief	  is	  true”,	  “This	  belief	  guides	  
me”,	  “This	  belief	  lives	  inside	  of	  me”	  and,	  “This	  belief	  directs	  me”.	  	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  rank	  
each	  of	  these	  statements	  according	  to	  the	  level	  of	  certainty	  they	  felt	  the	  speakers	  had	  about	  their	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beliefs.	  	  The	  reason	  why	  this	  idea	  was	  also	  rejected	  was	  because	  of	  its	  very	  restrictive,	  closed	  
structure.	  	  It	  could	  only	  engage	  with	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  target	  words	  and	  phrases	  and	  it	  was	  
impossible	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  results	  were	  due	  to	  the	  vocabulary	  used	  or	  the	  agency	  pattern.	  	  
The	  fact	  that	  participants	  also	  had	  no	  freedom	  to	  use	  their	  own	  language	  or	  agency	  patterns	  meant	  
that	  it	  was	  also	  very	  difficult	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  that	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  their	  specific	  belief	  
communities.	  
I	  therefore	  moved	  away	  from	  these	  closed	  designs	  towards	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  open	  discussion	  that	  would	  
follow	  a	  structured	  set	  of	  tasks.	  	  The	  structured	  tasks	  would	  focus	  the	  participants	  on	  some	  of	  the	  
target	  vocabulary	  while	  giving	  them	  complete	  freedom	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  their	  own	  agency	  patterns	  
and	  the	  addition	  of	  their	  own	  vocabulary.	  	  The	  tasks	  would	  also	  be	  designed	  to	  stimulate	  the	  
discussions	  by	  encouraging	  them	  to	  engage	  from	  the	  outset	  with	  each	  other’s	  worldviews	  and	  
language.	  	  The	  discussion	  phases	  encouraged	  the	  participants	  to	  generate	  a	  sizeable	  amount	  of	  
language	  related	  to	  the	  target	  vocabulary	  primed	  during	  the	  tasks.	  	  It	  also	  allowed	  me	  to	  investigate	  
the	  kind	  of	  language	  that	  would	  be	  generated	  during	  unplanned,	  spoken	  interaction	  as	  opposed	  to	  
the	  planned,	  non-­‐interactive,	  written	  language	  I	  analysed	  in	  the	  testimonials.	  	  However,	  as	  with	  any	  
study,	  there	  would	  be	  disadvantages	  as	  well	  as	  advantages	  to	  its	  structure.	  	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  
discuss	  in	  more	  detail	  the	  structure	  of	  this	  study	  and	  to	  examine	  some	  of	  aspects	  of	  the	  study	  that	  
could	  be	  viewed	  as	  problematic.	  	  	  	  	  	  
First	  task	  and	  discussion:	  The	  participants	  were	  seated	  next	  to	  separate	  tables	  that	  were	  far	  enough	  
apart	  to	  prevent	  them	  from	  seeing	  what	  the	  other	  participant	  would	  write.	  	  Each	  one	  was	  given	  a	  
blank	  card,	  and	  asked	  to	  draw	  on	  their	  knowledge	  of	  each	  other’s	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  write	  three	  
points	  on	  how	  they	  thought	  the	  other	  participant	  would	  answer	  if	  they	  were	  asked	  how	  they	  arrived	  
at	  a	  sense	  of	  certainty	  that	  their	  beliefs	  were	  objectively	  real	  and	  true.	  	  At	  that	  point,	  their	  
knowledge	  of	  each	  other’s	  religious	  beliefs	  was	  restricted	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Muslim	  participants	  
knew	  that	  they	  were	  talking	  to	  a	  Christian	  who	  believed	  that	  the	  Bible	  was	  the	  word	  of	  God,	  while	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the	  Christian	  participants	  knew	  that	  they	  were	  talking	  to	  a	  Muslim	  who	  believed	  that	  the	  Qur’an	  was	  
the	  word	  of	  God.	  	  The	  instructions	  for	  this	  task	  given	  to	  the	  participants	  have	  been	  listed	  in	  table	  4.2	  
below.	  	  These	  instructions	  were	  read	  to	  the	  participants.	  
Table	  4.2:	  First	  task	  and	  discussion:	  instructions	  for	  participants	  (with	  notes	  on	  procedure	  between	  instructions):	  
• You	  have	  each	  been	  given	  a	  blank	  card.	  I	  want	  you	  to	  think	  about	  the	  other	  person	  and	  draw	  on	  your	  knowledge	  
of	  their	  religious	  beliefs.	  	  If	  they	  were	  to	  be	  asked	  how	  they	  arrived	  at	  a	  sense	  of	  certainty	  that	  their	  beliefs	  are	  
objectively	  real	  and	  true,	  what	  do	  you	  think	  would	  be	  the	  three	  main	  points	  that	  they	  would	  mention	  as	  
evidence?	  
• If	  you	  are	  unable	  to	  think	  of	  three	  possible	  points,	  feel	  free	  to	  leave	  some	  of	  the	  points	  blank.	  
• Feel	  free	  to	  use	  a	  single	  word,	  phrase	  or	  sentence	  for	  each	  point.	  
• I	  will	  be	  giving	  you	  a	  maximum	  of	  five	  minutes	  to	  complete	  this	  task.	  
• [At	  this	  point	  I	  waited	  five	  minutes,	  but	  stayed	  in	  the	  room	  in	  case	  there	  were	  any	  questions	  or	  problems.]	  	  
• Could	  you	  now	  please	  attach	  those	  answers	  to	  the	  top	  of	  the	  whiteboard?	  
• Take	  a	  look	  at	  the	  answers	  the	  other	  person	  has	  given	  in	  terms	  of	  your	  arrival	  at	  a	  sense	  of	  certainty	  that	  your	  
beliefs	  are	  objectively	  real	  and	  true.	  	  Do	  you	  agree	  or	  disagree	  with	  them?	  	  Do	  you	  wish	  to	  expand	  on	  or	  qualify	  
anything	  they	  have	  said?	  	  I	  will	  give	  you	  around	  ten	  minutes	  to	  make	  any	  comments	  you	  want	  to	  make	  in	  any	  
order	  that	  you	  want	  to	  make	  them.	  	  Anyone	  can	  begin	  and	  anyone	  can	  finish,	  and	  also	  feel	  free	  to	  interrupt	  each	  
other	  if	  you	  wish	  and	  respond	  to	  any	  of	  the	  comments	  made.	  	  The	  ten	  minutes	  will	  start	  as	  soon	  as	  I	  have	  left	  the	  
room.	  	  When	  I	  re-­‐enter	  the	  room,	  try	  to	  begin	  drawing	  the	  discussion	  to	  a	  close.	  
• [At	  this	  point	  I	  turned	  on	  the	  video	  camera	  and	  left	  the	  room.]	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
By	  asking	  the	  participants	  during	  the	  task	  to	  answer	  for	  each	  other,	  the	  intention	  was	  to	  compel	  
them	  from	  the	  outset	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  beliefs	  of	  the	  other	  while	  focusing	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  certainty.	  	  
It	  is	  possible	  that,	  due	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  factors	  such	  as	  politeness	  and	  natural	  reticence,	  a	  situation	  
may	  develop	  in	  the	  interactive	  section	  where	  each	  participant	  states	  his	  or	  her	  beliefs,	  but	  avoids	  any	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subsequent	  critical	  engagement.	  If,	  however,	  the	  participants	  are	  compelled	  to	  think	  about	  the	  other	  
and	  are	  also	  able	  to	  later	  view	  what	  that	  person	  has	  written	  about	  aspects	  of	  their	  belief,	  then	  the	  
pressure	  to	  actively	  engage	  with	  them	  should	  be	  increased.	  	  	  
Another	  important	  purpose	  of	  this	  task	  is	  that	  it	  enables	  the	  participants	  to	  engage	  with	  a	  natural	  
usage	  of	  metaphorical	  language	  related	  to	  movement	  through	  the	  use	  of	  the	  word	  arrived	  in	  the	  
instructions.	  	  The	  use	  of	  arrived	  also	  naturally	  foregrounds	  the	  dynamic	  process	  of	  believing	  rather	  
than	  the	  theoretical	  dimension	  of	  discussing	  beliefs	  as	  static	  objects.	  	  This	  intention	  to	  get	  the	  
participants	  to	  work	  within	  the	  frame	  of	  metaphors	  related	  to	  movement	  in	  addition	  to	  language	  
that	  emphasises	  the	  process	  of	  belief	  was	  further	  consolidated	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  written	  
stage,	  which	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  examine.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Second	  task	  and	  discussion:	  	  Each	  participant	  was	  given	  a	  blank	  card,	  in	  addition	  to	  nine	  strips	  of	  
card	  with	  one	  word	  from	  the	  following	  list	  written	  on	  each	  card:	  find,	  come,	  follow,	  guide,	  lead,	  bring,	  
through,	  with,	  and	  in.	  	  They	  were	  then	  asked	  to	  arrange	  the	  nine	  words	  in	  order	  of	  how	  frequently	  
they	  use	  them	  to	  describe	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  their	  personal	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Christian	  or	  
Muslim.	  	  This	  second	  task	  was	  concluded	  by	  asking	  the	  participants	  to	  write	  five	  sentences	  that	  
described	  their	  personal	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Christian	  or	  a	  Muslim	  that	  each	  included	  one	  word	  
from	  the	  top	  five	  words	  of	  their	  list.	  The	  precise	  instructions	  given	  to	  participants	  are	  listed	  in	  table	  
4.3	  below:	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Table	  4.3:	  Second	  task	  and	  discussion:	  instructions	  for	  participants	  (with	  notes	  on	  procedure	  between	  instructions):	  
• Think	  of	  sentences	  and	  phrases	  that	  you	  often	  use	  to	  describe	  your	  personal	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  committed	  
believer.	  	  	  
• You	  have	  each	  been	  given	  nine	  cards	  with	  one	  of	  the	  following	  words	  written	  on	  each	  card:	  find/found,	  come,	  
follow/followed,	  guide/guided,	  lead/led,	  bring/brought,	  through,	  with,	  and	  in.	  	  All	  of	  these	  words	  are	  used	  to	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some	  degree	  by	  both	  Muslims	  and	  Christians	  to	  describe	  their	  personal	  experience.	  	  
• Again,	  think	  of	  the	  language	  that	  you	  often	  use	  to	  describe	  your	  personal	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Christian	  or	  a	  
Muslim.	  	  I	  now	  want	  you	  to	  arrange	  the	  nine	  words	  in	  order	  of	  how	  frequently	  you	  use	  them	  as	  part	  of	  that	  
language.	  	  If	  you	  use	  a	  word	  more	  often	  than	  the	  others,	  then	  place	  it	  at	  or	  near	  the	  top	  of	  your	  list.	  	  If	  you	  don’t	  
use	  a	  word	  as	  frequently	  as	  the	  others,	  then	  place	  it	  at	  or	  near	  the	  bottom	  of	  your	  list.	  I	  will	  give	  you	  three	  
minutes	  to	  complete	  this	  task.	  	  	  	  
• [At	  this	  point	  I	  waited	  three	  minutes,	  but	  stayed	  in	  the	  room	  in	  case	  there	  were	  any	  questions	  or	  problems.]	  	  
• I	  now	  want	  you	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  top	  five	  words	  in	  your	  list.	  	  I	  want	  you	  to	  think	  about	  how	  you	  would	  use	  them	  in	  a	  
sentence	  that	  would	  describe	  an	  aspect	  of	  your	  personal	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Christian	  or	  a	  Muslim.	  	  Starting	  
from	  the	  top	  word,	  I	  want	  you	  to	  write	  a	  sentence	  using	  that	  word	  on	  the	  card	  that	  is	  marked	  with	  the	  number	  
one,	  then	  write	  a	  sentence	  using	  the	  second	  word	  in	  your	  list	  on	  the	  card	  that	  is	  marked	  with	  the	  number	  two,	  
and	  so	  on	  until	  you	  have	  written	  a	  sentence	  on	  each	  of	  the	  five	  cards.	  I	  am	  going	  to	  give	  you	  seven	  minutes	  to	  
complete	  this	  task.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• The	  phrase	  “personal	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Christian	  or	  Muslim”	  is	  deliberately	  vague,	  so	  feel	  free	  to	  interpret	  it	  
in	  any	  way	  that	  you	  want.	  
• You	  should	  not	  use	  more	  than	  one	  of	  the	  words	  in	  a	  single	  sentence.	  	  	  	  
• All	  the	  words	  are	  in	  their	  active	  form	  and	  where	  relevant	  have	  also	  been	  given	  in	  their	  passive	  form.	  	  However,	  
feel	  free	  to	  use	  any	  tense	  (e.g.	  by	  using	  present,	  present	  continuous,	  future,	  etc.)	  or	  voice	  (e.g.	  a	  passive	  sentence	  
or	  active	  sentence,	  etc.)	  or	  person	  (e.g.	  first,	  second	  or	  third	  person,	  etc.).	  
• Try	  to	  choose	  the	  words	  and	  write	  the	  sentences	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible	  without	  thinking	  too	  much	  about	  the	  
content.	  Remember,	  there	  are	  no	  wrong	  or	  right	  answers,	  so	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  feel	  anxious	  about	  “getting	  it	  
right”.	  	  This	  study	  is	  also	  particularly	  interested	  in	  the	  first	  ideas	  that	  come	  into	  your	  head,	  whatever	  they	  are.	  	  	  	  
• If	  you	  write	  a	  sentence	  and	  then	  change	  your	  mind,	  draw	  a	  single	  line	  through	  that	  sentence	  and	  write	  the	  
replacement	  sentence	  next	  to	  it.	  
• I	  will	  give	  you	  seven	  minutes	  to	  complete	  this	  task.	  
• [At	  this	  point	  I	  waited	  seven	  minutes,	  but	  stayed	  in	  the	  room	  in	  case	  there	  were	  any	  questions	  or	  problems.]	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• I	  now	  want	  you	  to	  stick	  those	  sentences	  on	  the	  board	  behind	  you	  so	  that	  the	  other	  person	  can	  clearly	  see	  them.	  	  
• This	  is	  the	  last	  task	  that	  I	  will	  give	  you	  before	  we	  conclude	  this	  study.	  	  Please	  take	  a	  look	  at	  the	  five	  sentences	  that	  
the	  other	  person	  has	  produced.	  	  I	  want	  you	  to	  compare	  them	  with	  your	  own	  sentences	  and	  make	  any	  conclusions	  
concerning	  any	  key	  differences	  and	  possible	  reasons	  for	  those	  differences.	  	  Do	  you	  think	  they	  indicate	  any	  
important	  differences	  between	  how	  Muslims	  and	  Christians	  practise	  and	  live	  out	  their	  faith?	  	  Again,	  I	  will	  give	  you	  
a	  maximum	  of	  ten	  minutes	  to	  make	  any	  comments	  you	  want	  to	  make	  in	  any	  order	  that	  you	  want	  to	  make	  them.	  	  
Anyone	  can	  begin	  and	  anyone	  can	  finish,	  and	  also	  feel	  free	  to	  interrupt	  each	  other	  if	  you	  wish	  and	  respond	  to	  any	  
of	  the	  comments	  made.	  	  The	  ten	  minutes	  will	  start	  as	  soon	  as	  I	  have	  left	  the	  room.	  When	  I	  re-­‐enter	  the	  room,	  try	  
to	  begin	  drawing	  the	  discussion	  to	  a	  close.	  
• [At	  this	  point	  I	  turned	  on	  the	  video	  camera	  and	  left	  the	  room.]	  
• [After	  returning	  and	  allowing	  the	  discussion	  to	  naturally	  conclude,	  I	  formally	  announced	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study.]	  The	  
study/discussion	  is	  now	  complete,	  so	  feel	  free	  to	  leave	  the	  room.	  	  Please	  ensure	  that	  you	  do	  not	  communicate	  
with	  any	  participants	  that	  may	  be	  waiting	  outside.	  	  Thank	  you	  again	  for	  your	  assistance.	  
	  
As	  I	  mentioned	  above,	  one	  of	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  tasks	  was	  to	  encourage	  the	  participants	  during	  the	  
discussion	  period	  to	  engage	  with	  some	  of	  the	  metaphorical	  language	  that	  was	  found	  to	  be	  interesting	  
in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  testimonials	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  It	  would	  of	  course	  have	  been	  possible	  to	  
give	  the	  participants	  a	  topic	  to	  discuss	  without	  engaging	  in	  any	  form	  of	  priming.	  	  However,	  it	  was	  
necessary	  for	  the	  study	  to	  be	  designed	  within	  the	  time	  constraints	  of	  three	  one-­‐hour	  sessions,	  which	  
meant	  that	  the	  participants	  could	  only	  be	  allowed	  to	  talk	  for	  a	  limited	  period	  of	  time.	  	  There	  was	  
therefore	  a	  need	  to	  explicitly	  focus	  the	  participants	  on	  the	  target	  language.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  priming	  
the	  participants	  in	  terms	  of	  specific	  collocations	  and	  patterns	  of	  agency	  (which	  were	  the	  main	  focus	  
of	  the	  study),	  the	  task	  was	  designed	  so	  that	  only	  isolated,	  disconnected	  words	  were	  shown	  to	  them,	  
forcing	  them	  to	  produce	  their	  own	  associations.	  	  In	  addition,	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  forcing	  the	  participants	  
to	  make	  use	  of	  language	  they	  normally	  did	  not	  use,	  they	  were	  directed	  to	  discard	  four	  out	  of	  the	  nine	  
words.	  	  It	  should	  also	  be	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  this	  study	  was	  not	  the	  language	  that	  the	  
participants	  generated	  during	  the	  tasks,	  but	  the	  content	  of	  the	  subsequent	  discussions.	  One	  last	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point	  aimed	  at	  addressing	  the	  possible	  criticism	  of	  unnecessary	  levels	  of	  priming	  is	  that,	  as	  the	  
subsequent	  analysis	  will	  demonstrate,	  there	  was	  a	  high	  level	  of	  variation	  in	  the	  type	  of	  language	  and	  
patterns	  of	  agency	  that	  the	  tasks	  and	  the	  discussions	  generated.	  	  	  	  
Methodology	  for	  analysing	  the	  language:	  As	  I	  have	  pointed	  out	  above,	  this	  is	  a	  follow-­‐up	  study	  
complementing	  the	  previous	  analysis	  of	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  testimonials.	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this,	  it	  will	  
primarily	  focus	  on	  the	  same	  types	  of	  metaphorical	  language	  (proximity	  and	  movement	  metaphors),	  
and	  will	  use	  the	  same	  identification	  procedure	  (the	  Pragglejaz	  Metaphor	  Identification	  Procedure)	  as	  
the	  previous	  study.	  	  The	  challenges	  of	  applying	  this	  identification	  procedure	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  
movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  in	  religious	  language	  have	  been	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  section	  3.3	  
of	  this	  thesis	  and	  apply	  equally	  to	  this	  study.	  	  
Ethical	  issues:	  There	  are	  two	  main	  ethical	  issues	  that	  are	  related	  to	  this	  type	  of	  study.	  	  The	  first	  issue	  
relates	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  analysing	  conservative	  religious	  language.	  	  In	  previous	  chapters	  I	  have	  
highlighted	  that	  such	  language	  can	  lead	  to	  conflict	  and	  that	  it	  involves	  oversimplified	  categorizations	  
of	  reality.	  	  It	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  the	  participants	  of	  the	  study	  would	  view	  these	  assertions	  as	  negative,	  
and	  probably	  would	  not	  have	  agreed	  to	  participate	  if	  I	  had	  shared	  these	  ideas	  with	  them	  before	  the	  
study.	  	  I	  was	  also	  aware	  from	  the	  outset	  that,	  in	  terms	  of	  displays	  of	  empathy	  and	  the	  blocking	  of	  
empathy,	  I	  may	  also	  be	  placed	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  my	  analysis	  of	  their	  language	  might	  lead	  me	  to	  
conclusions	  that	  the	  participants	  themselves	  would	  disagree	  with.	  	  It	  would	  have	  been	  inappropriate	  
to	  discuss	  these	  issues	  with	  the	  participants	  before	  the	  study	  because,	  even	  if	  they	  had	  still	  agreed	  to	  
participate,	  it	  would	  probably	  have	  led	  them	  to	  behave	  in	  an	  uncharacteristic	  manner.	  	  My	  approach	  
to	  this	  issue	  was	  therefore	  not	  to	  discuss	  these	  issues	  upfront,	  but	  to	  be	  willing	  and	  open	  to	  discuss	  
them	  if	  any	  of	  the	  participants	  became	  concerned	  before	  or	  after	  the	  study,	  and	  to	  encourage	  them	  
to	  withdraw	  if	  they	  became	  uncomfortable.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
A	  second	  ethical	  issue	  was	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  argument	  developing	  during	  the	  study.	  	  I	  felt	  it	  was	  
necessary	  to	  leave	  the	  room	  during	  the	  discussion	  phases,	  so	  this	  perhaps	  increased	  the	  chances	  of	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some	  form	  of	  unpleasant	  disagreement.	  	  My	  solution	  to	  this	  was	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  when	  I	  left	  the	  
room	  I	  remained	  close	  to	  the	  door,	  so	  that	  I	  would	  know	  if	  an	  argument	  was	  beginning	  and	  be	  able	  to	  
quickly	  re-­‐enter	  the	  room	  if	  I	  felt	  it	  was	  necessary.	  	  I	  also	  made	  sure	  that	  I	  re-­‐entered	  the	  room	  just	  
before	  each	  discussion	  concluded	  so	  that	  I	  would	  know	  if	  one	  or	  both	  of	  the	  participants	  were	  feeling	  
uncomfortable.	  	  The	  problem	  of	  course	  with	  this	  type	  of	  study	  is	  that	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  
disagreement	  was	  encouraged,	  and	  that	  some	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  are	  very	  accustomed	  
to	  heated	  debate.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  very	  difficult	  to	  know	  when	  an	  intervention	  is	  necessary.	  	  My	  rule-­‐
of-­‐thumb	  was	  therefore	  to	  rapidly	  intervene	  if	  I	  detected	  any	  form	  of	  one-­‐sided	  verbal	  bullying,	  or	  
any	  sense	  that	  the	  participants	  were	  no	  longer	  interested	  in	  interacting	  and	  had	  moved	  to	  talking	  at	  
each	  other.	  	  	  
Having	  discussed	  how	  the	  study	  was	  structured,	  the	  methodology	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  language,	  
and	  the	  ethical	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  study,	  I	  am	  now	  able	  to	  move	  on	  to	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  results	  
derived	  from	  recording	  the	  three	  pairs	  of	  participants.	  
	  
4.5	  The	  Results	  
Three	  pairs	  of	  conservative	  Muslims	  and	  Christians	  were	  invited	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  study	  after	  
answering	  in	  the	  affirmative	  to	  the	  questions	  testing	  for	  conservative	  belief.	  	  These	  participants	  
contacted	  me	  after	  seeing	  my	  post	  on	  the	  Centre	  for	  English	  Language	  Studies,	  University	  of	  
Birmingham	  website	  that	  offered	  to	  pay	  20	  pounds	  for	  volunteers	  for	  a	  study	  of	  the	  language	  of	  
Muslim	  and	  Christian	  conservative	  religious	  believers.	  	  All	  of	  the	  individuals	  invited	  attended	  as	  
planned.	  	  The	  participants,	  along	  with	  their	  country	  of	  origin,	  age	  group,	  gender,	  occupation	  and	  




Table	  4.4:	  Participants	  
	   Muslim	  Participants	   Christian	  Participants	  
Pair	  1:	   Muslim	  Believer	  1	  (MB1):	  	  
Age	  group:	  20s	  
Occupation:	  MA	  TEFL	  student	  
Gender:	  male	  
Nationality:	  British	  
Religious	  affiliation:	  Sunni	  Muslim	  
Previous	  contact	  with	  Christianity:	  
Extensive.	  	  MB1	  was	  a	  Christian	  before	  
he	  became	  a	  Muslim.	  
Christian	  Believer	  1	  (CB1):	  	  
Age	  group:	  20s	  
Occupation:	  MA	  TEFL	  student	  
Gender:	  male	  
Nationality:	  British	  
Religious	  affiliation:	  Evangelical	  
Christian	  attending	  a	  Pentecostal	  
church	  
Previous	  contact	  with	  Islam:	  Extensive.	  	  
CB1	  had	  previously	  engaged	  in	  
missionary	  work	  aimed	  at	  converting	  
Muslims	  and	  had	  a	  working	  knowledge	  
of	  Arabic.	  	  
Pair	  2:	   MB2:	  
Gender:	  female	  
Age	  group:	  20s	  
Occupation:	  MA	  TEFL	  student	  
Nationality:	  Omani	  
Religious	  affiliation:	  Ibadhi	  Muslim	  









denominational	  Evangelical	  Christian	  
attending	  a	  house	  church	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Previous	  contact	  with	  Islam:	  Extensive.	  	  
Spoke	  about	  having	  Muslim	  friends	  
and	  visiting	  mosques	  in	  India	  to	  discuss	  
Christianity	  with	  Muslims.	  
Pair	  3:	   MB3:	  
Gender:	  female	  
Age	  group:	  20s	  
Occupation:	  MA	  TEFL	  student	  
Nationality:	  Omani	  
Religious	  affiliation:	  Ibadhi	  Muslim	  




Age	  group:	  20s	  
Occupation:	  BA	  Theology	  student	  
Nationality:	  Indian	  
Religious	  affiliation:	  non-­‐
denominational	  Evangelical	  Christian	  
attending	  a	  house	  church	  
Previous	  contact	  with	  Islam:	  had	  
previously	  engaged	  in	  some	  
conversations	  with	  Muslim	  believers.	  
	  
In	  section	  3.5.2	  above,	  I	  noted	  that	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  website	  represented	  a	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  
inclusive	  approach	  to	  Muslim	  belief.	  	  Despite	  only	  minor	  doctrinal	  differences	  with	  Sunni	  Islam	  (such	  
as	  the	  insistence	  that	  the	  Qur’an	  was	  created),	  the	  Ibadhi	  school	  of	  Islam	  defines	  itself	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  
separatism	  and	  avoidance	  of	  inclusivist	  approaches	  (Rahman	  2002;	  Glasse	  1989).	  	  Therefore	  in	  many	  
respects	  it	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  even	  more	  conservative	  form	  of	  Islam	  than	  that	  represented	  by	  the	  
islamfortoday.com	  website.	  	  
House	  churches	  or	  groups	  can	  often	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  identity	  marker	  of	  some	  Evangelical	  Christian	  
communities	  in	  that	  they	  wish	  to	  separate	  themselves	  from	  more	  mainstream	  Protestant	  Christian	  
denominations	  such	  as	  the	  Church	  of	  England.	  	  These	  groups	  often	  define	  themselves	  as	  non-­‐
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denominational	  and	  claim	  to	  adhere	  to	  Biblical	  principles	  rather	  than	  any	  traditional	  creed	  that	  
would	  mark	  them	  out	  as	  belonging	  to	  a	  particular	  traditional	  denomination.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  written	  parts	  of	  the	  study	  were	  collected	  and	  have	  been	  reproduced	  below.	  	  Only	  the	  discussion	  
stages	  of	  the	  study	  were	  videoed	  and	  subsequently	  transcribed.	  	  The	  transcriptions	  were	  organised	  
according	  to	  tonal	  units	  (units	  that	  ended	  in	  “a	  final	  pitch	  contour	  of	  the	  type	  associated	  with	  the	  end	  
of	  a	  sentence”	  or	  clause	  (Chafe	  1993)).	  	  For	  reference	  purposes,	  the	  full	  video	  files	  can	  be	  found	  in	  
appendix	  3.1	  on	  the	  CD	  (MB1	  and	  CB1),	  3.2	  (MB2	  and	  CB2)	  and	  3.3	  (MB3	  and	  CB3),	  while	  the	  
complete	  transcripts	  of	  the	  discussions	  can	  be	  found	  in	  appendix	  4.1	  (MB1	  and	  CB1),	  4.2	  (MB1	  and	  
CB1)	  and	  4.3	  (MB1	  and	  CB1).	  	  When	  referring	  to	  language	  from	  the	  transcripts,	  the	  first	  discussion	  
will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  p1	  (part	  one)	  and	  the	  second	  discussion	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  p2	  (part	  two).	  	  
Line	  numbers	  will	  also	  always	  be	  provided	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ‘l’	  followed	  by	  the	  line	  number,	  so,	  for	  
example,	  a	  reference	  to	  CB2’s	  first	  use	  of	  the	  phrase	  “presence	  of	  God”	  in	  the	  first	  discussion	  in	  line	  
67	  in	  the	  transcript	  will	  be	  referenced	  as	  p1l67.	  	  	  	  
The	  answers	  given	  for	  the	  first	  and	  second	  part	  of	  the	  written	  stage	  have	  been	  included	  below	  (tables	  
5,	  6,	  7,	  8,	  9	  and	  10),	  along	  with	  summaries	  of	  the	  first	  and	  second	  part	  of	  the	  discussion	  stages.	  
The	  first	  pair	  to	  take	  part	  consisted	  of	  two	  participants	  that	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  as	  Muslim	  Believer	  1	  (MB1)	  
and	  Christian	  Believer	  1	  (CB1).	  	  The	  first	  task	  consisted	  of	  asking	  the	  participants	  to	  write	  down	  three	  
points	  relating	  to	  how	  they	  think	  the	  other	  participant	  arrived	  at	  their	  sense	  of	  certainty	  in	  their	  
religious	  beliefs	  (see	  table	  2	  above).	  	  MB1	  completed	  this	  task	  with	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  Christian	  Bible	  
and	  two	  closely	  related	  references	  to	  experience:	  “life	  experience”	  and	  “travel”.	  	  CB1’s	  answers	  
included	  references	  to	  Muslim	  doctrine,	  the	  perceived	  continuity	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  a	  perceived	  
confusion	  in	  the	  beliefs	  and	  behaviour	  of	  other	  religious	  believers	  outside	  of	  Islam.	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  
that	  these	  perceptions	  closely	  match	  the	  emphasis	  on	  a	  system	  of	  belief	  in	  the	  Muslim	  language	  and	  
the	  importance	  of	  personal	  experience	  in	  the	  Christian	  language	  that	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  the	  results	  




Table	  4.5:	  First	  task	  for	  Muslim	  believer	  1	  (MB1)	  and	  Christian	  believer	  1	  (CB1):	  	  
First	  task,	  MB1	  (How	  does	  the	  other	  participant	  arrive	  at	  certainty?):	  
[1]	  scripture	  
[2]	  life	  experience	  
[3]	  travel	  
First	  task,	  CB1	  (How	  does	  the	  other	  participant	  arrive	  at	  certainty?):	  
[1]	  Tawhid	  –	  the	  simplicity	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  God’s	  unity.	  [note:	  Tawhid	  is	  the	  Muslim	  doctrine	  that	  God	  is	  one,	  not	  one-­‐in-­‐
three,	  three-­‐in-­‐one	  as	  the	  Christian	  doctrine	  of	  the	  Trinity	  maintains]	  
[2]	  The	  unbroken-­‐ness	  (continuity)	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  throughout	  the	  centuries.	  
[3]	  Conflicting,	  unclear,	  confusing	  messages	  –	  in	  words	  and	  behaviour	  –	  from	  other	  world	  religions	  or	  their	  followers	  …	  
	  
	  
The	  two	  participants	  were	  then	  asked	  to	  display	  their	  answers	  on	  the	  board	  behind	  them	  and	  then	  
given	  approximately	  twenty	  minutes	  to	  discuss	  whether	  they	  agreed	  or	  disagreed	  with	  what	  the	  
other	  participant	  had	  written,	  or	  wanted	  to	  add	  anything.	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  give	  a	  brief,	  
evaluative	  synopsis	  of	  the	  discussion	  (see	  appendix	  3.1	  for	  the	  video	  file	  and	  appendix	  4.1	  for	  the	  full	  
transcript).	  
	  
CB1	  begins	  by	  addressing	  MB1’s	  decision	  to	  view	  life	  experience	  and	  scripture	  as	  the	  key	  elements	  
that	  have	  enabled	  CB1	  to	  arrive	  at	  certainty.	  	  He	  states	  that	  in	  his	  view	  reason	  and	  intellect	  would	  
play	  a	  more	  important	  role	  than	  life	  experience.	  	  I	  will	  pick	  up	  on	  this	  foregrounding	  of	  reason	  and	  
intellect	  in	  the	  discussion	  section	  below	  as	  a	  notion	  that	  appears	  to	  contradict	  the	  patterns	  of	  
emphasis	  I	  established	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  Christian	  testimonials.	  	  MB1	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  agree	  with	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CB1’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  God	  being	  the	  most	  important	  element	  in	  MB1’s	  
arrival	  at	  certainty	  in	  his	  beliefs.	  	  He	  expands	  on	  this	  by	  arguing	  for	  the	  superiority	  of	  Islam	  over	  
Christianity	  because	  of	  its	  adherence	  to	  the	  oneness	  of	  God,	  its	  simplicity	  (he	  views	  the	  Trinity	  as	  
man-­‐made	  complexity	  and	  confusion	  imposed	  over	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  God),	  and	  consistency	  
(he	  views	  the	  Old	  Testament	  as	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  New	  Testament).	  I	  will	  argue	  below	  that	  this	  
supports	  the	  view	  that	  MB1	  wants	  to	  foreground	  elements	  of	  an	  objective	  system	  of	  belief	  over	  a	  
way	  of	  believing	  that	  is	  based	  around	  a	  personal,	  intimate	  relationship	  with	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  CB1	  
responds	  by	  stating	  his	  belief	  in	  the	  consistency	  of	  the	  Bible	  and	  arguing	  that	  the	  Christian	  view	  of	  
the	  trinity	  is	  viewed	  as	  being	  confusing	  and	  inconsistent	  because	  of	  the	  ineffective	  ways	  in	  which	  
Christians	  talk	  about	  it,	  and	  how	  it	  has	  been	  misunderstood	  by	  those	  outside	  Christianity.	  	  He	  goes	  on	  
to	  argue	  that	  the	  Muslim	  view	  of	  God	  is	  too	  simplistic	  and	  then	  argues	  for	  a	  side	  point	  that	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  realise	  that	  many	  Christians	  do	  not	  view	  the	  word	  of	  God	  as	  being	  the	  Bible	  but	  take	  it	  
as	  a	  reference	  to	  Jesus.	  MB1	  responds	  by	  returning	  to	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  God	  and	  arguing	  
that	  God	  is	  unique	  and	  therefore	  the	  word	  of	  God	  should	  not	  be	  equated	  with	  Jesus.	  	  He	  then	  moves	  
on	  to	  make	  the	  point	  that	  believers	  should	  be	  able	  to	  communicate	  directly	  with	  God	  without	  the	  
need	  for	  an	  intermediary.	  CB1	  again	  argues	  that	  the	  Muslim	  view	  (of	  Jesus	  being	  an	  intermediary	  
between	  God	  and	  man)	  is	  too	  simplistic.	  	  One	  of	  the	  interesting	  aspects	  of	  this	  discussion	  is	  that	  
MB1’s	  language	  follows	  many	  of	  the	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  established	  for	  the	  Muslim	  believers	  in	  the	  
analysis	  of	  the	  testimonials.	  	  In	  contrast,	  as	  I	  shall	  explore	  below,	  CB1’s	  language	  often	  does	  not	  
exhibit	  the	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  established	  for	  the	  Christian	  believers.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
After	  the	  discussion,	  the	  participants	  were	  moved	  on	  to	  the	  second	  task.	  	  This	  consisted	  of	  first	  
asking	  the	  participants	  to	  arrange	  nine	  words	  in	  order	  of	  how	  frequently	  they	  used	  them	  as	  part	  of	  
their	  usual	  language	  for	  talking	  about	  their	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Christian	  or	  Muslim	  believer.	  	  The	  
participants	  were	  then	  asked	  to	  use	  the	  top	  five	  words	  in	  their	  list	  to	  produce	  five	  sentences	  that	  
would	  describe	  an	  aspect	  of	  their	  personal	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Christian	  or	  a	  Muslim	  (see	  table	  3	  
above).	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MB1	  chose	  words	  such	  as	  with,	  came	  and	  in	  that	  were	  commonly	  used	  by	  the	  Christian	  believers	  in	  
the	  testimonials	  to	  express	  personal,	  divine-­‐relationship	  language,	  and	  yet	  in	  his	  sentences,	  he	  used	  
them	  to	  express	  alternative	  notions.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  terms	  of	  his	  use	  of	  with,	  instead	  of	  referring	  to	  
being	  with	  a	  divine	  entity,	  he	  simply	  referred	  to	  reaching	  a	  conclusion	  “with	  the	  experience	  and	  
knowledge	  I	  gathered”.	  	  In	  contrast,	  CB1	  made	  use	  of	  words	  like	  in,	  follow	  and	  through	  to	  explicitly	  
express	  a	  relationship	  with	  a	  divine	  entity,	  for	  example,	  “With	  Christ	  in	  my	  life,	  my	  black-­‐and-­‐white	  
world	  became	  coloured”.	  The	  five	  sentences	  from	  both	  participants	  have	  been	  reproduced	  below	  in	  
table	  4.6:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  Table	  4.6:	  Second	  task	  for	  Muslim	  believer	  1	  (MB1)	  and	  Christian	  believer	  1	  (CB1):	  
	  
Second	  task,	  MB1	  (Make	  sentences	  from	  the	  chosen	  words	  that	  reflect	  your	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Muslim):	  
[1]	  By	  the	  permission	  of	  Allah	  I	  came	  to	  Islaam	  
[2]	  Through	  my	  life	  experience	  I	  believe	  Islaam	  to	  be	  the	  truth	  
[3]	  I	  spent	  some	  time	  researching	  other	  religions	  as	  well	  as	  attending	  religious	  ceremonies	  and	  events,	  and	  with	  the	  
experience	  and	  knowledge	  gathered	  I	  concluded	  that	  Islam	  to	  be	  the	  truth	  
[4]	  The	  concept	  that	  God	  is	  One	  and	  that	  this	  principle	  should	  reflect	  throughout	  religion	  guided	  my	  decision	  to	  accept	  
Islaam	  	  
[5]	  I	  accepted	  Islaam	  in	  the	  90s.	  
Second	  task,	  CB1	  (Make	  sentences	  from	  the	  chosen	  words	  that	  reflect	  your	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Christian):	  
[1]	  With	  Christ	  in	  my	  life,	  my	  black-­‐and-­‐white	  world	  became	  coloured	  
[2]	  I	  submit	  to	  God	  through	  Jesus	  
[3]	  Recognizing	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  spiritual	  brings	  a	  more-­‐than-­‐helpful	  sense	  of	  perspective	  
[4]	  I	  follow	  Jesus	  –	  and	  I	  happen	  to	  be	  a	  Christian!	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[5]	  In	  him	  is	  peace	  and	  purpose	  
	  
The	  two	  participants	  were	  then	  asked	  to	  display	  their	  sentences	  on	  the	  board	  behind	  them	  and	  then	  
given	  approximately	  twenty	  minutes	  to	  discuss	  any	  interesting	  differences	  they	  noticed	  or	  
observations	  that	  they	  wanted	  to	  make.	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  give	  a	  brief,	  evaluative	  synopsis	  of	  this	  
discussion	  (see	  appendix	  3.1	  for	  the	  video	  file	  and	  appendix	  4.1	  for	  the	  full	  transcript).	  
	  
CB1	  initially	  struggles	  with	  the	  discussion	  activity,	  claiming	  that	  the	  task	  was	  a	  “little	  bit	  too	  linguistic	  
for	  me”	  (second	  discussion,	  line	  3,	  subsequently	  referred	  to	  as	  p2l3).	  	  MB1	  therefore	  takes	  over	  and	  
begins	  by	  talking	  through	  the	  sentences	  he	  wrote	  and	  his	  rationale	  for	  writing	  them.	  	  He	  particularly	  
focuses	  in	  on	  his	  life	  experience	  and	  the	  process	  of	  research	  he	  underwent	  to	  arrive	  at	  his	  belief	  in	  
Islam.	  	  This	  leads	  him	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  superiority	  of	  Islam	  compared	  to	  other	  world	  religions	  and	  
how	  other	  religions	  such	  as	  Christianity	  have	  complicated	  and	  distorted	  the	  truth.	  	  Again,	  MB1’s	  
emphasis	  on	  a	  process	  of	  research	  and	  reflection	  and	  a	  foregrounding	  of	  doctrinal	  issues	  or	  the	  
system	  of	  belief	  matches	  some	  of	  the	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  in	  the	  Muslim	  testimonial	  language.	  	  CB1	  
briefly	  responds	  by	  acknowledging	  some	  of	  the	  translation	  issues	  with	  the	  Bible	  while	  essentially	  
arguing	  for	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  manuscripts	  it	  was	  based	  on.	  	  He	  also	  argues	  that	  it	  may	  be	  over	  
simplistic	  to	  argue	  that	  truth	  is	  deliberately	  distorted	  by	  man	  because	  humans	  are	  often	  unable	  to	  
see	  the	  truth	  without	  divine	  help.	  	  Once	  more,	  CB1	  does	  not	  foreground	  personal	  relationship	  
language,	  instead	  opting	  to	  foreground	  doctrinal	  issues	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  MB1	  does.	  	  His	  allusions	  
to	  divine	  aid	  in	  the	  process	  of	  arriving	  at	  truth	  remain	  theoretical	  and	  are	  never	  operationalized	  in	  a	  
first	  person,	  autobiographical	  manner	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  they	  often	  were	  in	  the	  Christian	  
testimonial	  data.	  	  MB1	  continues	  the	  theoretical	  discussion	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  process	  of	  blinding	  
occurs	  after	  humans	  have	  come	  into	  contact	  with	  the	  truth	  and	  decided	  to	  reject	  it,	  because	  if	  
humans	  were	  naturally	  blind	  to	  the	  truth,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  unjust	  because	  people	  would	  have	  been	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deprived	  of	  the	  fair	  opportunity	  to	  embrace	  that	  truth.	  	  CB1	  concludes	  the	  discussion	  by	  wishing	  he	  
had	  debated	  these	  issues	  with	  MB1	  when	  he	  was	  younger	  before	  MB1	  had	  been	  persuaded	  to	  join	  
Islam	  by	  his	  Muslim	  friends.	  	  I	  will	  argue	  below	  in	  the	  discussion	  section	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  construction	  
of	  hypothetical	  situations	  serves	  the	  purpose	  of	  covertly	  conveying	  certain	  presuppositions,	  such	  as	  
the	  presupposition	  that	  MB1	  was	  weak	  minded	  when	  he	  was	  young	  and	  that	  explains	  why	  he	  was	  so	  
easily	  led	  towards	  a	  religion	  that	  is	  being	  perceived	  by	  CB1	  as	  self-­‐evidently	  incorrect.	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  question	  relating	  to	  both	  of	  these	  discussions	  between	  MB1	  and	  CB1	  is	  
whether	  CB1	  backgrounds	  personal	  relationship	  language	  because	  he	  is	  being	  temporarily	  influenced	  
by	  the	  language	  of	  MB1,	  or	  whether	  it	  is	  because	  he	  generally	  conceptualises	  and	  operationalizes	  his	  
doctrinal	  beliefs	  in	  a	  different	  way	  to	  CB2	  and	  CB3.	  I	  will	  address	  this	  key	  point	  in	  detail	  in	  my	  
discussion	  of	  the	  results	  in	  section	  4.6.2	  below.	  
Having	  briefly	  outlined	  the	  results	  of	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  tasks	  and	  the	  two	  periods	  of	  discussion	  
completed	  by	  MB1	  and	  CB1,	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  an	  outline	  of	  the	  results	  of	  the	  tasks	  and	  
discussions	  completed	  by	  MB2	  and	  CB2.	  	  	  	  	  	  
As	  we	  saw	  above,	  the	  first	  task	  consisted	  of	  asking	  the	  participants	  to	  write	  down	  three	  points	  
relating	  to	  how	  they	  think	  the	  other	  participant	  arrived	  at	  their	  sense	  of	  certainty	  in	  their	  religious	  
beliefs	  (see	  table	  2	  above).	  	  MB2’s	  answers	  included	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  feeling	  of	  “peace	  in	  
Christianity”.	  	  This	  fits	  with	  the	  Christian	  pattern	  of	  emphasis	  identified	  in	  the	  testimonial	  language	  
relating	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  subjective	  feelings	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  certainty.	  	  However,	  
MB2’s	  second	  answer	  –	  the	  influence	  of	  family	  and	  reading	  about	  Christianity	  –	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  
matching	  the	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  found	  in	  the	  Muslim	  testimonial	  language	  better	  than	  the	  
patterns	  found	  in	  the	  Christian	  testimonial	  language.	  	  She	  also	  refers	  to	  the	  Christian	  need	  for	  a	  
system	  of	  salvation	  that	  can	  get	  “rid	  of	  the	  sins”	  that	  Christians	  believe	  all	  humans	  are	  born	  with	  and	  
the	  observation	  that	  Christians	  will	  respect	  those	  who	  love	  Jesus,	  although	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  ascertain	  
how	  these	  last	  two	  points	  relate	  to	  an	  arrival	  at	  certainty	  of	  belief.	  	  CB2’s	  answers	  included	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references	  to	  the	  Qur’an,	  the	  perception	  that	  Westerners	  are	  immoral,	  the	  notion	  that	  Allah	  “blesses	  
those	  that	  live	  by	  his	  rule”	  and	  the	  teaching	  of	  Islam.	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  that	  all	  these	  points	  match	  an	  
emphasis	  on	  language	  relating	  to	  a	  system	  of	  belief	  involving	  a	  set	  of	  prescribed	  rules.	  	  The	  answers	  
to	  the	  task	  have	  been	  reproduced	  below	  in	  table	  4.7:	  	  	  
	  
Table	  4.7:	  First	  task	  for	  MB2	  and	  CB2:	  	  	  
First	  task,	  MB2	  (How	  does	  the	  other	  participant	  arrive	  at	  certainty?):	  
[1]	  Peace	  in	  Christianity	  
[2]	  Arrived	  at	  certainty	  because	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  family	  and	  readings	  on	  this	  religion	  
[3]	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  the	  sins	  he	  believes	  is	  born	  with	  
[4]	  I	  guess	  the	  other	  person	  respects	  whoever	  loves	  Jesus	  and	  believes	  that	  Allah	  is	  one	  
First	  task,	  CB2	  (How	  does	  the	  other	  participant	  arrive	  at	  certainty?):	  
[1]	  Qur’an	  
[2]	  Lifestyle	  of	  ‘Westerners‘	  is	  wrong	  (morally	  etc.)	  
[3]	  Allah	  blesses	  those	  who	  live	  by	  his	  rule	  
[4]	  Teaching	  
	  
The	  two	  participants	  were	  then	  asked	  to	  display	  their	  answers	  on	  the	  board	  behind	  them	  and	  then	  
given	  approximately	  twenty	  minutes	  to	  discuss	  whether	  they	  agreed	  or	  disagreed	  with	  what	  the	  
other	  participant	  had	  written,	  or	  wanted	  to	  add	  anything.	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  give	  a	  brief,	  





MB2	  begins	  the	  discussion	  by	  disagreeing	  with	  CB2’s	  written	  statement	  that	  disagreement	  with	  the	  
Western	  way	  of	  life	  would	  be	  one	  of	  the	  points	  that	  would	  allow	  her	  to	  arrive	  at	  certainty	  in	  terms	  of	  
her	  belief	  in	  Islam.	  	  She	  concedes	  that	  there	  are	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  West	  that	  she	  disagrees	  with,	  
but	  there	  are	  also	  aspects	  that	  she	  likes.	  	  CB2	  then	  partially	  disagrees	  with	  MB2’s	  statement	  that	  he	  
has	  arrived	  at	  certainty	  through	  influence	  from	  his	  parents.	  	  He	  concedes	  that	  some	  members	  of	  his	  
family	  were	  Christian,	  but	  that	  his	  personal	  commitment	  to	  Christianity	  and	  his	  arrival	  at	  certainty	  in	  
terms	  of	  his	  Christian	  beliefs	  were	  not	  as	  a	  result	  of	  his	  family	  connections.	  He	  then	  explains	  that	  his	  
sense	  of	  certainty	  is	  derived	  from	  his	  view	  that	  Christianity	  makes	  sense	  to	  him,	  in	  addition	  to	  his	  
experience	  of	  “the	  presence	  of	  God”	  (see	  table	  13	  below)	  in	  his	  life,	  as	  well	  as	  experiencing	  the	  Bible	  
as	  the	  living	  word	  of	  God.	  	  CB2	  makes	  repeated	  use	  of	  this	  divine	  proximity	  metaphor,	  “the	  presence	  
of	  God”,	  developing	  a	  clear	  pattern	  of	  emphasis	  relating	  to	  the	  foregrounding	  of	  a	  perceived	  personal	  
relationship	  with	  God,	  while	  MB2	  does	  not	  appropriate	  this	  type	  of	  language	  or	  make	  use	  of	  a	  similar	  
variation	  of	  her	  own.	  	  She	  instead	  responds	  by	  talking	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  for	  her	  
beliefs	  and	  how	  she	  believes	  the	  book	  “gives	  solutions	  to	  what	  happens”	  (first	  discussion,	  line	  149,	  
subsequently	  referred	  to	  as	  p1l149)	  in	  her	  life.	  Both	  participants	  then	  note	  that	  they	  are	  able	  to	  
continuously	  discover	  new	  things	  in	  their	  respective	  sacred	  texts,	  although	  CB2	  indirectly	  relates	  this	  
to	  divine	  relationship	  language	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  he	  is	  able	  to	  discover	  these	  new	  things	  because	  
of	  the	  Holy	  Spirit	  highlighting	  them	  to	  him.	  	  MB2	  then	  moves	  towards	  focusing	  the	  discussion	  on	  a	  
theoretical	  point	  of	  doctrine	  by	  asking	  whether	  CB2	  believes	  that	  all	  humans	  are	  “born	  with	  sin”.	  	  
CB2	  replies	  that	  he	  believes	  that	  all	  humans	  are	  fallen	  because	  of	  Adam	  and	  Eve	  and	  that	  some	  sins	  
can	  also	  be	  inherited	  from	  a	  person’s	  parents.	  	  He	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  the	  idea	  that	  these	  sins	  
can	  be	  cleansed	  by	  asking	  Jesus,	  who	  died	  for	  the	  sins	  of	  humanity,	  for	  forgiveness.	  MB2	  then	  
explains	  that	  she	  believes	  all	  humans	  are	  born	  without	  sin	  and	  that	  they	  are	  all	  responsible	  for	  their	  
actions	  after	  their	  birth.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Again,	  after	  the	  discussion,	  the	  participants	  were	  moved	  on	  to	  the	  second	  task.	  	  This	  consisted	  of	  first	  
asking	  the	  participants	  to	  arrange	  nine	  words	  in	  order	  of	  how	  frequently	  they	  used	  them	  as	  part	  of	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their	  usual	  language	  for	  talking	  about	  their	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Christian	  or	  Muslim	  believer.	  	  The	  
participants	  were	  then	  asked	  to	  use	  the	  top	  five	  words	  in	  their	  list	  to	  produce	  five	  sentences	  that	  
would	  describe	  an	  aspect	  of	  their	  personal	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Christian	  or	  a	  Muslim	  (see	  table	  3	  
above).	  	  	  
MB2’s	  sentences	  revolved	  around	  following	  the	  set	  of	  rules	  set	  down	  by	  the	  Qur’an,	  but	  also	  
included	  references	  to	  being	  guided	  by	  God,	  as	  well	  as	  allusions	  to	  her	  own	  life	  experience	  as	  a	  
Muslim.	  	  In	  contrast,	  CB2’s	  sentences	  made	  use	  of	  prepositions	  like	  in,	  with	  and	  into	  to	  make	  a	  range	  
of	  divine	  proximity	  sentences	  that	  were	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  language	  encountered	  in	  the	  
Christian	  testimonial	  data.	  The	  five	  sentences	  from	  both	  participants	  have	  been	  reproduced	  below	  in	  
table	  4.8:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Table	  4.8:	  Second	  task	  for	  MB2	  and	  CB2:	  	  	  
Second	  task,	  MB2	  (Make	  sentences	  from	  the	  chosen	  words	  that	  reflect	  your	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Muslim):	  
[1]	  I	  follow	  the	  right	  path	  in	  this	  life	  
[2]	  Allah	  guides	  us	  to	  His	  path	  through	  His	  Holy	  Quran	  and	  by	  sending	  prophets	  
[3]	  When	  I	  came	  through	  a	  bad	  experience,	  I	  don’t	  feel	  upset	  because	  I	  know	  that	  it	  is	  the	  best	  thing	  Allah	  has	  given	  me	  
[4]	  Through	  reflecting	  on	  the	  good	  and	  bad	  moments	  I	  came	  through,	  I	  feel	  my	  faith	  becomes	  stronger	  and	  deeper	  
[5]	  I	  find	  the	  Islamic	  rules	  so	  useful	  in	  governing	  every	  aspect	  of	  my	  life	  
Second	  task,	  CB2	  (Make	  sentences	  from	  the	  chosen	  words	  that	  reflect	  your	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Christian):	  
[1]	  The	  Holy	  Spirit	  lives	  in	  me	  
[2]	  I	  have	  a	  personal	  relationship	  with	  God	  
[3]	  I	  follow	  Jesus’	  teaching	  and	  example	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[4]	  My	  Salvation	  comes	  through	  Jesus’	  sacrifice	  
[5]	  Invited	  Jesus	  into	  my	  heart	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  God	  came	  into	  my	  life	  (Presence	  of	  God,	  Jesus	  came	  into	  my	  life/heart)	  
	  
The	  participants	  were	  then	  asked	  to	  display	  their	  sentences	  on	  the	  board	  behind	  them	  and	  then	  
given	  approximately	  twenty	  minutes	  to	  discuss	  any	  interesting	  differences	  they	  noticed	  or	  
observations	  that	  they	  wanted	  to	  make.	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  give	  a	  brief,	  evaluative	  synopsis	  of	  this	  
discussion	  (see	  appendix	  3.2	  for	  the	  video	  file	  and	  appendix	  4.2	  for	  the	  full	  transcript).	  
	  
CB2	  begins	  by	  acknowledging	  that	  the	  laws	  that	  Christians	  should	  follow	  are	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  laws	  
that	  Muslims	  are	  expected	  to	  follow,	  and	  MB2	  responds	  by	  acknowledging	  that	  the	  way	  she	  views	  
the	  Qur’an	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  way	  that	  CB2	  views	  the	  Bible.	  	  MB2	  then	  asks	  CB2	  to	  explain	  how	  he	  
believes	  salvation	  is	  attained,	  and	  he	  responds	  by	  asking	  her	  to	  first	  outline	  how	  salvation	  is	  attained	  
in	  Islam.	  	  MB2	  states	  that	  reaching	  heaven	  depends	  on	  following	  the	  Qur’an,	  and	  CB2	  responds	  by	  
pointing	  out	  that	  the	  key	  difference	  between	  their	  beliefs	  is	  that	  MB2	  believes	  she	  will	  get	  to	  heaven	  
by	  what	  she	  does,	  while	  he	  believes	  he	  will	  get	  to	  heaven	  by	  believing	  what	  Jesus	  has	  done	  for	  him.	  	  
In	  my	  previous	  analysis	  of	  the	  testimonials,	  I	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  difference,	  but	  also	  
discussed	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  can	  often	  be	  an	  overlap	  between	  the	  language	  of	  the	  two	  religions	  in	  
the	  sense	  that	  Allah	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  sometimes	  bringing	  believers	  to	  belief	  in	  Islam,	  while	  Christian	  
believers	  can	  also	  often	  emphasise	  the	  importance	  of	  their	  willing	  acceptance	  that	  salvation	  has	  been	  
achieved	  for	  them.	  	  We	  can	  also	  see	  a	  level	  of	  overlap	  and	  even	  convergence	  here	  in	  that	  MB2	  goes	  
on	  to	  point	  out	  that	  although	  she	  believes	  that	  what	  she	  does	  is	  important,	  she	  also	  believes	  in	  the	  
mercy	  of	  Allah	  who	  forgives	  her	  even	  when	  she	  does	  do	  something	  wrong.	  	  This	  tentative	  degree	  of	  
convergence	  continues	  with	  CB2	  building	  on	  MB2’s	  point	  by	  stating	  that	  in	  both	  Islam	  and	  
Christianity	  the	  view	  is	  that	  God	  judges	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  believer	  and	  not	  just	  their	  outward	  actions.	  	  
MB2	  agrees	  but	  then	  re-­‐focuses	  the	  discussion	  on	  what	  she	  views	  as	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  doctrinal	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differences	  between	  Christianity	  and	  Islam:	  the	  Christian	  belief	  that	  God	  is	  comprised	  of	  the	  Father,	  
the	  Son	  and	  the	  Holy	  Spirit.	  	  CB2	  then	  explains	  that	  the	  trinity	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  referring	  to	  three	  
aspects	  of	  God,	  rather	  than	  three	  separate	  parts	  to	  God.	  	  MB2	  then	  asks	  if	  Christians	  need	  to	  go	  to	  
Church	  in	  order	  to	  speak	  to	  God.	  	  What	  follows	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  one	  of	  the	  strongest	  displays	  of	  
empathy	  in	  all	  three	  discussions.	  	  CB2	  responds	  by	  saying	  that	  he	  can	  speak	  to	  God	  anywhere,	  but	  
that	  he	  goes	  to	  church	  in	  order	  to	  spend	  time	  with	  other	  Christians	  because	  then	  they	  can	  help	  and	  
guide	  each	  other	  in	  difficult	  times.	  	  CB2	  consolidates	  this	  point	  by	  outlining	  a	  personal	  situation	  
where	  sometimes	  he	  does	  not	  know	  what	  God	  wants	  him	  to	  do	  at	  a	  particular	  time,	  and	  then	  it	  is	  
helpful	  to	  be	  able	  to	  meet	  with	  other	  Christians	  and	  listen	  to	  their	  advice.	  	  After	  some	  degree	  of	  
apparent	  misunderstanding,	  MB2	  agrees	  with	  what	  CB2	  is	  saying	  by	  acknowledging	  that	  his	  
experience	  of	  sometimes	  being	  unsure	  about	  what	  God	  wants	  him	  to	  do	  is	  something	  that	  she	  also	  
sometimes	  experiences.	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  the	  discussion	  section	  4.6.1	  below	  that	  this	  is	  a	  particularly	  
important	  moment	  in	  the	  discourse	  because	  it	  does	  not	  just	  involve	  an	  acknowledgement	  of	  some	  
theoretical	  doctrinal	  similarity,	  but	  a	  similarity	  in	  a	  perceived	  shared	  experience	  of	  relating	  to	  a	  divine	  
entity.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Having	  briefly	  outlined	  the	  results	  of	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  tasks	  and	  the	  two	  periods	  of	  discussion	  
completed	  by	  MB2	  and	  CB2,	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  an	  outline	  of	  the	  results	  of	  the	  tasks	  and	  
discussions	  completed	  by	  MB3	  and	  CB3.	  	  	  	  	  	  
As	  with	  the	  previous	  pairs,	  the	  first	  task	  consisted	  of	  asking	  the	  participants	  to	  write	  down	  three	  
points	  relating	  to	  how	  they	  think	  the	  other	  participant	  arrived	  at	  their	  sense	  of	  certainty	  in	  their	  
religious	  beliefs	  (see	  table	  2	  above).	  	  MB3	  appeared	  to	  find	  the	  task	  challenging	  and	  was	  only	  able	  to	  
provide	  two	  points:	  “salvation”	  and	  “original	  sin”.	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  MB3	  viewed	  the	  notion	  that	  
Christians	  believe	  that	  Jesus’	  death	  on	  the	  cross	  saves	  them	  from	  the	  sin	  that	  they	  believe	  is	  inherent	  
in	  humanity	  as	  central	  and	  therefore	  crucial	  in	  any	  sense	  of	  certainty.	  	  CB3	  also	  referred	  to	  two	  
elements	  that	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  central	  to	  the	  belief	  system	  of	  the	  other	  participant:	  “Prophet	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Mohammed”	  and	  the	  “Qur’an”.	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  that	  she	  also	  included	  a	  reference	  to	  praying	  and	  
experience,	  acknowledging	  that	  from	  her	  perspective	  the	  practice	  of	  her	  beliefs	  were	  a	  crucial	  
element	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  certainty.	  	  The	  answers	  to	  the	  task	  have	  been	  reproduced	  below	  in	  table	  4.9:	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Table	  4.9:	  First	  task	  for	  MB3	  and	  CB3	  	  
First	  task,	  MB3	  (How	  does	  the	  other	  participant	  arrive	  at	  certainty?):	  
[1]	  Salvation	  
[2]	  Original	  sin	  
First	  task,	  CB3	  (How	  does	  the	  other	  participant	  arrive	  at	  certainty?):	  
[1]	  Prophet	  Mohammed	  (pbuh)	  
[2]	  The	  Qur’an	  
[3]	  Prayer?/Experience	  
	  
The	  participants	  were	  then	  asked	  to	  display	  their	  answers	  on	  the	  board	  behind	  them	  and	  then	  given	  
approximately	  twenty	  minutes	  to	  discuss	  whether	  they	  agreed	  or	  disagreed	  with	  what	  the	  other	  
participant	  had	  written,	  or	  wanted	  to	  add	  anything.	  I	  will	  now	  provide	  a	  brief,	  evaluative	  synopsis	  of	  
the	  discussion	  (see	  appendix	  3.3	  for	  the	  video	  file	  and	  appendix	  4.3	  for	  the	  full	  transcript).	  
	  
MB3	  begins	  by	  disagreeing	  with	  CB3’s	  written	  statement	  that	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  the	  Prophet	  
Mohammad	  would	  be	  the	  most	  important	  points	  in	  her	  arrival	  at	  the	  certainty	  of	  her	  beliefs.	  	  She	  
goes	  on	  to	  explain	  that	  the	  most	  important	  point	  would	  be	  her	  belief	  in	  the	  oneness	  of	  God,	  and	  that	  
her	  experience	  of	  prayer,	  fasting	  and	  pilgrimage	  would	  also	  be	  very	  important.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  
note	  that	  from	  the	  outset,	  MB3	  appears	  to	  want	  to	  emphasise	  the	  personal,	  practical	  aspects	  of	  her	  
way	  of	  belief,	  while	  also	  making	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  divine	  entity	  itself	  should	  be	  foregrounded	  as	  the	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foundation	  of	  her	  faith	  even	  more	  than	  the	  signposts	  that	  are	  perceived	  to	  point	  towards	  that	  divine	  
entity.	  CB3	  responds	  by	  describing	  the	  basis	  for	  her	  arrival	  at	  certainty	  as	  the	  transition	  from	  
believing	  in	  God	  without	  experience	  to	  experiencing	  the	  spirit	  of	  God	  in	  her	  life,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  spirit	  
working	  through	  the	  Bible.	  	  In	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  CB2,	  CB3	  follows	  the	  pattern	  of	  emphasis	  highlighted	  
in	  the	  Christian	  testimonial	  data	  of	  foregrounding	  personal	  divine	  entity	  relationship	  language.	  	  MB3	  
moves	  on	  to	  highlight	  the	  difference	  between	  their	  beliefs	  in	  terms	  of	  Christians	  believing	  their	  
salvation	  is	  certain	  because	  of	  Jesus’	  death	  and	  Muslims	  believing	  that	  their	  salvation	  can	  only	  be	  
certain	  after	  they	  have	  earned	  it	  through	  a	  life	  of	  following	  the	  Qur’an.	  	  She	  then	  argues	  that	  the	  
Christian	  view	  is	  unfair	  because	  it	  means	  that	  Jesus	  was	  punished	  for	  what	  others	  did	  wrong.	  	  CB3	  
acknowledges	  that	  it	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  unfair,	  but	  that	  God’s	  love	  is	  so	  generous	  that	  he	  is	  not	  
concerned	  about	  it	  being	  unfair	  from	  Jesus’	  perspective.	  	  MB3	  responds	  by	  arguing	  that	  God	  cannot	  
be	  a	  loving	  father	  if	  he	  is	  willing	  to	  have	  his	  son	  killed	  for	  something	  he	  didn’t	  do,	  and	  CB3	  counters	  
by	  arguing	  that	  he	  is	  a	  loving	  father	  because	  he	  loved	  humanity	  enough	  to	  send	  his	  son	  to	  save	  them.	  	  
MB3	  then	  contrasts	  the	  Christian	  view	  with	  her	  own	  view	  that	  she	  finds	  peace	  in	  her	  relationship	  
with	  God	  and	  even	  though	  she	  cannot	  be	  certain	  about	  her	  salvation,	  she	  knows	  that	  God	  will	  be	  just	  
when	  he	  judges	  her	  and	  will	  give	  her	  salvation	  if	  she	  deserves	  it.	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  the	  discussion	  section	  
below	  that	  this	  exchange	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  indicators	  that	  MB3	  is	  working	  with	  a	  way	  of	  believing	  that	  
foregrounds	  a	  system	  of	  belief	  that	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  objective,	  logical	  and	  fixed	  while	  being	  
universally	  available	  and	  applicable.	  	  In	  contrast,	  CB3	  is	  working	  with	  a	  way	  of	  belief	  that	  foregrounds	  
a	  dynamically	  evolving	  personal	  relationship	  between	  the	  individual	  believer	  and	  the	  divine	  entity	  
that	  may	  appear	  “messy”	  and	  illogical	  when	  an	  attempt	  is	  made	  to	  reduce	  it	  to	  a	  system.	  	  However,	  
what	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  about	  this	  discussion	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  MB3	  also	  foregrounds	  
relationship	  language	  in	  a	  way	  that	  MB1	  and	  MB2	  do	  not.	  	  This	  foregrounding	  becomes	  even	  more	  
salient	  as	  she	  goes	  on	  to	  talk	  about	  her	  private	  relationship	  with	  God	  –	  a	  relationship	  that	  does	  not	  
require	  a	  middle	  man	  that	  she	  needs	  to	  confess	  to.	  	  CB3	  makes	  very	  frequent	  use	  of	  relationship	  
language	  throughout	  the	  discussion,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  MB3	  is	  the	  first	  to	  refer	  to	  a	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relationship	  with	  God,	  so	  it	  is	  therefore	  difficult	  to	  argue	  that	  MB3’s	  unusual	  foregrounding	  of	  this	  
type	  of	  language	  is	  due	  to	  her	  convergence	  with	  the	  language	  of	  CB3.	  	  CB3	  agrees	  that	  a	  relationship	  
with	  God,	  as	  well	  as	  Jesus	  and	  the	  Spirit,	  is	  the	  key	  part	  of	  religious	  faith,	  and	  explains	  that	  she	  can	  
talk	  to	  God	  at	  any	  moment,	  and	  not	  just	  five	  times	  a	  day,	  but	  she	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  maintain	  that	  it	  is	  
only	  through	  Jesus	  that	  she	  can	  understand	  and	  be	  assured	  of	  her	  salvation.	  	  MB3	  then	  concludes	  the	  
first	  part	  of	  the	  discussion	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  she	  doesn’t	  understand	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  trinity,	  and	  
attempts	  to	  re-­‐focus	  the	  discussion	  on	  a	  doctrinal	  point	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  as	  MB1	  and	  MB2	  does.	  	  
However,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  CB3	  does	  attempt	  to	  briefly	  explain	  the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  trinity,	  she	  
then	  switches	  to	  emphasising	  that	  theoretically	  understanding	  the	  trinity	  is	  not	  as	  important	  as	  
experiencing	  it	  through	  the	  death	  of	  Christ	  and	  being	  given	  the	  Spirit.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Again,	  after	  the	  discussion,	  the	  participants	  were	  moved	  on	  to	  the	  second	  task.	  	  This	  consisted	  of	  first	  
asking	  the	  participants	  to	  arrange	  nine	  words	  in	  order	  of	  how	  frequently	  they	  used	  them	  as	  part	  of	  
their	  usual	  language	  for	  talking	  about	  their	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Christian	  or	  Muslim	  believer.	  	  The	  
participants	  were	  then	  asked	  to	  use	  the	  top	  five	  words	  in	  their	  list	  to	  produce	  five	  sentences	  that	  
would	  describe	  an	  aspect	  of	  their	  personal	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Christian	  or	  a	  Muslim	  (see	  table	  3	  
above).	  	  	  
In	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  MB1,	  MB3	  chose	  the	  preposition	  in,	  but	  did	  not	  use	  it	  to	  make	  sentences	  related	  
to	  divine	  proximity,	  and	  instead	  used	  it	  in	  phrases	  like	  “in	  afterlife”	  and	  “in	  my	  life”.	  	  MB3	  also	  chose	  
guide	  and	  follow,	  but	  did	  not	  use	  them	  in	  direct	  reference	  to	  a	  divine	  entity.	  In	  contrast,	  all	  of	  CB3’s	  
sentences	  directly	  referred	  to	  a	  divine	  entity,	  and	  the	  preposition	  in	  was	  used	  to	  form	  an	  explicit	  
divine	  entity	  proximity	  sentence,	  “The	  Spirit	  lives	  in	  me”,	  in	  addition	  to	  using	  with	  to	  form	  another	  
divine	  proximity	  sentence,	  “God	  is	  always	  with	  me”.	  	  The	  five	  sentences	  from	  both	  participants	  have	  
been	  reproduced	  below	  in	  table	  4.10:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Table	  4.10:	  Second	  task	  for	  MB3	  and	  CB3	  	  
Second	  task,	  MB3	  (Make	  sentences	  from	  the	  chosen	  words	  that	  reflect	  your	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Muslim):	  
[1]	  Mohammad,	  peace	  be	  upon	  him,	  was	  sent	  by	  Allah	  to	  guide	  us	  
[2]	  True	  faith	  in	  afterlife	  leads	  muslims	  to	  be	  more	  committed	  
[3]	  The	  Holy	  Quran	  brings	  peace	  and	  tranquillity	  in	  my	  life	  
[4]	  Instructions	  of	  the	  prophet	  Mohammad	  and	  the	  holy	  Quran	  are	  to	  be	  followed	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  a	  better	  relationship	  
with	  Allah	  
[5]	  Faith	  must	  always	  be	  accompanied	  by	  practice	  
Second	  task,	  CB3	  (Make	  sentences	  from	  the	  chosen	  words	  that	  reflect	  your	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Christian):	  
[1]	  The	  Spirit	  lives	  in	  me	  
[2]	  God	  speaks	  through	  me	  
[3]	  God	  is	  always	  with	  me	  
[4]	  I	  am	  guided	  by	  the	  Spirit	  
[5]	  I	  am	  led	  by	  his	  power	  
	  
The	  participants	  were	  then	  asked	  to	  display	  their	  sentences	  on	  the	  board	  behind	  them	  and	  then	  
given	  approximately	  twenty	  minutes	  to	  discuss	  any	  interesting	  differences	  they	  noticed	  or	  
observations	  that	  they	  wanted	  to	  make.	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  give	  a	  brief,	  evaluative	  synopsis	  of	  this	  
discussion	  (see	  appendix	  3.3	  for	  the	  video	  file	  and	  appendix	  4.3	  for	  the	  full	  transcript).	  
	  
MB3	  begins	  by	  arguing	  that	  actions	  have	  a	  more	  important	  role	  in	  Islam	  than	  they	  do	  in	  Christianity	  
because	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  what	  the	  individual	  does	  and	  the	  consequences	  in	  the	  afterlife	  for	  those	  
actions.	  CB3	  responds	  by	  arguing	  that	  actions	  are	  also	  important	  in	  Christianity,	  but	  that	  the	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emphasis	  is	  doing	  those	  actions	  through	  the	  power	  of	  God	  and	  his	  Spirit.	  One	  pattern	  of	  emphasis	  
that	  is	  very	  clear	  in	  the	  language	  of	  CB3	  throughout	  the	  first	  and	  second	  discussions	  and	  in	  her	  five	  
sentences	  listed	  above	  is	  this	  sense	  of	  the	  divine	  entity	  doing	  things	  through	  her	  and	  the	  perceived	  
power	  of	  the	  divine	  entity’s	  agency.	  	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  very	  strong	  sense	  of	  perceived	  
channelling	  in	  the	  language	  of	  CB3	  that	  is	  not	  appropriated	  at	  all	  by	  MB3.	  	  Although	  MB3	  does	  not	  
appear	  to	  engage	  with	  this	  language	  of	  the	  divine	  entity	  working	  through	  her,	  this	  kind	  of	  language	  
does	  seem	  to	  prompt	  MB3	  to	  further	  foreground	  the	  logic	  and	  fairness	  of	  Islam	  as	  a	  detached	  system	  
of	  rules.	  	  She	  even	  appropriates	  CB3’s	  phrase	  “his	  [God’s]	  power”	  (p2l123)	  and	  uses	  it	  to	  emphasise	  
the	  power	  of	  God	  to	  punish	  those	  who	  do	  not	  follow	  this	  system	  of	  rules.	  	  MB3	  further	  emphasises	  
the	  need	  for	  a	  system	  that	  is	  logical	  and	  fair	  by	  asking	  CB3	  what	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  good	  
Christian	  and	  a	  bad	  Christian	  would	  be	  if	  all	  Christians	  are	  regarded	  as	  saved.	  CB3	  answers	  the	  
question	  by	  saying	  that	  the	  difference	  is	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  bad	  Christians	  will	  struggle	  and	  be	  unfulfilled,	  
but	  good	  Christians	  will	  be	  able	  to	  make	  best	  use	  of	  their	  life	  because	  they	  are	  living	  according	  to	  
how	  God	  wants	  them	  to	  live.	  	  MB3	  responds	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  it	  would	  be	  unfair	  if	  she	  was	  striving	  
to	  do	  everything	  she	  should	  do	  but	  another	  Christian	  was	  not,	  but	  both	  would	  get	  the	  same	  reward.	  	  
CB3	  answers	  by	  explaining	  that	  not	  doing	  what	  God	  wants	  is	  more	  difficult	  than	  doing	  it,	  because	  
when	  you	  live	  in	  the	  way	  that	  you	  should	  live,	  you	  are	  able	  to	  experience	  being	  with	  God.	  	  CB3	  goes	  
on	  to	  argue	  that	  she	  would	  find	  it	  scary	  to	  be	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  if	  she	  didn’t	  pray	  five	  times	  a	  day	  
then	  her	  salvation	  would	  be	  in	  danger.	  MB3	  acknowledges	  that	  it	  is	  a	  scary	  situation	  and	  one	  that	  
should	  be	  taken	  seriously,	  but	  also	  adds	  that	  God	  is	  merciful.	  	  CB3	  responds	  by	  arguing	  that	  truth	  
should	  set	  a	  person	  free	  and	  that	  as	  a	  Christian	  she	  does	  things	  because	  she	  loves	  doing	  them	  rather	  
than	  because	  she	  has	  to	  do	  them	  to	  earn	  salvation.	  As	  I	  will	  argue	  below	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  these	  
results	  in	  section	  4.6.2,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  alternative	  views	  of	  reality	  clashing	  here	  
and	  preventing	  meaningful	  convergence.	  MB3	  seems	  to	  continually	  adopt	  a	  systems-­‐based	  view	  in	  
this	  second	  discussion	  that	  views	  CB3’s	  responses	  according	  to	  whether	  they	  appear	  fair	  or	  unfair,	  
logical	  or	  illogical,	  while	  CB3	  seems	  to	  continually	  adopt	  an	  affective	  relationship-­‐based	  view	  that	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views	  her	  own	  perceived	  experiences	  as	  either	  being	  related	  to	  a	  distant,	  loveless	  relationship	  with	  a	  
divine	  entity	  or	  a	  close,	  loving	  relationship.	  	  Another	  aspect	  of	  this	  second	  discussion	  that	  also	  
appears	  to	  contribute	  to	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  ideational	  conflict	  is	  CB3’s	  use	  of	  a	  personal	  story	  to	  bring	  
the	  discussion	  to	  a	  close.	  	  The	  story	  consists	  of	  her	  going	  into	  a	  Mosque	  to	  persuade	  them	  about	  
Christianity.	  	  As	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  the	  discussion	  section	  4.6.1	  below,	  the	  details	  of	  the	  story	  are	  not	  as	  
important	  as	  the	  presuppositions	  that	  the	  story	  requires	  for	  it	  to	  make	  sense	  to	  the	  listener.	  	  In	  this	  
case,	  those	  presuppositions	  are	  that	  CB3	  has	  direct	  access	  to	  the	  truth	  about	  God	  and	  that	  the	  
Muslims	  in	  the	  Mosque	  did	  not.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Having	  outlined	  the	  details	  of	  the	  participants	  involved,	  as	  well	  as	  listing	  the	  answers	  they	  gave	  
during	  the	  written	  stages	  and	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  discussions	  during	  the	  interactive	  stages,	  I	  am	  now	  
able	  to	  move	  on	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  these	  results	  in	  the	  section	  below.	  	  	  	  
	  
4.6	  Discussion	  of	  the	  Results	  
In	  the	  introduction	  to	  this	  chapter	  I	  outlined	  three	  principal	  intentions	  for	  setting	  up	  these	  
discussions.	  	  My	  first	  intention	  was	  to	  see	  how	  closely	  the	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  discovered	  in	  a	  
particular	  written	  genre	  produced	  by	  a	  particular	  community	  within	  conservative	  Islam	  and	  
Christianity	  would	  match	  the	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  produced	  during	  a	  discussion	  by	  individuals	  from	  
other	  conservative	  communities	  within	  those	  religions.	  My	  second	  intention	  was	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  
degree	  and	  type	  of	  variation	  of	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  between	  individuals,	  and	  not	  
just	  between	  particular	  groups.	  My	  third	  intention	  was	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  effects	  that	  interacting	  with	  
someone	  with	  an	  alternate	  worldview	  could	  have	  on	  the	  language	  of	  conservative	  Christian	  and	  
Muslim	  believers.	  	  	  
In	  order	  to	  address	  these	  intentions	  in	  a	  systematic	  manner,	  I	  will	  separate	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  
results	  into	  two	  subsections.	  	  The	  first	  section	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  interactive	  aspects	  of	  the	  language	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produced,	  such	  as	  the	  examples	  of	  metaphor	  appropriation	  and	  recontextualisation	  and	  issues	  
related	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  empathy	  and	  adopting	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  other,	  as	  well	  as	  strategies	  that	  
were	  used	  to	  inhibit	  or	  block	  all	  of	  the	  above.	  The	  second	  section	  will	  focus	  on	  comparing	  the	  
patterns	  of	  emphasis	  found	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  six	  individuals	  involved	  in	  the	  study	  with	  the	  
patterns	  of	  emphasis	  identified	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  testimonials.	  	  	  	  I	  will	  then	  return	  to	  the	  key	  
issues	  that	  have	  been	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis,	  such	  as	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  language	  of	  experience	  
in	  terms	  of	  its	  relationship	  to	  certainty	  and	  applications	  to	  the	  field	  of	  religious	  dialogue,	  and	  discuss	  
them	  further	  in	  the	  light	  of	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  tasks	  and	  videoed	  discussions.	  	  Conclusions	  concerning	  
how	  dynamic	  interaction	  may	  influence	  a	  participant’s	  language	  will	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  
how	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  dynamic	  interaction	  can	  aid,	  but	  also	  in	  some	  situations	  inhibit,	  such	  attempts.	  	  	  	  	  
I	  have	  so	  far	  discussed	  in	  detail	  how	  episodic	  situations	  are	  used	  to	  express	  how	  individual	  religious	  
believers	  experience	  what	  they	  believe.	  	  What	  I	  have	  yet	  to	  do	  is	  place	  this	  expression	  of	  personal	  
experience	  within	  the	  explicit	  context	  of	  dynamic	  discourse.	  	  How	  do	  individual	  religious	  believers	  
respond	  to	  the	  episodic	  situations	  of	  the	  other,	  and	  how	  do	  they	  formulate	  and	  utilise	  their	  own	  
situations	  to	  fulfil	  various	  functions	  within	  a	  critical	  discussion	  with	  believers	  of	  other	  religions?	  	  In	  
order	  to	  address	  this	  question,	  the	  section	  below	  examines	  how	  language	  relating	  to	  religious	  
experience	  was	  used	  as	  both	  a	  rhetorical	  tool	  and	  a	  bridge	  builder	  in	  the	  discussions	  analysed	  in	  this	  
chapter.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
4.6.1	  The	  Role	  of	  Interaction	  in	  Participants’	  Language	  
In	  the	  previous	  section	  my	  main	  focus	  was	  on	  isolating	  and	  analysing	  the	  language	  of	  each	  individual	  
participant.	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  re-­‐examine	  the	  language	  from	  an	  interactive	  perspective,	  examining	  
how	  elements	  of	  it	  appear	  to	  be	  influenced	  or	  in	  some	  way	  shaped	  by	  its	  occurrence	  within	  an	  
unfolding	  conversation.	  One	  element	  that	  I	  will	  be	  particularly	  interested	  in	  are	  occurrences	  of	  
appropriation	  and	  recontextualization	  or	  redeployment	  of	  metaphors	  that	  occurred	  at	  an	  earlier	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point	  in	  a	  discussion,	  or,	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  examples	  of	  one	  discourse	  participant	  picking	  up	  and	  
developing	  the	  metaphor	  of	  another	  discourse	  participant	  (Cameron	  2010a:	  89;	  Cameron	  2010c:	  89-­‐
90;	  Linell	  2009;	  Semino,	  Deignan	  and	  Littlemore	  2012).	  I	  begin	  by	  arguing	  that	  with	  certain	  topics	  and	  
participants	  a	  level	  of	  similar	  or	  identical	  metaphor	  usage	  is	  to	  be	  expected.	  	  This	  means	  that	  in	  
certain	  cases	  we	  should	  not	  be	  too	  quick	  to	  read	  complex	  rhetorical	  strategies	  or	  displays	  of	  empathy	  
into	  them.	  	  However,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  even	  in	  these	  cases,	  the	  language	  can	  still	  be	  of	  interest	  in	  
terms	  of	  highlighting	  the	  different	  attitudes	  and	  beliefs	  of	  the	  participants.	  	  I	  will	  then	  go	  on	  to	  
examine	  examples	  where	  there	  does	  appear	  to	  be	  some	  level	  of	  rhetorical	  strategy	  behind	  certain	  
cases	  of	  metaphor	  appropriation,	  as	  well	  as	  behind	  other	  overlapping	  cases	  where	  one	  participant	  
attempts	  to	  impose	  a	  narrative	  on	  the	  other.	  I	  then	  go	  on	  to	  discuss	  those	  examples	  where	  a	  
participant	  appears	  to	  be	  offering	  (or	  attempting	  to	  force)	  their	  metaphors	  on	  the	  other	  participant	  
through	  conspicuous	  overuse,	  and	  why	  this	  strategy	  often	  appears	  to	  have	  had	  the	  opposite	  effect	  
than	  the	  speaker	  expects.	  	  I	  will	  then	  move	  on	  to	  those	  examples	  in	  the	  text	  where	  a	  participant	  
makes	  statements	  that	  only	  make	  sense	  when	  considered	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  other	  
participant,	  and	  those	  examples	  where	  a	  focus	  on	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  appears	  to	  lead	  
to	  a	  temporary	  backgrounding	  of	  doctrinal	  differences	  and	  a	  foregrounding	  of	  experiential	  
similarities	  between	  participants.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Metaphor	  Appropriation	  and	  Recontextualisation	  
Metaphor	  appropriation	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  discourse	  participant	  “taking	  over”	  a	  metaphor	  that	  
another	  participant	  has	  used	  (Cameron	  2010a:	  89;	  2010b:	  19-­‐20).	  	  Cameron	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  
that	  the	  original	  user	  may	  view	  the	  appropriated	  metaphor	  as	  their	  “discourse	  property”	  and	  
therefore	  need	  to	  decide	  whether	  to	  “refuse	  or	  allow	  the	  appropriation”	  (ibid).	  	  If	  the	  original	  user	  
allows	  the	  appropriation	  to	  go	  ahead,	  it	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  “a	  gesture	  of	  empathy	  that	  
contributes	  to	  the	  larger	  process	  of	  conciliation”	  or	  at	  least	  “could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  significant	  step	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towards	  acknowledging	  the	  other’s	  perspective	  through	  language”	  (ibid).	  	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
place	  these	  observations	  within	  a	  particular	  context.	  	  That	  context	  is	  a	  process	  of	  conciliation	  where	  
discourse	  participants	  attempt	  to	  take	  part	  in	  a	  type	  of	  “shared	  journey”	  that	  results	  in	  the	  
development	  of	  constructive	  points	  of	  connection	  between	  them	  (Cameron	  2010a:	  58-­‐70).	  	  Within	  
this	  context,	  each	  participant	  can	  use	  metaphor	  when	  they	  need	  to	  talk	  about	  a	  difficult,	  even	  painful,	  
aspect	  of	  their	  view	  of	  the	  world	  (Cameron	  2010a:	  4).	  	  If	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  those	  metaphors	  to	  be	  
constructively	  developed	  by	  the	  other,	  and	  for	  the	  original	  user	  to	  allow	  that	  development,	  then	  it	  is	  
reasonable	  for	  the	  analyst	  to	  identify	  such	  processes	  as	  a	  “gesture	  of	  empathy”	  (Cameron	  2010a:	  89).	  
However,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  this	  study	  where	  we	  are	  looking	  at	  discussions	  between	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  
participants,	  we	  are	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  both	  participants	  come	  to	  the	  discussion	  with	  a	  vast	  
network	  of	  “pre-­‐packaged”	  religious	  metaphors.	  	  Many	  of	  these	  religious	  metaphors	  are	  either	  
identical	  or	  in	  some	  way	  similar,	  so	  it	  is	  often	  unhelpful	  to	  regard	  many	  religious	  metaphors	  as	  being	  
the	  “discourse	  property”	  of	  the	  first	  person	  to	  use	  it	  in	  the	  discussion.	  	  However,	  as	  I	  shall	  argue	  
below,	  in	  some	  cases	  I	  believe	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  do	  so.	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  therefore	  wish	  to	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  
possible	  to	  identify	  different	  levels	  of	  co-­‐occurring	  metaphor	  usage	  in	  discussions	  involving	  religious	  
believers.	  	  I	  begin	  by	  considering	  those	  metaphors	  that	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  be	  used	  in	  a	  discussion	  of	  
religious	  belief	  by	  individuals	  from	  particular	  religious	  groups	  regardless	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  
appropriation.	  	  In	  these	  cases,	  we	  should	  be	  especially	  careful	  about	  viewing	  co-­‐occurrences	  of	  
metaphors	  as	  evidence	  for	  either	  a	  sophisticated	  rhetorical	  strategy	  or	  a	  display	  of	  empathy.	  	  It	  may	  
be	  possible	  instead	  to	  view	  them	  simply	  as	  the	  expected	  use	  of	  particular	  metaphors	  to	  “draw	  the	  
battle	  lines”	  or	  mark	  out	  the	  opposing	  viewpoints	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  discussion.	  	  I	  briefly	  






Examples	  of	  Shared	  Language	  
One	  example	  of	  participants	  using	  the	  same	  metaphor	  to	  simply	  mark	  out	  their	  different	  beliefs	  can	  
be	  found	  in	  the	  use	  of	  language	  by	  both	  CB2	  and	  MB2	  that	  draws	  on	  the	  domain	  of	  completing	  a	  
journey	  in	  order	  to	  describe	  the	  belief	  of	  going	  to	  heaven.	  	  Examples	  of	  this	  shared	  language	  were	  
the	  systematic	  repetition	  of	  phrases	  related	  to	  travelling	  to	  and	  entry	  into	  heaven	  (CB2:	  “get	  to	  
heaven”	  (p2l33);	  MB2:	  “reach	  heaven”	  (p2l38);	  CB2:	  “get	  to	  heaven”	  (p2l44);	  CB2:	  “gets	  you	  into	  
heaven”	  (p2l47);	  CB2:	  “get	  to	  heaven”	  (p2l53);	  CB2:	  “get	  into	  heaven”	  (p2l78);	  MB2:	  “get	  to	  heaven”	  
(p2l82);	  “enter	  heaven”	  (p2l84)),	  as	  well	  as	  MB2’s	  repetition	  (p2l11)	  of	  CB2’s	  phrase	  “right	  path”	  
(p2l10)).	  	  	  
Another	  cluster	  of	  examples	  of	  using	  the	  same	  metaphor	  to	  mark	  out	  and	  engage	  with	  different	  
beliefs	  is	  located	  in	  the	  use	  of	  sent	  by	  CB3	  and	  MB3:	  “…	  I	  believe	  in	  only	  one	  God	  whom	  he	  sent	  
Mohammed	  and	  the	  Quran	  to	  guide	  me	  towards	  him”	  (MB3,	  p1l8);	  “…	  both	  of	  that	  Mohammed	  and	  
the	  Quran	  were	  sent	  to	  help	  me	  find	  God	  …”	  (MB3,	  p1l11);	  “that	  God	  loved	  me	  so	  much	  that	  he	  sent	  
his	  only	  son	  to	  die	  for	  me”	  (CB3,	  p1l63)	  and	  “…	  it	  doesn’t	  make	  that	  much	  sense	  to	  me	  that,	  hmm,	  
the	  father,	  like,	  God	  in	  Christianity	  sent	  his	  only	  son	  to	  die	  for	  people,	  well	  I	  mean,	  what	  kind	  of	  
father	  is	  this?”	  (MB3,	  p1l79-­‐80).	  
All	  of	  these	  examples	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  attempts	  at	  conveying	  contrasting	  worldviews	  using	  mutually	  
accepted	  language	  to	  evaluate	  particular	  situations	  (for	  example,	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  provided	  by	  a	  
divine	  entity	  in	  order	  for	  salvation	  to	  become	  possible).	  	  What	  this	  means	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  
for	  the	  participants	  to	  alter	  or	  adapt	  the	  other’s	  references	  to	  the	  actions	  or	  situations	  of	  going,	  
getting	  to	  a	  location,	  or	  sending	  something	  –	  they	  all	  appear	  to	  be	  in	  broad	  agreement	  about	  their	  
meaning	  –	  although	  they	  clearly	  want	  to	  say	  different	  things	  about	  how	  these	  actions	  can	  be	  
successfully	  performed,	  their	  validity,	  what	  they	  involve	  and	  what	  they	  lead	  to.	  	  	  	  	  
Co-­‐occurring	  metaphor	  usage	  becomes	  more	  interesting	  when	  the	  participants	  make	  use	  of	  a	  shared	  
metaphor	  in	  a	  way	  that	  at	  first	  glance	  appears	  similar,	  but	  under	  closer	  examination	  reveals	  subtle	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differences,	  possibly	  reflecting	  equally	  subtle	  differences	  in	  belief.	  	  An	  example	  of	  this	  can	  be	  found	  
in	  the	  use	  of	  follow	  by	  both	  CB1	  and	  MB1.	  CB1	  first	  used	  this	  word	  as	  part	  of	  the	  sentence	  “I	  follow	  
Jesus	  –	  and	  I	  happen	  to	  be	  a	  Christian”	  in	  the	  second	  written	  activity.	  	  Variations	  of	  it	  are	  then	  used	  
twice	  by	  MB1	  and	  three	  times	  by	  CB1	  during	  the	  course	  of	  their	  discussion.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  metaphors	  
that	  are	  commonly	  used	  by	  believers	  from	  both	  religions	  (as	  discussed	  in	  section	  3.5	  above,	  there	  
were	  multiple	  occurrences	  of	  follow	  in	  both	  collections	  of	  testimonials),	  it	  is	  sometimes	  difficult	  to	  
establish	  whether	  a	  metaphor	  is	  being	  appropriated	  or	  is	  just	  naturally	  occurring	  in	  the	  language	  of	  
both	  participants.	  	  	  However,	  regardless	  of	  the	  level	  of	  appropriation,	  what	  is	  interesting	  is	  how	  the	  
participants	  use	  the	  same	  word	  in	  different	  ways	  in	  the	  same	  conversation.	  	  In	  this	  case	  CB1	  had	  no	  
problem	  directly	  connecting	  the	  word	  to	  a	  divine	  entity	  such	  as	  Jesus	  or	  God,	  while	  MB1	  avoided	  
such	  a	  direct	  connection,	  preferring	  objects	  indirectly	  related	  to	  God	  such	  as	  the	  Qur’an.	  	  These	  
possible	  moments	  of	  appropriation	  and	  recontextualization	  are	  therefore	  ideal	  for	  uncovering	  and	  
highlighting	  the	  different	  attitudes	  of	  the	  participants.	  
These	  differing	  attitudes	  can	  also	  be	  strong	  enough	  for	  the	  participant	  to	  avoid	  using	  a	  metaphor	  in	  
the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  other	  participant	  does	  even	  when	  he	  or	  she	  is	  describing	  the	  other’s	  beliefs.	  	  
For	  example,	  even	  though	  CB2	  described	  his	  faith	  using	  repeated	  examples	  of	  relationship	  and	  
proximity	  language,	  as	  well	  as	  language	  relating	  to	  God	  or	  Jesus	  coming	  towards	  him	  and	  written	  
expressions	  such	  as	  “following	  Jesus	  and	  his	  teaching”	  (sentence	  [2]),	  MB2	  avoids	  repeating	  any	  of	  
these	  usages.	  	  Instead,	  she	  characterises	  his	  belief	  as	  following	  his	  religion,	  but	  not	  directly	  following	  
a	  divine	  entity,	  “Do	  you	  believe	  that	  you	  are	  born	  with	  sins	  and	  you	  need	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  them	  by	  
following	  Christianity?”	  (p1l186).	  	  The	  phrase	  following	  Christianity	  is	  perfectly	  understandable,	  but	  
what	  makes	  it	  odd	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  phrase	  that	  CB2	  had	  not	  previously	  used	  in	  the	  discussion,	  and	  it	  is	  
not	  one	  that	  Christians	  tend	  to	  use	  (as	  I	  established	  in	  pattern	  1b	  in	  table	  8	  above,	  following	  Jesus	  or	  
following	  God	  would	  be	  more	  normal).	  Instead,	  this	  fits	  with	  the	  pattern	  of	  language	  found	  in	  the	  
language	  of	  Muslim	  believers	  of	  avoiding	  a	  direct	  association	  of	  follow	  with	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  However,	  
at	  another	  point	  in	  the	  discussion,	  MB2	  does	  demonstrate	  a	  willingness	  to	  directly	  associate	  a	  divine	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entity	  with	  a	  movement	  verb	  in	  order	  to	  clarify	  the	  Christian	  participant’s	  beliefs,	  although	  only	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  Christian	  notion	  of	  a	  Holy	  Spirit	  and	  not	  in	  a	  specific	  reference	  to	  Jesus	  or	  God,	  “so	  it’s	  
like	  the	  Holy	  Spirit	  comes	  to	  every	  Christian?”	  (p2l129).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Another	  example	  of	  how	  recontextualization	  of	  a	  word	  can	  reveal	  differing	  attitudes	  occurs	  in	  CB3	  
and	  MB3’s	  use	  of	  power.	  As	  I	  suggested	  in	  the	  brief	  synopsis	  of	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  results	  section	  
above,	  CB3	  consistently	  associates	  this	  term	  with	  a	  divine	  entity	  and	  appears	  to	  use	  it	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  
that	  divine	  entity’s	  agency	  in	  her	  life	  (being	  moved	  by	  a	  divine	  entity	  is	  a	  key	  theme	  for	  her).	  	  She	  
uses	  it	  nine	  times	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  discussion	  –	  eight	  times	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  phrase	  “his	  [God’s]	  
power”	  –	  while	  MB3	  makes	  only	  a	  single	  use	  of	  it,	  also	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  phrase	  “his	  power”.	  	  It	  may	  
be	  tempting	  to	  assume	  that	  CB3	  has	  won	  a	  battle	  of	  wills	  and	  has	  finally	  influenced	  MB3	  to	  make	  use	  
of	  a	  term	  that	  she	  would	  not	  normally	  make	  use	  of.	  	  However,	  a	  closer	  inspection	  of	  how	  MB3	  uses	  
the	  word	  reveals	  that	  it	  is	  being	  used	  in	  a	  way	  that	  fits	  predictably	  within	  an	  Islamic	  framework.	  	  CB3	  
predominantly	  uses	  the	  term	  to	  mark	  the	  perceived	  effect	  that	  God	  or	  the	  Holy	  Spirit	  is	  habitually	  
having	  on	  the	  direction	  of	  her	  life,	  for	  example,	  “I	  am	  led	  by	  his	  power”	  (sentence	  5).	  	  However,	  MB3	  
resists	  this	  repeated	  usage	  and	  only	  uses	  the	  term	  in	  answer	  to	  CB3’s	  remark	  that	  it	  is	  scary	  to	  
believe	  that	  if	  you	  do	  not	  pray	  five	  times	  a	  day	  your	  salvation	  is	  in	  danger,	  “I	  think	  it’s	  scary,	  but	  Islam	  
is	  very	  important,	  like	  we	  have	  this	  loving	  merciful	  God,	  he	  is	  the	  merciful,	  but	  again	  it’s	  not	  good	  to	  
underestimate	  his	  power	  …”	  (p2l123).	  Here	  the	  power	  of	  God	  is	  being	  removed	  from	  this	  frame	  of	  
daily	  divine	  intervention	  and	  influence	  and	  used	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  intuitively	  fits	  with	  a	  Muslim	  
believer’s	  emphasis	  on	  human	  responsibility	  and	  accountability	  in	  preparation	  for	  the	  one-­‐off	  
execution	  of	  judgement	  at	  the	  end	  of	  an	  individual’s	  life.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
All	  the	  examples	  of	  shared	  language	  so	  far	  are	  interesting	  in	  that	  they	  reveal	  the	  different	  attitudes	  
of	  the	  participants	  taking	  part	  in	  the	  discussion,	  although	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  view	  them	  as	  examples	  of	  
sophisticated	  rhetorical	  strategy	  or	  displays	  of	  empathy.	  	  I	  therefore	  now	  wish	  to	  turn	  to	  examples	  of	  
more	  explicit	  appropriation	  that	  do	  appear	  to	  involve	  some	  element	  of	  rhetorical	  strategy,	  serving	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the	  function	  of	  challenging	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  other	  and	  providing	  a	  perception	  of	  “winning”	  a	  
disputed	  point.	  	  	  	  
	  
Appropriating	  Metaphors	  and	  Imposing	  Personal	  Stories	  in	  order	  to	  Challenge	  Perspectives	  	  	  
One	  key	  reason	  for	  metaphor	  appropriation,	  or	  “adopting	  the	  other’s	  metaphor	  for	  one’s	  own	  use”	  
(Cameron	  2010a:	  158),	  is	  the	  need	  to	  develop	  and	  adapt	  it	  for	  a	  different	  function	  (Semino,	  Deignan	  
and	  Littlemore	  2013).	  	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  discussion	  or	  debate	  this	  process	  of	  adoption	  can	  
often	  take	  the	  form	  of	  using	  another’s	  metaphor	  in	  order	  to	  enter	  their	  perspective	  and	  either	  
challenge	  it	  or	  empathise	  with	  it.	  I	  will	  examine	  below	  some	  examples	  from	  the	  discussions	  that	  
appear	  to	  illustrate	  the	  desire	  of	  one	  participant	  to	  make	  use	  of	  a	  situation	  described	  by	  the	  other	  for	  
the	  purposes	  of	  rhetorical	  gain.	  	  	  	  
Towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  discussion	  between	  MB1	  and	  CB1	  (p2l117-­‐119),	  MB1	  
describes	  a	  perceived	  situation	  whereby	  non-­‐Muslims	  are	  presented	  with	  an	  inherently	  simple	  truth,	  
but	  go	  on	  to	  corrupt	  it	  by	  making	  it	  appear	  more	  complicated	  than	  it	  originally	  was.	  	  CB1	  responds	  by	  
arguing	  that	  this	  is	  an	  oversimplification,	  and	  presents	  his	  own	  counter	  scenario	  of	  people	  being	  
presented	  with	  the	  truth	  but	  then	  being	  “blinded”	  to	  that	  truth	  by	  “the	  God	  of	  this	  world”	  (p2l195-­‐
197).	  	  MB1	  responds	  by	  appropriating	  CB1’s	  reference	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  blindness	  and	  arguing	  that	  an	  
individual	  only	  “becomes	  blinded	  to	  the	  truth”	  after	  that	  person	  has	  already	  decided	  not	  to	  embrace	  
the	  simplicity	  of	  that	  truth	  (p2l201-­‐206).	  	  This	  appropriation	  appears	  to	  have	  little	  to	  do	  with	  
empathy	  and	  more	  to	  do	  with	  using	  the	  other’s	  language	  to	  challenge	  their	  perspective.	  	  For	  CB1,	  
blindness	  to	  the	  truth	  is	  a	  condition	  that	  is	  imposed	  on	  humans	  (fitting	  with	  the	  theme	  of	  habitual	  
supernatural	  interference	  in	  the	  life	  of	  humans	  that	  was	  even	  more	  frequent	  in	  the	  language	  of	  CB2	  
and	  CB3).	  	  MB1	  appears	  to	  be	  aware	  that	  if	  he	  grants	  that	  humans	  can	  have	  blindness	  done	  to	  them,	  
then	  this	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  that	  humans	  also	  need	  in	  some	  way	  to	  have	  salvation	  done	  to	  them	  
(in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  atoning	  death	  of	  Christ).	  	  He	  therefore	  picks	  up	  on	  this	  perceived	  situation	  of	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blindness	  to	  the	  truth	  and	  re-­‐castes	  it	  within	  the	  frame	  of	  total	  human	  responsibility	  and	  
accountability.	  	  This	  is	  achieved	  by	  construing	  this	  state	  of	  blindness	  to	  the	  truth	  as	  something	  that	  
they	  do	  to	  themselves	  by	  attempting	  to	  complicate	  and	  therefore	  corrupt	  the	  truth.	  	  	  	  	  
Soon	  after	  the	  above	  example,	  CB1	  appears	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  tit-­‐for-­‐tat	  rhetorical	  strategy	  by	  
appropriating	  one	  of	  MB1’s	  metaphors	  in	  order	  to	  challenge	  his	  perspective.	  	  It	  occurs	  after	  MB1	  
makes	  his	  closing	  statement	  of	  the	  discussion	  by	  alluding	  to	  the	  freedom	  that	  all	  people	  have	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  make	  their	  own	  decisions	  and	  choose	  the	  “direction	  that	  we	  want	  to	  go”	  (p2l235).	  	  Earlier,	  
MB1	  had	  also	  alluded	  to	  some	  friends	  he	  had	  met	  at	  school	  who	  had	  influenced	  his	  decision	  to	  
become	  a	  Muslim.	  	  CB1	  responds	  by	  appropriating	  this	  notion	  of	  direction	  and	  suggesting	  that	  if	  he	  
could	  have	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  speak	  to	  him	  when	  he	  was	  younger	  (before	  he	  had	  made	  his	  mind	  
up)	  then	  MB1	  could	  have	  ended	  up	  heading	  in	  a	  different	  religious	  direction,	  
…	  and	  you	  said	  all	  those	  friends	  that	  you	  had	  in	  school,	  different	  directions	  and	  decisions,	  I	  wish	  you	  had	  me	  as	  a	  friend	  
because	  I	  feel	  like	  some	  of	  what	  you	  are	  saying,	  although	  I	  hear	  your	  heart	  in	  it,	  is	  based	  on	  misunderstanding	  …	  if	  I	  was,	  
I	  wonder	  what	  would	  have	  happened	  if	  I	  had	  these	  conversations	  with	  you	  before,	  maybe	  five	  or	  ten	  years	  ago.	  (p2l239-­‐
250)	  
This	  is	  the	  only	  example	  of	  CB1	  appropriating	  a	  metaphor	  that	  MB1	  has	  used.	  	  This	  occurs	  just	  after	  
MB1	  has	  alluded	  to	  the	  decisions	  that	  we	  are	  all	  able	  to	  make	  about	  the	  “direction	  that	  we	  want	  to	  
go”	  (p2l235).	  	  CB1	  picks	  up	  on	  MB1’s	  use	  of	  direction,	  but	  the	  intention	  is	  not	  to	  build	  a	  bridge	  but	  to	  
send	  a	  message	  thinly	  concealed	  in	  the	  language	  of	  concerned	  friendship.	  	  The	  message	  is	  that	  MB1’s	  
direction	  in	  terms	  of	  religious	  belief	  could	  have	  been	  changed	  if	  CB1	  had	  met	  him	  earlier	  (before	  he	  
had	  made	  his	  mind	  up).	  	  
It	  is	  worth	  examining	  this	  response	  in	  a	  little	  more	  detail	  because	  of	  the	  way	  it	  makes	  use	  of	  a	  
strategy	  of	  imposing	  a	  hypothetical	  event	  or,	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  a	  hypothetical	  episodic	  situation	  
on	  the	  other	  discourse	  participant.	  	  What	  I	  mean	  by	  this	  is	  that	  CB1	  is	  attempting	  to	  construct	  a	  kind	  
of	  alternate	  reality	  where	  he	  imagines	  meeting	  MB1	  as	  a	  friend	  at	  school	  and	  having	  the	  chance	  to	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persuade	  him	  before	  he	  had	  the	  chance	  to	  meet	  others	  who	  led	  him	  to	  Islam	  instead	  of	  to	  
Christianity.	  	  As	  I	  indicated	  in	  my	  brief	  outline	  of	  this	  story	  in	  the	  results	  section	  above,	  the	  crucial	  
characteristic	  of	  this	  constructed	  text	  world	  (cf.	  Stockwell	  2002	  and	  Gavins	  2007)	  is	  that	  it	  relies	  on	  
the	  assumption	  that	  MB1	  is	  vulnerable	  and	  dependent	  on	  guidance	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  to	  believe,	  and	  
that	  CB1	  is	  wise	  and	  capable	  of	  leading	  someone	  to	  truth	  as	  long	  as	  they	  haven’t	  already	  been	  led	  
astray	  by	  others	  and	  become	  close	  minded.	  	  The	  important	  element	  of	  imposing	  personal	  stories	  on	  
others	  is	  therefore	  not	  necessarily	  the	  content	  of	  the	  story	  itself	  (which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  related	  to	  
an	  interpretation	  of	  a	  current	  reality),	  but	  the	  assumptions	  about	  the	  characters	  within	  the	  story	  
(which	  most	  certainly	  are	  designed	  to	  relate	  to	  an	  interpretation	  of	  a	  current	  reality).	  	  	  
This	  strategy	  of	  attempting	  to	  impose	  a	  personal	  story	  on	  MB1	  appears	  therefore	  to	  have	  three	  
possible	  functions.	  	  The	  first	  relates	  to	  an	  attempt	  to	  persuade	  MB1	  to	  view	  his	  situation	  from	  the	  
perspective	  of	  CB1	  –	  to	  recognise	  that	  he	  (MB1)	  is	  impressionable	  and	  has	  been	  led	  to	  believe	  
something	  that	  is	  patently	  incorrect	  –	  instead	  of	  his	  current	  perspective	  that	  his	  religious	  views	  are	  
correct	  and	  CB1’s	  are	  clearly	  incorrect.	  	  The	  second	  relates	  to	  a	  possible	  attempt	  by	  CB1	  to	  listen	  to	  
and	  persuade	  himself	  that	  the	  assumptions	  of	  his	  own	  story	  are	  valid.	  	  This	  second	  point	  requires	  
some	  explanation.	  	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  critical	  discussions	  can	  cause	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  
stress	  and	  frustration	  in	  individuals	  who	  are	  convinced	  that	  their	  beliefs	  are	  self-­‐evidently	  correct.	  	  
This	  stress	  and	  frustration	  may	  increase	  as	  the	  discussion	  progresses	  and	  the	  other	  participant	  is	  able	  
to	  raise	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  arguments	  that	  conflict	  with	  the	  believer’s	  worldview.	  	  I	  have	  
already	  noted	  that	  in	  this	  particular	  discussion,	  MB1’s	  contribution	  took	  up	  70%	  of	  the	  discussion.	  	  
This	  demonstrates	  that	  MB1	  was	  holding	  on	  to	  his	  turn	  far	  more	  than	  CB1	  and	  appeared	  most	  of	  the	  
time	  to	  dominate	  the	  discussion.	  	  It	  therefore	  appears	  to	  be	  reasonable	  to	  put	  forward	  the	  possibility	  
that	  CB1’s	  strategy	  of	  imposing	  this	  personal	  story	  on	  MB1	  does	  not	  just	  serve	  the	  function	  of	  trying	  
to	  persuade	  the	  person	  for	  whom	  the	  story	  is	  intended	  (MB1).	  	  It	  also	  serves	  the	  function	  of	  
reassuring	  the	  story	  teller	  himself	  (CB1)	  by	  encouraging	  him	  to	  continue	  to	  visualise	  or	  simulate	  the	  
assumptions	  underpinning	  his	  own	  story	  (that	  MB1	  is	  vulnerable	  and	  impressionable).	  	  This	  could	  be	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viewed	  as	  helping	  CB1	  to	  better	  cope	  with	  the	  pressure	  and	  discomfort	  of	  being	  dominated	  in	  the	  
critical	  discussion	  by	  MB1.	  	  	  	  
The	  third	  function	  appears	  to	  be	  related	  to	  rhetorical	  strategy	  and	  the	  observation	  that	  an	  imposed	  
personal	  story	  with	  embedded	  ideological	  assumptions	  is	  more	  slippery	  and	  trickier	  to	  counter	  than	  
an	  explicit	  propositional	  argument.	  	  People	  become	  very	  adept	  at	  countering	  arguments,	  especially	  
people	  who	  often	  engage	  in	  debating	  the	  same	  topic.	  	  This	  is	  almost	  certainly	  the	  case	  with	  
conservative	  religious	  believers	  who	  often	  appear	  to	  be	  able	  to	  rapidly	  activate	  stock,	  very	  well-­‐
rehearsed	  counters	  to	  a	  range	  of	  issues	  related	  to	  their	  belief.	  	  MB1	  often	  displays	  this	  kind	  of	  ability	  
to	  rapidly	  construct	  and	  chain	  together	  his	  own	  arguments	  while	  countering	  CB1’s	  arguments	  and	  
uses	  it	  to	  dominate	  the	  discussion.	  	  However,	  when	  CB1	  makes	  use	  of	  an	  imposed	  story	  with	  
particular	  assumptions,	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  harder	  for	  MB1	  to	  process	  both	  the	  story	  and	  its	  embedded	  
ideological	  assumptions	  and	  implications	  and	  rapidly	  construct	  an	  effective	  counter.	  	  The	  result	  is	  
that	  the	  story	  is	  left	  “hanging”	  and	  its	  assumptions	  are	  never	  explicitly	  addressed	  by	  MB1.	  	  It	  
therefore	  appears	  to	  disrupt	  the	  normal	  flow	  of	  the	  debate	  where	  MB1	  had,	  up	  until	  that	  point,	  been	  
able	  to	  rapidly	  counter	  every	  point	  that	  CB1	  had	  raised.	  
This	  disrupting	  effect	  of	  imposed	  stories	  is	  made	  even	  more	  effective	  when	  the	  controversial	  
assumptions	  of	  the	  story	  are	  partially	  concealed	  within	  non-­‐controversial	  or	  seemingly	  sympathetic	  
assumptions	  (for	  example,	  CB1	  concealing	  or	  embedding	  the	  negative	  assumption	  that	  MB1	  is	  
impressionable	  and	  vulnerable	  to	  being	  led	  astray	  in	  the	  positive,	  “warm”	  assumption	  that	  CB1	  is	  a	  
friend	  who	  feels	  sorry	  for	  MB1	  and	  just	  wants	  to	  help	  him	  find	  the	  right	  direction).	  	  This	  third	  
function	  may	  also	  suggest	  why	  these	  imposed	  stories	  appear	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  a	  discussion,	  as	  they	  
did	  in	  this	  case,	  because	  they	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  particularly	  effective	  ways	  to	  conclude	  a	  debate	  in	  a	  
way	  that	  may	  allow	  the	  story	  teller	  to	  perceive	  him	  or	  herself	  as	  having	  effectively	  “had	  the	  last	  
word”.	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In	  the	  results	  section	  above,	  I	  briefly	  alluded	  to	  another	  example	  of	  this	  strategy	  of	  using	  a	  
hypothetical	  event	  or	  personal	  story	  to	  impose	  particular	  presuppositions	  on	  the	  other,	  this	  time	  in	  
the	  discussion	  between	  MB3	  and	  CB3.	  	  	  Towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  discussion	  between	  MB3	  and	  CB3,	  
CB3	  recalls	  an	  event	  that	  took	  place	  in	  a	  Mosque.	  	  Again,	  the	  actual	  details	  of	  the	  personal	  story	  are	  
not	  as	  important	  as	  the	  assumptions	  present	  in	  the	  perceived	  reality	  that	  CB3	  constructs.	  	  The	  
account	  has	  been	  reproduced	  in	  full	  below	  (CB3/MB3,	  p2l172-­‐189):	  
Christian	  Believer	  3:	   One	  time	  I	  went	  to	  a	  Mosque	  and	  I	  said,	  God,	  these	  people	  
are	  hungry	  for	  the	  truth.	  
Muslim	  Believer	  3:	   You	  think	  so?	  
Christian	  Believer	  3:	   Well,	  we’re	  all	  hungry	  for	  the	  truth,	  and	  we	  think	  what	  
we	  know	  is	  true	  right	  now	  and	  that’s	  why	  I	  want	  to	  sit	  
there	  and	  receive	  from	  them	  as	  well,	  I	  want	  to	  get	  
everything	  that	  I	  want	  out	  of	  them,	  what	  they	  believe	  to	  
see	  if	  it’s	  true	  really	  and	  confirm	  in	  my	  heart,	  and	  that’s	  
the	  same	  thing	  that	  I	  want	  for	  them.	  	  I	  say	  to	  them	  if	  
they	  want	  to	  know	  the	  truth,	  like	  they	  said	  they	  were,	  
that’s	  the	  truth,	  so	  I	  said,	  if	  God	  you	  love	  us	  all	  the	  
same,	  and	  we	  all	  want	  to	  know	  the	  truth,	  I’m	  going	  to	  
stand	  in	  front	  of	  you,	  I	  want	  your	  Spirit	  to	  tell	  me	  what	  
to	  say,	  and	  that’s	  the	  word	  I	  spoke.	  	  If	  you	  want	  to	  know	  
the	  truth,	  the	  truth	  should	  be	  able	  to	  set	  you	  free,	  and	  
that’s	  what	  I	  talked	  about,	  and	  there	  were	  
conversations	  that	  followed,	  and	  it	  didn’t	  really	  end	  in	  
any	  particular	  way,	  I	  don’t	  think,	  any	  side,	  but	  it	  was	  just	  
brilliant	  because	  we	  all	  have	  access	  to	  the	  same	  God,	  




In	  is	  interesting	  that	  when	  CB3	  first	  began	  to	  introduce	  the	  story,	  MB3	  immediately	  picked	  up	  on	  the	  
assumptions	  that	  the	  story	  appears	  to	  contain.	  	  When	  CB3	  claims	  that	  the	  Muslims	  were	  “hungry	  for	  
the	  truth”	  the	  implication	  appears	  to	  be	  that	  the	  Muslims	  didn’t	  have	  the	  truth	  at	  that	  time	  (if	  you	  
are	  hungry,	  the	  implication	  is	  that	  you	  don’t	  have	  any	  food).	  CB3	  immediately	  responds	  by	  
attempting	  to	  persuade	  MB3	  that	  she	  has	  misunderstood	  the	  assumptions	  of	  the	  story	  and	  that	  her	  
reference	  to	  hunger	  was	  only	  meant	  to	  imply	  that	  the	  Muslims	  were	  interested	  in	  the	  truth	  in	  the	  
same	  way	  as	  all	  human	  beings	  are,	  including	  CB3,	  “we’re	  all	  hungry	  for	  the	  truth”.	  However,	  it	  could	  
be	  argued	  that	  this	  qualification	  acts	  only	  as	  a	  smokescreen	  that	  serves	  the	  purpose	  of	  getting	  MB3	  
to	  allow	  the	  story	  to	  proceed	  unchallenged.	  	  Evidence	  for	  this	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  CB3’s	  
subsequent	  conversation	  with	  God	  within	  the	  story	  only	  makes	  sense	  if	  the	  listener	  assumes	  that	  
truth	  resides	  in	  CB’s	  understanding	  of	  God	  and	  his	  Spirit,	  in	  addition	  to	  CB3	  being	  able	  to	  act	  as	  a	  
channel	  of	  communication	  between	  that	  God	  and	  those	  human	  beings	  in	  need	  of	  the	  truth.	  	  In	  other	  
words,	  CB3	  construes	  herself	  as	  having	  direct	  access	  to	  the	  truth	  while	  the	  Muslims	  are	  still	  in	  need	  
of	  it,	  which	  is	  what	  she	  appeared	  to	  deny	  in	  her	  use	  of	  the	  inclusive	  we	  in	  her	  statement	  “we’re	  all	  
hungry	  for	  the	  truth”.	  	  
It	  is	  interesting	  that	  CB3	  goes	  on	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  Mosque	  “didn’t	  really	  end	  in	  
any	  particular	  way”.	  	  This	  reinforces	  my	  point	  above	  that	  the	  surface	  content	  of	  the	  story	  is	  rarely	  the	  
most	  important	  element.	  	  The	  most	  important	  element	  in	  both	  this	  story	  and	  MB1’s	  story	  above	  are	  
the	  assumptions	  that	  are	  required	  for	  the	  story	  to	  make	  sense	  to	  the	  story	  teller.	  	  In	  this	  case	  it	  is	  the	  
assumption	  that	  CB3	  has	  direct	  access	  to	  the	  truth,	  but	  Muslims	  do	  not.	  	  This	  is	  qualified	  by	  the	  
implied	  offer	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  them	  to	  gain	  this	  direct	  access	  by	  changing	  their	  understanding	  of	  
how	  a	  believer	  can	  relate	  to	  a	  divine	  entity	  (by	  accepting	  a	  Charismatic	  Christian	  perspective	  that	  
presupposes	  the	  validity	  of	  direct,	  conversational	  access	  to	  a	  divine	  entity,	  typified	  by	  the	  phrase,	  
“just	  ask	  him”).	  	  What	  is	  also	  very	  interesting	  about	  this	  story	  is	  that	  CB3	  times	  it	  perfectly	  so	  that	  it	  
becomes	  the	  last	  thing	  that	  is	  said	  in	  the	  discussion.	  	  The	  assumptions	  powering	  the	  story	  are	  
therefore	  again	  left	  “hanging	  in	  the	  air”	  as	  the	  discussion	  closes.	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This	  strategy	  of	  attempting	  to	  impose	  personal	  stories	  with	  seemingly	  hostile	  ideological	  assumptions	  
must	  be	  contrasted	  with	  the	  kind	  of	  personal	  stories	  Cameron	  identifies	  in	  her	  analysis	  of	  conciliation	  
discourse.	  	  Cameron	  notes	  that,	  
…	  the	  other	  person,	  once,	  but	  no	  longer,	  an	  enemy,	  has	  a	  story	  to	  tell,	  and	  taking	  the	  time	  and	  effort	  to	  listen	  to	  what	  
he	  or	  she	  has	  to	  say	  is	  a	  gesture	  of	  empathy.	  	  However,	  allowing	  the	  Other	  to	  tell	  their	  story	  remains	  distinct	  from	  giving	  
validity	  to	  that	  story	  as	  ‘truth’,	  and	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  participants	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  conciliation	  need	  to	  retain	  this	  
distinction	  ...	  While	  making	  an	  effort	  to	  understand	  their	  perspective	  of	  the	  Other,	  one	  can,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  maintain	  
disagreement	  with	  or	  disapproval	  of	  the	  moral	  or	  ethical	  decisions.	  
(Cameron	  2010a:	  79)	  
Again,	  we	  need	  to	  recognise	  that	  the	  context	  in	  the	  target	  discussions	  is	  very	  different	  from	  the	  post-­‐
conflict	  conciliation	  context	  outlined	  in	  Cameron’s	  quote	  above.	  	  In	  a	  sense,	  the	  discussions	  focused	  
on	  in	  this	  thesis	  between	  Christians	  and	  Muslims	  still	  exist	  within	  a	  context	  of	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  
sociological	  tension	  and	  conflict.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  two	  stories	  analysed	  within	  these	  discussions	  are	  
not	  just	  attempts	  at	  outlining	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  other,	  as	  they	  appear	  to	  be	  in	  Cameron’s	  quote	  
above,	  but	  are	  also	  attempts	  at	  imposing	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  story	  teller	  on	  the	  addressee.	  	  In	  a	  
sense,	  any	  possible	  future	  process	  of	  conciliation	  can	  only	  be	  initiated	  once	  these	  kinds	  of	  stories	  
have	  been	  rendered	  completely	  transparent	  and	  their	  functions	  recognised	  for	  what	  they	  are.	  	  	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  construction	  of	  stories	  during	  a	  discussion	  between	  believers	  of	  different	  
religions	  is	  always	  negative.	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  this	  chapter	  will	  end	  with	  the	  examination	  of	  an	  
example	  of	  narrative	  construction	  that	  offers	  the	  most	  powerful	  possibility	  of	  empathy	  out	  of	  all	  of	  
the	  language	  produced	  in	  the	  target	  discussions.	  	  However,	  for	  now,	  the	  key	  point	  that	  has	  been	  
discussed	  in	  this	  section	  is	  that	  the	  power	  of	  this	  strategy	  of	  imposing	  personal	  stories	  with	  
embedded	  ideological	  assumptions	  on	  others	  should	  not	  be	  underestimated.	  	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  
often	  employed	  by	  individuals	  with	  very	  strong	  beliefs	  and	  that	  it	  is	  used	  to	  persuade	  the	  other,	  as	  
well	  as	  to	  disrupt	  the	  other’s	  capability	  to	  use	  pre-­‐formulated	  counters.	  	  I	  have	  also	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  
one	  of	  the	  strongest	  coping	  strategies	  for	  allowing	  an	  individual	  with	  a	  very	  strong	  belief	  in	  an	  idea	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that	  is	  flatly	  rejected	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  others	  to	  manage	  the	  psychological	  pressure	  of	  that	  constant	  
rejection.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  functions	  of	  imposing	  these	  types	  of	  stories	  is	  
the	  effect	  they	  may	  have	  on	  the	  person	  telling	  the	  story.	  	  This	  point	  has	  particularly	  important	  
implications	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  development	  of	  empathy	  or	  the	  blocking	  of	  it	  in	  the	  course	  of	  
religious	  dialogue.	  	  This	  strategy	  of	  imposing	  stories	  needs	  to	  be	  viewed	  within	  the	  context	  of	  this	  
powerful	  ability	  to	  block	  both	  worldview	  change	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  empathy	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  
story	  teller.	  	  I	  will	  now	  further	  examine	  this	  area	  of	  blocking	  empathy	  by	  considering	  how	  participants	  
often	  resisted	  appropriating	  the	  language	  of	  the	  other.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Avoidance	  of	  Appropriation	  
Given	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  discussions	  contain	  a	  large	  number	  of	  metaphors,	  it	  is	  surprising	  that	  the	  
participants	  did	  not	  make	  use	  of	  each	  other’s	  metaphors	  more	  than	  they	  did.	  	  This	  lack	  of	  
appropriation	  becomes	  all	  the	  more	  marked	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  of	  the	  Christian	  
participants	  repeated	  certain	  metaphors	  to	  an	  unusually	  high	  degree.	  	  There	  are	  two	  possible	  
explanations	  for	  this	  lack	  of	  metaphor	  appropriation	  in	  the	  face	  of	  such	  high	  levels	  of	  repetition.	  	  The	  
first	  is	  that	  certain	  religious	  believers	  are	  especially	  resistant	  to	  metaphors	  generated	  from	  an	  
opposing	  world	  view,	  and	  the	  second	  is	  that	  high	  levels	  of	  repetition	  may	  often	  have	  the	  opposite	  
effect	  on	  the	  addressee	  than	  would	  perhaps	  be	  expected.	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  constant	  repetition	  of	  
language	  that	  conflicts	  with	  the	  addressee’s	  worldview	  does	  not	  contribute	  to	  worldview	  change	  but	  
instead	  produces	  negative	  emotions	  and	  ends	  up	  consolidating	  the	  opposing	  worldview.	  	  Both	  these	  
explanations	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  overlapping	  with	  each	  other,	  so	  it	  is	  therefore	  possible	  that	  both	  may	  
be	  the	  case	  in	  certain	  instances.	  	  	  	  	  	  
These	  discussions	  were	  relatively	  short	  (between	  20	  to	  30	  minutes	  in	  length),	  which	  should	  have	  
made	  multiple	  repetitions	  of	  a	  word	  or	  phrase	  even	  more	  salient	  to	  the	  addressee.	  	  They	  were	  also	  
designed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  encourage	  the	  participants	  to	  pay	  attention	  to,	  respond	  to	  and	  question	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the	  other’s	  language.	  	  When	  these	  factors	  are	  combined	  with	  the	  observation	  that	  some	  key	  words	  
were	  repeated	  by	  participants	  five	  or	  more	  times,	  it	  becomes	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  appropriation	  
was	  being	  blocked	  in	  some	  way.	  	  The	  clearest	  examples	  of	  this	  include:	  	  
• CB2’s	  repeated	  usage	  of	  the	  words	  relationship	  (with	  a	  divine	  entity,	  5	  occurrences),	  
presence	  (of	  a	  divine	  entity,	  7	  occurrences)	  and	  love	  (between	  the	  believer	  and	  a	  divine	  
entity	  and	  vice	  versa,	  9	  occurrences)	  and	  MB2’s	  complete	  avoidance	  of	  these	  terms.	  	  
• CB3’s	  same	  repeated	  usage	  of	  the	  word	  love	  (between	  the	  believer	  and	  a	  divine	  entity	  and	  
vice	  versa,	  13	  occurrences)	  and	  MB3’s	  complete	  avoidance	  of	  this	  word.	  	  This	  avoidance	  
becomes	  even	  more	  noticeable	  when	  we	  also	  take	  into	  account	  CB3’s	  attempt	  to	  explicitly	  
impose	  the	  word	  on	  MB3,	  “love	  is	  the	  most	  important	  commandment,	  love	  the	  Lord	  God	  
with	  all	  your	  heart,	  and	  I’m	  sure	  it	  is	  yours	  as	  well”	  (p2l143-­‐145,	  my	  italics).	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  above	  examples,	  CB2	  makes	  10	  references	  to	  proximity	  language	  and	  12	  references	  
to	  unity	  language,	  and	  yet	  MB2	  consistently	  refuses	  to	  appropriate	  the	  language	  or	  engage	  with	  it	  
apart	  from	  the	  isolated	  clarification	  discussed	  above,	  “so	  it’s	  like	  the	  Holy	  Spirit	  comes	  to	  every	  
Christian?”	  (p2l129).	  
In	  my	  brief	  outline	  of	  the	  results	  in	  the	  section	  above	  I	  referred	  to	  two	  types	  of	  believing	  –	  a	  system-­‐
based	  way	  of	  believing	  and	  a	  personal	  relationship-­‐based	  way	  of	  believing.	  	  The	  view	  that	  the	  
Christian	  participants	  are	  making	  use	  of	  a	  personal	  relationship-­‐based	  way	  of	  believing,	  while	  the	  
Muslim	  participants	  are	  making	  use	  of	  a	  systems-­‐based	  way	  of	  believing	  may	  go	  some	  way	  to	  
account	  for	  these	  examples	  of	  lack	  of	  appropriation.	  	  I	  will	  discuss	  this	  argument	  in	  detail	  in	  section	  
4.6.2	  below,	  but	  in	  this	  section	  I	  will	  lay	  the	  groundwork	  by	  addressing	  the	  question	  of	  why	  there	  are	  
so	  few	  examples	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  convergences	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  conciliation	  texts	  Cameron	  
(2010a)	  analyses.	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Cameron	  notes	  several	  examples	  in	  her	  data	  of	  such	  convergences	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  positive	  
appropriation	  of	  metaphorical	  language	  introduced	  by	  another	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  points	  of	  
connection	  between	  participants.	  	  The	  difference	  is	  perhaps	  due	  to	  a	  collection	  of	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  
agenda	  of	  the	  individual	  participants,	  their	  motivations	  for	  being	  involved	  in	  the	  conversation,	  and	  
the	  type	  of	  preparation	  that	  they	  underwent	  in	  anticipation	  of	  the	  conversation	  (cf.	  Cameron	  2010a:	  
177-­‐178).	  	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  is	  the	  observation	  made	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  that	  
these	  discussions	  cannot	  be	  classed	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  genre	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  conciliation	  discourse,	  
but	  rather	  to	  discourse	  taking	  place	  within,	  to	  some	  extent,	  a	  context	  of	  sociological	  tension	  and	  
conflict.	  	  When	  a	  conservative	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  come	  together	  to	  discuss	  their	  differences,	  they	  
are	  unlikely	  to	  do	  so	  with	  the	  primary	  intention	  of	  searching	  for	  points	  of	  connection	  and	  reconciling	  
differences.	  	  MB1	  provides	  a	  good	  example	  of	  this	  in	  that	  the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  God	  and	  its	  
superiority	  to	  the	  Christian	  doctrine	  of	  the	  trinity	  was	  an	  issue	  that	  appeared	  to	  be	  something	  that	  he	  
had	  planned	  to	  focus	  on,	  or	  at	  least	  he	  had	  planned	  to	  find	  some	  way	  of	  integrating	  it	  into	  the	  tasks	  
that	  he	  would	  be	  given.	  	  CB1’s	  reference	  to	  it	  in	  the	  first	  written	  activity	  also	  appears	  to	  demonstrate	  
his	  agenda	  of	  using	  the	  tasks	  to	  anticipate	  and	  engage	  with	  that	  topic.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  this,	  his	  difficulty	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  second	  discussion	  task	  (“I	  don’t	  know,	  it’s	  a	  
little	  bit	  too	  linguistic	  for	  me,	  a	  little	  out	  of	  my	  depth	  really	  …	  after	  you,	  you	  know,	  you	  tell	  me”	  (p2l2-­‐
4))	  may	  reflect	  his	  difficulty	  with	  adapting	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  his	  expectations	  and	  
preparations	  for	  the	  encounter	  and	  the	  actual	  task	  that	  he	  was	  asked	  to	  perform.	  When	  both	  
participants	  realised	  that	  the	  second	  discussion	  task	  was	  asking	  them	  to	  focus	  on	  similarities	  and	  
differences	  in	  their	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  believer	  rather	  than	  theoretical	  doctrinal	  differences,	  they	  
both	  had	  to	  seemingly	  undergo	  a	  process	  of	  rapid	  adaption,	  which	  CB1	  appeared	  to	  find	  slightly	  
harder	  than	  MB1.	  Conservative	  believers	  may	  not	  have	  a	  problem	  focusing	  on	  action	  and	  relationship	  
language,	  although	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  for	  some	  believers	  the	  discussion	  of	  doctrine	  is	  easier	  in	  that	  it	  
can	  be	  more	  easily	  prepared	  for	  and	  reduced	  to	  a	  series	  of	  community	  agreed	  and	  sanctioned	  
branching	  arguments,	  responses	  and	  counter	  arguments.	  	  The	  discussion	  of	  doctrine	  is	  also	  
182	  
	  
seemingly	  more	  suitable	  for	  allowing	  believers	  to	  calculate	  who	  is	  perceived	  as	  right	  and	  wrong	  and	  
why	  they	  are	  perceived	  as	  right	  and	  wrong.	  	  A	  desire	  to	  talk	  about	  beliefs	  that	  are	  perceived	  as	  
correct	  while	  explaining	  why	  other	  beliefs	  are	  incorrect	  may	  also	  account	  for	  the	  high	  prevalence	  of	  
holding	  on	  to	  turns,	  the	  low	  frequency	  of	  questions,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  divergence	  from	  the	  set	  tasks	  that	  
could	  be	  found	  in	  these	  discussions.	  	  	  
Another	  possible	  factor	  that	  may	  explain	  why	  participants	  did	  not	  pick	  up	  on	  language	  that	  was	  
repeated	  many	  times	  is	  that	  the	  addressee	  may	  have	  sensed	  that	  the	  speaker	  was	  attempting	  to	  
impose	  language	  upon	  them.	  	  In	  this	  situation,	  even	  when	  that	  language	  may	  not	  be	  in	  direct	  conflict	  
with	  the	  addressee’s	  beliefs,	  this	  pressure	  may	  produce	  the	  opposite	  effect	  than	  the	  one	  intended.	  	  
This	  suggests	  that	  in	  any	  process	  of	  dialogue	  it	  is	  very	  possible	  that	  any	  form	  of	  over-­‐repetition	  or	  
attempts	  at	  imposing	  words	  or	  phrases	  that	  are	  key	  to	  the	  speaker’s	  ideology	  could	  have	  the	  effect	  
of	  pushing	  the	  language	  of	  the	  addressee	  further	  away	  rather	  than	  drawing	  it	  into	  a	  process	  of	  
constructive	  convergence.	  
Having	  considered	  these	  examples	  where	  any	  displays	  of	  empathy	  through	  language	  convergence	  
appear	  to	  have	  been	  suppressed,	  I	  now	  wish	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  few	  examples	  in	  the	  discussion	  that	  do	  
appear	  to	  offer	  some	  evidence	  for	  signs	  of	  empathy	  between	  the	  discussion	  participants.	  	  These	  
examples	  take	  two	  forms:	  the	  first	  involves	  statements	  that	  appear	  to	  be	  unusually	  sympathetic	  to	  
the	  beliefs	  of	  the	  other,	  and	  the	  second	  involves	  an	  example	  of	  extended	  perspective	  alignment	  
between	  the	  two	  discussion	  participants.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  
Empathy	  or	  Strategy	  in	  Statements	  that	  Adopt	  the	  Perspective	  of	  the	  Other	  
The	  data	  related	  to	  the	  three	  discussions	  contain	  almost	  no	  examples	  of	  metaphorical	  appropriation	  
that	  could	  suggest	  the	  presence	  of	  empathy	  or	  any	  desire	  to	  build	  bridges	  between	  the	  belief	  
systems	  of	  the	  two	  participants.	  	  One	  of	  the	  only	  examples	  follows	  MB3’s	  statement	  about	  her	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experience	  of	  being	  a	  Muslim,	  “…it’s	  this	  quality	  and	  peace	  with	  myself	  and	  it’s	  this	  relationship	  
between	  me	  and	  God”	  (p1l113).	  	  CB3	  picks	  up	  on	  the	  word	  relationship	  and	  repeats	  it	  back	  to	  her	  in	  a	  
positive	  manner,	  “this	  relationship,	  I	  love	  it”	  (p1l114-­‐115).	  	  However,	  as	  I	  discussed	  above,	  CB3	  goes	  
on	  to	  recontextualise	  the	  word	  in	  a	  way	  that	  systematically	  highlights	  the	  differences	  between	  her	  
beliefs	  and	  the	  beliefs	  of	  MB3.	  	  This	  leads	  me	  to	  extrapolate	  that	  this	  instance	  does	  not	  so	  much	  
instantiate	  a	  desire	  to	  build	  bridges	  between	  different	  beliefs,	  as	  much	  as	  it	  highlights	  CB3’s	  
passionate	  acknowledgement	  that	  the	  word	  relationship	  is	  also	  crucial	  to	  her	  Christian	  beliefs,	  
although,	  from	  her	  perspective,	  in	  a	  markedly	  different	  way	  to	  that	  understood	  by	  MB3.	  In	  other	  
words,	  it	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  another	  way	  of	  drawing	  the	  battle	  lines.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	  order	  to	  explore	  other	  possible	  examples	  of	  displays	  of	  empathy	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  shift	  my	  focus	  
away	  from	  processes	  of	  metaphorical	  appropriation	  and	  concentrate	  on	  statements	  that	  would	  make	  
little	  sense	  outside	  of	  the	  context	  of	  a	  dynamic	  interaction	  between	  two	  participants	  with	  very	  
different	  beliefs.	  In	  the	  discussion	  between	  MB1	  and	  CB1,	  CB1	  states,	  “they’ll	  tell	  you	  that	  Jesus	  is	  
the	  word	  of	  God	  and	  that	  is	  where	  the	  parallel	  with	  the	  Quran	  comes	  because	  the	  Quran	  is	  sent	  from	  
heaven	  to	  reveal	  God’s	  way	  …”	  (p1l238-­‐239).	  	  As	  an	  Evangelical	  Christian,	  CB1	  would	  undoubtedly	  
not	  believe	  that	  the	  Quran	  was	  sent	  from	  heaven	  by	  God.	  	  The	  motivation	  behind	  this	  statement	  
therefore	  appears	  to	  be	  CB1	  viewing	  his	  beliefs	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  MB1	  and	  subsequently	  
looking	  for	  a	  comparison	  that	  would	  drive	  home	  the	  point	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  Jesus	  being	  the	  word	  
of	  God.	  	  MB1	  seems	  to	  also	  be	  following	  a	  similar	  principle	  when	  he	  argues,	  “…	  basically	  I	  always	  
found	  that	  Islam	  seemed	  to	  appeal	  the	  best	  or	  appeal	  the	  most,	  in	  terms	  of,	  maybe	  it’s	  a	  problem,	  
but	  the	  simplicity	  of	  the	  message	  and	  because	  I	  believe	  that	  religion	  is	  easy,	  it	  shouldn’t	  be	  difficult	  …”	  
(p2l108-­‐113).	  	  The	  phrase	  “maybe	  it’s	  a	  problem”	  appears	  to	  relate	  back	  to	  CB1’s	  counter	  argument	  
that	  MB1’s	  doctrinal	  views	  are	  over-­‐simplistic.	  	  This	  suggests	  that	  we	  should	  give	  this	  phrase	  the	  
interpretation	  of	  meaning	  maybe	  you	  will	  think	  this	  is	  a	  problem	  from	  your	  perspective	  but	  it	  isn’t	  a	  
problem	  from	  my	  Muslim	  perspective.	  	  This	  therefore	  again	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  example	  of	  one	  of	  the	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participants	  briefly	  placing	  himself	  in	  the	  position	  of	  the	  other	  and	  briefly	  producing	  language	  from	  
that	  perspective.	  	  	  
Another	  example	  can	  be	  found	  in	  CB2’s	  language	  when	  he	  states,	  “…	  but	  I	  don’t	  think	  the	  guidelines	  
for	  the	  Quran	  and	  the	  guide	  that	  the	  Quran	  gives	  you	  and	  the	  guide	  that	  the	  Bible	  gives	  you	  aren’t	  
too	  dissimilar	  anyway,	  you	  know	  what	  I	  mean?”	  (p2l16).	  	  It	  is	  unlikely	  that	  this	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  
statement	  that	  CB2	  would	  make	  if	  he	  were	  preaching	  a	  sermon	  at	  his	  local	  church	  (where	  he	  would	  
probably	  foreground	  key	  differences,	  not	  similarities),	  but	  it	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  statement	  that	  fits	  well	  into	  
a	  polite,	  non-­‐confrontational	  conversation	  with	  a	  Muslim	  participant.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  recognise	  
that	  all	  the	  participants	  appeared	  determined	  to	  avoid	  any	  language	  related	  to	  impoliteness	  or	  bad	  
feeling.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  a	  valid	  question	  to	  ask	  whether	  the	  above	  statements	  should	  be	  explained	  in	  
terms	  of	  empathy	  and	  seeing	  through	  the	  other’s	  eyes	  or	  just	  politeness	  strategies,	  although	  it	  may	  
be	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  some	  connection	  between	  these	  two	  notions.	  	  
However,	  too	  much	  should	  not	  be	  read	  into	  these	  brief	  indications	  of	  perspective	  expansion,	  because	  
again	  it	  may	  have	  more	  to	  do	  with	  a	  rhetorical	  technique	  of	  persuasion	  –	  conceding	  on	  smaller	  points	  
with	  the	  hope	  of	  softening	  the	  competitor,	  before	  winning	  on	  the	  big	  points	  –	  than	  it	  has	  to	  do	  with	  a	  
marker	  of	  personal	  connection	  and	  the	  experiencing	  of	  the	  world	  from	  another’s	  perspective.	  	  Other	  
examples	  of	  statements	  that	  may	  contain	  a	  mix	  of	  factors	  related	  to	  empathy	  and	  rhetorical	  strategy	  
include	  CB1’s	  tendency	  to	  offer	  partial	  agreement	  with	  MB1’s	  criticism	  followed	  by	  disagreement,	  for	  
example,	  “…	  I	  agree	  that	  in	  the	  West	  especially	  the	  [Christian]	  concept	  of	  God’s	  nature	  has	  been	  
confused	  …	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  …”	  (p1l179-­‐213),	  “…	  the	  manuscripts	  in	  my	  opinion	  are	  trustworthy	  
but	  I	  hear	  what	  you	  are	  saying	  about	  the	  standardisation	  of	  the	  translation	  …”	  (p2l157-­‐158).	  	  	  
Another	  dynamic	  that	  may	  be	  at	  play	  here	  that	  should	  also	  prevent	  us	  from	  reading	  too	  much	  
empathy	  into	  the	  above	  examples	  is	  what	  I	  shall	  term	  the	  rubber	  band	  effect.	  	  What	  I	  mean	  by	  this	  is	  
a	  temporary	  “bending”	  in	  perspective	  or	  a	  transient	  appearance	  of	  empathy	  that	  subsequently	  
disappears	  later	  in	  the	  conversation,	  or	  by	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  next	  conversation.	  	  As	  I	  have	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discussed	  above,	  CB1	  appears	  to	  concede	  some	  key	  points	  with	  his	  statements	  that	  follow	  phrases	  
such	  as	  “I	  agree	  that”	  and	  “I	  hear	  what	  you	  are	  saying	  about”.	  	  I	  have	  also	  discussed	  how	  CB1	  is	  
generally	  dominated	  in	  the	  discussion	  by	  MB1.	  	  These	  two	  points	  might	  lead	  to	  the	  assumption	  that	  
CB1	  is	  being	  “beaten”	  in	  the	  discussion	  and	  that	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  discussion	  is	  pressuring	  CB1	  
towards	  a	  worldview	  change.	  	  However,	  CB1’s	  technique	  of	  narrative	  imposition	  that	  I	  explored	  
above	  clearly	  demonstrates	  that	  CB1	  is	  still	  intent	  on	  assuming	  that	  MB1’s	  religious	  beliefs	  are	  self-­‐
evidently	  incorrect.	  	  The	  point	  is	  that	  there	  may	  be	  strong	  linguistic	  evidence	  that	  CB1’s	  rhetorical	  
defences	  are	  crumbling,	  but	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  discussion	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  this	  crumbling	  is	  
simply	  a	  very	  brief	  “bending”	  in	  CB1’s	  worldview.	  	  A	  worldview	  that	  is	  quickly	  able	  to	  return	  to	  its	  
original	  position	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  competitive	  discourse	  begins	  to	  draw	  to	  a	  close.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
I	  have	  so	  far	  been	  relatively	  negative	  about	  the	  presence	  of	  empathy	  in	  the	  discussion	  data.	  	  I	  now	  
wish	  to	  balance	  this	  negativity	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  a	  particular	  stretch	  of	  the	  discussion	  between	  CB2	  and	  
MB2	  that	  appears	  to	  display	  some	  degree	  of	  perspective	  alignment	  in	  terms	  of	  action	  and	  
relationship	  language.	  	  	  
	  
Moments	  of	  Perspective	  Alignment	  
I	  have	  so	  far	  focused	  on	  numerous	  examples	  where	  the	  participants	  have	  used	  their	  turn	  in	  the	  
discourse	  to	  highlight	  the	  differences	  between	  their	  own	  beliefs	  and	  the	  beliefs	  of	  the	  other,	  
highlight	  the	  perceived	  superiority	  of	  their	  own	  beliefs,	  or	  to	  block	  any	  possibility	  of	  a	  change	  in	  
belief.	  	  One	  of	  my	  arguments	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  was	  that	  a	  focus	  on	  action	  and	  relationship	  
language	  would	  allow	  committed,	  conservative	  believers	  to	  move	  beyond	  an	  emphasis	  on	  theoretical	  
doctrine	  and	  the	  perception	  that	  belief	  was	  composed	  of	  an	  oversimplified,	  binary	  framework.	  	  The	  
discussions	  analysed	  in	  this	  chapter	  were	  designed	  to	  focus	  the	  participants	  on	  action	  and	  
relationship	  language,	  and	  yet	  the	  examples	  examined	  so	  far	  show	  little	  evidence	  of	  a	  move	  away	  
from	  a	  perception	  of	  clear,	  fixed	  differences.	  	  Rigid	  doctrinal	  differences	  in	  the	  form	  of	  beliefs	  related	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to	  the	  trinity	  and	  the	  unity	  of	  God	  and	  the	  atoning	  death	  of	  Christ	  were	  still	  relatively	  prominent	  in	  
the	  discussions.	  	  This	  appears	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  even	  when	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  is	  
foregrounded,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  propensity	  for	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  to	  rapidly	  return	  to	  a	  
focus	  on	  theoretical	  doctrinal	  differences.	  	  However,	  there	  is	  also	  some	  evidence	  that	  the	  focus	  on	  
action	  and	  relationship	  language	  did	  produce	  moments	  where	  a	  perception	  of	  absolute	  differences	  
appeared	  to	  fade	  into	  the	  background.	  	  In	  the	  results	  section	  above,	  I	  briefly	  referred	  to	  such	  a	  
moment	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  second	  discussion	  between	  MB2	  and	  CB2.	  	  It	  is	  worth	  analysing	  this	  
part	  of	  MB2	  and	  CB2’s	  discussion	  in	  some	  detail.	  	  	  	  	  
This	  particular	  stretch	  of	  discourse	  begins	  with	  MB2	  asking	  CB2	  whether	  Christians	  need	  to	  go	  to	  
church	  in	  order	  to	  communicate	  with	  God.	  	  The	  question	  appears	  to	  be	  based	  on	  MB2’s	  
understanding	  of	  the	  mediating	  role	  of	  the	  priest	  in	  Roman	  Catholic	  belief	  and	  her	  assumption	  that	  
CB2	  follows	  such	  beliefs.	  	  CB2	  is	  quick	  to	  affirm	  his	  Protestant	  Evangelical	  belief	  that	  there	  is	  no	  
human	  mediator	  and	  that	  direct	  communication	  with	  God	  is	  possible	  in	  his	  form	  of	  Christianity.	  	  
However,	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  meeting	  with	  other	  Christians	  is	  still	  important	  because	  fellow	  
believers	  need	  to	  support	  each	  other.	  	  He	  makes	  this	  point	  by	  first	  affirming	  that	  no	  one	  can	  follow	  
their	  religion	  perfectly	  and	  that	  there	  will	  always	  be	  differences	  in	  a	  group	  of	  believers,	  but	  that,	  
despite	  these	  imperfections	  and	  differences,	  fellow	  believers	  are	  still	  able	  to	  support	  and	  help	  each	  
other.	  	  MB2	  agrees	  with	  both	  points,	  indicating	  that	  they	  fit	  with	  her	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Muslim.	  
This	  is	  followed	  by	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  brief	  moment	  of	  misunderstanding	  which	  is	  solved	  by	  CB2	  
rephrasing	  his	  point	  and	  stating	  that	  “sometimes	  it’s	  very	  hard	  to	  understand	  what	  God	  wants	  in	  a	  
situation,	  and	  then	  you	  need	  people	  around	  you	  to	  help	  you	  out”.	  	  MB2	  does	  not	  just	  agree	  with	  this	  
observation,	  but	  also	  intensifies	  her	  agreement	  through	  the	  use	  of	  exactly,	  “to	  help	  you,	  yeah,	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Participant	   Type	  of	  comment	   Extract	  
MB2:	   Justification	  for	  earlier	  
question	  
“	  …	  I	  wanted	  to	  check	  my	  understanding,	  I	  have	  heard	  Christians	  need	  to	  go	  to	  
church,	  can’t	  pray	  to	  God	  directly.”	  
CB2:	   Further	  explanation	  of	  
earlier	  answer	  	  
“It	  does	  say	  that	  you	  need	  a	  fellowship	  with	  each	  other,	  doesn’t	  necessarily	  
have	  to	  be	  in	  a	  church	  building,	  I’m	  possibly	  a	  little	  bit	  less	  mainstream	  than	  
some	  people,	  I’m	  sure	  you	  don’t	  live	  perfectly	  according	  to	  the	  Quran,	  you	  try	  
to.”	  
MB2:	   Agreement	   “Well,	  yeah,	  I	  try	  to.”	  
CB2:	   Expansion	  of	  point	   “Yeah,	  well	  equally	  like	  with	  Christians,	  you’re	  not	  going	  to	  get	  everything	  
absolutely	  right	  all	  the	  time,	  there	  might	  be	  some	  scripture	  that	  you	  think	  says	  
one	  thing,	  or	  your	  teacher,	  because	  there’s	  different	  sects	  in	  Islam,	  yeah,	  that	  
will	  teach	  slightly	  different	  things,	  but	  essentially	  the	  basic	  tenets	  of	  the	  faith	  
are	  the	  same.”	  
MB2:	   Agreement	   “There	  are	  minor	  differences	  between	  sects.”	  
CB2:	   Expansion	  of	  point	  with	  
question	  
“You	  get	  these	  minor	  differences,	  so	  my	  view	  on	  what	  scripture	  says	  differs	  
slightly	  from	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  people	  at	  the	  church	  that	  I	  go	  to	  the	  main	  points	  are	  
the	  same,	  but	  I	  don’t	  think	  you	  have	  to	  meet	  in	  a	  church	  building,	  but	  you	  
certainly	  have	  to	  meet	  with	  fellow	  Christians.	  	  If	  you	  were	  trying	  to	  live	  by	  the	  
Quran	  and	  you	  didn’t	  have	  any	  other	  Muslims	  to	  help	  you,	  you	  would	  really	  
struggle	  wouldn’t	  you?”	  	  	  
MB2:	   Agreement	   “Yeah.”	  
CB2:	   Expansion	  of	  point	   “You’ve	  got	  God	  to	  help	  you	  and	  that’s	  awesome,	  but	  sometimes	  you	  find	  it	  
hard,	  well,	  like,	  I	  know	  I	  certainly	  do,	  sometimes	  I	  will	  find	  it	  hard	  to	  talk	  to	  God,	  
and	  you	  need	  people	  to	  guide	  you.”	  
MB2:	   Partial	  agreement	  and	   “I	  need	  people	  to	  help	  me	  understand	  the	  words	  of	  God	  but,	  it’s	  like,	  I	  don’t	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qualification	   find	  it	  hard	  to	  talk	  to	  God	  all	  the	  time.”	  
CB2:	   Clarification	   “No,	  maybe	  I	  phrased	  that	  wrong.	  Sometimes	  things	  aren’t	  as	  easy,	  and	  then	  
sometimes	  it’s	  very	  hard	  to	  understand	  what	  God	  wants	  in	  a	  situation,	  and	  then	  
you	  need	  people	  around	  you	  to	  help	  you	  out.”	  
MB2:	   Complete	  Agreement	   “To	  help	  you,	  yeah,	  exactly.”	  
	  
What	  is	  very	  interesting	  about	  the	  above	  segment	  is	  that	  what	  is	  being	  foregrounded	  is	  the	  daily	  
personal	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Christian	  or	  a	  Muslim	  and	  the	  practical	  issues	  relating	  to	  having	  a	  
perceived	  relationship	  with	  a	  divine	  entity,	  rather	  than	  what	  a	  Christian	  or	  Muslim	  theoretically	  
believes.	  	  CB2	  discusses	  this	  experience	  by	  using	  the	  same	  narrative	  creation	  technique	  that	  both	  CB1	  
and	  CB3	  used,	  but	  with	  two	  crucial	  differences.	  	  	  
Firstly,	  the	  narrative	  is	  not	  so	  much	  imposed	  as	  offered	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  question,	  or,	  to	  put	  it	  another	  
way,	  an	  invitation	  to	  join	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  shared	  analogy,	  “if	  you	  were	  trying	  to	  live	  by	  the	  Quran	  
and	  you	  didn’t	  have	  any	  other	  Muslims	  to	  help	  you,	  you	  would	  really	  struggle,	  wouldn’t	  you?”.	  	  It	  is	  
only	  after	  MB2	  has	  accepted	  the	  validity	  of	  this	  situation	  that	  CB2	  tentatively	  offers	  a	  second	  
narrative	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  stated	  situation	  where	  “things	  aren’t	  easy”	  and	  that	  sometimes	  “it’s	  very	  
hard	  to	  understand	  what	  God	  wants	  in	  a	  situation”,	  and	  in	  that	  situation	  “you	  need	  people	  around	  
you	  to	  help	  you	  out”.	  	  	  
Secondly,	  MB2	  appears	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  respond	  very	  positively	  to	  these	  narratives	  because,	  unlike	  
the	  narratives	  of	  CB1	  and	  CB3	  analysed	  above,	  they	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  rely	  upon	  a	  framework	  of	  
underlying	  assumptions	  that	  can	  be	  related	  to	  the	  superiority	  of	  Christianity.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  
obvious	  intention	  by	  CB2	  at	  this	  point	  in	  the	  discussion	  to	  rhetorically	  “win”,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  
propose	  that	  the	  intention	  is	  simply	  to	  explain	  something	  (namely,	  why	  some	  Christians	  feel	  they	  
don’t	  have	  to	  meet	  together,	  but	  still	  think	  it’s	  a	  good	  idea	  to	  do	  so).	  	  However,	  what	  is	  interesting	  
about	  this	  explanation	  is	  that	  CB2	  chooses	  to	  explain	  it	  by	  recourse	  to	  a	  shared	  experience	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(sometimes	  it’s	  difficult	  to	  know	  what	  God	  wants	  you	  to	  do	  in	  a	  given	  situation)	  and	  a	  shared	  
conclusion	  from	  that	  experience	  (it’s	  therefore	  good	  if	  you	  can	  meet	  with	  other	  believers	  in	  your	  
religion	  who	  can	  support	  you).	  This	  strategy	  for	  explaining	  a	  point	  makes	  no	  sense	  unless	  at	  some	  
level	  these	  two	  believers	  recognise	  that,	  despite	  the	  serious	  theological	  differences	  that	  have	  already	  
been	  highlighted	  and	  discussed	  during	  CB2	  and	  MB2’s	  discussion,	  there	  are	  key	  similarities	  in	  their	  
everyday	  perceived	  experience.	  	  If	  this	  is	  correct,	  then	  it	  is	  an	  indication	  that	  a	  level	  of	  empathy	  and	  
bridge	  building	  was	  present	  to	  some	  degree	  during	  this	  section	  of	  the	  discussion.	  
In	  order	  to	  appreciate	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  example,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  re-­‐iterate	  the	  positions	  of	  
the	  majority	  of	  Evangelical	  Christians	  and	  conservative	  Muslims.	  	  The	  standard	  position	  in	  Evangelical	  
Christianity	  can	  be	  summarised	  in	  this	  quote	  from	  an	  article	  on	  Muslim	  beliefs	  in	  the	  January	  2007	  
edition	  of	  the	  Evangelical	  Times,	  	  
Only	  by	  honouring	  the	  Son	  do	  we	  honour	  the	  Father	  (John	  5:23).	  So	  rejecting	  Christ	  amounts	  to	  a	  rejection	  of	  God.	  
There	  is	  no	  other	  gospel,	  whatever	  the	  multi-­‐faith	  liberals	  and	  other	  deceivers	  may	  claim.	  	  
(http://www.evangelical-­‐times.org/archive/item/2192/Cults-­‐and-­‐other-­‐religions/The-­‐path-­‐to-­‐paradise-­‐Christ-­‐or-­‐
Muhammad-­‐/)	  
The	  meaning	  is	  clear:	  Muslims	  may	  think	  that	  they	  have	  a	  relationship	  with	  God,	  but	  in	  fact	  their	  
beliefs	  are	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  such	  a	  relationship.	  	  The	  standard	  position	  in	  conservative	  
Islam	  is	  similarly	  stark.	  	  In	  his	  booklet	  Concept	  of	  God	  in	  Major	  Religions,	  Zakir	  Naik	  (2008:	  23-­‐24),	  a	  
prominent	  Sunni	  Muslim	  apologist,	  states	  unequivocally	  that	  any	  religious	  believer	  who	  rejects	  the	  
Muslim	  doctrine	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  God	  and	  attempts	  to	  argue	  that	  Jesus	  is	  God	  is	  committing	  
blasphemy	  and	  is	  heading	  for	  hell.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  it’s	  clearly	  impossible	  to	  simultaneously	  be	  
viewed	  as	  blaspheming	  a	  divine	  entity	  while	  having	  a	  meaningful	  relationship	  with	  it.	  	  	  
The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  Evangelical	  Christians	  and	  conservative	  Muslims	  may	  be	  able	  to	  concede	  that	  
they	  have	  a	  degree	  of	  similarity	  and	  overlap	  in	  terms	  of	  theoretical	  doctrinal	  issues	  (for	  example,	  
they	  both	  recognise	  as	  authoritative	  the	  first	  five	  books	  of	  the	  Old	  Testament).	  	  However,	  they	  would	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want	  to	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  absolute	  dissimilarity	  in	  terms	  of	  episodic	  situations	  relating	  to	  a	  
relationship	  with	  God.	  	  This	  situation	  can	  be	  illustrated	  by	  comparing	  Evangelical	  views	  about	  Roman	  
Catholics.	  	  There	  are	  clearly	  many	  more	  points	  of	  similarity	  in	  terms	  of	  theoretical	  doctrinal	  belief	  
between	  Evangelical	  Protestant	  Christians	  and	  Roman	  Catholics	  than	  there	  are	  between	  Evangelical	  
Protestant	  Christians	  and	  Muslims,	  and	  yet	  many	  Evangelical	  Protestant	  Christians	  refuse	  to	  allow	  
even	  the	  possibility	  that	  Roman	  Catholics	  can	  have	  a	  relationship	  with	  God.	  	  Consider	  the	  quote	  
below	  from	  the	  2008	  June	  edition	  of	  the	  Evangelical	  Times:	  
Beware	  of	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  and	  of	  her	  pretence	  to	  have	  changed.	  Beware	  also	  of	  those	  Evangelicals	  who	  are	  
affiliating	  with	  Rome	  today	  and	  who	  speak	  of	  Rome's	  errors	  in	  a	  soft	  manner.	  They	  teach	  that	  non-­‐Catholics	  should	  join	  
hands	  with	  Catholics	  to	  solve	  the	  social-­‐political	  issues	  of	  our	  day,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  understand	  her	  doctrines.	  The	  Word	  
of	  God	  clearly	  tells	  us,	  'Whoever	  transgresses	  and	  does	  not	  abide	  in	  the	  doctrine	  of	  Christ	  does	  not	  have	  God.	  He	  who	  
abides	  in	  the	  doctrine	  of	  Christ	  has	  both	  the	  Father	  and	  the	  Son.	  If	  anyone	  comes	  to	  you	  and	  does	  not	  bring	  this	  
doctrine,	  do	  not	  receive	  him	  into	  your	  house	  nor	  greet	  him,	  for	  he	  who	  greets	  him	  shares	  in	  his	  evil	  deeds'	  (2	  John	  9-­‐11).	  
(http://www.evangelical-­‐times.org/archive/item/2993/Cults-­‐and-­‐other-­‐religions/Has-­‐Rome-­‐changed-­‐/)	  
Despite	  the	  numerous	  similarities	  in	  doctrinal	  belief,	  most	  Evangelical	  Christians	  will	  be	  adamant	  that	  
a	  committed	  Roman	  Catholic	  “does	  not	  have	  God”.	  	  From	  the	  Evangelical	  Christian	  or	  conservative	  
Muslim	  perspective,	  it	  is	  therefore	  clearly	  possible	  to	  concede	  that	  believers	  from	  different	  belief	  
communities	  can	  have	  numerous	  points	  of	  similarity	  in	  terms	  of	  theoretical	  beliefs	  without	  being	  
recognised	  by	  each	  other	  as	  true	  believers.	  	  However,	  even	  the	  smallest	  concession	  that	  believers	  
from	  another	  belief	  community	  can	  have	  a	  personal	  relationship	  with	  God	  has	  enormous	  
ramifications.	  In	  terms	  of	  a	  relationship	  with	  God,	  you	  are	  either	  perceived	  to	  be	  having	  one	  (in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  perceived	  true	  believer)	  or	  not	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  perceived	  non-­‐believer).	  	  The	  key	  point	  
here	  is	  that	  exclusivist	  religious	  groups	  must	  be	  over	  simplistic	  and	  devoid	  of	  ambiguity	  in	  this	  area	  if	  
they	  are	  to	  sustain	  their	  exclusivist	  worldviews.	  	  
Now	  that	  I	  have	  highlighted	  the	  reason	  why	  similarities	  in	  a	  perceived	  personal	  relationship	  with	  a	  
divine	  entity	  are	  so	  significant,	  we	  can	  now	  more	  fully	  appreciate	  the	  import	  of	  the	  above	  extract	  
191	  
	  
from	  the	  discussion	  between	  CB2	  and	  MB2.	  As	  I	  noted	  above,	  CB2	  chooses	  to	  explain	  his	  point	  by	  
recourse	  to	  a	  shared	  experience	  (sometimes	  it’s	  difficult	  to	  know	  what	  God	  wants	  you	  to	  do	  in	  a	  
given	  situation)	  and	  a	  shared	  conclusion	  from	  that	  experience	  (it’s	  therefore	  good	  if	  you	  can	  meet	  
with	  other	  believers	  in	  your	  religion	  who	  can	  support	  you).	  This	  strategy	  for	  explaining	  a	  point	  makes	  
no	  sense	  unless	  at	  some	  level	  these	  two	  conservative	  believers	  recognise	  that	  there	  are	  key	  
similarities	  in	  their	  everyday	  perceived	  experience,	  and	  this	  type	  of	  recognition	  is	  impossible	  without	  
an	  unusually	  (in	  terms	  of	  conservative	  believers)	  advanced	  degree	  of	  mutual	  empathy.	  	  	  	  
However,	  it	  is	  still	  important	  to	  resist	  the	  blanket	  conclusion	  that	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  
automatically	  promotes	  empathy.	  	  The	  sections	  above	  on	  metaphor	  appropriation	  serving	  rhetorical	  
purposes	  and	  the	  imposing	  of	  narratives	  with	  ideological	  assumptions	  all	  demonstrate	  how	  action	  
and	  relationship	  or	  episodic	  language	  can	  be	  used	  to	  widen	  the	  ideological	  gap	  between	  the	  
participants.	  It	  is	  therefore	  clear	  that	  this	  type	  of	  language	  does	  not	  at	  all	  guarantee	  an	  empathetic	  
connection.	  	  However,	  this	  example	  from	  CB2	  and	  MB2’s	  discussion	  demonstrates	  the	  potential	  of	  
this	  type	  of	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  ability	  to	  promote	  bridge	  building	  
between	  certain	  conservative	  believers	  at	  certain	  times.	  More	  importantly,	  I	  believe	  it	  also	  
demonstrates	  the	  possible	  potential	  for	  action	  and	  relationship	  discourse	  to	  be	  used	  to	  encourage	  
empathy	  when	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  discussion	  has	  a	  thorough	  grasp	  of	  the	  range	  of	  
issues	  discussed	  above	  and	  a	  strong	  desire	  to	  forge	  points	  of	  personal	  connection.	  	  	  	  	  
Having	  considered	  some	  of	  the	  interactive	  features	  of	  the	  discourse	  produced	  during	  the	  videoed	  
discussions,	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  in	  each	  participant’s	  
language	  and	  the	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  identified	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  testimonial	  data.	  	  The	  section	  
below	  should	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  distinct	  from	  some	  of	  the	  interactive	  aspects	  I	  have	  discussed	  above.	  	  





4.6.2	  Patterns	  of	  Emphasis	  in	  the	  Language	  of	  Participants	  
In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  my	  principal	  argument	  was	  that	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  has	  a	  
tendency	  to	  vary	  across	  individuals,	  contexts	  and	  genres.	  	  This	  meant	  that	  it	  should	  be	  impossible	  to	  
view	  such	  language	  in	  absolute,	  static	  terms.	  	  Instead,	  it	  should	  only	  be	  possible	  to	  describe	  such	  
language	  in	  terms	  of	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  at	  play	  at	  a	  particular	  time	  and	  setting	  within	  particular	  
genres,	  individuals	  and	  communities.	  	  The	  previous	  chapter	  identified	  some	  of	  these	  patterns	  of	  
emphasis	  in	  the	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  found	  in	  the	  testimonials	  of	  the	  Evangelical	  
Times	  and	  the	  website	  islamfortoday.com.	  The	  discussions	  analysed	  below	  do	  not	  belong	  specifically	  
to	  those	  communities	  and	  also	  do	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  genre	  of	  testimonials,	  so	  we	  would	  expect	  the	  
patterns	  of	  emphasis	  to	  vary.	  	  However,	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  establish	  that	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  
within	  religious	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  are	  not	  all	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  variation.	  	  
Some	  types	  of	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  may	  be	  more	  closely	  controlled	  and	  determined	  by	  
doctrinal	  beliefs	  than	  others.	  	  The	  analysis	  below	  will	  examine	  these	  possibilities	  by	  focusing	  in	  on	  the	  
same	  types	  of	  movement	  and	  proximity	  language	  I	  focused	  on	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  
In	  order	  to	  avoid	  repeated	  references	  to	  sections	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  table	  4.11	  below	  
summarises	  the	  various	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  explored	  in	  that	  chapter.	  	  Whenever	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  
contrast	  language	  in	  the	  studies	  with	  patterns	  of	  language	  in	  the	  testimonial	  analysis,	  I	  will	  therefore	  
refer	  to	  the	  numbered	  patterns	  below	  rather	  than	  continually	  referring	  back	  to	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  
	  
Table	  4.11:	  Patterns	  of	  Emphasis	  between	  Religious	  Testimonials	  Established	  in	  Chapter	  3	  
Patterns	  of	  Emphasis	  and	  Section	  
where	  Discussed:	  
a) Islamfortoday.com	  	  
Testimonials:	  
b) Evangelical	  Times	  
Testimonials	  
Pattern	  1:	  COME	  and	  FOLLOW	  
	  
Fewer	  occurrences	  of	  COME	  +	  
preposition	  +	  [divine	  entity]	  or	  
FOLLOW	  +	  [divine	  entity]	  
More	  occurrences	  of	  COME	  +	  
preposition	  +	  [divine	  entity]	  or	  
FOLLOW	  +	  [divine	  entity]	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Pattern	  2:	  Divine	  proximity	  	  
	  
Fewer	  occurrences	  of	  divine	  proximity	  
language,	  occurrences	  usually	  
restricted	  to	  the	  use	  of	  close	  
More	  occurrences	  of	  divine	  proximity	  
language,	  occurrences	  exhibit	  a	  wider	  
range	  of	  verbs	  and	  prepositions	  
Pattern	  3:	  Relationship	  with	  a	  divine	  
entity	  
	  
Fewer	  occurrences	  of	  language	  relating	  
to	  a	  relationship	  with	  a	  divine	  entity	  
More	  occurrences	  of	  language	  relating	  
to	  a	  relationship	  with	  a	  divine	  entity	  
Pattern	  4:	  Divine	  unity	  
	  
No	  occurrences	  of	  divine	  unity	  
language	  
Occurrences	  of	  divine	  unity	  language	  
Pattern	  5:	  Believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  
	  
More	  occurrences	  of	  type	  3	  (e.g.	  
guided)	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  movement	  
metaphors	  and	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  
movement	  metaphors	  related	  to	  an	  
argument	  or	  realisation	  rather	  than	  a	  
divine	  entity	  
More	  occurrences	  of	  type	  1	  (e.g.	  
brought)	  and	  2	  (e.g.	  led)	  believer-­‐as-­‐
patient	  movement	  metaphors	  
Pattern	  6:	  Through	  with	  the	  meaning	  
of	  going	  through	  a	  challenging	  life	  
experience	  
	  
Fewer	  occurrences	  of	  through	  with	  the	  
meaning	  going	  through	  a	  challenging	  
life	  experience	  
More	  occurrences	  of	  through	  with	  the	  
meaning	  going	  through	  a	  challenging	  
life	  experience	  
Pattern	  7:	  Through	  with	  the	  meaning	  
by	  means	  of	  	  
	  
More	  occurrences	  of	  through	  with	  the	  
meaning	  by	  means	  of	  that	  suggest	  a	  
process	  of	  research	  and	  reflection	  
More	  occurrences	  of	  through	  with	  the	  
meaning	  by	  means	  of	  that	  suggest	  
divine	  intervention	  
	  
I	  will	  now	  proceed	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  language	  used	  by	  each	  pair	  in	  the	  study	  and	  the	  patterns	  of	  
emphasis	  identified	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  in	  the	  two	  collections	  of	  testimonials.	  	  This	  discussion	  will	  
be	  ordered	  according	  to	  the	  above	  patterns,	  and	  the	  list	  of	  relevant	  occurrences	  in	  the	  language	  of	  
each	  participant	  will	  be	  colour	  coded	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  quick	  visual	  summary.	  	  This	  coding	  will	  




	   Multiple	  occurrences	  supporting	  a	  pattern,	  or,	  if	  the	  pattern	  is	  based	  on	  certain	  language	  not	  being	  present,	  no	  
occurrences	  contradicting	  the	  pattern	  
	   Limited	  support	  for	  the	  pattern,	  or,	  if	  the	  pattern	  is	  based	  on	  certain	  language	  not	  being	  present,	  some	  isolated	  
occurrences	  contradicting	  the	  pattern	  
	   No	  occurrences	  supporting	  the	  pattern	  or	  multiple	  occurrences	  contradicting	  it	  	  
	  	  	  
With	  reference	  to	  the	  above	  patterns	  and	  colour	  codes,	  I	  will	  now	  proceed	  to	  a	  comparison	  and	  
discussion	  of	  the	  language	  used	  by	  each	  pair	  in	  the	  study	  and	  the	  patterns	  of	  language	  identified	  in	  
the	  two	  collections	  of	  testimonials,	  beginning	  with	  a	  consideration	  of	  come	  and	  follow	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  
divine	  entity.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Using	  come	  and	  follow	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  divine	  entity	  
In	  the	  testimonials	  analysed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  verbs	  come	  and	  follow	  were	  rarely	  directly	  
associated	  with	  the	  divine	  entity	  in	  the	  Muslim	  testimonials	  (pattern	  1a	  in	  table	  1	  above),	  but	  were	  
frequently	  associated	  with	  the	  divine	  entity	  in	  the	  Christian	  testimonials	  (pattern	  1b	  in	  table	  1	  above).	  
In	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  testimonials,	  I	  observed	  a	  tendency	  in	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  texts	  to	  avoid	  
associating	  movement	  verbs	  such	  as	  come	  and	  follow	  directly	  with	  a	  divine	  entity,	  preferring	  instead	  
to	  associate	  these	  verbs	  with	  words	  that	  indirectly	  relate	  to	  the	  divine	  entity	  or	  the	  belief	  system	  
surrounding	  that	  entity	  (e.g.	  “…	  the	  story	  of	  how	  my	  husband	  and	  I	  came	  to	  embrace	  Islam”	  (MT1)”,	  
but	  not	  came	  to	  God).	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  texts	  often	  directly	  associated	  these	  verbs	  
with	  a	  divine	  entity,	  and	  made	  frequent	  uses	  of	  phrases	  like	  follow	  Jesus	  or	  come	  to	  God	  (e.g.	  “come	  
to	  God	  in	  prayer”	  (CT1)	  and	  “I	  had	  to	  come	  to	  God	  in	  repentance”	  (CT14)).	  One	  possible	  explanation	  
for	  this	  is	  that	  the	  Christian	  texts	  wished	  to	  emphasise	  the	  sense	  of	  intimacy	  associated	  with	  
metaphors	  that	  draw	  on	  a	  domain	  of	  movement	  towards	  physical	  proximity,	  while	  the	  Muslim	  texts	  
appeared	  to	  be	  uncomfortable	  with	  this	  usage.	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In	  the	  section	  above	  I	  discussed	  how	  co-­‐occurring	  metaphor	  usage	  becomes	  more	  interesting	  when	  
the	  participants	  make	  use	  of	  a	  shared	  metaphor	  in	  a	  way	  that	  at	  first	  glance	  appears	  similar,	  but	  
under	  closer	  examination	  reveals	  subtle	  differences,	  possibly	  reflecting	  equally	  subtle	  differences	  in	  
belief.	  	  I	  noted	  that	  the	  use	  of	  follow	  by	  the	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  participants	  in	  the	  videoed	  
discussions	  was,	  in	  a	  similar	  manner	  to	  the	  use	  of	  follow	  in	  the	  testimonial	  data,	  a	  good	  example	  of	  
this.	  	  In	  table	  12	  below,	  I	  further	  expand	  this	  discussion	  by	  listing	  the	  usages	  for	  both	  follow	  and	  come	  
by	  all	  six	  participants	  during	  the	  tasks	  and	  the	  discussions.	  	  We	  can	  see	  that	  the	  Muslim	  participants	  
tend	  to	  use	  these	  verbs	  in	  a	  way	  that	  indirectly	  associated	  them	  with	  God	  or	  the	  belief	  system	  
surrounding	  God	  (e.g.	  “came	  to	  Islam”	  (p1l16)),	  whereas	  the	  Christian	  participants	  tend	  to	  use	  them	  
to	  refer	  directly	  to	  Jesus	  or	  God	  (e.g.	  “follow	  Jesus”	  (p1l15)).	  Because	  the	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  data	  
follow	  patterns	  1a	  and	  1b	  respectively	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  occurs	  with	  come	  and	  follow,	  both	  of	  the	  
columns	  in	  table	  4.12	  below	  have	  been	  shaded	  green.	  
Table	  4.12:	  Use	  of	  come	  and	  follow	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  divine	  entity	  
	   Muslim	  Participants	   Christian	  Participants	  
Pair	  One:	  MB1	  and	  CB1	   [1]	  came	  to	  Islam	  (sen1);	  [2]	  came	  to	  
Islam	  (p1l16);	  [3]	  follow	  it	  [the	  truth]	  
(p2l203);	  	  
[1]	  follow	  Jesus	  (p1l15);	  [2]	  following	  
Jesus	  (p1l44);	  [3]	  Jesus’	  followers	  
(p1l207)	  
	  
[4]	  follow	  Jesus’	  teaching	  and	  example	  
(sen	  3);	  
Pair	  Two:	  MB2	  and	  CB2	   [1]	  follow	  the	  right	  path	  (sen	  1);	  [2]	  by	  
following	  Christianity	  (p1l86);	  [3]	  
following	  the	  Quran	  (p2l37);	  [4]	  mercy	  
of	  God	  comes	  at	  the	  end	  (p2l83)	  
	  [1]	  God	  comes	  down	  to	  a	  level	  that	  we	  
can	  interact	  with	  him	  (p2l122);	  [2]	  so	  
it’s	  like	  the	  Holy	  Spirit	  comes	  to	  every	  
Christian?	  (MB2)	  Yeah	  (CB2)	  (p2l129-­‐
130)	  
	  
[3]	  follow	  the	  right	  path	  (p2l10)	  
Pair	  Three:	  MB3	  and	  CB3	   [1]	  follow	  this	  instruction	  like	  wearing	   [1]	  He	  [Jesus]	  came	  to	  save	  me	  from	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hijab	  (p2l97-­‐98)	   my	  sin	  (p1l39);	  [2]	  follower	  of	  Christ	  
(p2l65)	  
	  
[3]	  I	  should	  follow	  this	  bit,	  faith	  
(p2l136)	  
	  
Despite	  the	  shift	  in	  genre	  (testimonial	  to	  discussion)	  and	  the	  expansion	  beyond	  individuals	  
specifically	  associated	  with	  islamfortoday.com	  or	  the	  Evangelical	  Times,	  the	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  in	  
terms	  of	  come	  and	  follow	  have	  remained	  essentially	  similar.	  	  MB1	  associates	  the	  verbs	  with	  “Islam”	  
and	  “truth”,	  but	  never	  directly	  with	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  This	  pattern	  is	  also	  reproduced	  in	  MB1’s	  
metaphorical	  use	  of	  other	  related	  verbs,	  such	  as	  “embrace”	  being	  used	  in	  the	  phrase	  “embraced	  
Islam”	  (four	  occurrences:	  p2l21,	  p2l43,	  p2l75,	  p2l102),	  but	  never	  in	  the	  form	  of	  embracing	  a	  divine	  
entity.	  	  Both	  MB2	  and	  MB3	  also	  avoid	  directly	  associating	  these	  verbs	  with	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  MB2	  does	  
refer	  to	  the	  coming	  of	  a	  particular	  abstract	  divine	  characteristic,	  “the	  mercy	  of	  God”,	  but	  still	  makes	  
no	  direct	  reference	  to	  the	  coming	  of	  God.	  
In	  contrast,	  divine	  entities	  such	  as	  God,	  Jesus	  and	  the	  Spirit	  in	  the	  Christian	  language	  of	  CB1,	  CB2	  and	  
CB3	  seem	  to	  readily	  lend	  themselves	  to	  being	  directly	  associated	  with	  distance	  closing	  metaphors	  
such	  as	  come	  and	  follow.	  	  This	  is	  further	  consolidated	  by	  the	  only	  example	  of	  a	  Muslim	  participant	  
echoing	  the	  Christian’s	  use	  of	  this	  type	  of	  language,	  although,	  as	  I	  noted	  in	  the	  section	  above,	  it	  was	  
related	  only	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Holy	  Spirit	  (a	  term	  that	  Muslims	  generally	  use	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  angel	  
Gabriel	  and	  not	  a	  divine	  entity),	  and	  not	  Jesus	  or	  God.	  	  MB2	  repeats	  the	  gist	  of	  CB2’s	  language	  back	  
to	  him	  in	  order	  to	  seek	  clarification:	  “so	  it’s	  like	  the	  Holy	  Spirit	  comes	  to	  every	  Christian?”.	  	  The	  
answer	  from	  CB2	  is	  an	  emphatic	  “yeah”.	  	  	  
CB2	  also	  appears	  to	  give	  a	  clear	  explanation	  for	  this	  difference	  that	  encapsulates	  the	  importance	  of	  
intimacy	  language	  for	  Evangelical	  Christians	  through	  the	  use	  of	  a	  movement	  metaphor,	  “God	  comes	  
down	  to	  a	  level	  that	  we	  can	  interact	  with	  him”.	  	  This	  contrasts	  with	  a	  statement	  from	  MB1	  that	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appears	  to	  explicitly	  counter	  the	  possibility	  of	  drawing	  on	  physical	  intimacy	  metaphors	  based	  on	  a	  
spatially	  bounded	  entity,	  “…	  there	  is	  nothing	  like	  unto	  God	  …	  all	  of	  the	  heavens	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  
contain	  the	  Lord”	  (p1l274-­‐284).	  	  
In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  argued	  that	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  will	  inherently	  vary	  more	  than	  
doctrinal	  language	  from	  community	  to	  community	  (within	  the	  same	  religion)	  as	  well	  as	  from	  
individual	  to	  individual.	  	  This	  observation	  was	  based	  on	  the	  argument	  that	  action	  and	  relationship	  
language	  is	  far	  more	  complex	  and	  fluid	  because	  it	  is	  based	  on	  individual	  things,	  but	  on	  complex,	  
dynamically	  unfolding	  personal	  situations.	  	  However,	  the	  consistency	  of	  these	  two	  contrasting	  
patterns	  of	  emphasis	  suggests	  that	  some	  types	  of	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  may	  achieve	  a	  
certain	  degree	  of	  stability	  across	  particular	  communities	  and	  individuals	  within	  the	  same	  religion.	  	  
Some	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  appears	  to	  be	  so	  closely	  connected	  to	  bedrock	  doctrine,	  key	  
identity	  markers	  and	  the	  belief	  of	  things	  (such	  as	  the	  incarnation	  –	  God	  becoming	  man	  –	  and	  the	  
Tawhid	  –	  the	  Muslim	  doctrine	  of	  the	  unity	  and	  therefore	  complete	  otherness	  of	  God)	  that	  it	  takes	  on	  
a	  high	  level	  of	  consistency	  and	  stability	  across	  multiple	  contexts	  and	  genres.	  Further	  support	  for	  this	  
assertion	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  language	  of	  CB1.	  	  As	  I	  shall	  discuss	  below,	  despite	  CB1’s	  avoidance	  
of	  many	  of	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  patterns	  and	  his	  closer	  similarity	  to	  some	  of	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  
patterns	  (discussed	  below),	  even	  he	  consistently	  adheres	  to	  the	  Christian	  pattern	  1b	  rather	  than	  1a.	  	  	  	  
I	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  patterns	  associated	  with	  come	  and	  follow	  and	  issues	  of	  intimacy	  are	  closely	  
interwoven	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  closing	  or	  maintaining	  the	  perceived	  distance	  between	  a	  divine	  entity	  
and	  a	  believer.	  	  These	  notions	  are	  closely	  related	  to	  concepts	  of	  divine	  proximity	  and	  relationship,	  
and	  I	  will	  therefore	  turn	  to	  a	  consideration	  of	  how	  these	  concepts	  were	  instantiated	  in	  the	  language	  





Divine	  proximity,	  unity	  and	  relationship	  language	  
In	  the	  Muslim	  testimonials	  analysed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  there	  were	  only	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  
references	  to	  a	  divine	  entity	  being	  construed	  as	  near	  a	  believer	  (pattern	  2a	  in	  table	  1	  above)	  or	  having	  
a	  relationship	  with	  a	  believer	  (pattern	  3a),	  and	  no	  references	  at	  all	  to	  a	  divine	  entity	  being	  construed	  
as	  inside	  a	  believer	  or	  a	  believer’s	  life	  (pattern	  4a).	  	  In	  contrast,	  in	  the	  Christian	  testimonials	  there	  
were	  a	  far	  higher	  number	  of	  references	  to	  divine	  proximity	  (pattern	  2b),	  relationship	  with	  a	  divine	  
entity	  (pattern3b)	  and	  divine	  unity	  (pattern	  4b).	  
In	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  testimonials,	  I	  discovered	  that	  both	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  texts	  and	  the	  
Evangelical	  Times	  texts	  made	  use	  of	  language	  that	  described	  the	  believer’s	  relationship	  with	  a	  divine	  
entity	  through	  the	  use	  of	  metaphors	  drawn	  from	  the	  domain	  of	  being	  physically	  near	  something.	  
However,	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  texts	  contained	  far	  fewer	  references	  and	  the	  occurrences	  that	  were	  
found	  tended	  to	  be	  restricted	  to	  some	  use	  of	  the	  adjective	  close,	  for	  example:	  “I	  have	  never	  been	  so	  
close	  to	  God	  as	  I	  have	  been	  since	  becoming	  Muslim”	  (MT5)	  and	  “Each	  time	  I	  went,	  I	  felt	  …	  closer	  and	  
closer	  to	  the	  Prophet	  Jesus	  and	  God”	  (MT7).	  The	  Muslim	  texts	  also	  contained	  far	  fewer	  cases	  where	  
the	  word	  relationship	  was	  directly	  associated	  with	  a	  divine	  entity	  (this	  occurred	  five	  times	  (relative	  
frequency:	  0.17)	  in	  the	  Muslim	  testimonials	  compared	  to	  six	  times	  (relative	  frequency:	  0.39)	  in	  the	  
Christian	  testimonials).	  	  Another	  important	  difference	  was	  that	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  texts	  also	  
made	  no	  use	  of	  language	  that	  went	  beyond	  the	  domain	  of	  physical	  nearness	  and	  into	  the	  domain	  of	  
unity	  (the	  divine	  entity	  being	  construed	  as	  inside	  the	  body	  or	  life	  of	  the	  believer).	  In	  contrast	  to	  this,	  
references	  to	  divine	  proximity	  and	  divine	  relationship	  were	  more	  frequent	  in	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  
texts,	  along	  with	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  variability	  in	  the	  divine	  proximity	  language	  that	  included	  a	  range	  of	  
prepositions	  (e.g.	  with	  as	  in,	  “God	  was	  with	  me”	  (CT3))	  as	  well	  as	  adjectives	  such	  as	  close.	  	  The	  
Evangelical	  Times	  texts	  also	  contained	  frequent	  references	  to	  divine	  unity	  language,	  for	  example,	  in	  
as	  in,	  “a	  person	  truly	  becomes	  a	  new	  creature	  in	  Christ	  Jesus”	  (CT5).	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Table	  4.13	  below	  lists	  occurrences	  of	  divine	  proximity	  language	  in	  the	  discussions,	  table	  4.14	  lists	  
occurrences	  of	  divine	  unity	  language,	  and	  table	  15	  lists	  occurrences	  of	  relationship	  language.	  	  As	  can	  
be	  seen	  from	  these	  tables,	  in	  over	  half	  of	  the	  cases,	  the	  lists	  of	  occurrences	  have	  been	  shaded	  in	  
green	  because	  they	  follow	  the	  relevant	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  described	  above.	  	  However,	  there	  are	  
some	  cases	  where	  the	  lists	  of	  occurrences	  have	  been	  shaded	  in	  orange	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  above	  
patterns	  only	  receive	  limited	  support,	  or,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  CB1	  and	  MB3,	  shaded	  in	  red	  to	  suggest	  that	  
they	  receive	  no	  support	  at	  all.	  	  	  
Table	  4.13:	  Use	  of	  Divine	  proximity	  and	  language	  
	   Muslim	  Participants	   Christian	  Participants	  
Pair	  One:	  MB1	  and	  CB1	   [1]	  close	  to	  God	  (p1l334)	   [no	  references]	  
Pair	  Two:	  MB2	  and	  CB2	   [no	  references]	  except:	  so	  it’s	  like	  the	  
Holy	  Spirit	  comes	  to	  every	  Christian?”	  
(p2l129).	  [discussed	  below]	  
[1]	  the	  presence	  of	  God	  came	  into	  my	  
life	  …	  [2]	  Presence	  of	  God,	  Jesus	  (sen	  
5);	  [3]	  presence	  of	  God	  in	  my	  life	  
(p1l67);	  	  
[4]	  I	  [Jesus]	  stand	  at	  the	  door	  [of	  your	  
heart]	  (p1l70);	  [5]	  have	  a	  relationship	  
with	  you	  [God];	  [6]	  the	  presence	  of	  
God	  (p1l80);	  [7]	  the	  presence	  of	  God	  
(p1l92);	  [8]	  the	  presence	  of	  God	  
(p1l109);	  [9]	  God’s	  presence	  (p1l180);	  
[10]	  further	  along	  the	  journey	  with	  
God	  (p2l69)	  
Pair	  Three:	  MB3	  and	  CB3	   [1]	  he	  sent	  Mohammed	  and	  the	  Quran	  
to	  guide	  me	  towards	  him	  (p1l8);	  [2]	  
that	  will	  make	  me	  closer	  to	  God	  
(p2l99)	  
[1]	  God	  is	  always	  with	  me	  (sen	  3);	  [2]	  
Being	  with	  him	  [the	  Spirit]	  (p2l45);	  [3]	  





Table	  4.14:	  Use	  of	  Divine	  Unity	  Language	  
	   Muslim	  Participants	   Christian	  Participants	  
Pair	  One:	  MB1	  and	  CB1	   [no	  references]	   [1]	  In	  him	  is	  peace	  and	  purpose	  (sen	  5)	  
Pair	  Two:	  MB2	  and	  CB2	   [no	  references]	  	   [1]	  The	  Holy	  Spirit	  lives	  in	  me	  (sen	  1);	  
[2]	  Invited	  Jesus	  into	  my	  heart	  …	  (sen	  
5)	  [3]	  presence	  of	  God	  came	  into	  my	  
life	  …(sen	  5)	  	  
[4]	  Presence	  of	  God	  …	  came	  into	  my	  
life/heart	  (sen	  5);	  
[5]	  presence	  of	  God	  in	  my	  life	  (p1l67);	  
[6]	  let	  him	  [Jesus]	  [in]	  (p1l71);	  [7]	  invite	  
him	  [Jesus]	  in	  (p1l72);	  [8]	  [God]	  come	  
into	  my	  life	  (p1l75);	  [9]	  Holy	  Spirit	  lives	  
in	  you	  (p1l88);	  [10]	  God	  into	  your	  life	  
(p1l89);	  [11]	  Holy	  Spirit	  dwells	  in	  you	  
(p1l89);	  [12]	  [Holy	  Spirit]	  dwells	  in	  
every	  Christian	  (p1l89)	  	  	  
Pair	  Three:	  MB3	  and	  CB3	   [1]	  He’s	  [God]	  is	  always	  in	  my	  heart	  
(p1l143)	  
[1]	  The	  Spirit	  lives	  in	  me	  (sen	  1);	  [2]	  I	  
felt	  the	  Spirit	  in	  me	  (p1l26)	  
	  
Table	  4.15:	  Relationship	  with	  a	  Divine	  Entity	  Language	  
	   Muslim	  Participants	   Christian	  Participants	  
Pair	  One:	  MB1	  and	  CB1	   [no	  references]	   [no	  references]	  
Pair	  Two:	  MB2	  and	  CB2	   [no	  references]	  	   [1]	  I	  have	  a	  personal	  relationship	  with	  
God	  (sen	  2);	  [2]	  [Jesus]	  come	  into	  my	  
life	  and	  have	  a	  relationship	  with	  you	  
(p1l75);	  [3]	  my	  salvation	  and	  my	  
relationship	  with	  God	  (p2l60);	  [4]	  a	  
result	  of	  my	  relationship	  with	  God	  
(p2l61);	  [5]	  everybody	  has	  an	  





Pair	  Three:	  MB3	  and	  CB3	   [1]	  reach	  a	  better	  relationship	  with	  
Allah	  (sen	  4);	  [2]	  relationship	  between	  
me	  and	  God	  (p1l113);	  [3]	  relationship	  
between	  me	  and	  God	  (p1l116);	  [4]	  
private	  relationship	  with	  God	  (p1l121);	  
[5]	  to	  reach	  a	  better	  relationship	  with	  
God	  (p2l97);	  [6]	  a	  better	  relationship	  
with	  God	  (p2l113)	  
[1]	  this	  relationship	  [with	  God]	  I	  love	  it	  
(p1l114-­‐115);	  [2]	  relationship	  [with	  
God]	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  your	  faith	  (p1l127);	  
[3]	  feel	  like	  you	  have	  a	  relationship	  
(p1l128);	  [4]	  my	  relationship	  with	  God	  
and	  Jesus	  and	  the	  Spirit	  (p1l129);	  [5]	  
the	  relationship	  [with	  God]	  is	  strong	  
(p1l132);	  [6]	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  
God	  that	  you	  have	  (p1l149);	  [7]	  I	  can	  
just	  have	  this	  relationship	  with	  God	  
(p2l34);	  [8]	  only	  a	  person	  that	  has	  that	  
relationship	  [with	  God]	  (p2l65);	  [9]	  get	  
back	  into	  a	  proper	  relationship	  with	  
God	  (p2l86);	  [10]	  that	  better	  
relationship	  [with	  God]	  (p2l132);	  [11]	  
like	  you	  said,	  a	  relationship	  with	  God	  
(p2l133)	  
	  
The	  above	  three	  tables	  encompass	  a	  wide,	  complex	  range	  of	  data.	  	  I	  will	  therefore	  break	  the	  
discussion	  below	  into	  three	  sections.	  	  The	  first	  section	  will	  focus	  on	  discussing	  the	  evidence	  that	  CB2	  
and	  CB3’s	  above	  use	  of	  proximity,	  unity	  and	  relationship	  language	  suggest	  a	  type	  of	  personal	  
relationship-­‐based	  way	  of	  believing	  that	  is	  rooted	  in	  combining	  notions	  of	  proximity	  and	  unity	  with	  a	  
divine	  entity,	  emotion	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  intimate	  relationship.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  second	  section	  will	  argue	  
that	  the	  language	  of	  the	  Muslim	  participants	  suggests	  a	  way	  of	  believing	  that	  is	  rooted	  not	  primarily	  
in	  personal,	  affective	  relationship	  but	  in	  a	  system	  of	  cause	  and	  effect	  that	  is	  equal	  to	  all.	  	  The	  third	  
section	  will	  then	  seek	  to	  blur	  the	  lines	  between	  these	  first	  two	  sections	  by	  focusing	  on	  CB1	  and	  MB3	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and	  how	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  variation	  may	  be	  present	  between	  individuals	  with	  the	  same	  doctrinal	  
beliefs.	  
	  
Emotion	  and	  Relationships	  in	  CB2	  and	  CB3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
As	  we	  saw	  in	  tables	  4.13	  and	  4.14	  above,	  CB2	  uses	  a	  high	  volume	  of	  both	  proximity	  and	  unity	  
language	  principally	  revolving	  around	  the	  phrase	  the	  presence	  of	  God.	  	  He	  even	  goes	  as	  far	  as	  
explicitly	  tying	  his	  sense	  of	  certainty	  with	  his	  sense	  of	  the	  proximity	  of	  a	  divine	  entity,	  “…	  my	  
certainty	  is	  based	  on	  basically	  the	  presence	  of	  God	  in	  my	  life	  …”	  (p1l67,	  my	  emphasis).	  	  This	  is	  clearly	  
very	  important	  in	  terms	  of	  identifying	  the	  core	  of	  CB2’s	  belief.	  
It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  beliefs	  held	  by	  any	  collection	  of	  believers	  can	  be	  viewed	  
as	  composed	  of	  three	  overlapping	  principal	  elements:	  1)	  a	  mixture	  of	  conclusions	  drawn	  from	  
arguments,	  2)	  faith	  (or	  some	  kind	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  knowledge	  of	  others),	  and	  3)	  conclusions	  drawn	  
from	  perceived	  experiences.	  	  However,	  it	  appears	  that	  it	  is	  often	  possible	  for	  individuals	  to	  have	  the	  
sense	  that	  one	  of	  these	  elements	  is	  primary.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  CB2,	  he	  appears	  to	  be	  explicitly	  
identifying	  his	  perceived	  experience	  of	  the	  proximity	  of	  a	  particular	  divine	  entity	  as	  the	  primary	  core	  
or	  foundation	  of	  his	  beliefs.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  explicit	  acknowledgement	  related	  to	  the	  phrase	  the	  
presence	  of	  God,	  he	  also	  uses	  a	  range	  of	  other	  verbs	  and	  prepositions	  to	  instantiate	  this	  concept	  of	  
proximity	  that	  covers	  the	  construal	  of	  a	  divine	  entity	  moving	  towards	  or	  into	  him	  or	  being	  in	  his	  life.	  	  
CB3	  does	  not	  match	  the	  frequency	  of	  CB2’s	  proximity	  and	  unity	  language	  but	  does	  demonstrate	  a	  
similar	  commitment	  to	  their	  key	  importance	  in	  her	  sense	  of	  certainty.	  	  During	  the	  discussion	  stage,	  
she	  explained	  how	  she	  arrived	  at	  a	  sense	  of	  certainty	  by	  expanding	  on	  the	  language	  of	  her	  first	  
sentence	  during	  the	  second	  written	  stage	  (“The	  Spirit	  lives	  in	  me”),	  	  
…	  but	  nothing	  really	  convinced	  me	  until	  I	  came	  to	  the	  point	  where	  I	  did	  believe	  in	  everything	  that	  I	  believed	  in,	  but	  
without	  experience	  it’s	  not	  valid	  …	  and	  I	  believe	  I	  came	  to	  the	  conclusion	  when	  I	  felt	  the	  Spirit	  in	  me	  and	  when	  I	  was	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moved	  by	  the	  Spirit,	  and	  mine,	  a	  biggie	  would	  have	  been	  experience,	  hmm,	  because	  I	  have	  experienced	  the	  Spirit	  …	  
(p1l22-­‐29)	  
CB2	  and	  CB3	  therefore	  both	  appear	  to	  share	  the	  same	  commitment	  to	  defining	  their	  sense	  of	  
certainty	  as	  based	  on	  a	  perceived	  experience	  rather	  than	  an	  argument	  related	  to	  a	  system	  of	  belief.	  	  
However,	  there	  does	  seem	  to	  be	  an	  intrinsic	  connection	  here	  between	  doctrine	  and	  action	  and	  
relationship	  language.	  The	  doctrine	  of	  the	  Trinity	  formalises	  the	  belief	  that	  God,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Jesus	  
and	  the	  Spirit,	  comes	  to	  people.	  The	  thing	  believed	  –	  the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  Trinity	  –	  is	  a	  theological	  
entity,	  but	  CB2	  and	  CB3	  have	  chosen	  to	  psychologically	  operationalize	  that	  doctrine	  through	  
processes	  wrapped	  up	  in	  action	  and	  relationship	  language.	  	  For	  them,	  the	  perception	  of	  intimacy	  
with	  a	  divine	  entity	  appears	  to	  have	  become	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  Christian	  belief	  and	  expression.	  	  
Within	  the	  domain	  of	  human	  relationships,	  the	  notion	  of	  intimacy	  is	  often	  associated	  with	  a	  range	  of	  
strong	  mutual	  feelings	  or	  emotions	  between	  two	  people.	  	  Is	  there	  also	  an	  emotional	  dimension	  
associated	  with	  the	  proximity	  language	  of	  CB2	  and	  CB3?	  In	  terms	  of	  CB2,	  two	  words	  that	  are	  relevant	  
to	  answering	  this	  question	  are	  love	  and	  heart.	  CB2	  uses	  the	  word	  love	  to	  describe	  a	  divine	  entity’s	  
feeling	  towards	  a	  believer	  and	  vice	  versa	  nine	  times,	  as	  well	  as	  using	  the	  word	  heart	  as	  part	  of	  his	  
description	  of	  his	  religious	  belief	  four	  times	  (in	  addition	  to	  gesturing	  towards	  his	  heart	  while	  stating,	  
“…	  Christianity,	  I	  guess	  it	  makes	  sense	  somewhere	  in	  here”	  (p1l62-­‐63,	  my	  emphasis)).	  These	  words	  
are	  significant	  because	  they	  both	  strongly	  imply	  an	  affective	  dimension.	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  
that	  these	  words	  are	  also	  sometimes	  used	  in	  relation	  to	  proximity	  language.	  	  Below	  are	  two	  key	  
examples:	  
…	  the	  love	  that	  God	  shows	  for	  us	  is	  overwhelming	  and	  the	  further	  along	  the	  journey	  with	  God	  you	  go	  the	  more	  you	  
grow	  to	  understand	  and	  love	  him	  …	  (CB2,	  p1l68-­‐69)	  
…	  which	  is	  like	  Jesus	  is	  knocking	  at	  the	  door	  of	  your	  heart	  and	  you	  have	  to	  let	  him	  you	  have	  to	  invite	  him	  in	  …	  (CB2,	  
p1l71-­‐72)	  
In	  terms	  of	  CB3,	  further	  evidence	  that	  she	  wishes	  to	  distance	  herself	  from	  an	  emphasis	  on	  theoretical	  
arguments	  and	  knowledge	  and	  focus	  in	  on	  the	  existential	  and	  emotional	  dimensions	  involved	  in	  her	  
perceptions	  can	  be	  found	  in	  her	  statements,	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…	  I’m	  moved	  by	  his	  love,	  and	  that’s	  the	  basis	  of	  my	  faith.	  (CB3,	  p1l78)	  
…	  there	  are	  so	  many	  other	  things	  in	  the	  Bible	  to	  say	  but	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  go	  into	  that	  –	  I	  do	  theology,	  so	  you	  can	  
understand	  where	  I	  come	  from	  –	  but	  just	  the	  basis	  on	  what	  has	  changed	  my	  life	  …	  it’s	  not	  about	  oh,	  how	  can	  it	  be	  that	  
God	  and	  Jesus	  are	  the	  same	  person?	  It’s	  more	  about	  God	  became	  Jesus	  and	  then	  he	  died	  for	  us,	  that’s	  how	  much	  he	  
loved	  us	  …	  and	  then	  when	  Jesus	  left,	  he	  wasn’t	  just	  going	  to	  leave	  us,	  he	  gave	  us	  the	  Spirit.	  (CB3,	  p1l168-­‐178)	  
She	  uses	  the	  word	  love	  eighteen	  times	  to	  describe	  a	  divine	  entity’s	  intense	  feeling	  towards	  her	  or	  
vice	  versa	  and	  this	  is	  often	  tied,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  above	  quotes,	  to	  proximity	  or	  unity	  related	  notions	  such	  
as	  Jesus	  coming	  down	  from	  heaven	  to	  save	  believers,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Spirit	  entering	  those	  believers.	  	  
This	  dimension	  of	  feelings	  and	  emotions	  is	  also	  made	  explicit	  in	  phrases	  such	  as	  “I	  felt	  the	  Spirit	  in	  me”	  
(p1l26	  –	  my	  emphasis).	  
It	  therefore	  appears	  that	  for	  both	  CB2	  and	  CB3	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  divine	  entity	  always	  being	  there	  is	  
also	  tied	  to	  a	  consistent	  perception	  of	  being	  the	  recipient	  of	  that	  divine	  being’s	  positive	  feelings	  or	  
emotions	  (as	  well	  as	  reciprocating	  those	  feelings).	  	  This	  allows	  a	  connection	  to	  be	  drawn	  proximity	  
and	  intimacy	  and	  intense	  mutual	  feelings,	  which	  brings	  into	  focus	  how	  closely	  CB2	  and	  CB3’s	  belief	  
system	  is	  systematically	  modelled	  on	  a	  physically	  close,	  embodied	  human	  relationship	  and	  the	  
emotions	  involved.	  This	  connection	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  research	  from	  a	  cognitive	  
linguistic	  perspective	  that	  has	  highlighted	  some	  of	  the	  key	  metaphors	  that	  are	  used	  to	  describe	  
relationships	  and	  emotions.	  Kövecses	  (2008:	  388)	  has	  found	  that	  a	  comparison	  of	  lists	  of	  a	  range	  of	  
metaphors	  used	  to	  describe	  relationships	  and	  emotions	  only	  yield	  two	  principal	  points	  of	  overlap,	  
“There	  seems	  to	  be	  only	  a	  minimal	  overlap	  between	  the	  two	  sets.	  	  Human	  relationships	  share	  
CLOSENESS	  and	  WARMTH	  with	  emotions”.	  Kövecses	  (2008:	  387)	  also	  notes	  the	  overlapping	  nature	  of	  
the	  word	  love	  in	  that	  “love	  is	  a	  special	  case	  here	  because	  it	  functions	  as	  both	  an	  emotion	  and	  a	  
relationship”.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
CB2	  also	  goes	  on	  make	  this	  modelling	  of	  a	  divine	  relationship	  on	  a	  loving	  human	  relationship	  explicit	  
at	  one	  point	  by	  using	  human	  relationships	  to	  explain	  his	  relationship	  to	  God,	  
God	  still	  wants	  you	  to	  adhere	  to	  this,	  he	  still	  wants	  you	  to	  live	  by	  his	  rules	  …	  but	  you	  don’t	  do	  them	  to	  try	  and	  get	  to	  
heaven,	  you	  do	  them	  to	  please	  God	  …	  the	  people	  that	  you	  love	  and	  care	  for	  you	  want	  to	  please,	  you	  want	  to	  make	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them	  happy,	  you	  want	  to	  please	  them	  and	  you	  want	  to	  have	  good	  times	  with	  them,	  this	  is,	  hmm,	  basically	  comes	  down	  
to	  love	  (CB2,	  p1l50-­‐64)	  
It	  is	  therefore	  no	  surprise	  that	  the	  word	  relationship	  occurs	  so	  frequently	  in	  the	  language	  of	  CB2	  and	  
CB3.	  	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  table	  5,	  CB2	  makes	  five	  references	  to	  a	  relationship	  with	  a	  divine	  entity,	  while	  
CB3	  makes	  eleven	  references.	  In	  addition,	  CB2	  and	  CB3	  also	  seem	  to	  be	  drawing	  on	  the	  domain	  of	  
close	  human	  relationships	  in	  their	  references	  to	  informally	  talking	  to	  a	  divine	  entity,	  
…	  like,	  you	  see,	  I’ve	  been	  talking	  to	  God,	  praying,	  before	  we	  got	  here,	  during	  this	  as	  well,	  like	  he	  would	  guide	  the	  
conversation,	  things	  like	  that.	  (CB2,	  p2l136-­‐139)	  	  
…	  one	  time	  I	  went	  to	  a	  Mosque	  and	  I	  said:	  God,	  these	  people	  are	  hungry	  for	  the	  truth	  …	  so	  I	  said,	  if	  God	  you	  love	  us	  all	  
the	  same,	  and	  we	  all	  want	  to	  know	  the	  truth,	  I’m	  going	  to	  stand	  in	  front	  of	  you,	  I	  want	  your	  Spirit	  to	  tell	  me	  what	  to	  say,	  
and	  that’s	  the	  word	  I	  spoke.	  (CB3,	  p2l172-­‐	  184)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Here,	  communicating	  with	  God	  appears	  to	  be	  more	  informal,	  casually	  interactive	  and	  more	  closely	  
modelled	  on	  normal	  human	  conversation	  than	  many	  other	  types	  of	  prayer	  (such	  as	  the	  kind	  of	  formal	  
prayers	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  at	  a	  Mosque).	  	  	  
I	  have	  so	  far	  discussed	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  evidence	  that	  suggests	  a	  strong	  connection	  between	  an	  
emphasis	  on	  emotion,	  intimacy	  and	  relationships	  in	  the	  language	  of	  CB2	  and	  CB3.	  	  However,	  all	  I	  
have	  done	  up	  until	  this	  point	  is	  draw	  attention	  to	  differences	  in	  frequencies.	  	  The	  important	  question	  
to	  address	  now	  is	  whether	  the	  highlighted	  similarities	  between	  these	  various	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  
can	  be	  viewed	  as	  adding	  up	  to	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  believing	  that	  can	  be	  contrasted	  with	  another	  
distinct	  type	  of	  believing.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  these	  repeated	  and	  combined	  references	  to	  interactive	  
communication,	  love	  and	  proximity	  consolidate	  the	  view	  that	  their	  belief	  framework	  is	  not	  primarily	  
based	  on	  arguments	  or	  faith,	  but	  in	  a	  cognitive	  dynamic	  revolving	  around	  “experiencing	  is	  believing”	  
(Tremlin	  2005:	  77),	  or	  to	  be	  more	  precise,	  experiencing	  a	  perceived	  personal	  relationship	  with	  a	  
divine	  entity	  is	  believing.	  	  I	  will	  go	  on	  to	  argue	  below	  that	  this	  contrasts	  with	  the	  Muslim	  participants,	  
partiucularly	  MB1	  and	  MB2,	  who	  appear	  to	  be	  primarily	  basing	  their	  belief	  framework	  and	  sense	  of	  
certainty	  around	  arguments	  and	  intuitions	  relating	  to	  and	  faith	  in	  an	  all-­‐encompassing,	  existential	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In	  the	  section	  4.6.1	  above	  I	  noted	  that	  CB2	  repeatedly	  used	  the	  words	  relationship	  (with	  a	  divine	  
entity,	  5	  occurrences),	  presence	  (of	  a	  divine	  entity,	  7	  occurrences)	  and	  love	  (between	  the	  believer	  
and	  a	  divine	  entity	  and	  vice	  versa,	  9	  occurrences),	  while	  MB2	  completely	  avoided	  any	  of	  these	  terms.	  
I	  also	  noted	  that	  CB3	  repeatedly	  used	  the	  word	  love	  (between	  the	  believer	  and	  a	  divine	  entity	  and	  
vice	  versa,	  13	  occurrences),	  while	  MB3	  completely	  avoided	  this	  word.	  	  I	  went	  on	  to	  point	  out	  that	  this	  
avoidance	  becomes	  even	  more	  noticeable	  when	  we	  also	  take	  into	  account	  CB3’s	  attempt	  to	  explicitly	  
impose	  the	  word	  on	  MB3,	  “love	  is	  the	  most	  important	  commandment,	  love	  the	  Lord	  God	  with	  all	  
your	  heart,	  and	  I’m	  sure	  it	  is	  yours	  as	  well”	  (p2l143-­‐145,	  my	  italics).	  I	  also	  noted	  how,	  in	  addition	  to	  
the	  above	  examples,	  CB2	  makes	  10	  references	  to	  proximity	  language	  and	  12	  references	  to	  unity	  
language,	  and	  yet	  MB2	  consistently	  refuses	  to	  appropriate	  the	  language	  or	  engage	  with	  it	  apart	  from	  
the	  isolated	  clarification	  discussed	  above,	  “so	  it’s	  like	  the	  Holy	  Spirit	  comes	  to	  every	  Christian?”	  
(p2l129).	  My	  brief	  explanation	  for	  this	  apparent	  appropriation	  block	  was	  that	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  view	  
the	  Christian	  and	  the	  Muslim	  language	  as	  representing	  two	  very	  different	  ways	  of	  believing.	  	  I	  have	  
tried	  to	  outline	  above	  in	  more	  detail	  the	  way	  of	  believing	  of	  the	  Christian	  participants	  that	  accounts	  
for	  their	  frequent	  usage	  of	  words	  like	  presence,	  relationship	  and	  love.	  	  I	  now	  therefore	  wish	  to	  give	  a	  
more	  detailed	  account	  below	  of	  why	  the	  Muslim	  participants	  appear	  to	  have	  blocked	  out	  certain	  
types	  of	  language.	  I	  will	  begin	  with	  a	  consideration	  of	  MB1’s	  language.	  	  	  	  	  
I	  have	  already	  alluded	  to	  MB1’s	  statement	  that	  “there	  is	  nothing	  in	  the	  creation	  …	  which	  is	  
comparable	  to	  God	  …	  all	  of	  the	  heavens	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  contain	  the	  Lord”	  (p1l276-­‐184).	  	  This	  is	  
a	  response	  to	  CB1’s	  view	  that	  Jesus,	  who	  came	  to	  earth	  as	  a	  (spatially	  bounded)	  man,	  was	  a	  member	  
of	  the	  trinity.	  	  It	  also	  ties	  in	  closely	  with	  MB1’s	  agreement	  with	  CB1’s	  sentence	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  
written	  stage	  that	  the	  belief	  in	  God’s	  unity	  was	  one	  of	  the	  main	  points	  that	  helped	  him	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  
sense	  of	  certainty	  in	  his	  beliefs,	  “…	  I	  think	  I	  would	  agree	  with	  the	  first	  one,	  definitely,	  that	  the	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simplicity	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  God’s	  unity	  …”	  (p1l47-­‐49).	  	  It	  can	  also	  be	  connected	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  
MB1	  only	  uses	  one	  example	  of	  divine	  proximity	  language	  and	  no	  examples	  of	  divine	  unity	  language.	  	  
It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that,	  as	  I	  pointed	  out	  in	  my	  brief	  discussion	  in	  the	  results	  section	  above,	  MB1,	  
MB2	  and	  MB3	  all	  had	  no	  problem	  with	  choosing	  prepositions	  such	  as	  in	  during	  the	  second	  task	  (that	  
were	  often	  used	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  divine	  unity	  sentences	  by	  the	  Christian	  believers),	  but	  then	  
using	  them	  to	  form	  sentences	  unrelated	  to	  divine	  unity.	  	  These	  points	  could	  all	  be	  viewed	  as	  evidence	  
for	  a	  desire	  to	  emphasise	  a	  perception	  of	  the	  otherness	  of	  a	  divine	  entity,	  which	  can	  again	  be	  viewed	  
as	  an	  operationalization	  through	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  of	  a	  theoretical	  doctrine	  (the	  unity	  
of	  God).	  	  	  
MB1	  appears	  to	  be	  certain	  of	  his	  beliefs	  for	  reasons	  that	  are	  in	  some	  respects	  conceptually	  the	  
opposite	  of	  the	  reasons	  provided	  by	  CB2	  and	  CB3.	  	  His	  certainty	  extends	  from	  the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  
unity	  of	  God,	  in	  other	  words	  the	  concept	  that	  God	  is	  absolutely	  different	  from	  human	  beings.	  	  The	  
lack	  of	  emphasis	  on	  describing	  his	  relationship	  with	  God	  through	  language	  drawn	  from	  the	  domain	  of	  
intimate,	  spatially	  bounded	  relationships	  should	  not	  simply	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  absence	  of	  a	  particular	  
perception,	  but	  possibly	  a	  deliberate	  choice	  to	  emphasise	  an	  opposite	  perception.	  
It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  as	  we	  can	  see	  from	  table	  3,	  the	  instances	  of	  proximity	  language	  that	  
both	  MB1	  and	  MB3	  use	  are	  both	  confined	  to	  the	  believer	  being	  able	  to	  close	  the	  distance	  between	  
him	  or	  herself	  and	  the	  divine	  entity,	  but	  not	  vice	  versa,	  while	  MB2	  avoids	  any	  reference	  at	  all	  to	  
proximity.	  	  In	  MB1’s	  case,	  he	  makes	  the	  point	  that,	  “you	  [the	  Christian	  believer]	  have	  to	  go	  through	  
an	  intermediary	  in	  order	  to	  get	  close	  to	  God”	  (p1l334),	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  point	  that	  Muslims	  can	  
get	  close	  to	  God	  without	  the	  need	  for	  an	  intermediary.	  	  Here	  the	  direction	  of	  movement	  is	  clearly	  
from	  the	  believer	  to	  God,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  examples	  of	  proximity	  language	  from	  MB3.	  	  This	  is	  identical	  to	  




[1]	  Following	  this	  path	  in	  a	  devout	  manner	  enables	  one	  to	  gain	  the	  pleasure	  of	  God	  and	  be	  closer	  to	  Him	  amid	  the	  
endless	  delights	  of	  Paradise.	  (Muslim	  Text	  4)	  
[2]	  Did	  I	  really	  think	  that	  God	  would	  be	  upset	  at	  me	  for	  wanting	  to	  get	  closer	  to	  Him?	  Did	  I	  really	  believe	  that	  Jesus	  
would	  be	  upset	  with	  me	  for	  trying	  to	  get	  closer	  to	  God?	  (Muslim	  Text	  5)	  
[3]	  I	  have	  never	  been	  so	  close	  to	  God	  as	  I	  have	  been	  since	  becoming	  Muslim.	  (Muslim	  Text	  5)	  
[4]	  I	  just	  knew	  that	  I	  wanted	  to	  connect	  with	  God.	  (Muslim	  Text	  5)	  
[5]	  Each	  time	  I	  went,	  I	  felt	  more	  and	  more	  distant	  from	  the	  congregation,	  but	  closer	  and	  closer	  to	  the	  Prophet	  Jesus	  
and	  God.	  (Muslim	  Text	  7)	  
[6]	  God	  is	  with	  me	  every	  moment,	  guiding	  me	  …	  (Muslim	  Text	  8)	  
[7]	  When	  I	  heard	  the	  Adhan	  (the	  call	  to	  prayer)	  I	  felt	  a	  closeness	  to	  God	  that	  penetrated	  my	  heart	  and	  soul.	  (Muslim	  
Text	  14)	  
[1]	  to	  [5]	  all	  construe	  the	  believer	  as	  the	  subject	  and	  suggest	  the	  believer	  is	  able	  to	  move	  closer	  to	  
the	  divine	  entity.	  	  [7]	  is	  ambiguous	  in	  that	  it	  appears	  that	  what	  penetrates	  the	  heart	  and	  soul	  of	  the	  
believer	  is	  the	  feeling	  of	  being	  close	  to	  the	  divine	  entity,	  rather	  than	  the	  divine	  entity	  itself.	  	  The	  only	  
exception	  is	  [6],	  that	  suggests	  that	  the	  divine	  entity	  is	  in	  some	  sense	  following	  the	  believer.	  	  	  
In	  contrast	  to	  this	  the	  Christian	  language	  in	  the	  discussions	  tends	  to	  emphasise	  movement	  in	  both	  
directions,	  for	  example,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  CB2	  talks	  about	  Jesus	  knocking	  on	  the	  door	  of	  the	  
believer’s	  heart	  and	  hoping	  to	  be	  invited	  in	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  God	  coming	  into	  his	  life,	  while	  CB3	  
refers	  to	  coming	  to	  a	  conclusion	  after	  she	  “felt	  the	  Spirit	  in	  me”,	  implying	  that	  the	  Spirit	  had	  entered	  
her	  rather	  than	  she	  had	  gone	  to	  the	  Spirit.	  This	  tendency	  was	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  testimonials	  with	  
ten	  occurrences	  of	  the	  divine	  entity	  being	  construed	  as	  the	  subject,	  along	  with	  the	  implication	  or	  
explicit	  statement	  that	  the	  divine	  entity	  was	  moving	  or	  had	  moved	  towards	  the	  believer,	  for	  example	  
“Jesus	  came	  into	  my	  life”	  (CT6)	  and	  “I’ve	  learned	  that	  he	  is	  always	  with	  me,	  sustains	  me,	  stands	  by	  
me	  in	  difficult	  times”	  (CT11).	  
Is	  there	  a	  conceptual	  significance	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Muslim	  participants	  tended	  to	  minimise	  
proximity	  language	  that	  suggests	  that	  the	  divine	  entity	  moves	  towards	  the	  believer?	  	  There	  appears	  
to	  be	  no	  significance	  that	  is	  explicitly	  discussed,	  but	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  put	  forward	  a	  tentative	  idea.	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I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  significance	  can	  be	  found	  in	  a	  relation	  to	  the	  notions	  of	  equality	  in	  terms	  of	  
equal	  freedom	  of	  choice,	  fairness,	  and	  justness	  and	  how	  this	  spatially	  translates	  into	  the	  inference	  
that	  the	  divine	  entity	  is	  primarily	  perceived	  as	  setting	  himself	  at	  an	  equal	  distance	  from	  all	  humans.	  	  
Muslim	  believers	  are	  encouraged	  to	  close	  that	  distance	  by	  obeying	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  belief	  system	  (e.g.	  
“I	  can	  choose	  not	  to	  wear	  hijab,	  but	  then	  I	  would	  be	  breaking	  one	  of	  the	  rules	  that	  will	  make	  me	  
closer	  to	  God”	  (p2l99)).	  	  However,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  divine	  entity	  should	  not	  primarily	  be	  viewed	  as	  
closing	  the	  distance	  with	  particular	  individuals	  or	  using	  his	  power	  to	  persuade	  or	  compel	  certain	  
individuals	  more	  than	  others,	  as	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  case	  in	  many	  of	  the	  Christian	  examples.	  Evidence	  
for	  this	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  notions	  of	  equality,	  justness	  and	  freedom	  of	  will	  and	  
choice	  are	  present	  in	  some	  form	  or	  other	  in	  the	  language	  of	  all	  the	  Muslim	  participants:	  
…	  because	  one	  of	  the	  names	  of	  God	  is	  the	  most	  just,	  so	  he’s	  not	  gonna	  be	  unjust	  to	  anybody,	  and	  so	  he’s	  gonna	  give	  
everybody	  a	  chance	  and,	  but	  we	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  ultimately	  make	  the	  decision	  …	  God	  could	  easily	  make	  everybody	  
…	  pious	  worshippers	  of	  him,	  	  and	  there	  would	  be	  no	  problem,	  but	  …	  God	  has	  given	  us	  …	  free	  will	  to	  decide	  for	  
ourselves	  …	  if	  Allah	  didn’t	  allow	  you	  to	  make	  your	  own	  decisions,	  then	  how	  would	  it	  be	  justified	  for	  you	  to	  …	  be	  
rewarded	  or	  punished	  (MB1,	  p2l208-­‐228)	  	  	  	  	  
…	  it’s	  like	  it	  gives	  us	  rules	  to,	  that	  show	  us	  how	  to	  behave	  with	  ourselves	  and	  with	  others	  …	  we	  respect	  the	  points	  of	  
view	  of	  others,	  we	  try	  to	  show	  them	  if	  they	  want	  to	  know	  about	  Islam,	  we	  show	  them	  the	  way,	  but	  we	  don’t	  force	  
others	  because	  we	  have	  the	  freedom	  of	  choice	  in	  Islam	  (MB2,	  p1l150-­‐157)	  …	  [192]	  what	  we	  believe	  in	  is	  that	  we	  are	  
born	  without,	  it’s	  like	  innocent	  people	  …	  we	  don’t	  have	  any	  sins,	  sin	  comes	  after	  this,	  like	  what	  you	  do,	  it’s	  like	  you	  
are	  not	  …	  punished	  or	  judged	  because	  of	  maybe	  what	  other	  people	  maybe	  in	  the	  past	  have	  done	  (MB2,	  p2l192-­‐200)	  	  	  
…	  but	  I	  can’t	  see	  your	  point	  because	  I	  can’t	  understand	  how	  salvation	  is	  given,	  I	  mean	  it	  doesn’t	  make	  much	  sense	  
to	  me	  that	  someone	  like	  Jesus	  would	  be	  blamed	  or	  punished	  for	  my,	  for	  my	  sins,	  it’s	  just	  unfair.	  (MB3,	  p168-­‐70)	  …	  
like	  even	  salvation	  is	  not	  assured,	  I	  know	  that	  God	  will	  do	  me	  justice	  because	  he	  will	  look	  at	  my	  heart	  and	  he	  will	  
look	  into	  my	  deeds,	  and	  he	  is	  the	  just,	  so	  I’m	  sure	  I	  will	  be	  given	  salvation	  if	  I	  deserve	  it	  (MB3,	  p108-­‐111)	  
What	  we	  have	  here	  is	  a	  cluster	  of	  notions	  that	  are	  diametrically	  opposed	  to	  the	  central	  perceptions	  
of	  the	  human-­‐like	  intimacy	  and	  divinely	  initiated	  interaction	  that	  we	  saw	  in	  CB2	  and	  CB3.	  	  This	  
suggests	  a	  set	  of	  beliefs	  that	  revolve	  around	  a	  very	  fixed,	  almost	  mechanical	  system	  of	  human	  cause	  
and	  effect	  that	  subsequently	  impacts	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  in	  the	  form	  of	  inhibiting	  
expressions	  of	  divine	  entity	  to	  believer	  movement.	  	  The	  conflicting	  contrast	  between	  this	  focus	  on	  an	  
incorruptible	  system	  and	  the	  focus	  on	  an	  affective,	  intimate	  relationship	  seen	  in	  CB2	  and	  CB3	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appears	  to	  become	  explicit	  at	  one	  point	  during	  the	  discussion	  between	  MB3	  and	  CB3.	  	  When	  MB3	  
points	  out	  that	  it	  is	  unfair	  for	  Jesus	  to	  be	  punished	  for	  the	  sins	  of	  somebody	  else,	  CB3	  quickly	  
acknowledges	  “It	  is	  unfair,	  but	  that’s	  God’s	  love”.	  	  	  	  
Having	  put	  forward	  the	  case	  that	  there	  are	  two	  contrasting	  ways	  of	  believing	  at	  play	  underneath	  the	  
language	  of	  the	  participants,	  it	  is	  now	  crucial	  to	  emphasise	  that	  there	  is	  not	  a	  simple,	  clear-­‐cut	  divide	  
between	  them.	  	  I	  have	  argued	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  that	  beliefs	  are	  subject	  to	  strong	  personal	  
variation	  that	  should	  prevent	  us	  from	  developing	  fixed	  views	  about	  the	  way	  that	  all	  individuals	  within	  
a	  community	  believe.	  	  Similar	  core	  doctrinal	  beliefs	  will	  be	  operationalized	  through	  action	  and	  
relationship	  language	  in	  different	  and	  important	  ways.	  	  	  I	  will	  now	  go	  on	  to	  discuss	  two	  marked	  
examples	  of	  this	  individual	  variation	  by	  focusing	  in	  on	  the	  language	  of	  MB3	  and	  CB1.	  	  	  
	  
Individual	  Variation	  in	  MB3	  and	  CB1	  
As	  we	  can	  see	  from	  table	  5	  above,	  MB3	  stated	  in	  sentence	  4	  of	  the	  second	  written	  stage,	  
“Instructions	  of	  the	  prophet	  Mohammad	  and	  the	  holy	  Quran	  are	  to	  be	  followed	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  a	  
better	  relationship	  with	  Allah”.	  	  She	  then	  went	  on	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  relationship	  with	  God	  a	  further	  five	  
times	  during	  the	  discussion	  stages.	  In	  comparison,	  both	  MB1	  and	  MB2	  made	  no	  mention	  of	  any	  
notion	  of	  a	  relationship	  with	  God.	  	  I	  have	  already	  made	  the	  observation	  that	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  
testimonials	  analysed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  contained	  a	  total	  of	  five	  references	  to	  a	  relationship	  
with	  a	  divine	  entity	  in	  29067	  words	  (relative	  frequency:	  0.17),	  while	  MB3	  used	  it	  a	  total	  of	  six	  times	  in	  
1170	  words	  (a	  relative	  frequency	  of	  5.13).	  	  	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  relative	  frequency	  is	  
also	  even	  higher	  than	  the	  relative	  frequency	  of	  this	  phrase	  in	  the	  Christian	  testimonials	  analysed	  in	  
the	  previous	  chapter	  (six	  references	  in	  15524	  words,	  relative	  frequency:	  0.39).	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  very	  
clear	  that	  this	  is	  a	  very	  potent	  pattern	  of	  emphasis	  for	  MB3.	  What	  is	  unusual	  about	  this	  is	  that	  the	  
term	  relationship,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  strict	  qualification	  to	  the	  contrary,	  can	  suggest	  a	  network	  of	  
connotations	  associated	  with	  human	  relationships,	  including	  the	  possibility	  of	  intimacy	  and	  a	  possible	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sense	  of	  some	  form	  of	  proximity.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  unusually	  high	  frequency	  of	  relationship	  
language,	  MB3	  also	  expands	  on	  this	  notion	  of	  a	  relationship	  with	  God	  by	  adding	  language	  that	  
contains	  an	  even	  stronger	  implication	  of	  intimacy:	  “private	  relationship	  with	  God”	  (p1l121,	  my	  
emphasis))	  and	  the	  suggestion	  of	  a	  form	  of	  divine	  unity	  language,	  “he’s	  [God]	  is	  always	  in	  my	  heart	  
even	  when	  I’m	  not	  praying”	  (p1l143,	  my	  emphasis).	  
It	  therefore	  appears	  that,	  despite	  MB3’s	  orthodox	  Muslim	  doctrinal	  beliefs	  and	  her	  action	  and	  
relationship	  language	  revolving	  around	  a	  fixed	  system	  of	  universal	  fairness	  and	  justice	  (see	  the	  
extract	  above	  from	  the	  language	  of	  MB3),	  she	  has	  developed	  her	  own	  individual	  pattern	  of	  emphasis	  
that	  includes	  an	  overlay	  involving	  a	  perception	  of	  intimacy	  with	  the	  divine	  that	  is	  seemingly	  far	  
stronger	  than	  many	  other	  conservative	  Muslim	  believers.	  	  
CB1’s	  language	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  even	  more	  unusual	  in	  many	  respects.	  	  He	  makes	  no	  references	  at	  
all	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  physical	  nearness	  to	  a	  divine	  entity	  and	  only	  one	  ambiguous	  statement	  that	  could	  
be	  construed	  as	  a	  reference	  to	  divine	  unity	  (“In	  him	  is	  peace	  and	  purpose”	  (sen	  5)).	  The	  construction	  
in	  him	  +	  be	  is	  well	  known	  among	  many	  Evangelical	  Christians	  because	  of	  its	  use	  in	  Biblical	  verses	  such	  
as	  John	  1:	  4-­‐5,	  “In	  him	  was	  life,	  and	  that	  life	  was	  the	  light	  of	  all	  mankind”	  (New	  International	  Version).	  
As	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  this	  example,	  this	  construction	  can	  be	  used	  simply	  as	  a	  way	  of	  saying	  that	  the	  
entity	  being	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  particular	  characteristic	  or	  attribute,	  and	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  any	  
notion	  of	  unity.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  he	  makes	  no	  references	  to	  words	  such	  as	  relationship,	  completely	  
avoids	  emotionally	  loaded	  terms	  such	  as	  love	  and	  heart,	  and	  speaks	  very	  little	  about	  his	  own	  
personal	  experience.	  	  Instead,	  he	  chooses	  to	  foreground	  aspects	  of	  his	  belief	  that	  many	  Evangelicals	  
choose	  to	  background,	  for	  example,	  insisting	  that	  “intellect	  and	  reason”	  should	  be	  placed	  above	  
“scripture	  and	  experience”	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  he	  arrived	  at	  his	  certainty	  of	  belief	  (p1l9-­‐11)	  and	  
repeatedly	  emphasising	  the	  complexity	  of	  Christian	  beliefs	  (p1l343-­‐347)).	  	  In	  many	  respects,	  CB1’s	  
action	  and	  relationship	  language	  is	  closer	  to	  (and	  in	  some	  respects	  even	  stronger	  than)	  the	  patterns	  
of	  emphasis	  found	  in	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  texts	  than	  it	  was	  to	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  texts.	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However,	  CB1	  shows	  no	  indication	  of	  having	  any	  unorthodox	  doctrinal	  beliefs	  and	  clearly	  viewed	  
himself	  as	  a	  generally	  prototypical	  Evangelical	  with	  ambitions	  of	  being	  a	  missionary	  in	  Islamic	  
countries.	  	  The	  key	  difference	  appears	  to	  be	  that	  he	  has	  chosen	  to	  operationalize	  his	  core	  doctrinal	  
beliefs	  using	  different	  patterns	  of	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  that	  appear,	  at	  that	  time,	  to	  
represent	  a	  very	  different	  attitude	  toward	  his	  beliefs.	  	  The	  result	  is	  that	  the	  central,	  foundational	  
theme	  of	  modelling	  experience	  of	  a	  divine	  entity	  on	  close,	  intimate	  human	  relationships	  is	  largely	  
absent.	  	  	  
As	  I	  noted	  in	  my	  brief	  synopsis	  of	  the	  discussion	  between	  MB1	  and	  CB1	  in	  the	  results	  section	  above,	  
one	  key	  question	  that	  arises	  here	  is	  whether	  CB1’s	  choice	  to	  operationalize	  his	  core	  doctrinal	  beliefs	  
using	  different	  patterns	  of	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  is	  a	  local,	  temporary	  phenomena,	  or	  a	  
stable,	  protracted	  one.	  	  Is	  he	  temporarily	  converging	  with	  the	  language	  of	  MB1,	  or	  is	  he	  expressing	  a	  
stable	  conceptualisation	  that	  would	  appear	  across	  multiple	  discourses?	  	  It	  is	  of	  course	  impossible	  to	  
be	  certain	  from	  looking	  at	  this	  one	  example	  of	  discourse,	  but	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  safe	  to	  say	  is	  that	  
CB1	  has	  a	  conceptualisation	  of	  his	  way	  of	  believing	  that	  allows	  him	  to	  converge	  with	  the	  systems-­‐
based	  language	  of	  MB1	  to	  an	  extensive	  degree.	  	  In	  contrast,	  CB2	  and	  CB3	  showed	  no	  evidence	  of	  a	  
conceptualisation	  that	  would	  allow	  such	  an	  extensive	  convergence.	  	  This	  provides	  some	  evidence	  for	  
the	  fact	  that	  individual	  believers	  do	  appear,	  whether	  they	  are	  aware	  of	  it	  or	  not,	  to	  conceptualise	  and	  
operationalize	  similar	  doctrinal	  beliefs	  in	  different	  ways.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
I	  have	  argued	  above	  that	  there	  are	  different	  levels	  of	  variation	  within	  action	  and	  relationship	  
language	  in	  general	  and	  between	  individual	  believers.	  	  This	  variation	  is	  due	  to	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  
which	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  operationalizes	  theoretical	  doctrinal	  language.	  	  These	  points	  
will	  be	  further	  developed	  below	  when	  we	  consider	  those	  metaphors	  that	  portray	  the	  divine	  entity	  as	  





Believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  movement	  metaphors	  
In	  the	  Muslim	  testimonials	  analysed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  there	  were	  only	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  
references	  to	  type	  1	  and	  type	  2	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  metaphors,	  but	  more	  references	  to	  type	  3	  believer-­‐
as-­‐patient	  metaphors	  (pattern	  5a	  in	  table	  1	  above).	  	  In	  the	  Christian	  Testimonials,	  there	  were	  more	  
references	  to	  type	  1	  and	  type	  2	  metaphors	  and	  fewer	  references	  to	  type	  3	  metaphors	  (pattern	  5b).	  	  
In	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  testimonials	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  I	  argued	  that	  movement	  metaphors	  that	  
construed	  the	  believer	  as	  in	  some	  sense	  the	  patient	  in	  the	  process	  or	  direction	  of	  movement	  could	  
be	  separated	  into	  three	  types.	  	  I	  referred	  to	  the	  first	  type	  as	  type	  1	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  metaphors	  and	  
defined	  them	  as	  those	  metaphors	  that	  construed	  the	  believer	  as	  being	  completely	  or	  almost	  
completely	  passive	  in	  a	  process	  of	  being	  moved,	  for	  example,	  “the	  Lord	  graciously	  brought	  me	  to	  
know	  him”	  (CT4).	  	  I	  referred	  to	  the	  second	  type	  as	  type	  2	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  metaphors,	  defining	  
them	  as	  those	  metaphors	  that	  construe	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  believer	  as	  being	  the	  result	  of	  some	  
level	  of	  shared	  agency	  between	  the	  believer	  and	  some	  divine	  entity.	  	  An	  example	  of	  this	  can	  be	  found	  
in	  the	  use	  of	  lead	  in	  “I	  believe	  he	  will	  lead	  me	  all	  the	  way”	  (CT9).	  	  The	  use	  of	  lead	  implies	  that	  the	  
believer	  is	  contributing	  in	  some	  way	  to	  the	  process	  of	  movement,	  although	  this	  process	  is	  being	  
“helped	  along”	  by	  the	  divine	  entity.	  	  In	  this	  example	  the	  divine	  entity	  is	  also	  controlling	  the	  direction	  
of	  the	  movement	  process.	  	  The	  third	  type,	  type	  3	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  metaphors,	  include	  those	  
movement	  metaphors	  that	  appear	  to	  lack	  this	  shared	  process	  of	  the	  believer	  being	  “helped	  along”	  by	  
the	  divine	  entity.	  	  However,	  this	  type	  of	  movement	  metaphor	  does	  still	  retain	  the	  characteristic	  of	  
the	  divine	  entity	  to	  some	  extent	  controlling	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  movement.	  	  An	  example	  of	  this	  can	  
be	  found	  in	  the	  use	  of	  guide	  in	  “God	  will	  guide	  us	  there”	  (MT4).	  	  It	  is	  possible	  for	  the	  verb	  guide	  to	  be	  
used	  without	  any	  implication	  of	  physical	  contact	  or	  even	  any	  form	  of	  movement	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  
guiding	  entity,	  while	  still	  clearly	  influencing	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  entity	  being	  guided.	  	  Examples	  such	  
as	  ships	  being	  guided	  by	  a	  lighthouse	  or	  stars	  guiding	  a	  traveller	  serve	  to	  illustrate	  this	  possible	  
signposting	  (as	  opposed	  to	  active	  leading)	  function.	  	  My	  analysis	  went	  on	  to	  reveal	  that	  the	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islamfortoday.com	  testimonials	  contained	  relatively	  fewer	  references	  to	  type	  1	  and	  type	  2	  
metaphors	  compared	  to	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  testimonials,	  but	  considerably	  more	  references	  to	  
type	  3	  	  metaphors.	  	  	  
As	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  table	  4.16	  below,	  there	  is	  stronger	  agreement	  between	  the	  usage	  of	  believer-­‐as-­‐
patient	  metaphors	  by	  the	  Muslim	  participants	  and	  the	  pattern	  established	  in	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  
testimonials	  than	  there	  is	  between	  the	  usage	  of	  such	  metaphors	  by	  the	  Christian	  participants	  and	  the	  
pattern	  established	  in	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  testimonials.	  The	  Muslim	  participants	  in	  every	  case	  
restrict	  themselves	  to	  the	  use	  of	  type	  3	  metaphors	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  believer	  being	  guided	  by	  entities	  
such	  as	  God,	  Mohammed	  and	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  altogether	  avoid	  the	  type	  1	  and	  type	  2	  metaphors.	  	  The	  
examples	  of	  their	  movement	  metaphors	  in	  the	  table	  below	  have	  therefore	  been	  shaded	  in	  green.	  	  
However,	  the	  Christian	  participants	  displayed	  far	  less	  consistency	  in	  their	  choice	  of	  language,	  with	  
only	  CB3	  making	  some	  (but	  not	  more	  frequent	  use)	  of	  type	  1	  and	  type	  2	  metaphors.	  	  The	  lists	  of	  
relevant	  language	  for	  both	  CB1	  and	  CB2	  have	  therefore	  been	  shaded	  in	  red,	  while	  the	  language	  of	  
CB3	  has	  been	  shaded	  in	  orange.	  	  	  
	  
Table	  4.16:	  Believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  Movement	  Metaphors	  
	   Muslim	  Participants	   Christian	  Participants	  
Pair	  One:	  MB1	  and	  CB1	   Type	  1:	  [no	  references]	  
Type	  2:	  [no	  references]	  
Type	  3:	  [1]	  The	  concept	  that	  God	  is	  
One	  …	  guided	  my	  decision	  (sen	  4);	  [2]	  
the	  concept	  that	  God	  is	  one	  …	  guided	  
my	  decision	  (p1l122-­‐124);	  [3]	  he	  is	  the	  
one	  who	  guided	  me	  to	  Islam	  (p2l17)	  
[no	  references]	  
Pair	  Two:	  MB2	  and	  CB2	   Type	  1:	  [no	  references]	  
Type	  2:	  [no	  references]	  
Type	  3:	  [1]	  Allah	  guides	  us	  to	  His	  path	  
Type	  1:	  [no	  references]	  
Type	  2:	  [no	  references]	  
Type	  3:	  [1]	  guidelines	  for	  lifestyle	  are	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(sen	  2)	   very	  similar	  (p1l34);	  [2]	  the	  guidelines	  
for	  the	  Quran	  and	  the	  guide	  that	  the	  
Quran	  gives	  you	  and	  the	  guide	  that	  the	  
Bible	  gives	  you	  aren’t	  too	  dissimilar	  
(p2l16);	  [3]	  he	  [God]	  would	  guide	  the	  
conversation	  (p2l139);	  [4]	  you	  need	  
people	  to	  guide	  you	  (p2l185)	  
Pair	  Three:	  MB3	  and	  CB3	   Type	  1:	  [no	  references]	  
Type	  2:	  [no	  references]	  
Type	  3:	  [1]	  one	  God	  whom	  he	  sent	  
Mohammed	  and	  the	  Quran	  to	  guide	  
me	  towards	  him	  (p1l8)	  
Type	  1:	  [1]	  I	  was	  moved	  by	  the	  Spirit	  
(p1l27);	  [2]	  he	  came	  to	  save	  me	  from	  
my	  sin	  (p1l59)	  
Type	  2:	  [3]	  I	  am	  led	  by	  his	  power	  (sen	  
5);	  [4]	  led	  by	  his	  power,	  by	  the	  Spirit	  
(p2l11);	  [5]	  being	  led	  by	  him	  (p1l44);	  	  
Type	  3:	  [6]	  I	  am	  guided	  by	  the	  Spirit	  
(sen	  4);	  [7]	  it’s	  [the	  Bible]	  is	  my	  guide	  
(p1l37);	  [8]	  he	  [God]	  is	  my	  guide	  
(p2l13);	  [9]	  being	  guided	  by	  him	  
(p2l44)	  
	  
The	  complete	  absence	  of	  any	  type	  of	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  movement	  metaphor	  in	  CB1’s	  language	  
requires	  some	  explanation.	  	  The	  idea	  that	  Jesus	  came	  to	  earth	  to	  die	  on	  the	  cross	  for	  the	  sins	  of	  
humanity	  in	  order	  to	  save	  them	  (an	  idea	  that	  is	  universally	  central	  to	  Christian	  belief)	  should	  be	  
difficult	  for	  a	  Christian	  to	  operationalize	  using	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  without	  using	  some	  
kind	  of	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  metaphors.	  	  Christian	  songs,	  especially	  the	  kinds	  of	  songs	  that	  CB1	  would	  
regularly	  sing	  in	  Pentecostal	  churches,	  contain	  numerous	  references	  to	  this	  type	  of	  language	  and	  it	  is	  
also	  very	  common	  in	  the	  Bible	  itself.	  	  This	  may	  make	  the	  idea	  that	  CB1	  does	  not	  generally	  use	  this	  
kind	  of	  language	  to	  describe	  his	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  Christian	  somewhat	  unlikely,	  but	  the	  point	  still	  
remains	  that	  CB1	  did	  not	  emphasise	  this	  language	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  discussion.	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However,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  he	  does	  make	  use	  of	  a	  non-­‐movement	  metaphor	  that	  does	  construe	  
people	  as	  patients.	  	  Towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  discussion	  stage	  CB1	  begins	  to	  
counter	  MB1’s	  argument	  that	  the	  truth	  is	  simple	  and	  self-­‐evidently	  recognisable.	  	  His	  counter	  
argument	  is	  based	  on	  the	  perception	  that	  “the	  God	  of	  this	  world	  …	  blinded	  people’s	  eyes	  to	  the	  truth”	  
(p2l196-­‐197),	  and	  therefore	  people	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  “discern”	  the	  truth	  when	  they	  meet	  it.	  	  This	  
notion	  of	  viewing	  a	  seeming	  inability	  to	  accept	  a	  perceived	  truth	  as	  being	  blinded	  fits	  in	  with	  the	  
Christian	  doctrine	  of	  the	  fall	  and	  original	  sin	  and	  the	  idea	  that	  people	  are	  acted	  on	  by	  the	  power	  of	  
sin.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  fits	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  without	  God’s	  grace	  people	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  save	  
themselves.	  CB1’s	  language	  appears	  to	  be	  based	  on	  a	  verse	  from	  the	  New	  Testament	  that	  states	  “The	  
god	  of	  this	  world	  has	  blinded	  the	  minds	  of	  unbelievers	  …”	  (2	  Corinthians	  4:4,	  New	  International	  
Version).	  	  The	  next	  two	  verses	  go	  on	  to	  state	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  Jesus	  coming	  to	  earth	  was	  to	  
reverse	  this	  state	  of	  being	  blind	  by	  making,	  “his	  light	  shine	  in	  our	  hearts”	  (another	  human	  as	  patient	  
metaphor).	  	  CB1	  is	  dominated	  by	  MB1	  in	  the	  discussion	  (MB1	  produces	  70%	  of	  the	  discussion’s	  
language,	  while	  CB1	  only	  produces	  30%),	  and	  therefore	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  he	  is	  often	  unable	  to	  fully	  
develop	  his	  arguments	  to	  their	  full	  extent.	  	  	  
However,	  the	  point	  still	  stands	  that	  CB1	  chooses	  to	  primarily	  restrict	  himself	  to	  a	  doctrinal	  discussion	  
and	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  MB1’s	  doctrinal	  beliefs	  are	  well-­‐meaning	  oversimplifications	  of	  the	  truth.	  
He	  makes	  no	  references	  to	  any	  perceived	  experiences	  of	  divine	  intervention	  in	  his	  own	  life	  and	  
emphasises	  the	  importance	  of	  an	  intellectually	  coherent	  explanation	  of	  his	  Christian	  beliefs	  that	  is,	  in	  
terms	  of	  action	  and	  relationship	  language,	  almost	  the	  opposite	  to	  CB2	  and	  CB3’s	  approach.	  These	  
patterns	  of	  emphasis	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  marginalising	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  movement	  metaphors.	  	  All	  
these	  points	  add	  strong	  support	  for	  the	  argument	  that	  individuals	  are	  able	  to	  operationalize	  the	  
same	  doctrinal	  beliefs	  in	  very	  different,	  even	  opposite	  ways.	  	  It	  is	  of	  course	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  CB1	  
is	  adapting	  the	  expression	  of	  his	  beliefs	  in	  order	  to	  more	  effectively	  engage	  with	  MB1’s	  system-­‐based	  
way	  of	  believing.	  	  However,	  what	  is	  interesting	  is	  that	  CB1	  made	  the	  choice	  to	  emphasise	  this	  way	  of	  
expressing	  his	  beliefs,	  while	  CB2	  and	  CB3,	  facing	  the	  same	  situation,	  appear	  to	  have	  chosen	  to	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emphasise	  personal	  experience	  and	  relationship	  language.	  	  I	  therefore	  would	  argue	  that	  these	  
differences	  in	  the	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  produced	  when	  exposed	  to	  the	  same	  communicative	  
situation	  reveal	  important	  insights	  into	  a	  particular	  individual’s	  way	  of	  believing.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
I	  have	  so	  far	  discussed	  CB1’s	  lack	  of	  references	  to	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  movement	  metaphors,	  but	  I	  
have	  yet	  to	  offer	  any	  explanation	  as	  to	  why	  all	  three	  participants	  make	  fewer	  references	  to	  type	  1	  
(e.g.,	  brought	  to	  or	  plucked	  from)	  and	  type	  2	  (e.g.	  led	  to)	  movement	  metaphors.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
first	  begin	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  the	  genre	  has	  changed	  from	  the	  more	  isolated,	  solitary	  and	  
considered	  genre	  of	  the	  personal	  testimonial	  to	  the	  dynamically	  unfolding,	  more	  unpredictable	  genre	  
of	  the	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  discussion.	  	  Given	  this	  jump	  to	  a	  very	  different	  and	  more	  chaotic	  genre,	  it	  is	  hardly	  
surprising	  that	  many	  relatively	  stable	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  in	  the	  testimonials	  become	  less	  stable	  in	  
the	  language	  of	  the	  discussions.	  	  A	  second	  explanation	  that	  may	  account	  for	  the	  high	  number	  of	  type	  
1	  and	  type	  2	  references	  in	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  three	  participants	  in	  the	  study	  
relates	  to	  how	  different	  doctrinal	  perspectives	  may	  be	  operationalized	  in	  action	  and	  relationship	  
language	  in	  different	  ways.	  	  The	  Evangelical	  Times	  is	  a	  magazine	  that	  embraces	  the	  set	  of	  doctrines	  
known	  as	  Calvinism	  or	  the	  doctrines	  of	  grace.	  	  These	  doctrines	  emphasise	  the	  idea	  that	  Jesus	  did	  not	  
die	  for	  everyone,	  but	  only	  the	  elect	  who	  have	  been	  predestined	  to	  be	  saved	  by	  God.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  
possible	  that	  this	  is	  another	  example	  where	  doctrinal	  beliefs	  influence	  and	  shape	  action	  and	  
relationship	  language.	  It	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  strong	  doctrinal	  beliefs	  that	  include	  ideas	  that	  humans	  are	  
dead	  in	  sin	  and	  can	  only	  be	  saved	  by	  being	  elected	  to	  salvation	  by	  God	  would	  translate	  into	  higher	  
occurrences	  of	  type	  1	  and	  type	  2	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  metaphors.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  these	  
notions	  clearly	  emphasise	  a	  perception	  that	  humans	  are	  to	  some	  degree	  passive	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
salvation.	  	  In	  contrast,	  those	  Evangelicals	  who	  are	  not	  Calvinists	  and	  therefore	  wish	  to	  stress	  the	  role	  
and	  importance	  of	  believers	  actively	  inviting	  God	  into	  their	  lives	  (as	  CB1,	  CB2	  and	  CB3	  do),	  would	  
make	  use	  of	  fewer	  type	  1	  and	  type	  2	  metaphors.	  A	  clear	  example	  of	  one	  of	  the	  participants	  wishing	  
to	  emphasise	  the	  importance	  of	  actively	  inviting	  the	  divine	  entity	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  CB2’s	  description	  of	  
a	  verse	  from	  the	  New	  Testament	  that	  uses	  a	  proximity	  and	  movement	  metaphor	  relating	  to	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accepting	  Christianity.	  	  It	  construes	  Jesus	  as	  a	  person	  knocking	  on	  the	  door	  of	  a	  house	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  
get	  inside.	  	  CB2	  uses	  five	  different	  words	  to	  stress	  the	  notion	  that	  Jesus	  can	  only	  enter	  if	  the	  believer	  
wishes	  it:	  
…	  which	  is	  like	  Jesus	  is	  knocking	  at	  the	  door	  of	  your	  heart	  and	  
[1]	  you	  have	  to	  let	  him	  	  
[2]	  you	  have	  to	  invite	  him	  in	  	  
[3]	  so	  you	  have	  to	  say,	  OK	  
[4]	  yeah	  
[5]	  I	  want	  you	  
to	  come	  into	  my	  life	  and	  have	  a	  relationship	  with	  you	  
(p1l171-­‐174)	  
However,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  language	  of	  all	  three	  participants	  contains	  fewer	  type	  1	  and	  type	  2	  
metaphors,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  marked	  difference	  between	  CB2	  and	  CB3’s	  usage.	  	  The	  list	  of	  occurrences	  
for	  CB3	  in	  table	  6	  above	  were	  shaded	  in	  orange	  rather	  than	  green	  because	  there	  were	  more	  
occurrences	  of	  type	  3	  metaphors	  than	  there	  were	  occurrences	  of	  type	  1	  and	  2	  metaphors,	  but	  it	  is	  
still	  important	  to	  note	  that	  CB3	  does	  make	  use	  of	  all	  three	  types	  of	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  movement	  
metaphors.	  	  She	  appears	  to	  be	  construing	  herself	  as	  almost	  completely	  passive	  through	  her	  use	  of	  
two	  type	  1	  metaphors	  (being	  “moved”	  and	  “saved	  from”	  something).	  	  I	  discussed	  above	  that	  CB3	  
appears	  to	  attribute	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  value	  to	  proximity	  and	  unity	  language,	  but	  there	  also	  seems	  
strong	  linguistic	  evidence	  that	  CB3	  also	  attaches	  great	  value	  to	  connecting	  this	  perception	  of	  
proximity	  with	  the	  perception	  of	  being	  existentially	  moved	  (as	  well	  as	  being	  shown	  where	  to	  move	  
to)	  by	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  These	  two	  perceptions	  were	  juxtaposed	  in	  her	  sentences	  for	  the	  second	  part	  
of	  the	  written	  stage.	  	  Two	  of	  her	  five	  sentences	  related	  to	  unity	  and	  proximity	  ([1]	  “The	  Spirit	  lives	  in	  
me”	  and	  [3]	  “God	  is	  always	  with	  me”)	  while	  another	  two	  related	  to	  being	  “guided”	  [4]	  and	  “led”	  [5].	  	  
In	  the	  key	  statement	  which	  I	  examined	  above	  in	  relation	  to	  how	  she	  arrived	  at	  her	  certainty	  of	  belief,	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she	  again	  juxtaposed	  the	  perceptions	  of	  divine	  proximity	  and	  being	  moved,	  “……	  and	  I	  believe	  I	  came	  
to	  the	  conclusion	  when	  I	  felt	  the	  Spirit	  in	  me	  and	  when	  I	  was	  moved	  by	  the	  Spirit	  …	  “	  (p1l22-­‐29).	  	  	  
CB3	  chooses	  to	  emphasise	  her	  charismatic	  theology	  (the	  belief	  that	  Christians	  can	  receive	  the	  gifts	  of	  
the	  Spirit,	  such	  as	  speaking	  in	  tongues	  –	  speaking	  in	  an	  incomprehensible	  language	  which	  is	  believed	  
to	  be	  the	  language	  of	  angels	  or	  the	  Spirit	  that	  may	  sometimes	  be	  subsequently	  interpreted	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  a	  comprehensible	  message	  –	  and	  prophetic	  dancing	  (see	  p1l29-­‐31)).	  	  This	  emphasis	  ties	  in	  
with	  her	  claim	  “God	  speaks	  through	  me”	  (sentence	  2)	  and	  led	  me	  to	  describe	  her	  language	  in	  the	  
synopsis	  of	  the	  discussion	  results	  as	  similar	  to	  the	  language	  of	  channelling.	  	  Many	  Christians	  use	  this	  
phrase	  moved	  by	  the	  Spirit	  to	  describe	  a	  kind	  of	  nagging	  feeling	  or	  ‘leading’	  to	  do	  something.	  	  
However,	  here	  the	  suggestion	  is	  that	  language	  such	  as	  “when	  I	  was	  moved	  by	  the	  Spirit	  …	  I	  have	  
experienced	  the	  Spirit	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  prophetic	  dancing”	  (p1l27-­‐29)	  has	  a	  literal	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
metaphorical	  dimension.	  	  My	  evidence	  for	  this	  is	  that	  she	  appears	  to	  sometimes	  perceive	  herself	  as	  
being	  prompted	  by	  the	  Spirit	  to	  not	  just	  talk	  but	  also	  physically	  move	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  dancing),	  and	  
crucially	  she	  views	  this	  movement	  as	  something	  that	  is	  beyond	  her	  control.	  	  Below	  is	  her	  response	  to	  
a	  follow-­‐up	  email	  asking	  her	  if	  she	  could	  expand	  upon	  this	  phenomenon:	  
Yes,	  it	  has	  been	  classified/named	  as	  prophetic	  dancing	  when	  I	  tried	  explaining	  it	  in	  the	  English	  context.	  I	  received	  it	  
when	  I	  was	  13	  in	  Mizoram	  [in	  India]	  when	  we	  were	  worshipping	  in	  church.	  It	  is	  a	  dance/movement	  prompted	  by	  the	  
spirit	  that	  I	  can't	  control.	  It	  usually	  happens	  during	  praise	  and	  worship	  (singing).	  All	  I	  can	  say	  is,	  it	  looks	  absolutely	  
bizarre!	  But	  it’s	  something	  I	  cannot	  control.	  I	  don't	  receive	  it	  every	  time	  we	  worship	  either.	  It	  is	  a	  spiritual	  gift,	  a	  
form/part	  of	  worship.	  	  
This	  close	  connection	  between	  proximity	  and	  being	  acted	  on	  also	  appears	  to	  be	  present	  in	  
perceptions	  of	  having	  conversations	  with	  the	  divine	  entity.	  	  In	  section	  4.6.1	  above,	  I	  discussed	  in	  
detail	  one	  such	  case	  that	  she	  recounted	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  personal	  story	  she	  used	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  
her	  second	  discussion	  with	  MB3.	  	  It	  began	  with	  the	  following	  account,	  “one	  time	  I	  went	  to	  a	  Mosque	  
and	  I	  said:	  God,	  these	  people	  are	  hungry	  for	  the	  truth	  …	  so	  I	  said,	  if	  God	  you	  love	  us	  all	  the	  same,	  and	  
we	  all	  want	  to	  know	  the	  truth,	  I’m	  going	  to	  stand	  in	  front	  of	  you,	  I	  want	  your	  Spirit	  to	  tell	  me	  what	  to	  
say,	  and	  that’s	  the	  word	  I	  spoke”	  (p2l172	  -­‐183).	  	  This	  indicates	  that	  CB3	  perceives	  a	  lot	  of	  her	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proximity	  language	  as	  having	  some	  degree	  of	  a	  literal	  dimension	  to	  the	  point	  where	  she	  converses	  
with	  an	  entity	  that	  she	  perceives	  as	  in	  some	  sense	  standing	  in	  front	  of	  her	  and	  able	  to	  dictate	  to	  her.	  	  
It	  therefore	  appears	  that	  her	  perception	  of	  her	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  experience	  is	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  a	  
sense	  of	  intimate,	  personal	  relationship	  (as	  noted	  above,	  she	  refers	  to	  a	  relationship	  with	  God	  nine	  
times	  and	  also	  uses	  the	  word	  love	  twenty	  two	  times)	  and	  a	  kind	  of	  informal	  conversational	  approach	  
with	  overlapping	  metaphorical	  and	  literal	  elements.	  	  This	  is	  further	  emphasised	  in	  her	  closing	  
comment,	  “we	  all	  have	  access	  to	  the	  same	  God	  and	  if	  we	  want	  to	  know	  the	  truth,	  just	  ask	  him	  [God],	  
right?”	  (p2l188-­‐189).	  
I	  have	  argued	  that	  proximity	  and	  the	  language	  of	  being	  moved	  is	  crucial	  for	  CB3’s	  perception	  of	  her	  
religious	  beliefs	  and	  experience	  and	  her	  certainty	  that	  those	  beliefs	  are	  absolutely	  correct.	  	  I	  have	  
also	  argued	  that	  this	  type	  of	  language	  suggests	  an	  underlying	  sense	  that	  goes	  beyond	  simply	  
believing	  that	  a	  divine	  entity	  acts	  on	  her.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  belief,	  there	  also	  appears	  to	  be	  particular	  
situations	  where	  she	  perceives	  herself	  as	  experiencing	  this	  divine	  agency	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  may	  not	  be	  
entirely	  construed	  as	  metaphorical.	  This	  emphasis	  on	  particular	  experiences	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  
to	  CB1’s	  avoidance	  of	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  related	  to	  experiencing	  divine	  intervention.	  	  This	  
difference	  in	  the	  way	  that	  these	  Christians	  operationalize	  their	  doctrinal	  beliefs	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  
the	  way	  that	  they	  use	  the	  word	  through	  in	  the	  course	  of	  their	  discussions.	  We	  will	  therefore	  turn	  to	  
an	  analysis	  of	  the	  usage	  of	  through	  in	  the	  section	  below.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Use	  of	  ‘Through’	  
In	  the	  Muslim	  testimonials	  analysed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  there	  were	  fewer	  occurrences	  of	  
‘through’	  with	  the	  meaning	  ‘going	  through	  a	  challenging	  life	  experience’	  (pattern	  6a	  in	  table	  1	  above)	  
than	  there	  were	  in	  the	  Christian	  testimonials	  (pattern	  6b).	  	  However,	  there	  were	  more	  occurrences	  of	  
‘through’	  with	  the	  meaning	  ‘by	  means	  of’	  that	  suggested	  a	  process	  of	  research	  and	  reflection	  (pattern	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7a),	  while	  in	  the	  Christian	  testimonials	  there	  were	  more	  occurrences	  of	  ‘through’	  with	  the	  meaning	  
‘by	  means	  of’	  that	  suggested	  divine	  intervention	  (pattern	  7b).	  
The	  analysis	  of	  the	  testimonials	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  arrived	  at	  two	  conclusions	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  
use	  of	  through.	  	  The	  first	  conclusion	  was	  that	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  texts	  tended	  to	  focus	  less	  on	  
subjective	  life	  experience	  than	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  texts,	  leading	  to	  a	  lower	  frequency	  of	  
occurrences	  of	  through	  with	  the	  meaning	  of	  going	  through	  a	  challenging	  life	  experience,	  for	  example,	  
“I	  went	  through	  many	  periods	  of	  confusion,	  happiness,	  doubt	  and	  amazement”	  (MT8).	  	  The	  second	  
conclusion	  was	  that	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  texts	  tended	  to	  use	  through	  with	  the	  meaning	  by	  means	  
of	  to	  emphasise	  a	  process	  of	  research	  and	  reflection,	  	  for	  example	  “I	  was	  able	  to	  ask	  and	  get	  answers	  
that	  I	  confirmed	  through	  further	  research”	  (MT1).	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  texts	  used	  it	  to	  
emphasise	  divine	  intervention,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  attainment	  of	  salvation,	  for	  example,	  “I	  
have	  the	  power	  to	  live	  a	  changed	  life	  through	  the	  Holy	  Spirit,	  who	  lives	  within	  me”	  (CT10).	  	  	  	  
Table	  4.17	  below	  lists	  the	  occurrences	  of	  through	  for	  the	  six	  participants.	  	  All	  the	  lists	  of	  occurrences	  
for	  the	  Muslim	  participants	  have	  been	  shaded	  in	  red	  to	  reflect	  the	  fact	  that	  none	  of	  them	  confirmed	  
either	  of	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  patterns	  outlined	  above.	  	  CB1	  was	  again	  atypical	  in	  his	  language	  and	  
avoided	  using	  the	  word	  through	  altogether.	  	  This	  has	  been	  reflected	  below	  by	  leaving	  his	  list	  of	  
occurrences	  empty	  and	  shaded	  in	  red.	  	  Support	  for	  the	  second	  conclusion	  concerning	  divine	  
intervention	  was	  present	  in	  the	  language	  of	  CB2	  and	  CB3,	  but	  the	  data	  from	  the	  discussions	  didn’t	  
match	  the	  data	  from	  the	  testimonials	  in	  terms	  of	  references	  to	  going	  through	  a	  difficult	  life	  
experience.	  	  Both	  of	  their	  lists	  of	  occurrences	  have	  therefore	  been	  shaded	  in	  orange.	  	  	  	  
	  
Table	  4.17:	  Use	  of	  Through	  
	   Muslim	  Participants	   Christian	  Participants	  
Pair	  One:	  MB1	  and	  CB1	   [1]	  through	  my	  life	  experience	  (sen2);	  
[2]	  went	  through	  a	  period	  where	  I	  was	  
[no	  references]	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searching	  (p2l22);	  [3]	  through	  all	  those	  
experiences	  (p2l69)	  	  
Pair	  Two:	  MB2	  and	  CB2	   [1]	  Allah	  guides	  us	  to	  His	  path	  through	  
His	  Holy	  Quran	  (sen	  2);	  [2]	  when	  I	  
came	  through	  a	  bad	  experience	  (sen	  
3);	  [3]	  through	  reflecting	  on	  the	  good	  
and	  bad	  moments	  [4]	  I	  came	  through	  
(sen	  4);	  [5]	  this	  is	  what	  will	  make	  me	  
happy	  through	  the	  whole	  life	  (p1l103);	  	  
[1]	  my	  salvation	  comes	  through	  Jesus’	  
sacrifice	  (sen	  4);	  [2]	  the	  forgiveness	  
comes	  through	  Christ	  (p1l245);	  [3]	  ask	  
God	  for	  forgiveness	  through	  because	  
Christ	  died	  for	  your	  sin	  (p1l247-­‐248);	  
[4]	  it’s	  not	  through	  what	  you	  do	  that	  
gets	  you	  into	  heaven	  (p2l47);	  [5]	  your	  
salvation	  comes	  through	  …	  Jesus	  
(p2l55)	  
Pair	  Three:	  MB3	  and	  CB3	   [no	  references]	   [1]	  experience	  through	  the	  Spirit	  
(p1l32);	  [2]	  makes	  my	  experience	  real	  
through	  the	  Bible	  (p1l39);	  [3]	  makes	  
complete	  sense	  only	  if	  it’s	  through	  
Jesus	  Christ	  (p1l150);	  [4]	  I	  only	  
understand	  the	  loving	  God	  through	  
Jesus	  Christ	  (p1l151);	  [5]	  assurance	  of	  
heaven	  through	  Jesus	  Christ	  (p1l152);	  
[6]	  my	  experience	  through	  the	  Spirit	  
(p1l153);	  [7]	  that	  it	  is	  only	  through	  him	  
[the	  Spirit]	  [8]	  and	  through	  God	  
(p2l12);	  [9]	  through	  his	  grace	  and	  
power	  that	  you	  are	  able	  to	  do	  good	  
things	  (p2l38);	  [10]	  life	  that	  you	  can	  
have	  through	  Christ	  [11]	  and	  through	  
his	  power	  (p2l60);	  [12]	  understanding	  
through	  the	  Spirit	  (p2l65);	  [13]	  only	  be	  
possible	  through	  love	  (p2l141);	  NOTE:	  





MB1	  made	  more	  references	  to	  his	  life	  experience	  than	  CB1,	  and	  also	  used	  through	  with	  the	  meaning	  
of	  by	  means	  of	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  his	  life	  experience	  in	  his	  decision	  to	  become	  a	  Muslim.	  
However,	  some	  support	  for	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  pattern	  7a	  relating	  to	  research	  and	  reflection	  can	  
be	  drawn	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  MB1	  described	  a	  large	  part	  of	  his	  life	  experience	  as	  a	  process	  of	  research	  
and	  reflection:	  	  
…	  when	  I	  started	  looking	  into	  the	  religious	  world,	  you	  know,	  I	  look	  into	  the	  Jehovah’s	  Witnesses,	  Seventh	  Day	  
Adventists,	  you	  know,	  	  I	  had	  a	  few	  Sikh	  friends	  you	  know,	  I	  had	  friends	  who	  had	  embraced	  Islam	  from	  school,	  you	  
know,	  Judaism,	  looked	  into	  many	  things,	  you	  know,	  you	  know,	  and	  basically	  I	  always	  found	  that	  Islam	  seemed	  to	  
appeal	  the	  best,	  or	  appeal	  the	  most	  in	  terms	  of,	  maybe	  it’s	  a	  problem,	  but	  the	  simplicity	  of	  the	  message	  …	  	  (p2l94-­‐
111)	  	  
This	  fusion	  of	  life	  experience	  and	  a	  journey	  of	  “looking	  into”	  the	  wider	  domain	  of	  religious	  belief	  in	  
general	  (and	  not	  just	  increasing	  knowledge	  about	  the	  believer’s	  own	  sacred	  text	  and	  religion)	  was	  
essentially	  restricted	  to	  MB1.	  	  One	  explanation	  for	  this	  could	  be	  that	  MB1	  is	  a	  convert	  to	  Islam	  (in	  the	  
UK),	  whereas	  MB2	  and	  MB3	  were	  brought	  up	  as	  Muslims	  in	  a	  Muslim	  society	  (the	  Oman).	  This	  may	  
also	  explain	  some	  other	  similarities	  to	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  testimonials	  that	  were	  not	  so	  visible	  in	  
the	  language	  of	  MB2	  and	  MB3.	  	  These	  include	  MB1’s	  insistence	  on	  the	  self-­‐evident,	  simple	  truth	  of	  
Islam	  compared	  to	  other	  religions,	  the	  notion	  that	  all	  religions	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  pointing	  to	  Islam,	  
and	  his	  emphasis	  on	  arriving	  at	  the	  truth	  (he	  refers	  to	  the	  words	  truth	  or	  true	  eight	  times	  during	  the	  
course	  of	  the	  discussions).	  	  	  	  	  	  
MB2	  made	  no	  reference	  to	  a	  process	  of	  research	  and	  reflection,	  and	  used	  through	  both	  to	  describe	  
emotions	  related	  to	  her	  subjective	  life	  experience	  (“…	  will	  make	  me	  happy	  through	  my	  whole	  life	  …”)	  
and	  to	  describe	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  in	  terms	  of	  guidance,	  while	  MB3	  avoided	  using	  the	  
word	  altogether.	  	  	  
Even	  when	  we	  allow	  for	  the	  many	  unusual	  characteristics	  of	  CB1’s	  language,	  it	  is	  still	  very	  surprising	  
that	  he	  also	  never	  uses	  through	  and	  also	  says	  nothing	  about	  the	  atoning	  death	  of	  Christ.	  	  This	  
becomes	  even	  more	  unusual	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  CB2	  and	  CB3	  have	  both	  used	  the	  word	  to	  the	  
attainment	  of	  salvation	  by	  means	  of	  Jesus’	  death	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  testimonial	  authors	  did	  in	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the	  Evangelical	  Times	  texts.	  	  This	  reinforces	  my	  conclusion	  from	  the	  previous	  section	  that,	  in	  terms	  of	  
action	  and	  relationship	  language,	  CB1	  wishes	  to	  emphasise	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  intellect	  and	  the	  
system	  of	  belief	  over	  any	  perceived	  experiences	  of	  direct	  intervention	  or	  emotional	  intimacy	  relating	  
to	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
As	  I	  alluded	  to	  above,	  both	  CB2	  and	  CB3	  did	  not	  adhere	  to	  pattern	  6b	  in	  terms	  of	  using	  through	  to	  
describe	  going	  through	  a	  challenging	  life	  experience,	  but	  they	  did	  adhere	  closely	  to	  pattern	  7b	  in	  
terms	  of	  frequent	  references	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  divine	  intervention.	  CB2	  appears	  to	  be	  determined	  to	  
highlight	  what	  he	  sees	  as	  the	  key	  difference	  between	  Islam	  and	  Christianity	  by	  using	  through	  solely	  
to	  repeatedly	  emphasise	  the	  attainment	  of	  salvation	  by	  means	  of	  the	  crucifixion.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  this,	  
CB3	  uses	  through	  with	  the	  meaning	  of	  by	  means	  of	  in	  reference	  to	  a	  range	  of	  agencies	  (such	  as	  a	  
divine	  entity	  -­‐	  the	  Spirit,	  God	  or	  Jesus	  -­‐	  the	  Bible	  and	  the	  emotion	  of	  love)	  to	  attain	  a	  range	  of	  effects,	  
including	  salvation,	  understanding,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  do	  good	  works.	  	  She	  also	  uses	  other	  language	  
that	  has	  a	  similar	  meaning,	  for	  example	  she	  makes	  use	  of	  the	  phrase	  by	  his	  power	  six	  times	  in	  the	  
discussion.	  This	  very	  high	  repetition	  of	  language	  that	  suggests	  she	  can	  only	  do	  something	  by	  means	  
of	  another	  power	  or	  force	  produces	  a	  very	  strong	  effect	  of	  passivity	  and	  powerlessness	  when	  not	  
dependent	  upon	  divine	  agency.	  	  This	  effect	  is	  further	  strengthened	  by	  the	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  
movement	  metaphors	  we	  examined	  above,	  as	  well	  as	  her	  language	  in	  the	  follow-­‐up	  interview	  
(quoted	  above	  in	  the	  section	  on	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  metaphors)	  relating	  to	  prophetic	  dancing,	  “I	  can’t	  
control	  …	  it’s	  something	  I	  cannot	  control”.	  	  This	  appears	  to	  be	  exactly	  the	  opposite	  effect	  that	  the	  
Muslim	  participants	  seemed	  to	  be	  conveying	  by	  their	  emphasis	  on	  an	  uninterrupted	  system	  of	  
responsibility	  and	  accountability	  discussed	  in	  the	  section	  above	  on	  proximity,	  unity	  and	  relationship	  
language.	  	  	  	  	  	  
I	  have	  now	  discussed	  a	  range	  of	  language	  related	  to	  metaphors	  of	  proximity	  and	  movement,	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  extensive	  degree	  of	  variation	  between	  individuals	  this	  range	  of	  language	  suggests.	  	  I	  will	  now	  
outline	  a	  framework	  drawn	  from	  research	  in	  cognitive	  psychology	  and	  cultural	  anthropology	  that	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may	  allow	  a	  more	  coherent	  assessment	  of	  some	  of	  the	  different	  types	  of	  belief	  that	  appear	  to	  have	  
been	  encountered	  in	  the	  above	  analysis.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
4.6.2	  Connecting	  the	  Strands	  
My	  analysis	  of	  the	  testimonials	  essentially	  leads	  me	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  Muslim	  participants	  revolve	  
their	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  around	  a	  rule-­‐based	  system	  of	  human	  cause	  and	  effect	  that	  is	  applied	  
equally	  to	  all	  and	  does	  not	  strongly	  emphasise	  an	  affective	  dimension.	  	  In	  contrast,	  CB2	  and	  CB3	  
revolve	  their	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  around	  affective	  language	  relating	  to	  a	  personal,	  intimate	  
relationship	  with	  a	  divine	  entity,	  who	  has	  done	  something	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  the	  
possibility	  of	  salvation.	  	  These	  conclusions	  can	  be	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  conclusions	  I	  arrived	  at	  
concerning	  the	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  identified	  in	  the	  islamfortoday.com	  testimonials	  and	  the	  
Evangelical	  Times	  testimonials.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  present	  analysis	  I	  have	  moved	  beyond	  looking	  only	  
for	  differences	  between	  individuals	  belonging	  to	  a	  different	  religion	  (Islam	  and	  Christianity).	  	  I	  have	  
also	  looked	  for	  individual	  differences	  between	  people	  belonging	  to	  the	  same	  religious	  group.	  	  I	  found,	  
for	  example,	  that	  MB3	  appears	  to	  embrace	  this	  pattern	  of	  emphasis	  revolving	  around	  a	  system	  of	  
human	  cause	  and	  effect,	  but	  also	  emphasises	  close	  relationship	  language	  (in	  contrast	  to	  the	  other	  
Muslim	  participants).	  	  CB1,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  makes	  very	  little	  mention	  of	  personal	  relationship	  and	  
intimacy	  language	  (in	  contrast	  to	  the	  other	  Christian	  participants)	  and	  appears	  to	  emphasise	  the	  
importance	  of	  the	  intellect	  and	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  theological	  ideas	  within	  his	  belief	  system.	  	  	  	  	  
The	  question	  that	  I	  want	  to	  ask	  now	  is	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  look	  towards	  developments	  in	  the	  
fields	  of	  cognitive	  science	  and	  the	  study	  of	  religions	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  possible	  context	  for	  these	  
patterns	  of	  emphasis	  and	  differences.	  	  What	  I	  mean	  by	  this	  is	  that	  we	  should	  not	  focus	  purely	  on	  the	  
different	  doctrines	  of	  different	  religions,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  different	  cognitive	  models	  that	  may	  
underpin	  those	  doctrines.	  	  I	  will	  therefore	  now	  move	  on	  to	  a	  brief	  review	  of	  the	  LCCM	  theory	  that	  I	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discussed	  in	  the	  second	  chapter	  and	  discuss	  how	  this	  theory	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  
chapter.	  
In	  my	  overview	  of	  LCCM	  theory,	  I	  discussed	  how	  Evans	  (2009)	  proposes	  that	  a	  person’s	  “beliefs	  about	  
the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  world”	  could	  be	  divided	  into	  their	  perception	  that	  reality	  consists	  of	  things	  
and	  events.	  	  According	  to	  Evans	  (2009:	  194-­‐200),	  things	  are	  composed	  of	  individuals,	  such	  as	  a	  
particular	  Christian	  that	  I	  have	  met,	  and	  types,	  such	  as	  my	  abstracted,	  stereotypical	  notion	  of	  a	  
Christian.	  	  Events	  are	  composed	  of	  a	  connected	  series	  of	  two	  or	  more	  episodic	  situations,	  such	  as	  the	  
run-­‐up	  to	  a	  particular	  discussion	  with	  a	  Christian	  that	  I	  have	  had	  in	  the	  past,	  the	  discussion	  itself	  or	  
what	  I	  did	  or	  how	  I	  felt	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  discussion,	  and	  generic	  situations,	  such	  as	  my	  abstracted,	  
stereotypical	  notion	  of	  the	  form	  and	  structure	  that	  discussions	  with	  Christians	  take.	  	  Episodic	  
situations	  are	  themselves	  composed	  of	  a	  series	  of	  discrete,	  situated	  images	  (ibid),	  which	  means	  that	  
episodic	  situations	  and	  individual	  entities	  have	  an	  inseparable	  relationship.	  You	  cannot	  have	  a	  
situation	  that	  does	  not	  consist	  of	  images	  of	  things,	  and	  it	  would	  therefore	  be	  unnatural	  to	  separate	  
things	  and	  events.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  this	  relationship	  between	  individuals,	  types,	  images	  and	  situations,	  
Evans	  argues	  that,	  
A	  situation	  is	  comprised	  of	  a	  series	  of	  images.	  	  Hence,	  and	  as	  with	  an	  image,	  a	  situation	  may	  consist	  of	  a	  relatively	  
stable	  set	  of	  individuals	  and	  types.	  	  The	  difference	  is	  that	  a	  situation,	  while	  occupying	  a	  relatively	  constant	  region	  of	  
space,	  is	  dynamic,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  entities	  may	  interact	  and	  move	  around,	  and	  there	  is	  change	  over	  time.	  	  For	  
instance,	  a	  situation	  might	  involve	  a	  person	  approaching	  the	  sofa,	  sitting	  down,	  turning	  their	  head	  to	  look	  at	  the	  
picture	  on	  the	  wall,	  turning	  their	  head	  away	  again,	  sitting	  for	  a	  while	  before	  getting	  up	  and	  moving	  away	  from	  the	  
sofa.	  
(Evans	  2009:	  197)	  
Having	  briefly	  provided	  an	  overview	  of	  Evans’	  notion	  of	  images,	  situations	  and	  events,	  it	  is	  now	  
possible	  to	  explore	  how	  these	  elements	  could	  relate	  to	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  
both	  the	  Muslim	  and	  the	  Christian	  language	  presuppose	  rich	  networks	  of	  things	  and	  events	  in	  their	  
language.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  things,	  such	  as	  God,	  heaven	  and	  hell	  there	  are	  some	  key	  similarities	  in	  their	  
attributes,	  and	  of	  course	  some	  key	  differences.	  	  However,	  I	  will	  argue	  below	  that	  the	  biggest	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differences	  are	  to	  be	  found	  not	  in	  the	  attributes	  of	  things	  or	  situations	  in	  general,	  but	  in	  the	  episodic	  
situations	  that	  relate	  specifically	  to	  an	  interaction	  between	  a	  	  divine	  entity	  and	  the	  individual	  believer.	  	  
I	  will	  also	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  these	  differences	  that	  primarily	  account	  for	  the	  foregrounding	  of	  the	  
affective	  dimension	  in	  the	  language	  of	  some	  Evangelical	  Christians	  and	  the	  backgrounding	  of	  such	  
language	  in	  the	  conservative	  Muslim	  believers	  I	  examined.	  	  	  	  	  
I	  have	  consistently	  argued	  in	  the	  last	  two	  chapters	  that	  the	  evidence	  from	  the	  testimonials	  and	  from	  
the	  discussions	  in	  most	  cases	  supports	  the	  view	  that	  the	  conservative	  Muslim	  believers	  use	  language	  
that	  tends	  to	  put	  less	  emphasis	  on	  the	  believer	  being	  close	  to	  the	  divine	  entity.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  
evidence	  supports	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  believer	  may	  move	  towards	  the	  divine	  entity,	  but	  the	  divine	  
entity	  does	  not	  move	  towards	  the	  believer.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  evidence	  from	  the	  testimonials	  and	  the	  
discussions	  in	  most	  cases	  supports	  the	  view	  that	  the	  Evangelical	  Christian	  believers	  use	  language	  that	  
tends	  to	  put	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  believer	  being	  close	  to	  the	  divine	  entity.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  
evidence	  also	  supports	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  divine	  entity	  may	  move	  towards	  the	  believer	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  notion	  that	  the	  believer	  may	  move	  towards	  the	  divine	  entity.	  It	  is	  of	  course	  possible	  to	  describe	  
these	  differences	  in	  terms	  of	  foregrounding	  particular	  attributes	  or	  values	  of	  the	  individual	  thing,	  
namely	  the	  divine	  entity,	  being	  discussed.	  	  According	  to	  Evans	  (2009:	  200),	  attributes	  can	  be	  defined	  
as	  “one	  aspect	  of	  the	  larger	  whole”,	  while	  values	  can	  be	  described	  as	  “subtypes	  of	  attributes”.	  	  An	  
example	  of	  foregrounding	  specific	  attributes	  of	  the	  divine	  entity	  could	  include	  emphasising	  the	  
aspect	  of	  absolute	  otherness	  over	  emotional	  warmth,	  or	  vice	  versa.	  However,	  it	  is	  often	  more	  natural	  
to	  depict	  these	  differences	  through	  the	  construction	  of	  images	  that	  make	  up	  particular	  episodic	  
situations,	  for	  example,	  indicating	  intimacy	  through	  the	  use	  of	  language	  such	  as,	  “Oh	  for	  a	  closer	  
walk	  with	  Christ”	  (CT9)	  or	  “Jesus	  is	  knocking	  at	  the	  door	  of	  your	  heart”	  (CB2).	  	  	  Such	  attributes,	  even	  
when	  unstated,	  may	  also	  be	  inferred	  from	  how	  certain	  images	  are	  constructed	  (for	  example,	  the	  
tendency	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  abstract	  belief	  system	  instead	  of	  the	  perceived	  concrete	  entity	  by	  using	  
phrases	  like	  “following	  Islam”	  more	  often	  than	  “following	  God”,	  or,	  conversely,	  the	  tendency	  to	  talk	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about	  the	  perceived	  concrete	  entity	  rather	  than	  the	  abstract	  belief	  system	  by	  using	  phrases	  like	  
“following	  Christ”	  more	  often	  than	  “following	  Christianity”).	  	  	  
It	  is	  when	  we	  discuss	  such	  images	  in	  this	  context	  that	  we	  see	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  
the	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  language	  in	  these	  discussions.	  	  It	  takes	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  time	  to	  
describe	  God	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  attributes	  of,	  for	  example,	  being	  more	  distant	  or	  more	  intimate,	  but	  
when	  we	  describe	  that	  difference	  in	  terms	  of	  episodic	  situations	  between	  the	  divine	  entity	  and	  the	  
believer,	  we	  see	  that	  there	  is	  a	  higher	  number	  of	  images	  with	  a	  greater	  richness	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  
episodic	  situations	  in	  the	  Christian	  language	  and	  less	  detail	  in	  the	  images	  in	  the	  Muslim	  language.	  	  
For	  example,	  in	  just	  a	  small	  extract	  of	  CB2’s	  language	  (p1l67-­‐80),	  he	  uses	  a	  rich	  tapestry	  of	  imagistic	  
language	  when	  he	  describes	  his	  experience	  of	  choosing	  to	  become	  and	  then	  continuing	  as	  a	  Christian.	  	  
This	  includes:	  “the	  presence	  of	  God	  in	  my	  life”	  three	  times,	  a	  “relationship	  with	  God”,	  Jesus	  knocking	  
at	  the	  door	  of	  a	  Christian’s	  heart	  and	  waiting	  to	  be	  invited	  into	  a	  Christian’s	  life,	  and	  his	  description	  
“the	  Holy	  Spirit	  like	  lives	  in	  you,	  once	  you	  invite	  God	  into	  your	  life,	  the	  Holy	  Spirit	  dwells	  in	  you,	  and	  
in	  every	  Christian,	  once	  you	  invite	  God	  into	  your	  life	  he	  actually	  takes	  up	  home	  in	  your	  life	  kind	  of	  
thing”.	  	  In	  contrast,	  there	  are	  very	  few	  situations	  that	  relate	  to	  MB2’s	  specific	  interaction	  with	  a	  
divine	  entity	  beyond	  the	  more	  generic	  situation	  of	  a	  cycle	  of	  asking	  for	  and	  receiving	  forgiveness.	  
In	  terms	  of	  these	  images,	  I	  have	  consistently	  argued	  for	  two	  general	  patterns.	  	  The	  Christian	  
testimonials	  and	  discussions	  contain	  language	  that	  exhibits	  greater	  explicitness	  and	  concreteness	  in	  
terms	  of	  images	  of	  interaction	  between	  the	  believer	  and	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  There	  is	  also	  a	  higher	  
frequency	  of	  language	  that	  depicts	  the	  believer	  and	  the	  divine	  entity	  in	  those	  images	  as	  being	  
physically	  closer	  and	  more	  intimate,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  higher	  frequency	  of	  language	  that	  relates	  to	  the	  
divine	  entity	  acting	  on	  the	  believer.	  My	  intention	  at	  this	  point	  is	  not	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  Christian	  
language	  is	  primarily	  imagistic	  and	  episodic	  while	  the	  Muslim	  language	  is	  primarily	  related	  to	  entities.	  	  
Instead,	  my	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  language	  both	  describe	  individual	  entities	  
(such	  as	  God,	  heaven,	  hell,	  their	  sacred	  texts,	  etc.)	  and	  episodic	  and	  generic	  situations	  (such	  as	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reading	  their	  sacred	  text	  and	  following	  its	  guidelines)	  related	  to	  their	  religious	  experience	  according	  
to	  a	  similar	  format	  and	  principle,	  despite	  some	  fundamental	  disagreements.	  However,	  when	  it	  comes	  
to	  describing	  episodic	  situations	  relating	  to	  interaction	  between	  the	  individual	  believer	  and	  a	  divine	  
entity,	  the	  Christian	  language	  generally	  makes	  use	  of	  images	  that	  are	  more	  frequent,	  explicit,	  
concrete	  and	  richer	  in	  detail,	  and	  which	  depict	  the	  believer	  as	  more	  passive.	  	  
I	  have	  now	  devoted	  a	  sizeable	  part	  of	  this	  section	  to	  locating	  my	  conclusions	  concerning	  my	  analysis	  
of	  the	  testimonials	  and	  the	  discussions	  within	  a	  cognitive	  linguistic	  framework	  of	  things	  and	  events.	  	  I	  
now	  intend	  to	  move	  towards	  justifying	  this	  effort	  and	  explaining	  its	  wider	  psychological	  significance,	  
but	  first	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  explore	  why	  this	  framework	  may	  appear	  controversial	  to	  some	  researchers.	  	  
I	  will	  begin	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  arguments	  proposed	  by	  certain	  researchers	  interested	  in	  social	  and	  
cognitive	  psychology	  that	  religious	  believers	  may	  be	  categorised	  as	  either	  emphasising	  elements	  of	  a	  
more	  universalistic	  doctrinal	  mode	  or	  a	  more	  individual	  and	  affective	  imagistic	  mode.	  	  The	  
conclusions	  of	  this	  bifurcation	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  religious	  belief	  will	  then	  be	  carried	  over	  into	  my	  
consideration	  of	  a	  second	  theory	  of	  dual	  modes	  of	  processing	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  perception	  of	  
directly	  experiencing	  or	  “feeling”	  an	  object	  of	  belief	  (the	  experiential	  system	  of	  processing)	  on	  the	  
one	  hand	  and	  constructing	  belief	  from	  conclusions	  drawn	  from	  a	  network	  of	  arguments	  that	  are	  
perceived	  to	  be	  irrefutably	  logical	  (the	  rational	  system	  of	  processing)	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  (Epstein	  and	  
Pacini	  1999).	  	  	  
As	  I	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  two,	  Evans’	  view	  that	  cognitive	  models	  consist	  of	  things	  and	  events	  relates	  
closely	  to	  theories	  from	  cognitive	  science	  relating	  to	  semantic	  and	  episodic	  memory.	  Episodic	  
memory	  relates	  to	  the	  storing	  of	  information	  as	  particular	  situations	  related	  to	  particular	  moments,	  
while	  semantic	  memory	  relates	  to	  the	  storing	  of	  information	  as	  a	  decontextualized,	  abstracted	  piece	  
of	  general	  knowledge	  (McCauley	  2005:	  xii).	  	  These	  different	  types	  of	  memory	  are	  distinct	  from	  each	  
other,	  but	  are	  viewed	  by	  many	  researchers	  as	  “processually	  connected”	  in	  that	  semantic	  memory	  is	  
seen	  as	  derived	  from	  episodic	  memory	  through	  a	  process	  of	  “abstraction	  and	  generalization”	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(Whitehouse	  2000:	  5-­‐6).	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  consistently	  focused	  on	  the	  significance	  and	  value	  of	  
episodic	  memory,	  so	  it	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  briefly	  examine	  other	  researchers	  that	  also	  share	  
this	  specific	  interest	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  episodic	  memory	  and	  the	  expression	  of	  religious	  
belief.	  	  Within	  the	  relatively	  new	  field	  of	  cognitive	  anthropology	  there	  has	  been	  a	  consistently	  strong	  
interest	  in	  how	  different	  ways	  of	  encoding	  memories	  may	  have	  a	  far	  reaching	  effect	  on	  how	  groups	  
of	  religious	  believers	  transmit	  (and	  therefore	  talk	  about)	  their	  beliefs.	  	  This	  interest	  is	  clearest	  in	  the	  
work	  of	  Whitehouse	  (2000)	  and	  his	  theory	  of	  modes	  of	  religiosity,	  which	  I	  will	  discuss	  below.	  	  	  	  	  
Whitehouse,	  in	  his	  theory	  of	  modes	  of	  religiosity,	  argues	  that	  religious	  groups	  tend	  to	  transmit	  their	  
beliefs	  through	  either	  a	  doctrinal	  mode,	  based	  around	  the	  workings	  of	  semantic	  memory,	  or	  an	  
imagistic	  mode,	  based	  around	  the	  workings	  of	  episodic	  memory	  (Whitehouse	  2000).	  	  This	  doctrinal	  
mode	  is	  characterized	  by	  “the	  frequent	  repetition	  of	  both	  ritual	  and	  dogma	  …	  expressed	  in	  language”	  
leading	  to	  a	  “continuous	  and	  stable	  influence	  on	  people’s	  attitudes,	  beliefs	  and	  actions”	  (Whitehouse	  
2000:	  9).	  	  Whitehouse	  argues	  that	  in	  this	  type	  of	  “universalistic	  ideology”,	  the	  individual	  person	  and	  
particular	  religious	  experiences	  are	  backgrounded	  in	  favour	  of	  “presumed	  commonalities	  in	  the	  
thought	  and	  behaviour	  of	  anonymous	  others,	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  which	  is	  only	  conceivable	  with	  
reference	  to	  semantic	  knowledge”	  (Whitehouse	  2000:	  10).	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  imagistic	  mode	  based	  on	  
episodic	  memory	  revolves	  around	  experiences	  that	  contain	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  emotional	  arousal,	  
“common	  identity	  among	  religious	  adherents	  in	  the	  imagistic	  mode	  is	  fundamentally	  particularistic,	  
based	  on	  lasting	  episodic	  memories	  of	  undergoing	  the	  traumatic	  lows	  and	  ecstatic	  highs	  of	  sacred	  
events	  together	  with	  a	  specifiable	  group	  of	  individuals”	  (Whitehouse	  2000:	  10).	  	  The	  features	  that	  are	  
of	  interest	  to	  my	  analysis	  relate	  to	  the	  doctrinal	  mode	  favouring	  a	  learned	  “universalistic	  ideology”	  or	  
uniform	  system	  that	  does	  not	  primarily	  revolve	  around	  an	  affective	  dimension,	  while	  the	  imagistic	  
mode	  revolves	  around	  individual	  “internally	  generated”	  experience	  and	  high	  emotional	  arousal	  
(Whitehouse	  2000:	  9-­‐10;	  Boyer	  2005:	  xiv).	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Features	  that	  are	  similar	  to	  these	  are	  also	  found	  in	  discussions	  relating	  to	  the	  application	  of	  other	  
dual	  information	  processing	  models	  from	  social	  and	  cognitive	  psychology.	  One	  of	  the	  motivations	  
behind	  the	  proposal	  of	  some	  of	  these	  models	  is	  to	  explain	  why	  “abstract	  theological	  reflection	  exists	  
side	  by	  side	  with	  intuitive	  forms	  of	  religion”	  (Tremlin	  2005:	  73).	  	  In	  his	  assessment	  of	  Whitehouse’s	  
arguments,	  Tremlin	  (2005:	  71)	  refers	  to	  one	  of	  these	  models	  -­‐	  the	  Cognitive	  Experiential	  Self-­‐Theory	  
(CEST)	  model	  proposed	  by	  Epstein	  and	  Pacini	  (1999)	  -­‐	  as	  “a	  promising	  example	  of	  dual-­‐processing-­‐
model	  building”	  in	  that	  it	  is	  able	  to	  offer	  an	  explanation	  for	  making	  a	  distinction	  between	  a	  
“theological	  level”	  that	  is	  rooted	  in	  language	  and	  “relatively	  affect-­‐free”	  and	  a	  more	  instinctive	  and	  
emotional	  “basic	  level”.	  	  Due	  to	  its	  importance	  within	  the	  field	  of	  dual-­‐processing	  models,	  its	  
importance	  to	  researchers	  investigating	  religious	  practices	  within	  the	  field	  of	  cognitive	  anthropology	  
and	  its	  relevance	  to	  the	  subject	  of	  episodic	  memory,	  it	  is	  worth	  examining	  this	  model	  in	  some	  detail.	  
Epstein	  and	  Pacini	  (1999)	  argue	  that	  religious	  believers	  can	  make	  use	  of	  two	  broad	  processing	  
systems.	  	  The	  first	  is	  a	  “rational	  system”	  that	  is	  “deliberative”,	  “reason-­‐orientated”	  and	  “capable	  of	  
high	  levels	  of	  abstraction”	  (Epstein	  and	  Pacini	  1999:	  463;	  Tremlin	  2005:	  71).	  	  Note	  that	  the	  term	  
rational	  is	  not	  being	  used	  here	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  something	  being	  regarded	  as	  universally	  logical,	  but	  in	  
the	  sense	  of	  it	  activating	  abstract	  reasoning	  processes	  in	  the	  brain	  of	  the	  believer.	  	  The	  second	  is	  an	  
“experiential	  system”	  typified	  by	  the	  sense	  that	  “experiencing	  is	  believing”.	  	  This	  system	  processes	  
and	  expresses	  information	  in	  a	  primarily	  “concrete”	  and	  “holistic”	  form	  directly	  associated	  with	  
emotions	  and	  feelings	  (Epstein	  and	  Pacini	  1999:	  463).	  	  The	  various	  differences	  between	  these	  two	  














1. Holistic	  responding	  
2. Automatic,	  effortless	  processing	  
3. Affective	  processing:	  Pleasure	  or	  pain	  orientated	  
(what	  feels	  good	  or	  bad)	  
4. Associative	  connections	  
5. Encoding	  of	  reality	  in	  concrete	  images,	  metaphors,	  
and	  narratives	  
6. More	  rapid	  processing:	  Orientated	  toward	  
immediate	  action	  
7. Slower,	  more	  difficult	  changes:	  Changes	  with	  
repetitive	  or	  intense	  experience	  
8. More	  crudely	  differentiated	  constructs:	  Broad	  
generalization	  gradient,	  stereotypical	  thinking	  
9. More	  crudely	  integrated	  and	  less	  coherent	  
networks:	  Dissociative,	  emotional	  complexes	  ;	  
context-­‐specific	  processing	  
10. Passive	  and	  preconscious	  experience	  of	  events:	  We	  
are	  seized	  by	  our	  emotions	  




1. Analytic	  responding	  
2. Intentional,	  effortful	  processing	  
3. Logical	  processing:	  Reason-­‐orientated	  (what	  can	  
be	  formulated	  as	  an	  argument)	  
4. Logical	  connections	  	  
5. Encoding	  of	  reality	  in	  abstract	  symbols,	  words,	  
and	  numbers	  
6. Slower	  processing:	  Orientated	  toward	  delayed	  
action	  
7. More	  rapid,	  easier	  changes:	  Changes	  with	  
strength	  of	  argument	  and	  new	  evidence	  
8. More	  highly	  differentiated	  constructs	  
9. More	  highly	  integrated	  and	  coherent	  networks:	  
Context-­‐general	  principles	  	  
10. Active	  and	  conscious	  experience	  of	  events:	  We	  
are	  in	  control	  of	  our	  thoughts	  
11. Need	  for	  a	  perceived	  justification	  via	  logic	  and	  
evidence	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
This	  proposed	  model	  has	  a	  number	  of	  features	  that	  are	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  verification	  from	  the	  
point	  of	  view	  of	  analysing	  language.	  	  For	  example,	  its	  insistence	  on	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  
“preconscious	  experience	  of	  events”	  and	  “conscious	  experience	  of	  events”	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	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address	  through	  any	  analysis	  of	  texts,	  and	  indeed	  may	  be	  problematic	  to	  establish	  even	  through	  
rigorous	  forms	  of	  experimentation	  (cf.	  Gibbs	  2005:	  22).	  	  However,	  there	  are	  certain	  other	  features	  
that	  an	  analysis	  of	  language	  could	  address.	  
One	  immediate	  problem	  with	  this	  dual-­‐processing	  approach	  as	  well	  as	  Whitehouse’s	  theory	  of	  
modes	  of	  religiosity,	  is	  that	  they	  suggest	  an	  either-­‐or	  situation,	  where	  religious	  belief	  is	  either	  
primarily	  reliant	  on	  an	  experiential	  or	  a	  rational	  system	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  Epstein	  and	  Pacini)	  or	  upon	  
semantic	  or	  episodic	  memory	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  Whitehouse).	  	  The	  reason	  why	  this	  is	  a	  problem	  is	  that	  
according	  to	  cognitive	  linguistic	  researchers	  such	  as	  Evans,	  cognitive	  models	  cannot	  be	  functional	  
without	  being	  constructed	  from	  networks	  consisting	  of	  both	  things	  and	  events,	  not	  primarily	  one	  or	  
the	  other.	  	  Researchers	  outside	  of	  Cognitive	  Linguistics	  have	  also	  expressed	  disagreement	  with	  this	  
either-­‐or	  situation,	  preferring	  to	  view	  processing	  modes	  as	  different	  “bundles	  of	  features”,	  where	  
certain	  features	  may	  be	  present	  and	  other	  features	  may	  not	  be,	  and	  where	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  features	  
from	  both	  modes	  co-­‐exist	  (Boyer	  2005:	  10,	  25;	  Pyysiainen	  2005:	  149).	  	  	  	  
Epstein	  and	  Pacini	  offer	  some	  support	  for	  this	  either-­‐or	  situation	  by	  pointing	  to	  experiments	  where	  
subjects	  seem	  to	  be	  simultaneously	  aware	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  both	  systems,	  but	  still	  decide	  to	  
foreground	  one	  system	  over	  the	  other.	  For	  example,	  they	  describe	  the	  following	  experiment:	  
…	  participants	  are	  given	  an	  opportunity	  to	  win	  money	  by	  blindly	  drawing	  a	  red	  jelly	  bean	  from	  one	  of	  two	  bowls	  
that	  contain	  a	  designated	  percentage	  of	  white	  and	  red	  jelly	  beans.	  	  A	  small	  bowl	  always	  contains	  1	  in	  10	  (10%)	  red	  
jelly	  beans,	  and	  a	  large	  bowl	  always	  contains	  100	  jelly	  beans,	  with	  the	  percentage	  of	  red	  jelly	  beans	  varying	  from	  5%	  
to	  10%.	  	  We	  have	  found	  that	  most	  participants	  choose	  to	  draw	  from	  the	  9%	  (large)	  rather	  than	  from	  the	  10%	  (small)	  
bowl,	  and	  that	  a	  surprisingly	  high	  number	  (nearly	  a	  quarter)	  even	  prefer	  to	  draw	  from	  the	  5%	  (large)	  bowl	  …	  
(Epstein	  and	  Pacini	  1999:	  466)	  
The	  key	  point	  to	  this	  experiment	  is	  that	  many	  of	  the	  participants	  who	  chose	  the	  larger	  bowl	  with	  
relatively	  fewer	  red	  jelly	  beans	  were	  aware	  that	  their	  choice	  was	  irrational	  and	  statistically	  
indefensible,	  but	  felt	  compelled	  to	  follow	  their	  feelings	  (ibid).	  Epstein	  and	  Pacini	  therefore	  are	  able	  to	  
argue	  that	  the	  participants	  had	  to	  make	  a	  choice	  to	  either	  follow	  a	  rational	  mode	  of	  processing	  by	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adhering	  to	  their	  knowledge	  of	  statistics,	  or	  to	  follow	  an	  experiential	  mode	  of	  processing	  by	  paying	  
more	  attention	  to	  their	  “gut	  feelings”.	  	  	  	  	  	  
However,	  it	  appears	  from	  the	  structure	  of	  this	  experiment	  that	  Epstein	  and	  Pacini’s	  rational	  and	  
experiential	  systems	  are	  different	  from	  Evans’	  individuals	  and	  types	  and	  episodic	  situations	  and	  
generic	  situations.	  	  In	  order	  to	  illustrate	  this	  point,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  analyse	  the	  difference	  that	  Epstein	  
and	  Pacini	  see	  in	  the	  thinking	  of	  the	  various	  participants.	  	  They	  view	  those	  participants	  that	  chose	  
from	  the	  smaller	  bowl	  as	  adhering	  to	  the	  objective	  principles	  of	  statistics,	  while	  they	  see	  those	  who	  
chose	  from	  the	  larger	  bowl	  as	  adhering	  to	  something	  like	  the	  vague	  feeling	  that	  “in	  real	  life	  it	  is	  
better	  to	  go	  with	  the	  bowl	  that	  offers	  more	  absolute	  chances	  to	  win”	  (ibid.).	  	  This	  is	  a	  very	  interesting	  
finding	  from	  a	  very	  interesting	  experiment,	  but	  the	  results	  are	  not	  directly	  applicable	  to	  the	  cognitive	  
linguistic	  distinction	  between	  things	  and	  events.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  the	  decision	  to	  make	  
judgements	  based	  on	  statistics	  or	  irrational	  feelings	  are	  both	  as	  much	  a	  result	  of	  personal	  evaluations	  
abstracted	  from	  past	  relevant	  episodic	  situations	  as	  they	  are	  the	  result	  of	  abstracted	  ideas	  that	  have	  
no	  grounding	  in	  any	  past	  situation	  at	  all.	  	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  essentially	  impossible	  to	  divorce	  
even	  the	  most	  seemingly	  objective	  of	  decisions	  from	  reflections	  upon	  and	  evaluations	  of	  our	  past	  
experience.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  observation	  that	  emotion	  can	  be	  a	  key	  factor	  in	  
episodic	  situations	  is	  without	  value	  for	  the	  cognitive	  linguistic	  perspective.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Evans	  has	  never	  provided	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  how	  emotions	  and	  feelings	  are	  connected	  to	  and	  
influence	  the	  form	  of	  things	  and	  events.	  	  However,	  it	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  reasonable	  to	  argue	  that	  a	  
greater	  degree	  of	  emotion	  could	  be	  attached	  to	  a	  rich	  network	  of	  specific,	  concrete-­‐like	  and	  more	  
embodied	  images	  constructed	  as	  specific	  memories,	  for	  example,	  the	  presence	  of	  X	  in	  my	  life,	  my	  
relationship	  with	  X,	  X	  knocking	  on	  the	  door	  of	  my	  heart,	  X	  coming	  into	  my	  life,	  X	  dwelling	  inside	  of	  
me,	  X	  taking	  up	  home	  within	  me,	  etc.,	  than	  a	  simple	  abstracted	  statement	  of	  an	  attribute,	  such	  as	  X	  
is	  capable	  of	  personal	  intimacy	  (cf.	  Whitehouse	  2000:	  7;	  Barrett	  2005:	  120;	  Epstein	  and	  Pacini	  1999:	  
463).	  One	  of	  the	  central	  points	  of	  Whitehouse	  and	  Epstein	  and	  Pacini	  is	  that	  personal	  memories	  of	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situations	  that	  we	  perceive	  ourselves	  to	  have	  experienced	  are	  more	  conducive	  to	  the	  affective	  
dimension	  than	  a	  list	  of	  relevant	  abstracted	  attributes.	  	  This	  is	  a	  point	  that	  should	  not	  at	  all	  conflict	  
with	  a	  cognitive	  linguistic	  perspective.	  	  If	  this	  is	  indeed	  the	  case,	  we	  should	  be	  able	  to	  predict	  that	  an	  
individual	  who	  describes	  a	  richer	  and	  more	  expansive	  network	  of	  episodic	  situations	  about	  a	  divine	  
entity	  relating	  to	  him	  or	  herself	  will	  tend	  to	  use	  more	  emotional	  language	  to	  describe	  their	  religious	  
belief	  concerning	  that	  divine	  entity.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
I	  would	  therefore	  argue	  that	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  identified	  in	  the	  language	  of	  CB2	  and	  CB3	  and	  
many	  of	  the	  Evangelical	  Times	  testimonials	  fit	  well	  with	  a	  process	  of	  being	  attracted	  to	  encoding	  
religious	  belief	  through	  a	  richer	  network	  of	  images	  and	  episodic	  situations	  relating	  to	  the	  believer	  
and	  a	  divine	  entity.	  I	  would	  also	  want	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  both	  causes	  and	  is	  caused	  by	  an	  increased	  
emphasis	  on	  the	  affective	  dimension	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  focus	  on	  what	  feels	  good	  or	  bad	  and	  an	  emphasis	  
on	  love	  and	  intimacy	  that	  was	  repeatedly	  emphasised	  to	  an	  unusually	  high	  degree	  in	  the	  language	  of	  
CB2,	  CB3	  and	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  Christian	  testimonials.	  
In	  point	  5	  in	  Epstein	  and	  Pacini’s	  table	  (table	  15	  above),	  they	  refer	  to	  the	  experiential	  system	  
encoding	  language	  in	  terms	  of	  concrete	  images	  and	  metaphor.	  	  Again,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  it	  would	  be	  
more	  accurate	  to	  propose	  that	  richer	  networks	  of	  images	  and	  episodic	  situations	  inevitably	  involve	  
drawing	  on	  a	  higher	  frequency	  of	  metaphorical	  language.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  gives	  such	  language	  the	  
appearance	  of	  being	  more	  concrete	  because	  metaphor	  draws	  on	  more	  concrete	  and	  physical	  source	  
domains	  in	  order	  to	  describe	  more	  abstract	  situations.	  
It	  should	  also	  be	  no	  surprise	  that	  the	  perception	  of	  these	  images	  and	  episodic	  situations	  relating	  to	  a	  
divine	  entity	  and	  the	  believer	  also	  involve	  a	  higher	  frequency	  of	  language	  relating	  to	  the	  believer	  
perceiving	  him	  or	  herself	  as	  passive	  and	  acted	  on.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  a	  plethora	  of	  images	  
and	  episodic	  situations	  relating	  to	  a	  divine	  entity	  and	  a	  believer	  presuppose	  the	  perception	  that	  a	  
divine	  entity	  is	  often	  breaking	  into	  the	  daily	  life	  and	  experience	  of	  the	  believer.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  entity	  
is	  always	  portrayed	  as	  exponentially	  more	  powerful	  than	  the	  believer	  it	  should	  not	  surprise	  us	  that	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there	  is	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  language	  relating	  to	  the	  entity	  as	  the	  active	  object	  and	  the	  believer	  as	  the	  
subject.	  	  This	  would	  account	  for	  point	  10	  in	  the	  experiential	  system	  in	  table	  15,	  as	  well	  as	  going	  some	  
way	  towards	  explaining	  the	  higher	  frequency	  of	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  metaphors	  in	  CB3	  and	  the	  
Evangelical	  Times	  testimonials	  (in	  addition	  to	  the	  operationalizing	  of	  specific	  doctrinal	  beliefs).	  	  	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  above	  points,	  I	  have	  argued	  throughout	  my	  analysis	  of	  CB2	  and	  CB3	  and	  the	  
Evangelical	  Times	  testimonials	  that	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  sense	  that	  belief	  and	  certainty	  are	  based	  on	  
perceived	  experience	  rather	  than	  theoretical	  arguments.	  	  Epstein	  and	  Pacini	  (1999:	  473)	  explicitly	  
relate	  this	  to	  their	  experiential	  system	  (point	  11	  in	  table	  15	  above).	  	  They	  argue	  that	  in	  the	  
experiential	  system,	  reality	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  directly	  appropriated	  through	  feelings	  and	  senses,	  
while	  in	  the	  rational	  system,	  the	  truth	  about	  reality	  is	  built	  up	  through	  processes	  of	  reasoning	  and	  
interpreting	  evidence.	  	  Some	  evidence	  for	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  CB2	  and	  CB3	  where	  
certainty	  appears	  to	  be	  based	  on	  the	  perceived	  reality	  of	  “the	  presence	  of	  God”	  or	  “being	  moved	  by	  
the	  Spirit”	  rather	  than	  a	  conclusion	  drawn	  from	  any	  form	  of	  logical	  inference.	  However,	  from	  a	  
cognitive	  linguistic	  perspective	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  create	  an	  either-­‐or	  situation	  here,	  but	  simply	  to	  
point	  out	  that	  CB2	  and	  CB3	  are	  placing	  a	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  inferences	  drawn	  from	  images	  and	  
episodic	  situations	  and	  therefore	  their	  language	  about	  their	  religious	  beliefs	  inevitably	  revolves	  more	  
around	  specific	  perceived	  memories	  or	  experiences	  than	  it	  does	  around	  abstracted	  items	  of	  belief.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	  contrast,	  the	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  in	  the	  language	  of	  CB1,	  the	  Muslim	  discussion	  participants	  and	  
the	  islamfortoday.com	  testimonials	  fit	  better	  with	  a	  process	  of	  expressing	  abstract	  notions	  such	  as	  
human	  responsibility,	  justness	  and	  fairness.	  	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  achieved	  partially	  through	  a	  
reduced	  focus	  on	  networks	  of	  images	  and	  episodic	  situations	  relating	  to	  interaction	  between	  the	  
believer	  and	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  I	  have	  noted	  that	  the	  language	  of	  MB1,	  MB2	  and	  MB3	  has	  a	  weaker	  
emphasis	  on	  words	  relating	  to	  the	  expression	  of	  intense	  emotion	  and	  feelings	  between	  the	  believer	  
and	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  Epstein	  and	  Pacini	  would	  want	  to	  claim	  that	  this	  weaker	  emphasis	  fits	  with	  the	  
encoding	  of	  reality	  primarily	  through	  a	  rational	  system	  that	  is	  “relatively	  affect-­‐free”	  (Epstein	  and	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Pacini	  1999:	  463).	  	  However,	  from	  a	  cognitive	  linguistic	  perspective,	  it	  is	  sufficient	  to	  account	  for	  this	  
difference	  by	  simply	  pointing	  to	  the	  smaller	  number	  of	  images	  and	  episodic	  situations	  relating	  to	  
interaction	  between	  the	  divine	  entity	  and	  the	  believer.	  	  As	  I	  argued	  above,	  the	  word	  love	  when	  used	  
to	  describe	  a	  feeling	  directed	  from	  the	  believer	  towards	  the	  divine	  entity	  or	  vice	  versa	  is	  a	  strong	  
indication	  of	  emotion	  being	  intertwined	  with	  religious	  belief.	  	  CB2	  used	  the	  word	  in	  this	  way	  nine	  
times	  and	  CB3	  used	  it	  thirteen	  times,	  but	  MB1,	  MB2,	  and	  MB3	  lacked	  the	  potential	  opportunities	  to	  
use	  the	  word	  because	  of	  their	  far	  smaller	  number	  of	  episodic	  situations	  relating	  to	  interaction	  
between	  a	  divine	  entity	  and	  a	  believer.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  re-­‐iterate	  the	  point	  that	  I	  am	  not	  
arguing	  that	  the	  Muslim	  believers	  are	  not	  interested	  in	  expressing	  episodic	  situations	  per	  se	  –	  the	  
discussions	  contain	  numerous	  references	  by	  the	  Muslim	  participants	  to	  personal	  situations.	  	  My	  
point	  is	  that	  the	  Muslim	  language	  simply	  exhibits	  a	  weaker	  emphasis	  on	  specific	  images	  and	  on	  
episodic	  situations	  relating	  specifically	  to	  the	  interaction	  between	  a	  divine	  entity	  and	  an	  individual	  
believer.	  	  
I	  have	  so	  far	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  among	  the	  Muslim	  participants	  to	  emphasise	  human	  
responsibility	  and	  therefore	  to	  minimise	  episodic	  situations	  describing	  interactions	  between	  a	  divine	  
entity	  and	  the	  individual	  believer.	  	  I	  have	  also	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  more	  language	  in	  the	  Christian	  
texts	  that	  appears	  to	  reflect	  the	  perception	  that	  a	  divine	  entity	  has	  broken	  into	  their	  daily	  life	  in	  
order	  to	  consistently	  interact	  with	  them,	  resulting	  in	  an	  emphasis	  on	  such	  episodic	  situations.	  	  
However,	  this	  perception	  of	  experiencing	  divine	  interaction	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  solely	  tied	  to	  the	  
operationalization	  of	  doctrinal	  belief	  and	  the	  consolidation	  of	  community	  ideas.	  	  There	  also	  appear	  to	  
be	  some	  key	  differences	  between	  individuals	  within	  the	  same	  belief	  community.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  
MB3	  (who	  comes	  from	  the	  same	  Ibadhi	  Muslim	  community	  in	  Oman	  as	  MB2)	  uses	  more	  frequent	  
and	  stronger	  relationship	  language,	  even	  to	  the	  point	  of	  describing	  her	  relationship	  with	  God	  as	  a	  
“private	  relationship”	  and	  describing	  God	  as	  always	  being	  in	  her	  heart.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  CB1	  (who	  
comes	  from	  the	  same	  Pentecostal	  Evangelical	  Christian	  community	  as	  CB2)	  avoids	  almost	  all	  
references	  to	  proximity,	  unity,	  relationship	  and	  believer-­‐as-­‐patient	  language,	  while	  also	  largely	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avoiding	  emotional	  language.	  	  Just	  as	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  religious	  systems	  and	  
leaders	  to	  encourage	  the	  foregrounding	  of	  one	  processing	  mode	  over	  another,	  I	  would	  also	  argue	  
that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  individuals	  to	  have	  particular	  attitudes,	  personal	  characteristics	  and	  personal	  
backgrounds	  that	  may	  lead	  them	  to	  also	  personally	  foreground	  one	  mode	  over	  another.	  	  	  
The	  foregrounding	  of	  a	  particular	  processing	  model	  may	  also	  be	  influenced	  by	  varying	  reactions	  to	  
different	  contexts	  and	  situations.	  Tremlin	  (2005:	  78-­‐79)	  puts	  this	  propensity	  for	  religious	  believers	  to	  
deviate	  and	  adapt	  the	  sometimes	  strict,	  orthodox	  dogma	  of	  their	  belief	  systems	  down	  to	  the	  idea	  
that	  “in	  each	  person	  there	  is	  both	  an	  “official”	  concept	  and	  an	  “implicit”	  concept	  that	  they	  can	  use”	  
in	  everyday	  life.	  	  This	  implicit	  concept	  is	  forged	  within	  the	  constant	  interaction	  and	  tension	  between,	  
on	  the	  one	  hand,	  universalistic,	  catch-­‐all	  beliefs	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  individual	  instincts,	  intuitive	  
perceptions,	  personal	  attitudes	  and	  characteristics,	  unique	  contexts	  and	  situated	  experiences.	  It	  is	  
also	  important	  to	  emphasise	  the	  relationship	  between	  these	  situated	  experiences	  and	  the	  different	  
contexts	  or	  genres	  through	  which	  believers	  describe	  these	  experiences.	  	  What	  CB1	  says	  within	  the	  
context	  of	  a	  dynamically	  unfolding	  discussion	  with	  a	  conservative	  Muslim	  may	  be	  very	  different	  from	  
what	  he	  would	  say	  if	  he	  were	  writing	  a	  testimonial	  for	  use	  by	  his	  local	  church.	  	  We	  should	  not	  forget	  
that	  taking	  part	  in	  a	  discussion	  or	  writing	  a	  testimonial	  are	  actions	  that	  would	  be	  processed	  by	  the	  
participant	  as	  episodic	  situations	  influenced	  in	  their	  own	  ways	  by	  a	  particular	  affective	  dimension,	  as	  
well	  as	  particular	  limitations	  and	  constraints	  in	  terms	  of	  format,	  style,	  timing,	  pressure,	  and	  levels	  of	  
influence	  from	  others.	  	  	  	  
I	  would	  also	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  worth	  focusing	  particularly	  on	  episodic	  situations	  because	  they	  can	  be	  
viewed	  as	  especially	  difficult	  to	  precisely	  synchronise	  between	  individuals	  from	  the	  same	  belief	  
communities.	  	  It	  appears	  to	  be	  reasonable	  to	  maintain	  that	  it	  is	  easier	  for	  religious	  leaders	  to	  monitor	  
and	  regulate	  what	  people	  theoretically	  believe	  within	  their	  community,	  but	  more	  difficult	  to	  
precisely	  monitor	  and	  regulate	  how	  people	  experience	  what	  they	  believe.	  	  It	  follows	  from	  this	  that	  
any	  religious	  community	  that	  encourages	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  rich	  network	  of	  episodic	  situations	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relating	  to	  a	  divine	  entity	  interacting	  with	  a	  believer,	  will	  probably	  exhibit	  more	  differences	  in	  belief	  
between	  individuals	  about	  that	  divine	  entity.	  	  This	  would	  go	  some	  way	  to	  explaining	  the	  wider	  
differences	  between	  the	  Christian	  participants	  compared	  to	  the	  Muslim	  participants.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
I	  would	  like	  to	  bring	  this	  chapter	  to	  a	  close	  by	  returning	  to	  my	  focus	  on	  action	  and	  relationship	  
language.	  	  I	  have	  spent	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  exploring	  the	  importance	  of	  episodic	  situations	  and	  their	  
relevance	  to	  my	  conclusions	  concerning	  the	  language	  used	  in	  the	  testimonials	  and	  the	  discussions.	  	  
However,	  what	  I	  have	  yet	  to	  mention	  is	  the	  point	  that	  episodic	  situations	  are	  in	  many	  ways	  
analogous	  to	  action	  and	  relationship	  language.	  	  Throughout	  this	  thesis,	  I	  have	  consistently	  focused	  
my	  analysis	  not	  on	  what	  religious	  people	  say	  they	  believe,	  but	  on	  how	  they	  describe	  their	  experience	  
of	  what	  they	  believe.	  	  To	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis	  has	  not	  been	  so	  much	  upon	  
specific	  individuals	  and	  abstracted	  types,	  so	  much	  as	  specific	  episodic	  situations	  expressed	  through	  
the	  religious	  believer	  acting	  on	  a	  divine	  entity	  or,	  in	  many	  cases,	  vice	  versa.	  	  I	  have	  also	  maintained	  
throughout	  this	  thesis	  that	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  can	  only	  be	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  
patterns	  of	  emphasis	  and	  not	  clear,	  fixed	  differences.	  	  The	  above	  exploration	  of	  episodic	  situations	  
and	  especially	  their	  ‘messiness’	  in	  terms	  of	  individual	  differences	  between	  members	  of	  the	  same	  
belief	  community	  further	  consolidates	  that	  belief.	  	  Further	  research	  into	  this	  area	  should	  further	  
highlight	  the	  relative	  uniqueness	  of	  each	  individual	  believer,	  despite	  the	  illusion	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  belief	  








Chapter	  Five:	  Conclusion	  
	  
I	  will	  conclude	  this	  thesis	  by	  drawing	  together	  the	  various	  analyses	  and	  discussions	  from	  each	  of	  the	  
chapters,	  in	  addition	  to	  exploring	  how	  the	  points	  raised	  by	  those	  discussions	  could	  be	  further	  
developed.	  	  I	  therefore	  begin	  by	  providing	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  chapter	  on	  cognitive	  models	  and	  
certainty	  and	  how	  it	  provided	  a	  basis	  for	  my	  analysis	  of	  both	  the	  religious	  testimonials	  and	  the	  
videoed	  discussions.	  	  After	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  analyses,	  I	  draw	  together	  all	  of	  the	  
various	  strands	  by	  exploring	  the	  various	  strategies	  that	  a	  conservative	  believer	  employs	  in	  order	  to	  
maintain	  the	  perspective	  that	  reality	  is	  simple	  and	  binary	  and	  reducible	  to	  a	  set	  of	  clear,	  fixed	  truths.	  	  
I	  then	  discuss	  how	  the	  results	  of	  these	  analyses	  could	  have	  important	  applications	  to	  the	  area	  of	  
interfaith	  dialogue	  between	  conservative	  belief	  communities,	  but	  also	  qualify	  those	  applications	  by	  
discussing	  in	  more	  detail	  why	  such	  communities	  tend	  to	  be	  highly	  resistant	  to	  dialogue.	  I	  conclude	  by	  
suggesting	  that	  further	  research	  could	  address	  the	  possibility	  of	  whether	  the	  strategies	  used	  by	  
conservative	  religious	  believers	  are	  also	  used	  by	  other	  communities	  and	  individuals	  outside	  of	  the	  
domain	  of	  conservative	  religion.	  
	  
5.1	  An	  Overview	  of	  the	  Thesis	  	  	  
This	  thesis	  began	  with	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  structure	  of	  cognitive	  models.	  	  I	  explored	  the	  
argument	  that	  even	  when	  people	  use	  seemingly	  objective	  terms,	  such	  as	  mother,	  they	  are	  selecting	  
particular	  cognitive	  models	  and	  focusing	  on	  certain	  characteristics	  of	  those	  models	  over	  other	  
characteristics	  (Lakoff	  1987;	  Taylor	  2003;	  Evans	  2009).	  	  These	  cognitive	  models	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  
different	  ways	  of	  construing	  reality	  and	  are	  seen	  within	  Cognitive	  Linguistics	  as	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  
of	  how	  we	  categorise	  what	  we	  see	  around	  us.	  	  I	  went	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  cognitive	  models	  also	  imply	  
certain	  premises	  about	  how	  we	  build	  up	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  that	  
241	  
	  
knowledge.	  	  First	  of	  all,	  human	  beings	  appear	  to	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  categorise	  what	  they	  
encounter.	  	  It	  is	  seemingly	  impossible	  to	  orientate	  to	  and	  successfully	  interact	  with	  the	  environment	  
without	  constructing	  networks	  of	  categories	  (Lakoff	  1987;	  Taylor	  2003).	  	  We	  also	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  
often	  view	  our	  category	  choices	  as	  obviously	  correct	  and	  self-­‐evidently	  true,	  or	  at	  least	  “feel	  the	  
pressure	  to	  pick	  one	  model	  as	  being	  the	  right	  one”	  (Lakoff	  1987:75).	  	  Human	  beings	  also	  often	  feel	  
the	  need	  to	  disagree	  with	  the	  choices	  of	  others,	  as	  well	  as	  use	  arguments	  to	  support	  their	  own	  
choices,	  attempt	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  superiority	  and	  justify	  their	  beliefs	  (cf.	  Lakoff	  1987:72).	  	  Such	  
arguments	  may	  appear	  (especially	  to	  the	  user)	  to	  be	  purely	  concerned	  with	  the	  uncovering	  of	  
objective	  knowledge	  about	  some	  aspect	  of	  our	  environment,	  even	  though	  their	  primary	  outcome	  is	  
often	  nothing	  more	  than	  the	  further	  consolidation	  or	  nuancing	  of	  existing	  viewpoints	  (cf.	  Mehan	  
2006;	  Wisdom	  2000).	  	  
It	  may	  be	  understandably	  controversial	  to	  many	  researchers	  to	  apply	  these	  premises	  relating	  to	  the	  
subjectivity	  of	  knowledge	  to	  our	  ideas	  about	  concrete,	  observable	  things.	  	  However,	  when	  we	  
consider	  highly	  complex,	  abstract	  networks	  of	  ideas	  such	  as	  worldviews,	  the	  notion	  of	  cognitive	  
models	  seems	  more	  difficult	  to	  resist.	  I	  argued	  that	  cognitive	  models	  appear	  to	  be	  particularly	  
suitable	  when	  we	  consider	  conservative	  religious	  worldviews,	  which	  tend	  to	  be	  built	  around	  notions	  
of	  absolute	  certainty	  and	  oversimplified,	  fixed	  views	  of	  reality.	  	  It	  also	  appears	  that	  key	  aspects	  of	  
language	  help	  belief	  communities	  maintain	  this	  perception	  of	  a	  fixed,	  concrete	  view	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
Notions	  such	  as	  the	  illusion	  of	  semantic	  unity	  suggest	  that	  words	  like	  car	  inevitably	  involve	  a	  diverse	  
range	  of	  things	  being	  encapsulated	  by	  a	  single	  basic	  category	  (Evans	  2009:207).	  	  In	  terms	  of	  
conservative	  religious	  worldviews,	  this	  illusion	  of	  semantic	  unity	  is	  at	  its	  most	  prevalent	  with	  the	  use	  
of	  abstract	  terms	  like	  non-­‐believers,	  true	  believers,	  true,	  false,	  good	  and	  evil	  that	  group	  a	  wide	  array	  
of	  judgements,	  values,	  perspectives	  and	  people	  into	  phrases	  that	  often	  appear	  to	  the	  user	  to	  be	  
simple	  and	  clearly	  bounded.	  Metaphor	  is	  another	  aspect	  of	  language	  that	  can	  be	  particularly	  
important	  in	  the	  expression	  of	  conservative	  religious	  worldviews	  and	  the	  perception	  that	  such	  
worldviews	  are	  obviously	  correct.	  	  Metaphor	  is	  ideal	  not	  just	  for	  construing	  the	  abstract	  as	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something	  concrete,	  basic	  and	  more	  tangible	  (Pragglejaz	  2007,	  Charteris-­‐Black	  2004),	  but	  also	  for	  
encoding	  certain	  presuppositions	  relating	  to	  agency	  and	  certainty.	  	  For	  example,	  If	  I	  say	  God	  brought	  
me	  to	  know	  him,	  I	  am	  already	  assuming	  beyond	  doubt	  that	  there	  is	  a	  God,	  and	  that	  he	  is	  clearly	  both	  
male	  and	  personally	  interested	  in	  me,	  and	  that	  he	  is	  capable	  of	  and	  willing	  to	  break	  into	  my	  life	  and	  
compel	  me	  to	  change	  my	  ideas	  about	  the	  world.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	  order	  to	  further	  explore	  my	  interest	  in	  applying	  the	  notion	  of	  cognitive	  models	  to	  the	  area	  of	  
certainty	  and	  conservative	  religious	  worldviews,	  I	  therefore	  chose	  to	  focus	  on	  metaphorical	  language.	  	  
I	  also	  chose	  to	  further	  narrow	  my	  focus	  by	  concentrating	  on	  movement	  and	  proximity	  metaphors	  in	  
conservative	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  testimonials.	  I	  was	  particularly	  interested	  in	  these	  types	  of	  
metaphors	  and	  the	  genre	  of	  the	  religious	  testimonials	  because	  I	  wanted	  to	  avoid	  revolving	  my	  
analysis	  around	  theoretical	  doctrinal	  beliefs	  and	  instead	  focus	  on	  action	  and	  relationship	  language,	  or	  
language	  relating	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  believing.	  	  This	  follows	  the	  premise	  that	  certainty	  is	  not	  
primarily	  derived	  from	  the	  acceptance	  of	  theoretical	  arguments,	  but	  from	  the	  way	  we	  express	  and	  
interpret	  relevant	  personal	  experiences.	  	  My	  first	  intention	  was	  therefore	  to	  explore	  the	  possibility	  
that	  a	  sense	  of	  certainty	  could	  be	  located	  in	  the	  seemingly	  self-­‐evident	  assumptions	  that	  needed	  to	  
be	  made	  in	  order	  for	  an	  individual’s	  language	  about	  their	  experience	  to	  make	  sense.	  	  A	  second	  
intention	  was	  also	  to	  collect	  evidence	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  when	  the	  language	  used	  by	  individual	  
believers	  was	  compared,	  it	  would	  provide	  evidence	  that	  the	  differences	  were	  not	  as	  clear	  and	  fixed	  
as	  the	  believers	  themselves	  might	  expect.	  	  In	  short,	  I	  was	  looking	  for	  evidence	  for	  or	  against	  the	  ideas	  
that	  firstly,	  human	  beings	  often	  feel	  self-­‐evidently	  certain	  about	  the	  choices	  they	  make	  with	  regard	  
to	  cognitive	  models	  and	  secondly,	  that	  reality	  is	  often	  more	  complex	  and	  category	  resistant	  than	  we	  
often	  perceive	  it	  to	  be.	  I	  also	  hoped	  that	  this	  analysis	  would	  lead	  to	  some	  application	  to	  the	  field	  of	  
inter-­‐faith	  dialogue,	  particularly	  between	  the	  religions	  of	  Christianity	  and	  Islam.	  
What	  I	  found	  was	  that	  both	  the	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  testimonials	  were	  rich	  in	  movement	  and	  
proximity	  metaphors	  that	  construed	  the	  abstract	  process	  of	  belief	  as	  something	  basic,	  concrete	  and	  
243	  
	  
tangible.	  	  However,	  I	  found	  key	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  types	  of	  texts	  in	  their	  patterns	  of	  
emphasis	  relating	  to	  agency,	  intimacy	  and	  affective	  language.	  	  The	  evidence	  suggested	  that	  the	  
Muslim	  texts	  tended	  to	  derive	  a	  sense	  of	  certainty	  from	  more	  frequent	  references	  to	  the	  
responsibility	  of	  the	  individual	  believer	  and	  his	  or	  her	  own	  journey	  of	  research	  and	  reflection.	  	  In	  
contrast,	  the	  Christian	  texts	  tended	  to	  derive	  a	  sense	  of	  certainty	  from	  more	  frequent	  references	  to	  
the	  idea	  of	  being	  acted	  on	  by	  a	  divine	  entity,	  perceived	  as	  more	  consistently	  breaking	  into	  their	  daily	  
life.	  	  I	  also	  found	  it	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  these	  differences	  were	  not	  absolute,	  but	  could	  only	  be	  
derived	  from	  comparing	  total	  frequencies	  of	  particular	  patterns	  of	  metaphor	  use	  across	  a	  sizeable	  
sample	  of	  texts.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  was	  that,	  despite	  the	  existence	  of	  general	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  
across	  the	  two	  collections	  of	  texts,	  there	  was	  still	  a	  large	  degree	  of	  variation	  between	  the	  individual	  
testimonials.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  Muslim	  texts	  I	  identified	  a	  lower	  frequency	  of	  language	  that	  related	  
to	  intimate,	  relationship	  language	  relating	  to	  the	  believer	  and	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  This	  even	  extended	  to	  
a	  very	  infrequent	  use	  (compared	  to	  the	  Christian	  texts)	  of	  phrases	  like	  follow	  God,	  and	  the	  more	  
frequent	  use	  of	  more	  impersonal	  phrases	  like	  follow	  Islam.	  	  In	  contrast,	  I	  found	  language	  related	  to	  
intimate	  personal	  relationships	  far	  more	  frequent	  in	  the	  Christian	  texts,	  and	  very	  few	  occurrences	  of	  
phrases	  like	  follow	  Christianity.	  	  This	  led	  me	  to	  suggest	  that,	  in	  the	  Muslim	  texts,	  there	  was	  a	  
connection	  between	  an	  emphasis	  on	  human	  responsibility	  and	  the	  perception	  that	  truth	  could	  be	  
arrived	  at	  through	  rational	  thought	  and	  reflection.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  went	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  the	  low	  
frequency	  of	  language	  relating	  to	  intimate	  contact	  and	  proximity	  between	  the	  believer	  and	  a	  divine	  
entity	  because	  this	  contact	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  compromising	  the	  notion	  of	  total	  human	  
responsibility.	  This	  is	  a	  very	  “tidy”	  set	  of	  observations	  and	  extrapolations	  that	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  textual	  
evidence	  in	  their	  favour.	  	  However,	  if	  we	  focus	  in	  on	  particular	  individuals,	  we	  soon	  discover	  marked	  
irregularities.	  	  For	  example,	  consider	  the	  Muslim	  testimonial	  below:	  	  
I’ve	  heard	  Christians	  say	  that	  with	  Christianity	  you	  “know	  God	  on	  a	  personal	  level”.	  In	  Islam,	  your	  relationship	  with	  
God	  is	  so	  much	  deeper	  than	  that.	  	  God	  is	  with	  me	  every	  moment,	  guiding	  me,	  teaching	  me,	  loving	  me,	  protecting	  
me,	  liberating	  me,	  enlightening	  me,	  comforting	  me	  …	  	  (MT8)	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This	  Muslim	  Testimonial	  author	  appears	  to	  be	  making	  the	  point	  that	  Islam	  should	  not	  just	  match	  the	  
language	  of	  intimacy	  and	  proximity	  used	  by	  Christians,	  but	  should	  intensify	  it.	  	  These	  kinds	  of	  
examples	  should	  not	  lead	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  uncovering	  of	  general	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  
should	  be	  avoided.	  	  Such	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  should	  still	  be	  viewed	  as	  invaluable	  in	  allowing	  
researchers	  to	  develop	  a	  working	  understanding	  of	  a	  particular	  belief	  community.	  	  However,	  such	  
examples	  do	  highlight	  the	  fact	  that	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  individual’s	  experience,	  there	  may	  rarely	  be	  
total	  alignment	  with	  established	  general	  patterns	  of	  emphasis.	  	  	  
This	  could	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  area	  of	  interfaith	  dialogue,	  where	  there	  can	  often	  be	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  
conflicting	  doctrinal	  differences	  between	  different	  belief	  communities.	  	  This	  focus	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  
community	  may	  conceal	  the	  possible	  wide-­‐ranging	  implications	  for	  interfaith	  dialogue	  of	  analysing	  
the	  differences	  between	  the	  personal	  experiences	  of	  individuals	  within	  the	  same	  community.	  	  If	  we	  
were	  to	  observe	  that	  there	  were	  key	  differences	  between	  the	  personal	  experiences	  of	  two	  
Evangelical	  Christians	  within	  the	  same	  belief	  community,	  this	  may,	  for	  example,	  influence	  how	  we	  
frame	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  key	  differences	  between	  an	  Evangelical	  Christian	  and	  a	  Sunni	  Muslim.	  	  It	  is	  
now	  therefore	  possible	  to	  see	  why	  relying	  purely	  on	  a	  search	  for	  general	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  
between	  two	  collections	  of	  texts	  belonging	  to	  different	  religious	  communities	  could	  be	  limiting.	  
Another	  obvious	  limitation	  of	  my	  analysis	  of	  testimonials	  was	  that	  it	  focused	  on	  the	  expression	  of	  
experience	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  a	  single	  genre.	  	  I	  was	  therefore	  also	  very	  interested	  to	  see	  whether	  
the	  general	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  that	  I	  had	  observed	  in	  the	  testimonials	  would	  also	  be	  visible	  if	  I	  
switched	  my	  focus	  to	  the	  very	  different	  genre	  of	  the	  unplanned	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  discussion.	  	  What	  could	  
be	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  pressure	  to	  immediately	  respond	  to	  another	  discourse	  participant	  in	  a	  
dynamically	  unfolding	  conversation,	  or	  the	  pull	  to	  empathise	  or	  to	  disagree	  and	  win	  an	  argument	  
with	  that	  participant?	  Could	  focusing	  religious	  believers	  on	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  (instead	  
of	  theoretical	  doctrinal	  differences)	  encourage	  them	  to	  empathise	  with	  each	  other’s	  viewpoints?	  In	  
order	  to	  therefore	  further	  address	  these	  areas,	  I	  followed	  up	  my	  analysis	  of	  testimonials	  with	  an	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analysis	  of	  videoed	  discussions	  between	  individual	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  believers.	  	  These	  discussions	  
revolved	  around	  some	  of	  the	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  that	  I	  had	  encountered	  in	  the	  different	  
patterns	  of	  emphasis,	  such	  as	  find,	  follow,	  come	  and	  guide.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  being	  able	  to	  take	  a	  closer	  
look	  at	  differences	  between	  individuals	  and	  genres,	  I	  was	  also	  able	  to	  test	  to	  see	  if	  the	  patterns	  of	  
emphasis	  could	  be	  confirmed	  when	  looking	  at	  believers	  from	  other	  conservative	  Muslim	  and	  
Christian	  communities	  outside	  of	  islamfortoday.com	  and	  the	  Evangelical	  Times.	  	  	  
The	  results	  of	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  discussions	  were	  predictably	  “messy”.	  	  CB2	  and	  CB3	  (Christian	  
Believers	  2	  and	  3)	  reproduced	  many	  of	  the	  key	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  highlighted	  in	  the	  testimonial	  
analysis	  and	  also	  explicitly	  related	  them	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  personal	  certainty,	  while	  CB1	  reproduced	  very	  
few	  of	  the	  patterns.	  	  MB1,	  MB2	  and	  MB3	  (Muslim	  Believers	  1,2	  and	  3)	  all	  reproduced	  some	  of	  the	  
key	  patterns	  of	  emphasis,	  but	  MB3	  also	  included	  seemingly	  intimate	  relationship	  language	  that	  
appeared	  close	  to	  one	  of	  the	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  found	  in	  the	  Christian	  testimonials.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  
the	  focus	  on	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  encouraging	  empathy,	  I	  found	  several	  examples	  where	  
action	  and	  relationship	  language	  was	  either	  not	  being	  appropriated	  by	  the	  other,	  or	  was	  being	  
appropriated	  seemingly	  for	  purposes	  of	  “winning”	  a	  point.	  	  I	  also	  found	  two	  examples	  where	  
personal	  stories	  or	  scenarios	  were	  used	  that	  presupposed	  ideas	  that	  the	  other	  participant	  would	  
have	  strongly	  disagreed	  with.	  	  In	  the	  first	  example,	  CB1	  presented	  an	  imagined	  scenario	  that	  would	  
only	  have	  made	  sense	  if	  it	  was	  presupposed	  that	  MB1	  was	  vulnerable	  and	  easily	  led	  astray	  in	  terms	  
of	  false	  religious	  ideas.	  	  In	  the	  second	  example,	  CB3	  told	  a	  story	  about	  a	  visit	  to	  a	  Mosque	  in	  order	  to	  
preach	  the	  gospel	  that	  would	  only	  have	  made	  sense	  if	  it	  was	  presupposed	  that	  CB3	  had	  direct	  access	  
to	  the	  truth	  but	  Muslims	  did	  not.	  	  
However,	  I	  did	  also	  discover	  possible	  signs	  of	  empathetic	  language.	  	  I	  encountered	  examples	  where	  
the	  participants	  used	  language	  suggesting	  similarity	  between	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  beliefs	  that	  would	  
probably	  appear	  very	  out	  of	  place	  in	  the	  language	  of	  testimonials.	  	  I	  also	  found	  an	  example	  where	  a	  
Christian	  participant	  (CB2)	  drew	  a	  parallel	  between	  his	  experience	  of	  relating	  to	  God	  and	  the	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Muslim’s	  experience	  in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  particular	  point	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  meeting	  with	  other	  
believers.	  	  I	  argued	  that	  this	  example	  was	  particularly	  interesting	  because	  it	  only	  made	  sense	  if	  the	  
Christian	  and	  the	  Muslim	  both	  assumed	  the	  possibility	  that	  their	  experiences	  were	  similar.	  	  This	  
assumption	  of	  a	  degree	  of	  shared	  experience	  is	  not	  an	  assumption	  that	  individual	  conservative	  
religious	  believers	  normally	  operate	  with,	  so	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  situation	  of	  being	  involved	  in	  a	  
face-­‐to-­‐face	  discussion	  had	  something	  influence	  here.	  	  
Having	  provided	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  possible	  interaction	  between	  cognitive	  models	  and	  certainty	  and	  
the	  results	  of	  the	  analysis	  of	  both	  the	  testimonials	  and	  the	  discussions,	  it	  is	  now	  possible	  for	  me	  to	  
draw	  together	  some	  key	  strands.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  conservative	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  belief,	  both	  the	  
analysis	  of	  the	  testimonials	  and	  the	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  discussions	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  illustrations	  of	  the	  
theory	  that	  at	  least	  certain	  groups	  of	  people	  can	  regard	  their	  choices	  of	  cognitive	  models	  and	  aspects	  
within	  those	  models	  as	  self-­‐evidently	  correct.	  	  The	  authors	  of	  the	  testimonials	  and	  the	  participants	  in	  
the	  discussion	  may	  have	  located	  their	  certainty	  in	  different	  aspects	  of	  their	  experience,	  but	  the	  point	  
is	  that	  their	  use	  of	  language	  did	  suggest	  that	  they	  were	  all	  certain	  about	  their	  beliefs.	  	  The	  language	  I	  
analysed	  also	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  illustrating	  the	  notion	  that	  people	  can	  view	  the	  choices	  of	  others	  as	  
clearly	  wrong	  and	  misguided.	  However,	  these	  findings	  are	  hardly	  surprising	  and	  could	  probably	  be	  
lifted	  from	  any	  surface	  analysis	  of	  conservative	  Muslim	  and	  Christian	  language.	  	  	  My	  discussion	  of	  the	  
results	  has	  gone	  a	  step	  further	  by	  arguing	  that	  that	  this	  sense	  of	  certainty	  originates	  from	  different	  
aspects	  of	  the	  believers’	  cognitive	  models.	  	  I	  have	  also	  argued	  that	  this	  sense	  is	  also	  primarily	  tied	  to	  
how	  believers	  perceive	  and	  interact	  with	  the	  episodic	  information	  that	  they	  store	  in	  their	  minds.	  	  
What	  I	  mean	  by	  this	  is	  that	  certainty	  is	  not	  primarily	  located	  in	  a	  belief	  in	  theoretical	  doctrinal	  beliefs	  
(the	  things	  they	  believe	  in),	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  way	  that	  they	  perceive	  and	  cognitively	  structure	  the	  
situations	  they	  experience.	  	  
This	  brings	  me	  back	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  and	  the	  view	  that	  such	  
language	  is	  intimately	  connected	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  storing	  memories	  as	  a	  series	  of	  episodic	  situations	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consisting	  of	  connected	  images	  of	  things	  and	  entities.	  	  For	  example,	  during	  the	  discussions,	  CB2	  
states	  that	  his	  sense	  of	  certainty	  is	  based	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  inviting	  God	  to	  “come	  into	  my	  life	  and	  
a	  have	  a	  relationship”	  with	  him,	  resulting	  in	  “the	  presence	  of	  God	  in	  my	  life”.	  	  Another	  example	  is	  
MB3	  stating	  that	  her	  certainty	  is	  based	  on	  “my	  religion	  because	  I	  believe	  in	  only	  one	  God	  whom	  he	  
sent	  Mohammed	  and	  the	  Quran	  to	  guide	  me	  towards	  him”.	  	  The	  key	  in	  both	  these	  examples	  is	  not	  so	  
much	  a	  static	  doctrine	  about	  the	  divine	  entity	  itself	  (God),	  but	  a	  connected	  series	  of	  perceived	  
interactive	  events	  and	  situations	  that	  consolidate	  particular	  ideas	  about	  a	  divine	  entity.	  	  These	  
connected	  situations	  also	  do	  not	  have	  to	  involve	  interaction	  with	  a	  divine	  entity,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  
they	  consolidate	  ideas	  about	  that	  divine	  entity.	  	  For	  example,	  as	  I	  argued	  in	  my	  conclusion	  to	  chapter	  
3,	  the	  Muslim	  testimonials	  displayed	  a	  pattern	  of	  emphasis	  relating	  to	  the	  believer	  going	  through	  a	  
journey	  of	  research	  and	  reflection	  that	  led	  to	  belief	  in	  Islam.	  	  Here	  again,	  a	  sense	  of	  certainty	  is	  not	  
being	  expressed	  as	  a	  static	  thing,	  but	  as	  a	  process	  of	  connected	  situations	  and	  events	  construed	  as	  a	  
journey	  or	  quest.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  her	  certainty	  was	  based	  upon,	  
MB2	  explained	  that	  at	  first	  she	  was	  just	  a	  Muslim	  because	  her	  parents	  were	  Muslim,	  but	  this	  
changed	  as	  she	  grew	  older,	  
…	  but	  later	  I	  tried	  to,	  you	  know,	  read	  behind	  the	  words	  of	  the	  Holy	  Quran,	  to	  read	  more	  books	  and	  watch	  more	  
programmes	  in	  order	  to	  know	  more	  about	  Islam,	  and	  the	  more	  I	  know,	  the	  more	  I,	  it’s	  like	  I	  feel	  like	  this	  is	  the	  right	  
thing	  in	  my	  life,	  and	  this	  is	  what	  will	  make	  me	  happy	  through	  the	  whole	  life.	  	  	  (MB2)	  
It	  is	  as	  if	  certainty	  of	  belief	  is	  not	  so	  much	  made	  up	  of	  layers	  of	  arguments,	  as	  layers	  of	  personal	  
perceptions	  and	  experiences	  that	  shape	  knowledge	  and	  the	  arguments	  derived	  from	  that	  knowledge.	  
At	  the	  centre	  of	  this	  sense	  of	  certainty	  and	  arrangement	  of	  knowledge	  is	  therefore	  the	  inescapable	  
experience	  of	  feeling	  ‘right’,	  or	  at	  least	  a	  search	  for	  such	  a	  feeling.	  	  And	  of	  course	  if	  a	  worldview	  can	  
be	  perceived	  as	  feeling	  ‘right’,	  then	  it	  often	  follows	  that	  other	  worldviews	  will	  be	  perceived	  as	  feeling	  
‘wrong’.	  	  	  
These	  points	  are	  relatively	  uncontroversial,	  but	  in	  order	  to	  get	  a	  fuller	  understanding	  of	  conservative	  
religious	  belief,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  explore	  why	  people	  need	  to	  feel	  that	  their	  worldview	  is	  right.	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Once	  I	  have	  explored	  a	  possible	  answer	  to	  this	  question,	  it	  is	  then	  possible	  to	  use	  that	  explanation	  as	  
a	  frame	  within	  which	  I	  can	  draw	  all	  the	  various	  strands	  of	  this	  thesis	  together.	  	  	  
	  
5.2	  Drawing	  the	  Strands	  Together:	  An	  Overview	  of	  the	  Strategies	  Employed	  by	  Conservative	  
Religious	  Believers	  to	  Maintain	  Certainty	  
One	  possibility	  that	  can	  be	  extrapolated	  from	  our	  incorrigible	  need	  to	  construe	  and	  categorise	  our	  
environments	  is	  that	  many	  humans	  find	  reality	  frighteningly	  complex,	  confusing	  (in	  terms	  of	  
identifying	  a	  clear,	  consistent	  purpose	  or	  reason	  for	  being)	  and	  on	  many	  levels	  beyond	  control.	  	  Some	  
process	  of	  imposing	  categories	  on	  reality	  can	  therefore	  be	  viewed	  as	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  manage	  
an	  inevitable	  degree	  of	  anxiety	  and	  allow	  the	  environment	  to	  be	  experienced,	  at	  some	  level,	  ordered,	  
purposeful	  and	  controllable.	  
However,	  it	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  language	  of	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  that	  the	  goal	  is	  not	  to	  
manage	  anxiety	  but	  to	  attempt	  to	  completely	  eliminate	  it.	  	  This	  elimination	  can	  only	  be	  achieved	  
through	  the	  imposition	  of	  absolute	  categories,	  or,	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  arriving	  at	  absolute	  truth	  
about	  key	  aspects	  of	  the	  world	  and	  our	  position	  within	  it.	  	  These	  categories	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	  
to	  provide	  answers	  to	  every	  aspect	  of	  reality,	  but	  it	  is	  crucial	  for	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  that	  
these	  categories	  at	  least	  presuppose	  that	  the	  divine	  being	  they	  are	  constructed	  around	  does	  have	  all	  
the	  answers	  and	  can	  be	  absolutely	  trusted.	  	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  in	  order	  for	  these	  categories	  or	  
cognitive	  models	  relating	  to	  that	  divine	  being	  to	  function	  effectively,	  they	  need	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  
being	  essentially	  correct	  and	  stable.	  	  If	  there	  is	  constant,	  shifting	  doubt	  about	  the	  validity	  of	  those	  
categories,	  then	  the	  believer	  will	  inevitably	  experience	  anxiety	  and	  emotional	  flux.	  	  Such	  anxiety	  and	  
flux	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  those	  categories,	  which	  will	  in	  turn	  be	  replaced	  by	  others	  that	  are	  
perceived	  as	  being	  more	  correct	  and	  stable.	  	  This	  cognitive	  process	  of	  searching	  for	  a	  sustainable	  
perception	  of	  veracity	  and	  stability	  is	  what	  we	  see	  in	  religious	  testimonials.	  	  Once	  stable	  categories	  
are	  perceived	  to	  have	  been	  established,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  that	  apparent	  stability	  by	  filtering	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out	  evidence	  that	  reality	  is	  in	  fact	  more	  confusing	  and	  complex	  than	  those	  categories	  allow.	  	  This	  
explains	  the	  hostility	  towards	  notions	  such	  as	  postmodernism	  and	  relativism,	  which	  are	  seen	  by	  
conservative	  religious	  believers	  as	  the	  primary	  threat	  to	  viewing	  a	  particular	  religious	  belief	  as	  
“enduringly	  true	  and	  right”	  (Piper	  2007:49,	  see	  section	  2.2	  above	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion).	  	  	  	  	  
It	  is	  also	  necessary	  for	  the	  believer	  to	  discover	  ways	  of	  re-­‐interpreting	  experiences	  and	  situations	  that	  
may	  suggest	  that	  other	  competing	  categories	  are	  right.	  	  We	  saw	  this	  again	  and	  again	  in	  the	  
discussions.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  discussion	  between	  MB1	  and	  CB1,	  one	  possible	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  situation	  of	  people	  rejecting	  Islam	  or	  Christianity	  is	  that	  they	  believe	  the	  ideas	  
underpinning	  these	  religions	  to	  be	  unconvincing.	  	  This	  interpretation	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  clearly	  
preferable	  to	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  non-­‐believers,	  and	  yet	  both	  MB1	  and	  CB1	  do	  not	  even	  consider	  it	  
as	  a	  possibility.	  	  Instead,	  MB1	  interprets	  this	  situation	  as	  evidence	  that	  people	  cannot	  handle	  simple,	  
direct	  truth	  and	  need	  to	  complicate	  and	  contort	  it	  until	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  truth.	  	  In	  contrast,	  CB1	  
interprets	  this	  situation	  as	  evidence	  that	  people	  are	  “blinded	  by	  the	  god	  of	  this	  world”	  and	  therefore	  
need	  to	  be	  saved.	  	  We	  see	  here	  that	  both	  MB1	  and	  CB1	  are	  interpreting	  situations	  in	  a	  way	  that	  best	  
supports	  their	  established	  worldviews.	  	  	  
This	  point	  overlaps	  with	  the	  related	  point	  that	  any	  experience	  that	  may	  be	  perceived	  as	  naturally	  
supporting	  the	  believer’s	  worldview	  will	  be	  foregrounded,	  and	  conversely	  any	  experience	  that	  
appears	  to	  undermine	  it	  will	  be	  backgrounded.	  We	  can	  see	  this	  in	  the	  language	  of	  MB1	  when	  he	  
observes	  that	  “the	  almighty	  reflects	  throughout	  his	  creation,	  and	  he	  points	  to	  him	  being	  the	  creator”.	  	  
This	  sentence	  only	  makes	  sense	  when	  particular	  feelings,	  intuitions	  and	  perspectives	  about	  the	  world	  
around	  us	  are	  foregrounded,	  while	  other	  aspects	  and	  possible	  conclusions	  relating	  to	  our	  current	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  world	  are	  backgrounded.	  	  This	  last	  point	  also	  includes	  the	  foregrounding	  of	  a	  
certain	  type	  of	  language	  that	  is	  viewed	  or	  felt	  to	  be	  useful	  in	  consolidating	  certainty,	  such	  as	  the	  use	  
of	  metaphor.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  metaphorical	  reference	  to	  the	  concrete	  and	  very	  unambiguous	  act	  of	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physical	  pointing	  in	  the	  above	  quote	  serves	  to	  foreground	  the	  perception	  that	  it	  is	  obvious	  that	  our	  
environment	  provides	  incontrovertible	  evidence	  of	  a	  creator.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
It	  is	  important	  at	  this	  stage	  to	  outline	  how	  these	  ideas	  contribute	  to	  the	  current	  debate	  between	  
objectivists	  and	  those	  who	  would	  argue	  that	  complex	  beliefs	  about	  our	  environment	  must	  consist	  of	  
some	  level	  of	  construal	  and	  imposed	  categorisation.	  	  As	  I	  argued	  in	  chapter	  two,	  scholars	  such	  as	  
Wisdom	  (cf.	  2000)	  and	  Mehan	  (cf.	  2006)	  are	  well	  known	  for	  their	  arguments	  that	  humans	  have	  a	  
tendency	  to	  interpret	  the	  available	  data	  in	  order	  to	  support	  their	  existing	  perspective.	  	  Cognitive	  
linguists	  such	  as	  Lakoff	  (cf.	  1999)	  and	  Goatly	  (cf.	  2007)	  are	  also	  well	  known	  for	  identifying	  how	  
metaphor	  usage	  can	  have	  both	  a	  conscious	  and	  subconscious	  role	  in	  consolidating	  an	  individual’s	  or	  a	  
society’s	  ideologies.	  	  Researchers	  such	  as	  Larsen-­‐Freeman,	  Cameron	  and	  Gibbs	  (cf.	  Larsen-­‐Freeman	  
and	  Cameron	  2008;	  Cameron	  2010c;	  Gibbs	  2011b)	  have	  foregrounded	  the	  importance	  of	  moving	  
away	  from	  a	  static,	  rigid	  view	  of	  language,	  and	  therefore	  a	  move	  away	  from	  the	  static,	  rigid	  view	  of	  
the	  attitudes	  that	  language	  can	  represent.	  	  Finally,	  work	  in	  Cognitive	  Psychology	  and	  Cognitive	  
Anthropology	  is	  beginning	  to	  highlight	  the	  importance	  and	  implications	  of	  our	  experience	  of	  the	  
world	  being	  encoded	  in	  our	  brains	  as	  episodic	  memories,	  or	  memories	  consisting	  of	  a	  connected	  
series	  of	  situations	  or	  events	  (cf.	  Barsalou	  1999;	  Evans	  2009;	  Whitehouse	  2004;	  Whitehouse	  and	  
McCauley	  2005).	  	  My	  contribution	  to	  this	  debate	  is	  therefore	  essentially	  synthetic.	  My	  aim	  has	  been	  
to	  explore	  certainty	  by	  bringing	  together	  the	  ideas	  of	  philosophers	  such	  as	  Wittgenstein	  and	  Wisdom	  
along	  with	  notion	  of	  cognitive	  models	  and	  the	  role	  of	  metaphor,	  combining	  them	  with	  both	  a	  
discourse	  dynamic	  approach	  and	  an	  approach	  that	  foregrounds	  the	  importance	  of	  experience	  over	  
theoretical	  statements	  of	  belief.	  Does	  this	  synthetic	  combination	  of	  ideas	  and	  approaches	  lead	  to	  any	  
distinctive	  conclusions	  concerning	  a	  conservative	  religious	  believer’s	  sense	  of	  certainty?	  	  I	  believe	  it	  
does.	  	  	  
First	  of	  all,	  it	  warns	  us	  that	  if	  the	  process	  of	  categorisation	  is	  to	  be	  successful	  in	  effectively	  reducing	  
anxiety,	  it	  is	  crucial	  that	  the	  individual	  over	  time	  develops	  cognitive	  models	  that	  are	  increasingly	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resistant	  and	  hostile	  to	  worldview	  change.	  	  However,	  the	  discourse	  dynamic	  dimension	  informs	  us	  
that	  some	  form	  of	  change	  and	  development	  over	  time	  in	  language	  and	  the	  way	  it	  is	  used,	  along	  with	  
the	  attitudes	  reflected	  in	  that	  usage,	  are	  inevitable	  and	  unavoidable	  (Larsen-­‐Freeman	  and	  Cameron	  
2008).	  	  Secondly,	  this	  proposed	  hostility	  to	  change	  explains	  why	  belief	  communities	  often	  attempt	  to	  
draw	  up	  a	  prescribed	  set	  of	  seemingly	  rigid	  beliefs	  and	  experiences	  that	  act	  as	  static	  membership	  
markers	  to	  a	  particular	  belief	  community.	  However,	  this	  thesis	  has	  consistently	  argued	  that	  
theoretical	  beliefs	  and	  doctrines	  are	  things	  that	  are	  easier	  to	  monitor	  by	  the	  community	  and	  
represent	  as	  static,	  as	  compared	  to	  expressions	  of	  perceived	  experiences.	  	  These	  expressions	  are	  far	  
more	  complex	  and	  fluid	  and	  therefore	  more	  difficult	  to	  monitor	  (cf.	  Tremlin	  2005:78-­‐79).	  	  This	  
suggests	  that	  there	  may	  often	  be	  a	  disconnection	  between,	  for	  example,	  an	  individual’s	  theoretical	  
statements	  of	  belief	  about	  a	  divine	  entity	  and	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  perceived	  experience	  about	  
interaction	  with	  that	  divine	  entity.	  	  Consequently,	  it	  also	  suggests	  that	  there	  will	  be	  a	  good	  chance	  of	  
clear	  unity	  between	  members	  of	  the	  same	  belief	  community	  in	  terms	  of	  theoretical	  statements	  of	  
belief,	  but	  far	  less	  chance	  of	  clear	  unity	  in	  terms	  of	  expressions	  of	  experience	  relating	  to	  those	  beliefs.	  	  
Essentially,	  what	  I	  am	  arguing	  for	  is	  the	  point	  that	  many	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  exist	  in	  a	  
state	  of	  contradictory	  tension.	  	  They	  represent	  themselves	  as	  belonging	  to	  a	  homogenous	  
community	  confidently	  and	  collectively	  drawing	  near	  to	  a	  state	  of	  impenetrable,	  anxiety-­‐free	  
certainty.	  	  However,	  if	  my	  synthesis	  is	  correct,	  they	  are	  also	  deriving	  their	  certainty	  primarily	  from	  
experiences	  that	  are	  at	  some	  level	  inevitably	  divergent.	  	  This	  would	  suggest	  that	  at	  one	  level	  
conservative	  religious	  believers	  may	  genuinely	  experience	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  certainty	  with	  regard	  to	  
their	  view	  of	  the	  world,	  while	  at	  another	  level	  they	  may	  experience	  varying	  degrees	  of	  anxiety	  over	  
the	  need	  to	  struggle	  to	  extract	  oversimplified,	  unambiguous	  levels	  of	  consistency	  from	  the	  fact	  of	  
complexity	  and	  constant	  change.	  	  This	  anxiety	  may	  account	  for	  some	  of	  the	  more	  defensive	  types	  of	  
behaviour	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  some	  communities,	  such	  as	  the	  relative	  popularity	  of	  home	  schooling	  
and	  a	  propensity	  to	  send	  ministers	  to	  study	  theology	  at	  approved	  Bible	  colleges	  rather	  than	  at	  
mainstream	  Universities.	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Having	  drawn	  together	  the	  various	  strands	  of	  this	  thesis	  and	  introduced	  the	  notion	  of	  tension	  
between	  the	  way	  the	  conservative	  religious	  believer	  perceives	  reality	  and	  the	  actual	  nature	  of	  that	  
reality,	  I	  am	  now	  able	  to	  move	  on	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  whether	  these	  findings	  have	  any	  practical	  
application	  to	  the	  area	  of	  inter-­‐faith	  dialogue.	  
	  	  
5.3	  Potential	  Applications	  to	  the	  Area	  of	  Inter-­‐faith	  Dialogue	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  strategies	  for	  maintaining	  certainty	  discussed	  in	  the	  section	  above	  may	  account	  for	  why	  
committed,	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  in	  general	  tend	  to	  be	  characterised	  by	  a	  seemingly	  
unshakable	  sense	  of	  certainty,	  but	  it	  also	  allows	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  believers	  experience	  and	  interpret	  
reality	  in	  very	  different	  ways.	  	  I	  believe	  this	  acknowledgement	  of	  key	  differences	  in	  where	  
conservative	  believers	  locate	  their	  certainty	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  inter-­‐faith	  dialogue.	  I	  
would	  want	  to	  argue	  that	  being	  aware	  of	  the	  key	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  in	  the	  language	  of	  a	  believer	  
in	  terms	  of	  experience	  and	  perspective	  can	  help	  in	  any	  attempt	  at	  meaningful	  conversation.	  This	  
would	  depend	  of	  course	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  at	  least	  one	  participant	  in	  the	  dialogue	  to	  be	  willing	  and	  
able	  to	  identify	  relevant	  patterns	  of	  emphasis,	  either	  before	  or	  during	  any	  process	  of	  dialogue.	  Pieces	  
of	  research	  such	  as	  this	  could	  therefore	  be	  useful	  in	  showing	  how	  such	  patterns	  could	  be	  identified	  
and	  how	  they	  could	  be	  linked	  to	  an	  individual’s	  core	  experience	  of	  their	  beliefs.	  	  Research	  such	  as	  
this	  could	  also	  encourage	  participants	  in	  a	  dialogue	  process	  to	  move	  away	  from	  a	  primary	  focus	  on	  a	  
list	  of	  theoretical	  points	  of	  doctrinal	  disagreement.	  	  Instead,	  they	  could	  be	  encouraged	  to	  focus	  on	  
differences	  and	  similarities	  in	  core	  experience	  expressed	  through	  action	  and	  relationship	  language.	  	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter	  I	  observed	  that	  a	  focus	  on	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  is	  no	  
guarantee	  of	  successful	  bridge	  building.	  	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  negate	  my	  central	  argument	  in	  both	  
my	  analysis	  of	  the	  testimonials	  and	  the	  discussions	  that	  action	  and	  relationship	  language	  are	  at	  the	  
heart	  of	  a	  religious	  believer’s	  expression	  of	  their	  way	  of	  believing.	  If	  there	  is	  to	  be	  any	  possibility	  of	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progress	  in	  terms	  of	  dialogue,	  any	  approach	  to	  analysing	  language	  that	  is	  able	  to	  identify	  patterns	  of	  
emphasis	  relating	  to	  core	  perceptions	  and	  experiences	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  valuable.	  	  	  	  
This	  research	  could	  also	  have	  one	  other	  key	  application	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  inter-­‐faith	  dialogue.	  	  As	  we	  
have	  seen,	  conservative	  religious	  worldviews	  hinge	  on	  clarity	  and	  rigidity	  and	  the	  unambiguous	  
perception	  of	  differences	  between	  believers	  and	  non-­‐believers	  and	  similarities	  between	  believers	  
and	  other	  believers.	  This	  need	  to	  see	  clear	  differences	  and	  the	  closely	  related	  need	  to	  separate	  from	  
those	  that	  are	  different	  often	  entail	  very	  negative	  evaluations	  of	  those	  who	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  non-­‐
believers.	  	  Any	  research	  that	  therefore	  identifies	  similarities	  between	  individuals	  from	  competing	  
belief	  communities	  and	  differences	  between	  individuals	  from	  the	  same	  belief	  community	  could	  
therefore	  be	  used	  to	  attempt	  to	  dilute	  this	  very	  rigid	  sense	  of	  oversimplified,	  binary	  difference.	  	  It	  
could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  relativizing	  of	  differences	  in	  experience	  is	  the	  most	  powerful	  strategy	  
available	  to	  an	  individual	  that	  is	  attempting	  to	  soften	  the	  divide	  between	  two	  entrenched	  belief	  
communities.	  	  As	  I	  argued	  above,	  it	  easier	  for	  a	  community	  to	  monitor	  and	  prescribe	  theoretical	  
statements	  of	  doctrinal	  belief,	  but	  it	  is	  far	  more	  difficult	  for	  a	  community	  or	  scared	  text	  to	  ensure	  
that	  perceived	  experiences	  are	  identical.	  	  	  
We	  have	  seen	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  this	  in	  the	  case	  of	  MB1,	  MB2	  and	  MB3.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  these	  two	  
Muslim	  believers,	  it	  is	  obvious	  that	  they	  share	  the	  same	  doctrinal	  belief	  in	  terms	  of,	  for	  example,	  the	  
unity	  of	  God	  and	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  Christian	  notion	  of	  a	  Trinity.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  therefore	  that	  their	  
theoretical	  statements	  about	  God	  are	  identical	  or	  at	  least	  very	  similar.	  	  However,	  their	  expression	  of	  
their	  experiences	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  God	  is	  very	  different.	  	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  my	  analysis	  of	  
the	  discussions	  in	  chapter	  four,	  MB1	  and	  MB2	  never	  make	  use	  of	  the	  term	  relationship	  when	  
describing	  events	  in	  his	  life	  that	  relate	  to	  God	  and	  makes	  no	  use	  of	  phrases	  such	  as	  came	  to	  God	  or	  
follow	  God,	  preferring	  more	  impersonal	  phrases	  such	  as	  “came	  to	  Islam”	  (MB1),	  “follow	  it	  [the	  truth]”	  
(MB1)	  or	  “follow	  the	  right	  path”	  (MB2).	  	  The	  only	  exception	  to	  this	  is	  MB1’s	  isolated	  use	  of	  the	  
phrase	  “close	  to	  God”.	  	  In	  contrast,	  MB3	  refers	  to	  the	  Qur’an	  having	  the	  purpose	  of	  guiding	  her	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“towards	  him	  [God]”	  and	  following	  the	  commands	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  in	  order	  to	  get	  “closer	  to	  God”.	  She	  
also	  talks	  about	  God	  as	  an	  entity	  that	  is	  “always	  in	  my	  heart”	  and	  uses	  the	  term	  relationship	  with	  God	  
five	  times,	  including	  the	  use	  of	  such	  intimate	  phrases	  as	  a	  “private	  relationship	  with	  God”.	  	  The	  
perceived	  experiences	  of	  MB1	  and	  MB2	  and	  the	  perceived	  experience	  of	  MB3	  appear	  to	  be	  very	  
different	  here.	  	  It	  is	  almost	  as	  if	  they	  are	  talking	  about	  two	  different	  kinds	  of	  divine	  entity	  –	  one	  
distant	  and	  more	  impersonal	  and	  the	  other	  more	  intimate	  and	  closer	  and	  more	  modelled	  on	  the	  
nature	  of	  human	  relationships.	  	  And	  yet	  these	  three	  individuals	  are	  absolutely	  committed	  to	  the	  
same	  essential	  doctrinal	  framework	  that	  involves,	  among	  other	  things,	  a	  description	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  
Allah.	  	  We	  can	  see	  now	  that	  if	  we	  focus	  on	  doctrine,	  we	  will	  be	  faced	  with	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  
homogenous	  group	  of	  believers,	  but	  if	  we	  focus	  on	  expressions	  of	  experience,	  we	  will	  inevitably	  
encounter	  extensive	  individual	  differences.	  An	  important	  avenue	  for	  further	  research	  in	  terms	  of	  
avenues	  for	  inter-­‐faith	  dialogue	  would	  therefore	  be	  to	  explore	  how	  entrenched	  conservative	  
believers	  could	  be	  made	  more	  aware	  of	  how	  the	  perceptions	  and	  experiences	  of	  their	  fellow	  
believers	  are	  not	  as	  clear	  and	  fixed	  as	  they	  may	  have	  perceived	  them	  to	  be.	  	  	  
My	  analysis	  of	  the	  discussions	  also	  highlighted	  another	  point	  relating	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  
experience	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  inter-­‐faith	  dialogue.	  	  In	  chapter	  four,	  I	  discussed	  the	  moment	  in	  
the	  discussion	  between	  MB2	  and	  CB2	  when	  they	  talked	  about	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  occasionally	  
unsure	  of	  God’s	  will.	  	  This	  part	  of	  the	  discussion	  lasted	  several	  turns	  and	  exhibited	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  
convergence,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  discussion	  as	  a	  whole	  was	  typified	  by	  doctrinal	  disagreement	  
on	  areas	  such	  as	  the	  Trinity.	  	  The	  point	  I	  am	  making	  here	  is	  that	  the	  example	  discussed	  above	  focused	  
our	  attention	  on	  the	  divergence	  between	  the	  experiences	  of	  individuals	  within	  the	  same	  belief	  
community.	  	  This	  example	  focuses	  our	  attention	  on	  how	  shared	  experiences	  can	  sometimes	  produce	  
convergence	  between	  individuals	  from	  different	  belief	  communities.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  points	  deserve	  
further	  research	  in	  order	  to	  explore	  how	  they	  could	  be	  further	  operationalized	  during	  processes	  of	  
inter-­‐faith	  dialogue.	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However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  return	  to	  the	  conservative	  religious	  believers’	  acute	  awareness	  of	  the	  fact	  
that	  any	  form	  of	  relativizing	  can	  blur	  the	  differences	  between	  belief	  communities.	  	  This	  factor	  will	  
always	  be	  one	  of	  the	  key	  reasons	  why	  such	  awareness-­‐raising	  will	  often	  (but	  not	  always)	  fail.	  	  This	  
returns	  the	  focus	  to	  the	  strategies	  for	  maintaining	  certainty	  discussed	  above.	  	  If	  the	  cognitive	  models	  
of	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  can	  only	  be	  effective	  if	  they	  are	  viewed	  as	  “enduringly	  true	  and	  
right”	  representations	  of	  reality	  (Piper	  2007:49),	  then	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  such	  believers	  will	  be	  
highly	  resistant	  to	  any	  evidence	  of	  relativism.	  At	  the	  level	  of	  the	  group,	  this	  does	  appear	  to	  guarantee	  
that	  processes	  of	  dialogue	  that	  are	  aimed	  at	  softening	  doctrinal	  views	  and	  bringing	  competing	  
conservative	  belief	  communities	  together	  will	  consistently	  fail,	  regardless	  of	  the	  language	  used.	  	  
However,	  this	  does	  not	  contradict	  my	  earlier	  point	  that	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  thesis	  could	  be	  usefully	  
applied	  to	  the	  field	  of	  inter-­‐faith	  dialogue.	  	  There	  are	  two	  reasons	  for	  this.	  	  The	  first	  is	  based	  on	  an	  
awareness	  that	  communities	  are	  made	  up	  of	  individuals.	  	  Attempting	  to	  soften	  the	  beliefs	  of	  an	  
entire	  community	  may	  be	  impossible,	  but	  building	  bridges	  with	  particular	  individuals	  who	  have	  had	  
particular	  experiences	  is	  more	  tenable.	  	  The	  second	  reason	  is	  based	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  reality	  is	  
complex,	  confusing,	  uncontrollable	  and	  ever-­‐changing.	  	  Conservative	  religious	  believers	  may	  have	  
developed	  powerful	  processes	  of	  cognitive	  categorisation	  designed	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  metaphysical	  
aspect	  of	  reality	  is	  always	  experienced	  as	  binary,	  rigid,	  and	  over	  simplistic.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  difficult	  for	  
a	  conservative	  Evangelical	  Christian	  to	  consistently	  avoid	  the	  realization	  that,	  for	  example,	  first	  
century	  Christians	  were	  very	  different	  from	  sixteenth	  century	  reformers,	  and	  that	  sixteenth	  century	  
reformers	  were	  very	  different	  from	  twenty	  first	  century	  Protestant	  Evangelicals.	  It	  is	  difficult	  for	  
them	  to	  consistently	  avoid	  the	  realization	  that	  each	  individual	  in	  their	  community,	  including	  
themselves,	  has	  different	  experiences	  and	  ways	  of	  viewing	  and	  interpreting	  those	  experiences,	  as	  
this	  thesis	  has	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  case	  of	  two	  particular	  belief	  communities.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  nature	  
of	  language	  may	  help	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  on	  one	  level,	  but	  not	  on	  another.	  	  As	  we	  have	  
seen,	  aspects	  of	  language	  such	  as	  the	  illusion	  of	  semantic	  unity	  and	  metaphor	  help	  to	  construe	  
elements	  of	  our	  environment	  as	  either	  less	  complex	  or	  less	  abstract	  than	  they	  may	  be	  in	  reality.	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However,	  our	  need,	  for	  example,	  to	  use	  terms	  such	  as	  loosely	  speaking,	  strictly	  speaking,	  ish,	  
technically,	  real,	  fake,	  or	  par	  excellence	  suggests	  that	  we	  are	  all	  aware	  that	  category	  boundaries	  are	  
not	  as	  fixed	  as	  they	  may	  sometimes	  appear	  to	  be	  (Taylor	  2003:	  63-­‐83).	  	  
To	  summarise	  my	  point	  here:	  my	  research	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  certainty	  and	  cognitive	  models	  affirms	  
that	  believers	  will	  be	  highly	  resistant	  to	  softening	  their	  positions.	  	  Whenever	  conservative	  believers	  
look	  through	  the	  propositions,	  metaphors,	  and	  metonyms	  that	  they	  use,	  their	  beliefs	  will	  always	  be	  
consolidated	  and	  strengthened,	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  feel	  self-­‐evidently	  true.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  always	  
possible	  that	  particular	  individuals	  will	  encounter	  situations	  that	  prompt	  them	  to	  look	  at	  the	  
language	  that	  they	  use,	  while	  looking	  at	  the	  language	  that	  others	  use.	  	  A	  focus	  on	  engaging	  with	  the	  
particular	  perceptions	  and	  experiences	  of	  individual	  believers	  and	  raising	  awareness	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
shifting,	  often	  category	  resistant	  nature	  of	  reality	  may	  therefore	  still	  contribute	  to	  an	  effective	  
process	  of	  dialogue	  with	  particular	  individuals	  at	  particular	  times.	  	  	  
Throughout	  chapters	  three	  and	  four	  and	  up	  until	  this	  point	  in	  my	  conclusion	  my	  attention	  has	  been	  
fixed	  on	  conservative	  religious	  believers.	  	  However,	  an	  important	  question	  to	  ask	  at	  this	  point	  is	  
whether	  my	  investigations	  into	  an	  individual’s	  sense	  of	  certainty	  could	  have	  wider	  implications	  
beyond	  the	  domain	  of	  conservative	  religion.	  	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  address	  this	  final	  consideration.	  	  	  
	  
5.4	  Applications	  beyond	  the	  Domain	  of	  Conservative	  Religion	  
In	  order	  to	  properly	  conclude	  this	  thesis,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  briefly	  discuss	  one	  last	  issue	  that	  involves	  a	  
broad	  suggestion	  for	  further	  research.	  	  I	  have	  already	  suggested	  that	  many	  of	  my	  conclusions	  in	  
chapters	  2,	  3	  and	  4	  can	  be	  arranged	  into	  a	  list	  of	  cognitive	  and	  linguistic	  strategies	  that	  are	  employed	  
by	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  their	  sense	  of	  certainty.	  	  These	  strategies	  are	  
based	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  processes	  of	  categorisation	  can	  only	  appear	  to	  be	  truly	  effective	  to	  the	  
categoriser	  if	  they	  appear	  to	  that	  individual	  to	  be	  self-­‐evidently	  correct.	  	  It	  also	  includes	  the	  points	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that	  the	  cognitive	  frameworks	  of	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  are	  able	  to	  filter	  out	  certain	  aspects	  
of	  reality,	  re-­‐interpret	  situations	  that	  appear	  to	  support	  opposing	  experiences,	  and	  foreground	  
situations	  and	  types	  of	  language	  that	  appear	  to	  support	  their	  experience	  and	  beliefs.	  	  The	  question	  
that	  this	  begs,	  along	  with	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  analysis	  in	  both	  chapters	  3	  and	  4,	  is	  how	  much	  of	  this	  is	  
totally	  unique	  to	  the	  conservative	  religious	  believer?	  	  Are	  such	  cognitive	  strategies	  employed	  by	  
more	  liberal	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  believers,	  or	  members	  of	  very	  different	  religions,	  such	  as	  Buddhist	  
believers?	  	  Could	  they	  be	  applied	  to	  how	  people	  experience	  and	  interpret	  situations	  as	  supporting	  
particular	  political	  beliefs	  or	  beliefs	  about	  certain	  groups	  or	  races	  within	  a	  society?	  	  Could	  they	  be	  
applied	  to	  how	  we	  experience,	  develop	  and	  maintain	  strong	  ideas	  about	  movies,	  music,	  or	  video	  
games?	  	  And	  finally,	  is	  it	  possible	  that	  a	  variation	  of	  these	  strategies	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  how	  
researchers,	  particularly	  within	  the	  Arts	  and	  Humanities,	  experience	  the	  world	  and	  the	  data	  they	  
draw	  from	  it	  as	  supporting	  a	  particular	  paradigm	  over	  others?	  	  The	  later	  work	  of	  Wittgenstein	  (2009)	  
and	  his	  argument	  that	  categories	  do	  not	  objectively	  represent	  the	  world	  as	  much	  as	  they	  represent	  
an	  agreement	  made	  at	  a	  particular	  time	  for	  a	  particular	  function	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  laying	  the	  
groundwork	  for	  such	  applications.	  	  Lakoff’s	  (1987)	  work	  on	  cognitive	  models	  and	  the	  pressure	  that	  
people	  feel	  to	  choose	  one	  way	  of	  classifying	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  world	  over	  another	  also	  offers	  some	  
support	  for	  extending	  the	  application	  of	  the	  model.	  	  Further	  support	  for	  extending	  some	  aspects	  of	  
the	  model	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  evidence	  gathered	  by	  the	  other	  researchers	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2.	  	  
For	  example,	  Mehan’s	  (2006:538)	  analysis	  of	  how	  a	  team	  of	  Psychiatrists	  continued	  to	  believe	  in	  their	  
basic	  premise	  “despite	  evidence	  that	  is	  presented	  to	  the	  contrary”,	  Gould’s	  (1983)	  analysis	  of	  how	  
scientists	  interpreted	  their	  data	  concerning	  human	  intelligence	  to	  support	  racist	  conclusions,	  Al-­‐
Zahrani	  and	  Kövecses	  analysis	  of	  ideological	  language	  in	  Darwin’s	  explanation	  of	  his	  findings,	  and	  
Wisdom’s	  (2000:285)	  observation	  that	  people	  tend	  to	  emphasise	  the	  pattern	  in	  the	  data	  that	  best	  fits	  
their	  model	  of	  the	  world.	  	  	  	  	  	  
My	  argument	  that	  a	  sense	  of	  certainty	  is	  primarily	  located	  in	  an	  individual’s	  experience	  would	  also	  
have	  important	  implications	  if	  applied	  to	  some	  worldviews	  outside	  of	  conservative	  religious	  belief	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systems.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  conservative	  religious	  belief,	  I	  have,	  for	  example,	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  possible	  for	  
a	  believer	  to	  theoretically	  believe	  that	  believers	  from	  other	  religions	  could	  not	  have	  a	  relationship	  
with	  God,	  and	  yet	  in	  certain	  cases	  their	  willingness	  to	  identify	  shared	  experiences	  with	  individuals	  
from	  other	  religions	  may	  suggest	  the	  opposite	  view.	  	  The	  key	  here	  is	  that	  theoretical	  statements	  and	  
expressions	  of	  experience	  may	  often	  be	  out	  of	  sync	  in	  the	  language	  of	  individual	  conservative	  
religious	  believers.	  	  However,	  in	  contexts	  outside	  of	  conservative	  religious	  belief,	  the	  opposite	  may	  
sometimes	  be	  the	  case.	  	  An	  individual	  may	  make	  theoretical	  statements	  that	  they	  are	  not	  certain	  
about	  their	  beliefs	  or	  they	  may	  make	  careful	  use	  of	  hedging,	  but	  the	  expression	  of	  their	  experience	  
may	  suggest	  that	  they	  are	  operating	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  their	  beliefs	  are	  completely	  correct.	  	  
Based	  on	  my	  argument	  that	  certainty	  is	  primarily	  located	  in	  experience,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  research	  
that	  could	  be	  related	  to	  interfaith	  dialogue	  should	  focus	  more	  on	  the	  way	  individuals	  express	  their	  
experience	  than	  the	  content	  of	  their	  theoretical	  statements.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  above	  point,	  further	  research	  in	  terms	  of	  exploring	  a	  sense	  of	  certainty	  outside	  of	  
conservative	  religious	  belief	  would	  still	  need	  to	  remain	  focused	  on	  situated	  analyses	  that	  focus	  both	  
on	  differences	  between	  belief	  communities	  and	  differences	  between	  individuals.	  	  This	  means	  first	  
looking	  for	  general	  patterns	  of	  emphasis	  in	  how	  a	  given	  group	  locates	  a	  sense	  of	  certainty	  at	  a	  given	  
time	  and	  within	  a	  specific	  genre,	  and	  then	  determining	  how	  particular	  individuals	  within	  that	  
community	  deviate	  from	  those	  general	  patterns.	  	  The	  aim	  here	  would	  be	  to	  progress	  beyond	  a	  catch-­‐
all	  critique	  of	  objectivism	  and	  the	  notion	  that	  certainty	  is	  derived	  from	  either	  being	  right	  or	  being	  
deluded.	  	  I	  would	  like	  to	  move	  towards	  situated	  analyses	  of	  how	  particular	  individuals	  from	  a	  specific	  
group	  with	  particular	  accepted	  beliefs	  forge	  their	  own	  stable,	  often	  rigid	  interpretations	  of	  their	  
environment	  based	  on	  their	  perceptions	  and	  experience.	  	  	  
What	  I	  would	  also	  need	  to	  address	  is	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  meaningfully	  compare	  the	  results	  of	  
this	  future	  research	  to	  the	  results	  of	  my	  findings	  in	  this	  thesis	  that	  relate	  to	  conservative	  religious	  
belief.	  	  For	  example,	  would	  it	  be	  more	  accurate	  to	  visualise	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  as	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operating	  with	  cognitive	  models	  that	  are	  qualitatively	  different	  from	  the	  cognitive	  models	  of	  others?	  	  
To	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  when	  we	  talk	  about	  the	  way	  conservative	  religious	  believers	  perceive	  the	  
world	  around	  them	  and	  the	  way	  other	  individuals	  do,	  are	  we	  talking	  about	  two	  completely	  different	  
cognitive	  processes?	  	  Or	  is	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  elements	  of	  these	  conservative	  religious	  models,	  
experiences	  and	  perceptions	  have	  important	  connections	  with	  the	  models,	  experiences	  and	  
perceptions	  of	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  people?	  Finding	  answers	  to	  these	  questions	  could	  allow	  applied	  
linguistics	  and	  cognitive	  psychology	  to	  further	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  fields	  such	  as	  anthropology	  
and	  theology.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  could	  also	  further	  develop	  the	  view	  that	  conservative	  religious	  
belief	  is	  a	  thoroughly	  human	  response	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  existence,	  and,	  to	  some	  extent,	  expected,	  
predictable	  and	  closer	  to	  other	  ways	  of	  interpreting	  the	  world	  than	  might	  be	  expected.	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